Judgment :- 1. These appeals arise from the common judgment in O.P. No. 6063 and 6064 of 1989, by which the learned single judge disposed of five more Original Petitions. Petitioners therein were direct recruits, who were recommended for appointment as Officers in the South Malabar Gramin Bank, in 50% of the vacancies which were earmarked for direct recruits. The learned single judge allowed the Original Petitions, directing the first respondent-Bank "to make appointments to the 50% of the vacancies strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in the Second Schedule to the Rules and while so doing, the petitioners claim must also be considered in accordance with their ranking in Ext.P2 list." 2. The appellants are the South Malabar Gramin Bank Employees Union, representing employees of the first respondent and three such individual employees. They were respondents 2 to 5 in the Original Petitions. Some of them are candidates included in the list and recommended for appointment in 50% of the vacancies, which are available for promotees in accordance with the rules. 3. The main grounds on which the appellants assail the judgment of the learned single judge are: (1) that this court has no jurisdiction to issue-a writ of mandamus directing appointment of the petitioners in the first respondent-Bank; (2) that the promotees are entitled to more vacancies since the short-fall of appointments to 50% of the vacancies from the inception of the Bank lias to be taken into account in working out the ratio between direct recruits and promotees for appointment of officers in the first respondent-Bank; and (3) that under Exts.R1(a) and R1(b), the first respondent-Bank had sought some clarifications from the Central Governments and appointments need be made only after obtaining clarifications from the Government of India and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. 4. It is necessary to refer to the basic facts. The first respondent is the Regional Rural Bank, which was organised and established by the sponsor-Bank, which was organised and established by the sponsor-Bank viz., the Canara Bank, under the Regional Rural Banks Act, 21 of 1976. Under S.29(2) of the Act, the Central Government is authorised to frame rules by notification in the Gazette of India regarding appointment and service conditions of officers and other employees of the Regional Rural Banks. The Central Government framed rules and published the same on 28-9-1988 in the Government of India Gazette. Under S.29(2) of the Act, the Central Government is authorised to frame rules by notification in the Gazette of India regarding appointment and service conditions of officers and other employees of the Regional Rural Banks. The Central Government framed rules and published the same on 28-9-1988 in the Government of India Gazette. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Regional Rural Bank has to fill up vacancies in the establishment of the Bank by three methods: deputation, promotion and direct recruitment. The methods of appointment to different categories are mentioned in the Second Schedule. The agency for selection of direct recruits to the post of officers and employees, other than those in the lower categories, is the Banking Service Recruitment Board. The procedure for such appointments are detailed in R.7 read with the Second Schedule. Category 6 in the Second Schedule is "Officers". Clause (a) provides for source of recruitment which states that 50% of appointments shall be by direct recruitment from open market and 50% by promotion from among Field Supervisors on the principle of seniority-cum-merit. The qualifications and eligibility prescribed are: "(i) For direct recruitment: (a) Graduate of a recognised University or any equivalent qualifications recognised as such by Government of India, preference will be given to Agriculture or Commerce or Economics Graduates; and (b) Proficiency in local language as may be laid down by the Board. (ii) For Promotions: Confirmed Field Supervisor with a minimum of five years service as Field Supervisor. xxxxxx XXXXXXXXXXX All vacancies in the officers cadre shall be filled up only by direct recruitment in Rural Banks which have not completed three years of existence after three year of establishment. In the case of Regional Rural Banks which have completed three years of existence after the year of their establishment but have not completed five years may be granted relaxation in favour of Field Supervisors having a minimum of three years experience in that capacity, subject to prior approval of the National Bank. If, even after the relaxation, suitable candidates are not available for promotion, the vacancies to be filled up by promotion shall be filled by direct recruitment, with a condition that the vacancies so filled will be nationally carried forward to the subsequent years till the backlog, if any, is cleared. If, even after the relaxation, suitable candidates are not available for promotion, the vacancies to be filled up by promotion shall be filled by direct recruitment, with a condition that the vacancies so filled will be nationally carried forward to the subsequent years till the backlog, if any, is cleared. Thereafter, the stipulated quota of fifty per cent from open market and fifty percent by promotion will be adhered to. 5. We are not concerned with the controversy regarding any back-log of vacancies earmarked for promotees having been filled up by direct recruits. It is the admitted case, that the vacancies which arose in the category of officers till 1987 were filled up by promotion to 60% and direct recruitment only to the remaining 40%. 6. The first question which we have to tackle is the ground urged by the appellants, that this court has no jurisdiction to direct appointment of the petitioners as officers in the first respondent-Bank. Reference is made to the following decisions of the Supreme Court: State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, AIR 1973 SC 2216, Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1984 SC 1851, State of Kerala v. Lakshmikutty, AIR 1987 SC 331, and Andi Mukta S.M.V.S. J. M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudani,1989 (2) SCC 691. We are afraid that these decisions do not render any assistance to the petitioners. In State of Haryana (supra), the Supreme Court observed, that the only fact that a candidate was eligible for consideration for appointment does not confer on him any right to claim appointment. The court observed: "The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed". It is clear from the above observations, that the Supreme Court had made a distinction between selection of eligible and selection for appointment. In Jatinder Kumar (supra), that the Supreme Court observed, that it is not obligatory for the Government to accept the recommendations of the Public Service Commission, and that inclusion of the name in the list of selected candidates does not entitle a candidate to insist on his appointment. In Jatinder Kumar (supra), that the Supreme Court observed, that it is not obligatory for the Government to accept the recommendations of the Public Service Commission, and that inclusion of the name in the list of selected candidates does not entitle a candidate to insist on his appointment. While observing, that they cannot claim as of right that the Government must accept the recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court observed: "If, however, the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. It cannot disturb the order of merit according to its own sweet will except for other good reasons viz., bad conduct or character. The Government also cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right a right to be appointed to the post which can be endorsed by a mandamus". It is clear from the above observations that the court is competent to insist that if appointments are to be made, it shall be only in accordance with the rank in the list. It is also clear that such a direction will not be beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of this court. 7. In State of Kerala v. Lakshmikutty, (supra), the question which arose for consideration was whether a person whose name was recommended for appointment as District Judge by the High Court under Art.233(1) of the Constitution of India had any legal right to claim the post, and whether the Government was bound to act on the advice of the High Court and therefore the recommended candidate can ask for a mandamus to direct his appointment. The question which arose for consideration there was as to whether the Governor could be compelled to act on the recommendations of the High Court contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers, who decided not to appoint any person included in the list prepared by the High Court. It was in that context that the Supreme Court said, that the High Court acted beyond jurisdiction in directing the Government to appoint the candidates selected by the High Court. It was in that context that the Supreme Court said, that the High Court acted beyond jurisdiction in directing the Government to appoint the candidates selected by the High Court. According to the constitutional provisions, the Governor had to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The court held, that the Government ought to have consulted the High Court effectively by communicating its views on the selected candidates. The Supreme Court therefore modified the direction issued for appointment to a mandamus requiring the State Government to communicate its views to the High Court to elicit its opinion. It also affirmed the quashing of the decision of the Government to reject the select list and re notify the vacancies. We do not understand that decision to mean that in no circumstances can a person selected/recommended for appointment seek assistance of the court for a writ of mandamus, or that the court shall be incompetent to issue such a direction. That decision turned more on the scope of Art.233(1) of the Constitution of India regarding the power of the High Court, the Council of Ministers and the Government. What the Supreme Court did was only to alter, the nature of the directions and not to hold that no direction could be issued. 8. The very question whether the court can in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution compel the Government or a public authority to exercise its discretion regarding appointment/ promotion in accordance with law had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. We need refer only to a few of those decisions, where writs of mandamus or directions in the nature of mandamus were issued. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427, State of Mysore v. C.R. Seshadri, AIR 1974 SC 460, N. K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1977 SC 251, State Bank of India v. Mohd. Mynuddin, AIR 1987 SC 1889, are a few of them. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427, State of Mysore v. C.R. Seshadri, AIR 1974 SC 460, N. K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1977 SC 251, State Bank of India v. Mohd. Mynuddin, AIR 1987 SC 1889, are a few of them. In C and AG v. Jagannathan, AIR 1987 SC 537, a Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court has held positively, that "There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Art.226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has foiled to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion". 9. We have therefore no doubt that the court has jurisdiction to insist that the first respondent should act according to the rules in effecting appointment of officers, and in doing so, it should consider the claims of persons included in the list of candidates recommended for appointment in accordance with their ranks. 10. 9. We have therefore no doubt that the court has jurisdiction to insist that the first respondent should act according to the rules in effecting appointment of officers, and in doing so, it should consider the claims of persons included in the list of candidates recommended for appointment in accordance with their ranks. 10. We also note with approval the fact that the learned single judge directed the first respondent to fill up 50% of the available vacancies of officers in view of the submission that "dearth of officers is causing considerable prejudice to the Bank's administration." The learned single judge did not direct the appointment of the petitioners. He only directed the first respondent, to effect appointment to 50% vacancies strictly in accordance with the rules and to consider the claims of the petitioners also while so doing. We do not find anything wrong, much less any defect of jurisdiction in the above direction. 11. The short-fall of vacancies earmarked for promotees seems to be based on a misapprehension that the rules are retrospective in character. They are not retrospective, either by specific recital in any of the provisions or by necessary implication. The recruitment with which we are now concerned relates to the year 1988 only, as is evident from Ext.P2 list. Those vacancies have to be filled up to the extent of 50% of the vacancies, if sufficient number of candidates are available in each group. No question of carry forward of back-log arises in terms of the rules which were promulgated on 28-9-1988. The pendency of a request for relaxation of the condition of minimum period of service for eligibility for promotion or for a provision for carrying forward the back-log of quota earmarked for promotees does not justify the submission, that the learned single judge erred in issuing the direction to fill up 50% of available vacancies strictly in accordance with the rules from candidates included in Ext.P2 list of direct recruits. 12. The last submission also cannot be accepted. The fact that in respect of matters which are covered by the rules, the first respondent has sought some. clarifications from the Government of India or the National Bank is no reason to insist that appointment under the rules should be deferred. As long as the rules are not retrospective, there cannot be any back-log in the quota for promotees. The fact that in respect of matters which are covered by the rules, the first respondent has sought some. clarifications from the Government of India or the National Bank is no reason to insist that appointment under the rules should be deferred. As long as the rules are not retrospective, there cannot be any back-log in the quota for promotees. Even if relaxation from the minimum period of service for eligibility for promotion is to be granted in favour of the promotees, none of them can aspire for appointment in any of the posts in 50% of the vacancies which are earmarked for direct recruits. As a matter of fact, none of the appellants can have any grievance against the direction to fill up 50% of, the vacancies by appointing direct recruits, since according to the rules as they stand, none of them can be appointed in those vacancies. We therefore do not find any merit in the Writ Appeals. 13. Some of the existing employees aspiring for promotion have sought impleadment. Some others have already been impleaded. Admittedly, all of them belong to or are represented by the first appellant. Shri K.M. Joseph appearing for some of them submitted that he supports the appellants and has no further submissions. The same reasons which we have given in respect of the appellants apply to these other employees also. 14. We should also note that the direction contained in the judgment does not in any manner affect the entitlement of the qualified among the employees to be appointed as officers in the first respondent-Bank in the 50% quota earmarked for them under the statutory rules. In that sense, they are not aggrieved by the judgment under appeal. The pendency of a proposal to clarify some provision in the rule does not give them any reason to assail the judgment. 15. In C.M.P. No.31376 and 31379 of 1989, the appellants had sought to. implead the National Bank and the Union of India as additional respondents. This court ordered notice on those petitions. Though notices do not seem to have been served on those additional respondents, we are of the opinion that in the nature of the contentions urged in the appeal, it is not necessary to await service of notice on or to hear those additional respondents. The appeals therefore have to be and are hereby dismissed. Though notices do not seem to have been served on those additional respondents, we are of the opinion that in the nature of the contentions urged in the appeal, it is not necessary to await service of notice on or to hear those additional respondents. The appeals therefore have to be and are hereby dismissed. Parties will suffer their respective costs.