JUDGMENT:- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No. 56 of 1979 on the file of the Ist Additional Sub Judge, Trivandrum. The suit for specific performance of an agreement was decreed as prayed for and the defendant has filed this appeal. 2. In broad but necessarily in precise terms the shape of this case is as follows: The defendant-company is the owner of 5 acres and 2 cents of land comprised in Sy Nos. 896, 897, 898 and 911 in Sreekariyam of Pangappara village. The Managing Director of the defendant-company agreed to sell 1 acre of land out of the 5 acres and 2 cents of land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Ruppees 90,000/-. This property situate on the northern side of the public road which leads to the Government Engineering College. On 15-12-78 the plaintiff paid Rs. 10,000/- as advance amount and Ext. A1 receipt was issued by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Apart from Ext. A1, there was no separate written agreement between the parties. In Ext. A1 the description of the plot agreed to be sold is given as follows : "the plot is just behind the 1 acre of the front land". The balance amount of Rs. 80,000/- was agreed to be paid within one month from the date of Ext. A1 receipt. The plaintiff's further case is that on 28-12-1978 he paid Rs. 50,000/- to the defendant and the balance amount of Rs. 30,000/- was paid on 4-1-79 as per two cheques drawn in favour of the defendant. The defendant-company refused to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff came to know that the defendant was taking setups to sell the property to strangers. The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement alleging that the defendant committed breach of the agreement. 3. The defendant contested the suit and disputed the identity of the property. According to the defendant, the plaintiff wanted to have 1 acre of land on the northern side. The defendant further alleged that there is a pathway on the western side of the property and the 1 acre of front land referred to in Ext. 3. The defendant contested the suit and disputed the identity of the property. According to the defendant, the plaintiff wanted to have 1 acre of land on the northern side. The defendant further alleged that there is a pathway on the western side of the property and the 1 acre of front land referred to in Ext. A1 relates to 1 acre of land abutting this pathway on the western side and the plot agreed to be sold is behind this plot and not behind the 1 acre of land on the side of the Engineering College road. The defendant also contended that the company received only Rs. 60,000/- and the payment of Rs. 50,000/-, endorsed in Ext. A1, is inclusive of the amount covered by the two cheques issued in favour of the defendant. According to the defendant, the plaintiff was not willing to perform his part of the agreement and that he did not pay the balance consideration. 4. The Court below held that the plaintiff paid the entire consideration of Rs. 90,000/- and the plot agreed to be sold by the defendant to the plaintiff was 1 acre of land adjoining the plot of 1 acre of land abutting the Engineering College road. This finding is challenged by the appellant-defendant. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Rs. 90,000/- was not paid by the respondent-plaintiff. The Managing Director of the defendant-company was examined as DW1. DW1 admitted of having received Rs. 10,000/- at the time of Ext. A1 and he would state that thereafter the plaintiff paid only Rs. 50,000/- and not Rs. 80,000/-. DW1 as Managing Director of the company endorsed in Ext. A1 to the effect that on 28-12-78 a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was received by him. The defendant contended that the said amount was not in fact received by him but he received only two post-dated cheques and those cheques were dated 4-1-1979 and were encashed subsequently. Ext. X1 and X3 are the two cheques drawn by plaintiff's mother in favour of the defendant. Both these cheques are dated 4-1-1979. The defendant would contend that he received these cheques on 28-12-78 and he made an endorsement in Ext. A1 to the effect that he received Rs. 50,000/- inclusive of the amount covered by the two cheques. Ext. X1 and X3 are the two cheques drawn by plaintiff's mother in favour of the defendant. Both these cheques are dated 4-1-1979. The defendant would contend that he received these cheques on 28-12-78 and he made an endorsement in Ext. A1 to the effect that he received Rs. 50,000/- inclusive of the amount covered by the two cheques. DWI, the Managing Director of the of the defendant company, is a highly educated man and from Ext. A1 itself it is clear that the defendant company is engaged in several business enterprises. It is difficult to believe that DW1 would make an endorsement to the effect that he received Rs. 50,000/- when he received only a portion of the amount and two post-dated cheques. According to the defendant at the time when these cheques were drawn in favour of DW1, plaintiff's mother had no sufficient funds in her credit to honour the cheques. This contention is belied by the production of the extract of account by the bank as Exts. X2 and X4. Exts. X2 and X4 would show that even on 28-1-1978 the plaintiff's mother had enough amount at her credit and the contention of the defendant that post-dated cheques were issued is clearly improbable. The defendant has no case that Exts. X1 and X3 cheques were not encashed. The Court below was fully justified in finding that the defendant received Rs. 90,000/- from the plaintiff. 6. The next contention urged by the appellant's counsel is that the terms of Ext. A1 are vague and uncertain and, therefore, it is not enforceable in view of S.29 of the Contract Act. The contention of the appellant is that the description of the property to be sold is not made clear and it is so vague and uncertain. At the outset, I may point out that this plea was not raised before the Court below. No such plea was raised in the written statement. Moreover, the defendant company received Rs. 10,000/- as per Ext. A1 receipt and therefore received the entire balance consideration as evidenced by Ext. A1 endorsement and the two cheques issued in favour of the defendant. At no point of time the defendant expressed the view that the terms of Ext A1 was vague and uncertain and hence unenforceable. Moreover, the defendant company received Rs. 10,000/- as per Ext. A1 receipt and therefore received the entire balance consideration as evidenced by Ext. A1 endorsement and the two cheques issued in favour of the defendant. At no point of time the defendant expressed the view that the terms of Ext A1 was vague and uncertain and hence unenforceable. However, I am of the view that the appellant is entitled to raise this plea since it is a question of law. 7. The plea that a particular contract is, void for uncertainty under S.29 of the Contract Act is a question of law and if the terms of the contract are vague and uncertain the contract itself would be void and unenforceable under S.29 of the Contract Act and that will go into the root of the matter and, therefore, it is a plea that could be raised even at the appellate stage. This view has been exemplified by authorities in Phuljhari Devi v. Mithai Lal, AIR 1971 All 494, Keshavalall v. Lalbhai T. Mills Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 512 at page 517. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that if the terms of the contract are uncertain no evidence can be admitted to remove the said vagueness or uncertainty in view of S.93 of the Evidence Act. It is true that if any of the terms of the document is clearly uncertain and incapable of being made certain it may not be open to the parties to attempt to remove that vagueness or uncertainly by adducing other evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that a Commission was taken out in this case to identify the plaintiff's property and the Commissioner prepared Ext. C2(a) plan and he has identified the property as plot "CXJK". The Commissioner identified the plot with reference to Ext. A1 agreement. It is incorrect to say that the Commission was taken out to identify the property as the recital in Ext. A1 was too vague and uncertain. The entire 5 acres and 2 cents of land was lying on the northern side of the public road leading to Engineering College. There is a bylane on the western side of the property. This bylane is being used by people residing on the further north of the defendant's property. A1 was too vague and uncertain. The entire 5 acres and 2 cents of land was lying on the northern side of the public road leading to Engineering College. There is a bylane on the western side of the property. This bylane is being used by people residing on the further north of the defendant's property. It is an undisputed fact that the main public road is on the southern side of the property. When the parties described the property as "1 acre of front land", it clearly means 1 acre of the property lying on the northern side of the Engineering College road. It is difficult to interpret that 1 acre of front land intended by the parties was on the extreme northern side of the entire property or the property lying on the east of the western pathway. From the lie of the property and the existence of the southern public road it is clear and certain that the 1 acre of land intended to be sold was "CXJK" in Ext. C2(a) plan. It is important to note that the defendant on the date of the agreement received Rupees 10,000/- and after two months he received the balance consideration. Thus, the defendant accepted several payments towards the agreement without any protest and he acted on the agreement. At no point of time the defendant contended that the terms of the agreement are vague and uncertain and the plaintiff is not entitled to enforce the agreement. PW1, the father of the plaintiff, who acted on behalf of the plaintiff and DW1, the Managing Director of the defendant-company are well educated and they knew each other for a number of years. According to P.W.1, he visited the property several times in the company of DW1 and fully satisfied about the identity of the property. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision reported in Nair Service Society v. Palat, 1966 Ker LT 644 : (AIR 1966 Ker 311) and contended that the terms of the contract are vague and uncertain and the same cannot be enforced and the contract must be free from doubt, vagueness and ambiguity so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be supplied by the Court. That was a case in which there was a compromise between the parties as regards the quantum of damages for the removal of some trees from the suit property. As per the agreement the value of the trees had to be assessed by the Advocates who appeared for the parties in the suit. One of the Advocates refused to participate in the assessment of the value of the trees and thereafter the Court deputed a Commission to fix the quantum of compensation. The question arose as to whether the party was entitled to recover the damages as assessed by the Commissioner. The Division Bench of this Court held that the compromise between the parties was vague and uncertain and, therefore, unenforceable. The facts of this case cannot be equated with the facts of the present case. 10. In M/s. D. Gobindram v. M/s. Shami K. and Co., AIR 1961 SC 1285 there was a clause in the agreement to the effect that "subject to usual force majeure clause", the appellant contended that there was no consensus ad idem and that the parties had not specified which force majeure clause they had in mind. The Supreme Court held that since both parties agreed to this letter and the buyers confirmed it, it could not be said that there was no consensus ad idem, or that the whole agreement was void for uncertainty. In a later decision reported in Sohbat Dei v. Devi Phal, AIR 1971 SC 2192 the Supreme Court held that : "The mere reference by the plaintiff to the proposed sale of her properties to indicate the source of funds for payment of sale consideration without any suggestion that the payment depended on such sale or the absence of a term in the agreement pleaded as to what is to happen on plaintiff's failure to purchase the property are not circumstances which would render the contract void under S.29 for uncertainty". 11. Throughout the law of contract there is respect for the sanctity of contract and the need to give effect to the reasonable expectation of honest man. It is important that law ought to uphold rather than destroy apparent contracts. Solemn contracts entered into between parties are not to be readily declared invalid for uncertainty or vagueness. If the Court is satisfied that there was ascertainable and determinative intention it must give effect to that intention. It is important that law ought to uphold rather than destroy apparent contracts. Solemn contracts entered into between parties are not to be readily declared invalid for uncertainty or vagueness. If the Court is satisfied that there was ascertainable and determinative intention it must give effect to that intention. A contract will become void only when its terms are vague, uncertain and it cannot be made certain. Mere difficulty in interpretation is not synonymous with vagueness. Documents embodying business agreements should be construed fairly and broadly so as to give business efficacy. 12. From the facts in this case it is clear that the defendant agreed to sell the property "CXJK" in Ext. C2(a) plan. There was no reason for any mistake regarding the identity of the property. From the conduct of the defendant it is clear that he wanted to avoid the agreement. He disputed the correctness of the amount received by him and raised all contentions to forestall the specific performance of the contract. The Court below has rightly decreed the suit as prayed for. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.