ORDER : We have heard Dr. Chitale and the learned Attorney General. 2. This is an application for contempt for the violation of the order of this Court. In this matter, a special leave petition from the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was moved in this Court and came before a Bench of two learned Judges on 21st April, 1989. The said Judges referred the matter to the Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench on 25th April, 1989 passed an order in the petition before this Court. In the petition, the constitutionality and the validity of the resolution of the Andhra Pradesh State Assembly dated 29th March, 1989 were challenged. It was alleged that the fundamental rights of the persons named therein have been violated by making an order of detention without giving any opportunity of hearing or showing cause to the said persons. There was, it was alleged, denial of the right to be heard and deprivation of the liberty of those persons by a procedure which was neither just, fair or reasonable. In the order passed by the Assembly, breach of Art. 21 of the Constitution was alleged. Facts were there in the application, which were considered by this Court carefully, and it was found that a prima facie case for investigation of the violation of Article 21 of the Constitution was made out. The order complained of was an order of detention for 30 days and seizure of the vehicles, which were in the compound of the Assembly. In that light, it became necessary to examine whether in the action of the Legislative Assembly there was any violation of any fundamental rights of the said persons. We, therefore, issued notices on the petition for leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court which had dismissed the application under Article 226 of the Constitution in this matter. After hearing the parties and after referring to the decision of this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, 1965 (1) SCR 413 we had passed the following order : "Issue notice returnable on 18.7.1989 to the Secretary, A.P., Legislative Assembly, Hyderabad. the Superintendent of Jail, Musheerabad, District Jail, Secunderabad, Shri K.V. Narayana Rao. Government Chief whip in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Hyderabad and also to the Attorney General of India and the Advocate General of the State of Andhra Pradesh. the Superintendent of Jail, Musheerabad, District Jail, Secunderabad, Shri K.V. Narayana Rao. Government Chief whip in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Hyderabad and also to the Attorney General of India and the Advocate General of the State of Andhra Pradesh. In view of the observations made by this Court in Special Reference 1 of 1964, 1965 (1) SCR 413 at page 496, we also issued notice to Speaker of the Legislative Assembly Hyderabad which may be served through the Secretary. In view of the fact that the matter has been referred to a Constitution Bench by virtue of order dated 21st April, 1989 as the question involved is the interpretation of Article 194 (3) of the Constitution of India and in view of the principle laid down by this Court in Special Reference I of 1964 (supra at 498), we direct that the detenus mentioned at page 51 and 52 of the Paper Book at Annexure I be released forthwith and their period of imprisonment will remain suspended until further order. This order is subject to further orders of this Court and in case the Special Leave Petition is dismissed, the persons so released shall be liable to be sent back to prison to serve out the remaining sentence. 3. By the aforesaid order quoted hereinbefore we had directed "that detenus mentioned therein should be released forthwith and their period of imprisonment will remain suspended until further orders." This was an interim order passed by this Court pending the consideration of the matter. We wanted to have the assistance of all concerned including the Speaker and the Secretary of the Hopse and to give opportunity to the necessary parties. We also requested the Advocate-General of the State as well as the Attorney General for India to assist this Court in this matter. Our attention has now been drawn to the warrant of commitment issued by the Speaker dated 15.9.1989. The Warrant inter-alia, recites as follows : "AND Whereas the Supreme Court ordered for the release of the 32 prisoners on 25th April, 1989 on a Special Leave Petition filed before the said Court. Our attention has now been drawn to the warrant of commitment issued by the Speaker dated 15.9.1989. The Warrant inter-alia, recites as follows : "AND Whereas the Supreme Court ordered for the release of the 32 prisoners on 25th April, 1989 on a Special Leave Petition filed before the said Court. And whereas it is expedient to provide for certain immunities and exemptions to render it possible for per sons in possession of black money to invest the same in the said Bonds ;" Whereas the said Detenus have undergone only 29 days of imprisonment before they were released as per the decision of the Supreme Court. Whereas it is decided now to imprison them for the remaining period of one day. Therefore, LG. Narayan Rao, Speaker, Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly by this warrant of commitment direct the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad city to take the above named persons into custody and lodge them in the Central Jail, Musheerabad, Hyderabad to undergo imprisonment for one day." Pursuant to this warrant of arrest we are informed 15 persons have been arrested and taken into custody. But the warrant is pending against others, and they have not been arrested, Dr. Chitale appearing for the petitioners states that the following persons against whom warrants have been issued have not yet been arrested : 1. Sri Shabbir (5) 2. Sri Anthony Dass (6) 3. Sri Saleem (9) 4. Sri Ayub Khan (11) 5. Sri A. Ravi Babu (12) 6. Sri B. Suresh Kumar (18) 7. Sri Wascem Khan (22) 8. Sri Asif Hussain (23) 9. Sri G. Ravi (24) 10. Sri K.V. Rama Rao (25) 11. Sri M. Arvindu (26) 12. Sri G. Vijay (27) 12. Sri G. Vijay (27) 13. Sri J. Sundaram (28) 14. Sri Mohammad Hazmat (29) 15. Sri Manikya Rao (30) 16. Sri Namala Anjaiah (31) 17. Sri Shaik Afsar (32) 4. It is, therefore, necessary to consider this Contempt Petition. Sri G. Ravi (24) 10. Sri K.V. Rama Rao (25) 11. Sri M. Arvindu (26) 12. Sri G. Vijay (27) 12. Sri G. Vijay (27) 13. Sri J. Sundaram (28) 14. Sri Mohammad Hazmat (29) 15. Sri Manikya Rao (30) 16. Sri Namala Anjaiah (31) 17. Sri Shaik Afsar (32) 4. It is, therefore, necessary to consider this Contempt Petition. We may mention here that in the Ruling of the Speaker which is annexed If to this petition the Speaker has raised certain questions about the proceedings of the Court and has observed as follows : "Then how could the Supreme Court arbitrarily and without any constitutional backing venture to issue notice to the Speaker of the House to appear before the Supreme Court in person 2( or through counsel, where and from which source do they derive these powers to summon the Speaker. Is it not clear violation of Constitutional provisions transgressing their limits and if so, what are the consequences for violating the law of land. These are very serious matters and the courts cannot be left free to the able with the powers of the Legislative wing. The Parliament and Legislatures, in their own right, are supreme and not subordinate to the judiciary." 5. In the order passed by us on 25.4.1989 we had referred to the decision in the Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra). In order to find the answer to the question raised it may be worthwhile to refer to the observations of this Court in the aforesaid Special Reference 1 of 1964. There, dealing with the question challenging the violation of fundamental rights, this Court has made it categorically clear that it is the duty of this Court to examine whether there has been violation by the conduct or any other act including any of the authorities including the Legislature infringing the fundamental rights. This Court put the matter beyond doubt by observing at page 446 of the report as follows : "There is another aspect of this matter which must also be mentioned whether or not there is distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian Constitution, there is no doubt that the Constitution has entrusted to the judicature in this country the task of construing the provisions of the constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens. When a statute is challenged on the ground that it has been passed by a Legislature without authority, or has otherwise unconstitutionally trespassed on fundamental rights, it is for the courts to determine the dispute and decide whether the law passed by the legislature is valid or not. Just as the legislatures are conferred legislative authority and their functions are normally confined to legislative functions, and of the functions and authority, of the executive lie within the domain of executive authority so the jurisdiction and authority of the judicature in this country lie within the domain of adjudication. If the validity of any law is challenged before the Court, it is never I suggested that the material question as to whether legislative authority has been exceeded or fundamental rights have been contravened, can be decided by the legislatures themselves. Adjudication of such a dispute is entrusted solely and exclusively to the Judicature of this country; and so we feel no difficulty in holding that the decision about the construction of Art. 194 (3) must ultimately rest exclusively-with the Judicature of this country. That I is why we must over-rule Mr. Seervais argument that the question of determining the nature, scope and effect of the powers of the House cannot be said to lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of this Court." 6. This Court further observed that whether or not there is distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian Constitution, there is no doubt that the Judicature in this country has been entrusted the task of construing the provisions of the Constitution and safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens. This Court observed at page 454 of the said decision as follows : "Art. 226 : This Article confers very wide powers on every High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any 31 other purpose. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the language used by Art. 226 in conferring power on the High Courts is very wide. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the language used by Art. 226 in conferring power on the High Courts is very wide. Art. 12 defines the "State" as including the Legislature of such State, and so, prima facies, the power conferred on the High Court under Art. 226 (1) can, in a proper case, be exercised even against the Legislature. If an application is made to the High Court for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, it would not be competent to the House to raise a preliminary objection that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application because the detention is by an order of the House. Art. 226 (1) read by 4 (itself, does not seem to permit such a plea to be raised. Art 32 which deals with the power of this Court, puts the matter on a Still higher pedestal; the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the fundamental rights is itself a guaranteed fundamental right, and so, what we have said about 41 Art. 226 (1) is still more true about Art. 32 (1). 7. Whilst we are considering this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to emphasise that the conflict which has arisen between the High Court and the House, is strictly speaking, not a conflict between the High Court and the House as such, but between the House and a citizen of this country. Keshav Singh claims certain fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution and he seeks to move the High Court under Art. 226 on the ground that his fundamental rights have been contravened illegally. The High Court purporting to exercise its power under Art. 226 (1), seeks to examine the merits of the claims made by Keshav Singh and issues an interim order. It is this interim order which has led to the present unfortunate controversy. No doubt, by virtue of the resolution passed by the House requiring the Judges to appear before the Bar of the House to explain their conduct, the controversy has developed into one between the High Court and the House; but it is because the High Court in the discharge of its duties as such Court intervened to inquire into the allegations made by a citizen that the Judges have been compelled to enter the arena. Basically and fundamentally, the controversy is between a citizen of Uttar Pradesh and the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. That is why in dealing with the question about the extent of the powers of the House in dealing with cases of contempt committed outside its four walls the provisions of Art. 226 and Art. 32 assume significance. We have already pointed out that in Pandit Sharma (1959) Suppl. 1 SCR 806 this Court has held that Art. 21 applies where powers are exercised by the legislature under the latter part of Art. 194(3). If a citizen moves the High Court on the ground that his fundamental right under Art. 21 has been contravened, the High Court would be entitled to examine his claim, and that itself would introduce some limitation on the extent of the powers claimed by the House in the present proceedings." (Emphasis supplied) 8. This is beyond doubt as appears from the observations of this Court at page 493 of the reports. "If a citizen moves this Court and complains that his fundamental right under Art. 21 had been contravened, it would plainly be the duty of this Court to examine the merits of the said contention, and that inevitably raises the question as to whether the personal liberty of the citizen has been taken away according to the procedure established by law. In fact, this question was actually considered by this Court in the case of Pandit Sharma (1959) Suppl. 1 SCR. 806. It is true that the answer was made in favour of the legislature, but that is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the present discussion. If in a given case, the allegation made by the citizen is that he has been deprived of his liberty not in accordance with law, but for capricious or mala fide reasons, this Court will have to examine the validity of the said contention, and it would be no answer in such a case to say that the warrant issued against the citizen is a general warrant and a general warrant must stop all further judicial inquiry and scrutiny. In our opinion therefore, the impact of the fundamental constitutional right conferred on Indian citizens by Art. 32 of the construction of the latter part of Art. 194(3) is decisively against the view that a power or privilege can be claimed by the House though it may be inconsistent with Art. 21. In this connection, it may be relevant to recall that the rules which the House has to make for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution under Art. 208(1)". The aforesaid, it appears, give the answer to the question raised as mentioned above. 9. This Court made it quite clear that if a citizen moves this Court and complains that his fundamental right Under Article 21 of the Constitution has been contravened it is the constitutional duty of this Court to examine the merits of the contention. It is not a question of power but the duty of this Court. In discharge of its constitutional duty, this Court in view of the averments made in the special leave petition issued notice to afford opportunity to the respondents including the Speaker and the Legislative Assembly. 10. Having considered the facts and the circumstances and in view of the action taken in the teeth of the order of this Court prima facie we are of the opinion that there has been contravention of the order of this Court which is in the circumstances of this case was binding on all authorities. In that view of the matter we direct that the arrest of persons mentioned hereinbefore on whom warrant of arrest has not been executed will remain stayed and they shall not be arrested until the disposal of this matter or further orders of this Court. We, further, direct respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to act accordingly. To consider the question raised by the aforesaid issue of warrant and Ruling of the Speaker we will require the views of all concerned, therefore, we issue notice to respondents Nos. 2 to 5. We also direct that notice shall be issued to the Speaker of the Assembly, the Respondent 1 No. 1 who may be served through the Secretary. The Speaker can appear through his Advocate and show cause why Contempt proceedings should not be initiated against him. 2 to 5. We also direct that notice shall be issued to the Speaker of the Assembly, the Respondent 1 No. 1 who may be served through the Secretary. The Speaker can appear through his Advocate and show cause why Contempt proceedings should not be initiated against him. This notice should be sent in the form of a letter by the Registrar and will be served through the Secretary of the House. Notice is made returnable on 24-10-1989 1 Notice will be issued to the Attorney General of India and to the Advocate-General for the State of Andhra Pradesh. 11. List the matter on 24-10-1989 for further orders. Writ Petition No. 852 of 1989 : 12. Dr. Chitaie wants to delete the names of second and third respondents. Let these names be deleted on the prayer of Dr. Chitaie. Let notice be issued to respondents Nos. 1 & 4 to 7. Notice to Respondent No. 1 will be served through the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. There is an application for interim stay. Issue notice of application for stay also returnable on 24.10.1989. S.L.P. No. 900 of 1989. 13. This matter should also come up on 24.10.1989.