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1989 DIGILAW 56 (GAU)

Md. Geda Shiekh v. MD. Mafizuddin Sheikh

1989-04-03

B.L.HANSARIA

body1989
The defendants are the appellants before this Court. A suit filed against them for correction of records of rights was initially dismissed by the learned trial Court, but the same came to be decreed by the learned Assistant District Judge in appeal. The defendants have, therefore, approached this Court in second appeal. 2. In assailing the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Assistant District Judge, Sari Bhattacaaryya has advanced two contentions. The first is that there was no cause of action for filing the suit and the second is that the suit is barred by limitation. 3. As to the absence of cause of action, it may be stated that tae plaintiff having found that the defendants had obtained Khatiaa in their favour daring the last Settlement Operation, they came to the Court claiming the aforesaid relief. As the final publication of the Khatian had taken place in August, 1962, it has been mentioned in para 8 of the plaint that the cause of action accrued since the end of 1962. It may thus be that after the names of the defendants were included in the finally published records of rights, they threatened dispossession which led the plaintiff to approach the Court. I am, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiff had a cause of action to approach the Court. 4. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, a perusal of the impugned judgment shows that a suit of the present nature is governed, according to the courts below, by Article 113 of the new Limitation Act whose parallel provision in the old Limitation Act was Article 120. No doubt the period of limitation under Article 113 of the new Limitation Act is 3 (three) years to be counted from the date the right to sue accrues, this period was 6 years under the old Limitation Act. It the limitation period is counted as 6 years, the suit was within time inasmuch as the final publi­cation of the Khatian was in August, 1962 whereas the suit was filed in April, 1968. 5. It the limitation period is counted as 6 years, the suit was within time inasmuch as the final publi­cation of the Khatian was in August, 1962 whereas the suit was filed in April, 1968. 5. In a situation where the period of limitation prescribed by the new Act is shorter than the period of limitation under the old Act, the suit can be filed as stated in section 30 of the new Act "within a period of 7 years next after the commencement of this Act, or within the period prescribed for such suits by Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier". Now, if the limitation is counted as 7 years from the commencement of the new Act, limitation would have been available till 1970, whereas if the limitation is counted under the old Limitation Act, the suit could have been filed within July, 1968. As the period under the old Limitation Act is shorter that would govern the present case, and as the suit was filed in April, 1968, the same was within the period visualised by the Limitation Act. 6. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it cannot be held that the suit was barred by limitation. The two contentions advanced by Shri Bhattacharyya cannot, therefore, be accepted and the appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.