JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav 1. The petitioner has challenged the order, dated 22-3- 1986 (Annexure IV) dismissing the appeal under section 33 of the U. P. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short the Act). The reasons for the dismissal are that the petitioner did not file the appeal within thirty days as provided under section 20 (1) of the Act. 2. Mr. K. B. L. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the appeal under section 33 of the Act could have been filed within thirty days from the date, the order of the competent authority, passed under section 20 of the Act, was communicated. In the present case, the said order was not communicated and there was no evidence to that effect, rather just by the fact that the petitioner has filed a statement, it has been inferred that the petitioner could have knowledge about the order passed under section 20. The relevant portion of the finding of the learned District Judge is set out as follows :- "It also shows that the orders were passed and then a notice was sent to his house and he again filed affidavit on 13-2-1980, in respect of his claim under section 20 of the Act. It is not acceptable that he did know about the order once he was taking proceedings under section 20 of the Act, he cannot all of a sudden say that he had no information. The ground is, therefore, insufficient." The learned District Judge has totally failed to notice the provision of section 33 of the Act. The provision of section 33 is that the person aggrieved from an order can prefer an appeal within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him. There is condition precedent before the limitation for preferring an appeal commences to run. It is, that the impugned order must have first been communicated to him, and, from the date of communication limitation for 30 days would run. The order appealed against was not communicated to the petitioner, hence there was no occasion for limitation to run. 3. There is condition precedent before the limitation for preferring an appeal commences to run. It is, that the impugned order must have first been communicated to him, and, from the date of communication limitation for 30 days would run. The order appealed against was not communicated to the petitioner, hence there was no occasion for limitation to run. 3. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, urged that the impugned order was correct because the delay in preferring the appeal has not been condoned and application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay has been dismissed and no sufficient ground was made out. 4. Learned counsel for the parties agreed that counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavits have been filed and the petition may be decided on merits. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, 1 am of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Section 33 of the Act provides that any person aggrieved by the impugned order by the competent authority under this Act ...... may "within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him" prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed. 5. In the present case, the petitioner has averred under paragraph 1 of the petition that he did not receive any communication about the objection being decided on any particular date. It has further been averred that he came to know about it through other sources other than usual source. Under paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been stated that the learned District Judge has rightly rejected the application under section 5 Limitation Act It has been stated that a notice was sent to the petitioner and thereafter the petitioner filed an affidavit on 13-2-1980 in respect of his claim under section 20 of the Act. In the counter affidavit nothing was stated about the knowledge of communication of the order of the competent authority against which appeal was to be preferred. The provisions of the Act and Rules are confiscatory in nature, consequently, they have to be interpreted strictly against the State unless the language of particular provision indicates otherwise. It was averred in the petition that no communication was made about the order of the competent authority, nor any order was served on the petitioner. The provisions of the Act and Rules are confiscatory in nature, consequently, they have to be interpreted strictly against the State unless the language of particular provision indicates otherwise. It was averred in the petition that no communication was made about the order of the competent authority, nor any order was served on the petitioner. Thirty days period of limitation could not commence to run unless the said order has been "communicated". 6. The mode of service of notice has been indicated under rule 5 etc., but those modes were not adopted and on assumption it has been held by the learned District Judge that there was no merit in the application under section 5 of Limitation Act. He appears to have been swayed away with the filing of the affidavit by the petitioner in a proceedings under section 20. But that affidavit was of much prior stage than decision in those proceedings. The procedure for filing an appeal commences after disposal of proceedings under section 20. Once an Order is passed the same has to be communicated to the person against whom the order has been passed. After communication the limitation of thirty days starts running. The expression "communication" has not been defined statutorily. In case no such denfition or meaning is available, the Dictionary meaning can be looked into with a view to look into the meaning in common parlance. In such matters the court has to be careful as a word is explained in the Dictionary in different sense. That meaning has to be selected which is relevant. Websteros Third New International Dictionary defines word "communicate" as follows :- to make known, inform a person, to convey the knowledge or information of. 7. According to Collins Cobuild, English Language Dictionary, the word "communicate" signifies, if you communicate another persons, it means to give them information. If you communicate an idea or feeling, it means to make them aware of it. Communication is the activity or process of giving information to other people." 8. According to Reader's Digest Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary the word 'communication' means imparting news, information given. The aforesaid meaning of word 'communicate' may be applied as required by section 33. If an order has been passed that has to be communicated to the person concerned, i.e., the petitioner has to be informed. The information about the order has to be given to that person concerned. The aforesaid meaning of word 'communicate' may be applied as required by section 33. If an order has been passed that has to be communicated to the person concerned, i.e., the petitioner has to be informed. The information about the order has to be given to that person concerned. In the present case there is no evidence on record nor it has been asserted in the counter affidavit that the order passed was conveyed or the information about the same was to be given. That information about the order passed was not given. Unless that information was given the limitation of thirty days for filing the appeal would not commence, even though the petitioner might have filed an affidavit or might have knowledge about the proceedings under section 20. 9. According to elementary rule of interpretation the words employed by the legislature under section 33 to express its intention, must be given natural meaning unless the same leads to absurdity. There is a latin Maxim "Absoluta Sententia Expositors Nonindigft" which connotes that where you have plain words of a statute, no explanation of them is required. As the information about the order was not communicated to the petitioner the limitation against him would not run, nor the appeal can be said to be time barred. As the appeal was not time barred there was no question of condoning delay by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In view of the discussion herein before mandatory requirement under section 33 of the Act have been ignored. 10. In view of the premise aforesaid, the impugned order dated 22-3- 1986 cannot be sustained. The petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned order dated 22-3-1986 (Annexure V) is quashed. The result is that the appeal of the petitioner under section 33 shall be restored to its original number and the same would be treated to be within time and would be disposed of in accordance with law. The matter has dragged on for too long what is required is expedition. It is directed that the District Judge would make it convenient to dispose of this appeal within 90 days from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. Petition allowed.