Honble N.C. SHARMA, J.—Phool Chand deceased was admittedly tenant of the respondents in a shop premises facing north and forming part of a building known as Pratap Bhawan standing on Plot No. S 4 B on Kabir Marg, Bani Park, Jaipur. He had taken this shop premises on rent on March 14, 1963 from the respondents on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. Electric consumption charges calculated on the basis of readings in electric meter and water charges on proportionate basis were payable by him besides the monthly rent. According to the respondents-landlords, the tenant, Phool Chand, had deposited with them a sum of Rs. 60/- to be retained as advance till the tenant continued to occupy the shop. Initially, the tenant paid the rent for the period March 14, 1963 to March 31, 1963 on April 4, 1963 and thereafter he started paying it monthly according to Gragarian calender month. Although, the duration of tenancy Was fixed, as ten months, but it was also agreed that whenever the landlords wanted to get the premises vacated, they could determine the tenancy by serving notice of one months duration. Irregular payments of rent were made upto the month of April 1966. Thereafter an amount of Rs. 59.60 was tendered by money order containing a remittance note that after appropriating the advance deposit of Rs. 60/- and deducting the money order commission of Rs. 0.90 paise, rent was being remitted in respect of the period from May 1, 1966 to August 31, 1966. This remittance was received by the plaintiffs on September 20, 1966 and the appropriation of the amount remitted was recorded towards the payment of rent for the months of May a.06.1966. Certain more remittances of rent were made as detailed in para 5 of the plaint which were appropriated towards payment of rent upto the end of the month of March 1967. Since the tenant had deducted money-order commissions from all these remittances made by money orders, they could not be termed as valid and proper tender of the monthly rent. Nothing was tendered or paid on account of rent in respect of the periods April 1967 and onwards. Upon these facts, the plaintiffs have pleaded that the non-tender and non-payment of rent by the deceased tenant, Phool Chand, for a period exceeding six months, as a ground for eviction of the appellants. Nothing was tendered or paid on account of rent in respect of the periods April 1967 and onwards. Upon these facts, the plaintiffs have pleaded that the non-tender and non-payment of rent by the deceased tenant, Phool Chand, for a period exceeding six months, as a ground for eviction of the appellants. Besides, Kailash Chandra, plaintiff No. 3, had passed the Diploma in Mechanical Engineering from Alwar Polytechnic in June 1967 and he was sitting idle and without employment. He reasonably and bona fide required the suit shop in order to start his workshop. It was alleged that since Phool Chand tenant used to carry on his business alone in the demised shop and since he has expired, his heirs are not legally entitled to retain the shop. Comparative hardship, in these circumstances, would not be greater to the appellants in case a decree for ejectment is passed against them and would be greater to the landlords-respondents in case such a decree is refused to them. This is the second ground upon which ejectment of the appellants from the suit premises is claimed. Although, the tenancy of Phool Chand deceased had determined by effluxion of time, yet, by way of abundant caution, the plaintiffs-landlords, by serving upon Phool Chand, a notice dated November 16, 1967 on 18.11.1967, effectively determined his tenancy on and by December 18, 1967. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the suit instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents against Phool Chand-tenant, the latter expired on June 15, 1973 and since thereafter the appellants were in possession of the suit shop and the right to sue survived against them, they were impleaded as defendants to the suit. The plaintiffs thus, claimed a decree for Rs. 292.95 as arrears of rent and money-order commission wrongly deducted by Phool Chand from the rents remitted by money orders and Rs. 1/- as cost of notice and for ejectment of the appellants from the shop in dispute. 2. Phool Chand tenant contested the suit by filing a written statement on April 16, 1968. After his death when his widow Kapoori Devi, son Rajendra Kumar and daughters Santosh Devi and Premwati were substituted as his legal representatives, they also contested the suit and filed another written statement. According to them, the amount of Rs. 2. Phool Chand tenant contested the suit by filing a written statement on April 16, 1968. After his death when his widow Kapoori Devi, son Rajendra Kumar and daughters Santosh Devi and Premwati were substituted as his legal representatives, they also contested the suit and filed another written statement. According to them, the amount of Rs. 60/-, which was deposited by Phool Chand with the respondents, was advance rent for two months and not a deposit under stipulation for adjustment on vacation of the demised premises. When the respondents deliberately did not accept rent and did not give receipt by appropriating the amount of Rs. 60/- towards rent, Phool Chand had to remit the amount of Rs. 59.60 by money order after appropriating the above amount of rent towards rent and after deducting the money order commission for the period upto August 31, 1966. According to the appellants. Phool Chand, was always ready and willing to pay the monthly rent but since the respondents avoided to accept the same, the former had to make remittances of rent by money order after deducting the money order commission. Since the respondents refused to accept the rent of the month of June 1967 remitted by money order, Phool Chand had to stop further remittances. The requirement of the suit shop reasonably and bona fide for the purposes of Kailash Chandra was denied and it was pleaded that the real intention of the landlords was to enhance the rent. According to the appellants, Kailash Chandra was employed as permanent government servant in the Overhaul Centre of Post and Telegraph Department at Jaipur and was not sitting idle. The latter had no intention to start a workshop in the demised premises. The respondents plea that the appellants have no right to continue to occupy the suit shop after the death of Phool Chand, is disputed and it is asserted that the heirs of a deceased statutory tenant have also been included in the definition of tenant as given in Sec. 3 (vii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short, hereinafter, "the Act"). It was further stated that the plaintiffs had five more shops belonging to them and, out of them, they had lately let out four shops and one shop was still vacant with them. It was further stated that the plaintiffs had five more shops belonging to them and, out of them, they had lately let out four shops and one shop was still vacant with them. Had a shop been really required for Kailash Chandra, he would have occupied the same and started his workshop. As the agreed rent of the premises was excessive, Phool Chand had instituted a suit for determination of the standard rent of the demised premises under Sec. 6 of the Act, on February 23, 1968 and had also presented therein an application for fixation of provisional rent till the determination of the standard rent. 3. It may be mentioned that both the landlords and tenant Phool Chand made applications before the trial Court under Sec. 13 (4) of the Act for determining the arrears of rent due against Phool Chand and for issuing directions to him to deposit the same in court. The trial Court determined a total amount of Rs. 542.50 as arrears of rent, interest and the amount which Phool Chand had deducted as money order commissions and directed the tenant to pay to the landlords or to deposit the same in Court by November 6, 1968. This amount was deposited by the tenant, Phool Chand in time. 4. Now, a brief narration regarding suit for determination of standard rent of the demised premises instituted by Phool Chand tenant. That suit was instituted on February 23, 1968. In that suit provisional rent of the premises was fixed as Rs. 25/ per month. Munsiff, Jaipur City (West), by his decree dated October 31, 1974, determined the standard rent of the premises as Rs. 30/per month which, it is to be noted, was also the agreed rate of rent. Rajendra Kumar and Smt. Kapoori Devi, respectively son and widow of deceased tenant Phool Chand filed Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1979, against the decree of the Munsif, Jaipur City (West) and one of the contentions put forward by these persons before the appellate Court was that the Munsif had not fixed any date in his decree with effect from which the standard rent fixed would come into force. The Additional District Judge No. 4, Jaipur City, who decided the said appeal on August 2, 1979, modified the decree of Munsif, Jaipur City (West) and fixed October 31, 1974 as the date from which the standard rent determined at Rs. 30/- per month would have effect. Landlords filed a revision before this Court and it was urged on their behalf that the first appellate Court had not made it clear as to at what rate the landlords would be entitled to receive rent in between Feb. 23, 1968 and Oct. 30, 1974. For obvious reasons, the revision petition filed by the landlords was summarily dismissed on February 7, 1980 by this Court stating that when standard rent had been fixed at Rs. 30/- per month from October 31, 1974, that meant that the landlords would be entitled to receive rent at the agreed rate prior to October 31, 1974 which was also Rs. 30/- per month. 5. Reverting to the ejectment suit, out of which this second appeal arises, the Additional Civil Judge, Jaipur City, after trial, held that Phool Chand had executed the rent-note dated March 14,1963, in favour of the plaintiffs-landlords and the tenancy was later on started from the first day of every month. The rent note Ex. 1 was held to be admissible in evidence. As to the determination of tenancy, it was held that the same determined by effluxion of time of 10 months and even otherwise it was validly determined by one months notice as stipulated in the rent note. On the question of defaults in the payment or tender of rent by the tenant, the trial Court held that with respect to the amount of Rs. 60/, it was, clearly stipulated in respect that this advance payment of rent will remain under deposit with the landlords tile the tenant vacated the demised premises. The tenant was, therefore not entitled to appropriate this amount of rent towards the rent due for the months of May a.06.1966 while remitting the amount of Rs, 59.10 by money order. Thus, when the plaintiffs had instituted the suit, the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the rent of six months which was a ground of ejectment furnished by Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. Thus, when the plaintiffs had instituted the suit, the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the rent of six months which was a ground of ejectment furnished by Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. Apart from that the tenant had not always regularly deposited rent month by month in Court by the fifteenth of the succeeding month as required by Sec. 13 (4) of the Act. When the provisional rent was fixed at Rs. 25/ per month in the standard-rent suit, the tenant deposited rent at that rate but when the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 30/- per month, he did not deposit the deficit amount at the rate of Rs. 5/per month in respect of the period from September 1, 1968 to October 31,, 1974. Consequent to these non-compliances of second part of the provision contained in Section 13 (4) of the Act, the defence of the defendants was liable to be struck off under Sec. 13 (5) of the Act and they were not entitled to the protection afforded by Sec. 13 (4) of the Act. On the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the landlords, the trial Court held that Kailash Chandra plaintiff intended to start machinery work and for that purpose he needed the suit premises reasonably and bona fidely. On the question of comparative hardship, it was found that Rajendra Kumar defendant was doing service and he had also a shop in the name of his daughter in Jawahar Nagar, Jaipur where business in cement is being carried on. The defendants have, thus, alternative accommodation as well as means with them and, therefore, comparative hardship would be greater to the landlords in case decree for ejectment is refused to them. The trial Court under issue No. 7A framed by it held that the demised premises had been taken on rent from the plaintiff by Phool Chand and that he alone was carrying on business in it. So far as his son Rajendra Kumar is concerned, he is in service. The licence was also in the name of Phool Chand alone and it was only with effect from January 1, 1976 that licence was got changed in the name of Vimal Kumar. It was held that the defendants were not carrying on business along with deceased Phool Chand till the death of the latter or members of his family. The licence was also in the name of Phool Chand alone and it was only with effect from January 1, 1976 that licence was got changed in the name of Vimal Kumar. It was held that the defendants were not carrying on business along with deceased Phool Chand till the death of the latter or members of his family. On the basis of these findings, the trial Court, on November 21, 1978, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises. 6. Aggrieved by this decree, the appellants filed Civil First Appeal No. 261/1978, in the Court of District Judge, Jaipur City, which was heard and dismissed by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City on August 24, 1983. Before the first appellate Court, the appellants challenged the findings of the trial Court on issues relating to defaults in payment, tender and deposit of rent, reasonable and bona fide necessity of the suit premises for the purpose of Kailash Chandra, comparative hardship in refusing and granting of decree of ejectment and the non-carrying of business by the appellants along with, deceased tenant, Phool Chand, till latters death. The first appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court on first three matters, just above mentioned, but upheld the findings of the trial Court on issue No. 7A. On the question of defaults, the first appellate Court held that in the standard rent suit. provisional rent was fixed at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month which had been deposited in Court by the defendants. In the standard rent suit, the first appellate Court had specified October 31, 1974 as the date from which the standard rent determined by the Munsif, Jaipur (West) at Rs. 30/- per month would take effect. The landlords filed a revision petition against the appellate decree in this Court and this Court had passed orders in revision without any notice to the defendants and consequently the defendants did not commit defaults in deposit of rent month by month in trial Court as required by Sec. 13(4) of that Act. So far as rent for the month of June 1976 was concerned, its tender was presented in Court on July 16, 1976 and deposit was made on July 17, 1976 as Advocates were on strike at Jaipur on July 15, 1976. So far as rent for the month of June 1976 was concerned, its tender was presented in Court on July 16, 1976 and deposit was made on July 17, 1976 as Advocates were on strike at Jaipur on July 15, 1976. It could not, therefore, be held that deposit of rent of the month of June 1976 was not made within the prescribed time. On the question of personal necessity, it was held that Kailash Chandra plaintiff was in service in Indian Post and Telegraph Department and, therefore, he does not reasonably and bona-fide require the suit premises for his use and occupation. As to comparative hardship, as Kailash Chandra was in service, no question of hardship to the plaintiff arises. Similarly, there was no hardship to the defendants as his son Rajendra Kumar did not carry on any business in the suit shop. Coming to issue No. 7A, the first appellate court held that Rajendra Kumar son of the deceased tenant Phool Chand was in service for the last 15 years and that Phool Chand, during his life time, was carrying on his business in the shop as sole proprietor. According to the first appellate Court, Phool Chand was holding statutory tenancy which was not heritable. Even after the amendment of the Act in the year 1975, the defendants did not become tenant of the plaintiffs within the meaning extended to that term by Sec. 3 (vii) (b) of the Act. So far as Vimal Kumar is concerned, his age was only 10 or 11 years at the time of the death of Phool Chand and moreover he was not a heir of the deceased in accordance with personal law applicable to the deceased and he was also not ordinarily carrying on business with the deceased in the suit premises as member of his family upto his death. Thus, although the first appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court on issues No. 3, 4, and 7B framed in the suit, but in view of its affirming the findings on issue No. 7A, it dismissed the first appeal filed by the appellants. The defendants and Vimal Kumar have come in second appeal to this Court and the landlords have filed cross-objections against the findings on issues No. 3, 4 and 7B given by the first appellate Court against them. 7. The defendants and Vimal Kumar have come in second appeal to this Court and the landlords have filed cross-objections against the findings on issues No. 3, 4 and 7B given by the first appellate Court against them. 7. It may be mentioned that in their grounds of appeal filed on November 14, 1983, the appellants attacked the decree of the first appellate Court mainly on the ground that the said court has not correctly interpreted the provisions regarding statutory tenant as given in Section 3 (vii) of the Act and has erred in not holding the appellants to be statutory tenants despite the fact that Rajendra Kumar was sitting on the shop with his deceased father in the morning and evening and Vimal Kumar, grand-son of Phool Chand, deceased was also carrying on business along with Phool Chand in the shop upto his death and substantial questions of law were also framed in that light in para 7 (f) (i) to(iii) of the grounds of appeal. Mr. B.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand V. Jeevan Kumar and others (1) had not been delivered when this second appeal was filed and that in Smt. Giandevi Anands case, five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has now authoritatively laid down that the tenant even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and that the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable. Accorrdingly, the learned counsel contended that on the death of the statutory tenant Phool Chand, the appellants stepped into the position of Phool Chand and all the rights and obligations of the deceased tenant Phool Chand including the protection afforded to the said deceased tenant under the Act devolved on the appellants as heir of deceased statutory tenant Phool Chand. It was urged that the view expressed to the contrary by the Supreme Court in its decision in Ganpat Ladha Vs. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde (2) did not lay down the correct law and was expressly overruled in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (Supra). The learned counsel also relied and referred to the decision in Damadi Lal vs. Parashram (3) and in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Vesodai Ammal (4) in support of his contention. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde (2) did not lay down the correct law and was expressly overruled in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (Supra). The learned counsel also relied and referred to the decision in Damadi Lal vs. Parashram (3) and in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Vesodai Ammal (4) in support of his contention. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents-landlord urged that Phool Chand was a statutory tenant and he had died on 15.6.73 i.e. before the definition of "tenant" was enlarged by the Amending Act of 1975 in this State and that statutory tenancy was not heritable. It was contended that it has been found as a fact that the appellants are not tenants within the extended definition given in the expression in Sec. 3 (vii) (b) even by the Amending Act of 1975. 8. In support of his cross-objections, Mr. Satish Chandra Agrawal, learned counsel for the landlords, urged that the appeal has not been properly constituted in as much as Vimal Kumar appellant No. 4 was neither a party in the suit and nor in the first appeal and he has been wrongly impleaded as one of the appellants. It was next contended that the defendants had not deposited in court rent month by month under section 13 (4) of the Act within the time prescribed by that provision and therefore they were not entitled to the benefit of protection conferred by section 13 (6) of the Act. The learned counsel also challenged the findings of the first appellate Court on issues relating to reasonable and bona-fide requirement of the premises for the purpose of Kailash Chandra and comparative hardship. It was urged that Kailash Chandra was a diploma-holder in Mechanical Engineering and he could not be expected to sit idle for so many years in the hope of availability of the shop till the eviction decree was passed and executed. The learned counsel submitted that Kailash Chandra had been employed as a temporary clerk in Post and Telegraph Department. He cannot be denied to have his shop to open a workshop and he cannot be expected to go on continuing with his clerical job which is insufficient to maintain himself and his family. The learned counsel submitted that Kailash Chandra had been employed as a temporary clerk in Post and Telegraph Department. He cannot be denied to have his shop to open a workshop and he cannot be expected to go on continuing with his clerical job which is insufficient to maintain himself and his family. On the question of comparative hardship, it was urged that on the one hand, there was a qualified diploma-holder in Mechanical Engineering who is under-jobed on a clerical post and on the other hand, Phool Chand, who was a sole proprietor of the business carried on in the shop, has died and his only son Rajendra Kumar is already employed and was not doing business in the shop, comparative hardship in these circumstances, it was contended, was greater to the landlords. The learned counsel, thus, urged for reversal of the findings of the first appellate court on issues No. 3,4 and 7B and for maintaining and restoring the decree of the trial Court, on the basis of these grounds, of ejectment pleaded and pressed by the landlords as well. Learned counsel for the appellants supported the findings of the first appellate Court on issues Nos. 3, 4 and 7B in his reply to cross-objections. 9. It was plaintiffs case that duration of tenancy of Phool Chand was for 10 months and it determined by effluxion of time on January 14, 1964 and in any event by its determination by notice to quit on December 18, 1967 and issue No. 5 pertaining to it was decided by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiffs. Findings on issue No. 5 given by the trial Court were neither challenged by the appellants before the first appellate Court and nor before this Court. Findings on issue No. 5 given by the trial Court were neither challenged by the appellants before the first appellate Court and nor before this Court. Section 3 (vii) of the Act defined the term "tenant" and the definition of this term, as it stood upto the death of Phool Chand on June 15, 1973, read as under- "Tenant" means the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is, or, that for a contract express or implied would be payable for any premises to his landlord including the person who is continuing in its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree for eviction passed under the provisions of this Act." Thus, the term "tenant" upto the death of Phool Chand on June 15, 1973 and even upto the time the Act was amended in 1975 meant and included both the contractual tenant as well as the statutory tenant. Phool Chand was the person who was continuing in possession of the premises in suit after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree for eviction passed under the provisions of the Act and was statutory tenant in any event from December 18, 1967 till his death on June 15, 1973. 10. Statutory immunity from eviction even after the lease has expired except on specific grounds mentioned in Rent Restriction Acts is one of the characteristics of a statutory tenant. In such circumstances, acceptance of rent by the landlord from a statutory tenant, whose lease has already expired, could not be regarded as evidence of a new agreement of tenancy and it would not be open to such a tenant to urge, by way of defence, in a suit for ejectment brought against him, under the provisions of Rent Restrictions Act that by acceptance of rent a fresh tenancy was created which had to be determined by a fresh notice to quit (see Davies V. Bristow, (5), Morrison V. Jacobs (6) and observations of B.K. Mukherjea J., in Kai Khushroo vs. Bai Jerbai (7) in this connection. 11. Before lull Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Prasad Bose vs. Smt. Sarajubala Dossi (8), Mr. Janah, counsel for the landlords, advanced his arguments in this manner; "He does not know who a statutory tenant is for the 1950 West Bengal Act does not speak of a statutory tenant. 11. Before lull Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Prasad Bose vs. Smt. Sarajubala Dossi (8), Mr. Janah, counsel for the landlords, advanced his arguments in this manner; "He does not know who a statutory tenant is for the 1950 West Bengal Act does not speak of a statutory tenant. The conception of statutory tenancy is imaginary and unreal. He is a phantom tenant". His Lordship Bachawat J. (as he then was), in a persuasive manner explained to Mr. Janali:- "Now a "statutory tenant" is a convenient name for a person who after his contractual tenancy of the premises has expired retains possession of the premises by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Control and Tenancy Acts (see observations of Lord Reid in Baker v. Turner 1950 A.C. 401 at 436. The Act gives protection to an ex-tenant from eviction and regulate his status. In the context of the Act the word "tenant" includes the ex-tenant and the word "rent" includes the periodical sum payable by the ex-tenant. In the Rent Control and Tenancy Acts these words are not used in a narrow technical sense (see Reman v. City of London Real Property Co. Ltd. 1921 1 KB 49. The concept of statutory tenancy is not known to the Transfer of Property Act. The statutory tenancy is a creation of the Rent Control and Tenancy Act and we must look at the Act which creates the tenancy to find out what its incidents are. The Rent Control and Tenancy Acts create a special world of their own. They speak of life after death. The statutory tenancy arises phoenix like out of the ashes of the contractual tenancy. The contractual tenancy may die but the statutory tenant may live long thereafter... However, described the statutory tenant is a real person having real rights. He is neither a contractual tenant nor a trespasser. He is a person having special rights and hearing the special name by a statutory tenant. We cannot ignore him. We must grapple with him as a reality and look at the Act under which he claims protection to find out what his rights are......He has the right to retain exclusive possession of the premises as long as he complies with the provisions of the Act. We cannot ignore him. We must grapple with him as a reality and look at the Act under which he claims protection to find out what his rights are......He has the right to retain exclusive possession of the premises as long as he complies with the provisions of the Act. He can actively enforce this right and even maintain an action of trespass against the landlord (See Marcroft Wagons Ltd. V. Smith, 1951 KB 496 at 501." 12. The concept of "statutory tenancy" has not been kindly received and has been described with same degree of vituperation. It has been described as something of a "jurisprudential curiosity" and the position of a statutory tenant has been described as "an anomalous legal entity" (See Shuter v. Hersh (9). 13. In older English law, there was a special form of trespass, de ejec-tione firmae, at the instance of a lessee against any one who had ejected him from his term of years. Initially, it gave him damages only, but from the fifteenth century it enabled him to recover his term also and later this enabled ejectment to use instead of most of the old forms of real action to try a question of title to the freehold of land. Thus, when two persons had to try the title to a piece of land, one of them fictionally leased it to the imaginary John. Doe and the other to the imaginary Richard Roe or William Styles. One lessee was said to have ejected the other and the court, in the guise of trying the rights of the lessees, determined the rights of the lessors. The real plaintiff appeared as lessor and the action was entitled Doed Bloggs V. Snooks, i.e. Deo on the demise by Bloggs. In the seventeenth Century the lessee replaced the fictions Richard Roe or William Styles as defendant, having been fictitiously asked by Roe or Styles to defend his interest. In 1852 John Deo was abolished by statute and in 1875 the whole form of action was abolished. Ejectment developed subsequently into a mode of trying the title to land and gradually usurped the place of all the other real and mixed actions for the recovery of corporeal hereditaments. All the forms of action (real, personal or mixed) were abolished by the statute in the mid-nineteenth century, finally by the judicature Act, 1875. Ejectment developed subsequently into a mode of trying the title to land and gradually usurped the place of all the other real and mixed actions for the recovery of corporeal hereditaments. All the forms of action (real, personal or mixed) were abolished by the statute in the mid-nineteenth century, finally by the judicature Act, 1875. But while they lasted the forms of action profoundly influenced the development of the substantive law and even yet have not wholly lost their importance. 14. The relationship of landlord and tenant was originally one of contract only, but from early times the contract conferred an estate in the land on the tenant without losing all its contractual characteristics (see National Carriers Ltd. Vs. Panalpina (Northna) Ltd. (House of Lords) (ii). In England a tenant who, with the land-lords consent, remains in possession after his lease has expired is tenant at will until some other interest is created and the person who enters on land by a lawful title and after his little has ended continues in possession without any statutory authority and without obtaining the consent of the person then entitled is said to be tenant at sufference. A tenancy at will, whether created expressly or by implication is not a tenancy within the meaning of that term in the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, Sec. 69 (1), for the purpose of the provision of that Act giving security of tenure for business, professional and other tenants (see Wheeler v. Mercer (House of Lords) (11). Whether it is for a term of years or from year to year, a tenants interest in the demised property vests, on his death in his personal representatives. A lease may only be determined in one of certain recognised way. that is by (1) effluxion of time (2) notice to quit (3) exercise of an option to determine (4) operation of a condition subsequent (5) forfeiture (6) surrender (7) merger (8) disclaimer (9) application to the county court in the case of derelict land (10) application to Magistrates in the case of deserted premises (11) compulsory purchase (12) operation of the Housing legislation (13) enlargement under the Law of Property Act, 1925 (14) exercise of landlords statutory power to determine the lease on tenants conviction for knowingly permitting the premises to be used as a brothel and failure hereafter to assign and (15) frustration. 15. 15. The first protection, afforded generally to business tenants, was conferred as a temporary measure by the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1951, whilst a more permanent code was preferred for their protection. The Code was embodied in Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (Section 23 to 46). The protection given to business tenants takes the form of continuing the tenancy automatically while it is terminated by certain steps being taken like notice in the prescribed form and by giving the tenant a right to apply for a new tenancy. A tenant who is refused a new tenancy on certain ground is enable to obtain a limited amount of compensation. The legal effect of the statutory continuance of business tenancy is fundamentally different in England from that of the creation of statutory right of occupancy under the Rent Act, 1977 for a statutory tenant under that Act. Such a statutory tenant under the Rent Act, 1977 has no estate but only "status of irremovability", but a business tenancy under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, the common law tenancy is continued with statutory variation as to the mode of determination, so that an estate in land, and not a mere status is enjoyed by the tenant (see Weinbergs Weather proofs Ltd. Vs. Radcliffe Paper Mills Co. Ltd. (12) and William Skelton and Son Ltd. V. Harrison and Pinder Ltd. (13). 16. Series of Acts were passed in England since the time of the 1914-18 war to mitigate hardship to tenants from a scarcity of housing as "the Rent Act". The first Rent Act was the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1915, which applied to unfurnished dwelling houses at the ratable value or rent by which at the out break of the 1914-18 War did not exceed £ 35 in the Metropolitan Police District or the City of London or £ 26 elsewhere. This Act froze rent at the level obtaining on August 14, 1914 and prohibited charge of premium and making of orders for possession of such house except on certain stated grounds. Then came the increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Act, 1920 and it continued upto the year 1968. This Act froze rent at the level obtaining on August 14, 1914 and prohibited charge of premium and making of orders for possession of such house except on certain stated grounds. Then came the increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Act, 1920 and it continued upto the year 1968. This Act by defining "tenant" so as to include the tenants widow or another member of his family residing with him, at the time of his death, the Act created what are known as statutory tenants by succession. The "statutory tenancy" was not however used in the Act, which was expressed to apply to the house rather than the tenancy, nor did it expressly provide that a tenant should only be entitled to security of tenure after the end of his contractual term if he continued to Occupy the demised house as his residence. This principle is commonly known as the rule in Skinner v. Geary (14). It did not receive statutory expression until the Rent Act, 1968, which in Sec. 3 (2) expressly adopted the existing case law. Until then the principle was entirely judge-made law (see Rabson v. Headland (15) Per Tucker L.T and Parkin v. Scott (16) per Harman LJ. The line of decision elucidating this principle has been called "courageous" (see Carter V. S.U. Carburettor (17) per Lord Greene MR) and said to amount of judicial legislation. 17. Then followed the de-control between the peace period during two wars. On the out-break of Second World War, all remaining forms of decontrol were stopped and large number of new premises were subjected to control by the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939, which Act was repealed by the consolidating Rent Act of 1969. Rent Act, 1968 applied to the tenancy and not to the dwelling house as had the Acts of 1920 to 1939. Under the Rent Act, 1965 persons holding over after the termination of tenancy before 8.12.1965 of tenancies which would have been regulated had the Rent Act, 1965 then been in force became statutory tenants. According to the provisions contained in the Rent Act of 1977, a tenancy under which a dwelling house (which may be a house or part of a house) is let as a separate dwelling is a protected tenancy for the purpose of the Rent Act. According to the provisions contained in the Rent Act of 1977, a tenancy under which a dwelling house (which may be a house or part of a house) is let as a separate dwelling is a protected tenancy for the purpose of the Rent Act. Protected tenancy included both regulated and controlled tenancies but only during their contractual, not their statutory, period. After the termination of a protected tenancy of a dwelling house the person who, immediately before the termination was the protected tenant of the dwelling house is, if and so long as he occupies the dwelling house as his residence, the statutory tenant of it. All statutory tenancies are now regulated tenancies with effect from November 28, 1980 i.e. the date of the commencement of the Housing Act, 1980. For the purpose of the Rent Act, 1977 a "regulated tenant" is a protected or statutory tenancy where a contractual regulated tenancy is followed by a statutory tenancy of the same dwelling house, the two are to be treated for all the purpose of that Act as together constituting one regulated tenancy (See Sec. 18(2), Rent Act, 1977). These provisions are subject to the rule that a tenancy cannot be regulated if the tenant occupies any part of the premises for the purpose of a business carried on by him. 18. If the original protected or statutory tenant of a dwelling house dies leaving a surviving spouse who was residing in the dwelling house immediately before the death, the surviving spouse becomes the statutory tenant if and so long as he or she occupies the dwelling house as his or her residence. If the original tenant leaves no such surviving spouse, a person who was a member of his or her family and was residing with him or her at the time of and for six months immediately before the death becomes the statutory tenant if and so long as he occupies the dwelling house as his residence. A person who becomes the statutory tenant by virtue of these provisions is called "the first successor". Subject to certain exceptions, the surviving spouse of the first successor or a member of his or her family may succeed to his tenancy subject to the same condition, but no further succession is possible after that. A person who becomes the statutory tenant by virtue of these provisions is called "the first successor". Subject to certain exceptions, the surviving spouse of the first successor or a member of his or her family may succeed to his tenancy subject to the same condition, but no further succession is possible after that. That is how the laws of statutory tenants and statutory tenancies have developed and reached to the present stage in England. 19. A statutory tenancy in England has no estate or property as tenant, but merely a persona) right to retain possession of the property which has been described as a "status of irremovability" (See Reo V. Russel (18). It follows that (l) a limited company, not being capable of personal residence, cannot be a statutory tenant, (2) a statutory tenant has no interest to assign or transmit by will or to his trustee in bankruptcy, (3) a purported sub-letting of the whole of the premises by a statutory tenant is a nullity, but a statutory tenant may sub-let part of the premises so as to the sub-tenant protection against the head land-lord; (4) there cannot be statutory tenancy where residence is not possible because the dwelling house has been destroyed or so damaged as substantially to have ceased to exist, and (5) there cannot be a statutory tenancy unless at the time when the contractual tenancy comes to an end the person in whom the tenancy is vested is residing in the dwelling house except where the absence is purely temporary or the tenant has always intended to return. The matter relating to succession to a statutory tenancy in England has already been narrated above. 20. Coming to the development of law on the point in India, the first decision is in the case of Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others (19) wherein Shah J. speaking for the Court, stated that where tenancy of a tenant is determined by efflux of time and subsequent occupation by him was not in pursuance of any contract express or implied, but was by virtue of the protection given by the successive statutes, the occupation did not confer any rights upon the tenant and was not required to be determined by a notice prescribed by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The statute protects his possession so long as the conditions which justify a lessor in obtaining an order of eviction against him do not exist. Once the prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court is removed, the right to obtain possession by the lessor under the ordinary law springs into action and the exercise of the lessors right to evict the tenant will not, unless the statute provides otherwise, be conditioned. 21. The matter directly came for consideration in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. Vs. Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi and other (20). In this case, the High Court had dismissed the appeal of sub-tenants against refusal to grant interim injunction against the landlord of the property holding that a "statutory tenant" remaining in possession after determination of his contractual tenancy was in law riot competent to sub-let the premises in whole or in part and a person claiming to be a sub-tenant from a "statutory tenant" could not effectively plead the protection of Section 14 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, as amended by the Ordinance III of 1959 or Bombay Act 14 of 1959. Shah J. delivering the majority judgment (A.K. Sarkar J. dissenting observed : "A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a "statutory tenant". Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute is that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases,if any, and performs the other conditions of tenancy. His right to remain in possession of the contractual tenancy is personal; it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The light of a lessee from a landlord, on the other hand, is an estate or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sub-let by him...... The light of a lessee from a landlord, on the other hand, is an estate or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sub-let by him...... Section 12 (1) of the Bombay Act merely recognised his right to remain in possession so long as he pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases and performs the other conditions of tenancy, but not the right to enforce the terms and conditions of the original tenancy after it is determined... Bombay Act merely grant conditional protection to a statutory tenant and does not invest him with the right to enforce the benefit of any of the terms and conditions of the original tenancy". 22. A.K. Sarkar J. in his dissenting judgment observed— It is to be remembered that there is no authority for the proposition that a statutory tenant has no interest in the demised premises and this is at the basis of the theory, which I think is misconceived, that a statutory tenant cannot transfer his tenancy. It is true that he has no estate or property in the demised premises, but that is a different matter. He has none-theless an interest, a right in the premises occupied by him, which he may be empowered to transfer. Lastly, I am unable to agree that because a statutory tenant cannot transfer, assuming that to be so, that would show that the word "tenant" in cl. (e) must be understood as referring to a contractual tenant only." 23. In Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd. and another Vs. Happy Homes (Private) Ltd. (21), Shah J. reiterated the majority view in Anandji Niwas Private Ltd. case (Supra) and relied upon the decision in Soloman v. Orwell (22). 24. Directly a case governed by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, came for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in J.C. Chatterjee and Ors. Vs. Shri Kishan Tandon and others (23) and his Lordship D.G. Palekar J., speaking for the Court, followed the decision in Anandji Niwas Private Ltds case and observed:- "In our opinion, rent was not payable by the legal representatives... Vs. Shri Kishan Tandon and others (23) and his Lordship D.G. Palekar J., speaking for the Court, followed the decision in Anandji Niwas Private Ltds case and observed:- "In our opinion, rent was not payable by the legal representatives... Indeed, if the original tenant had died before the contractual tenancy had been terminated then the heirs would have inherited the tenancy and in that sense the rent would have become payable by them. But, that is not the position here. When B.N. Chatterji died, he was only statutory tenant with a personal right to remain in possession till eviction under the provisions of the Act, and the heirs were incapable of inheriting any estate or interest in the original tenancy. It was also not shown to us that they fell within any other part of the definition of "tenant" reproduced above. Therefore, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased B.N. Chatterji could not in their own right claim to be "tenant" within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the only contention that they could put forward in the appeal were the contentions appropriate to their representative character and not one which was personal to the deceased. The contention based on the ground of bona fide requirement by the landlord was personal to the statutory tenant and on his death the same is not open to his legal representatives unless there is anything in the provisions of the Act which makes the legal representatives statutory tenants to the same extent as the deceased. It is not the case that there is any other provision of the Act which gives protection to the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant". 25. Had the law as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Anand Niwas (Private) Ltd. Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd, and J.C. Chatterjis cases continued to remain the same, that would have sealed the fate of this second appeal by its dismissal. 26. It is interesting to note that on account of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in J.C. Chatterjees case (supra), the Rajasthan State Legislature by the Amending Act of 1976 amended the definition of the term "tenant" in order to provide relief to the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant who were ordinarily residing or carrying on business with him as member of his family upto his death. In this connection, reference may be made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Bill No. 11 of 1976, which reads as under:- "The Supreme Court and the Rajasthan High Court had decided that where the original tenant had died, his heirs occupying the premises ceased to be statutory tenants and were not entitled to statutory protection against eviction under the Act. To provide relief to the heirs of the deceased tenant, the definition of the term was amended by the Rajasthan Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 so as to include within its ambit his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heirs ordinarily residing or carrying on business with him as member of his family upto his death." 27. However, soon thereafter, the judge-made law pertaining to so-called "statutory tenants" progressed and there came the decision of the Supreme Court in Damadilal and others v/s Parashram and others (supra), which ruled to the contrary to the decisions in Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. case and J.C. Chatterjees case (Supra). In Damadilals case, it was contended on behalf of the landlords before the Supreme Court that Begamal and Budhar Mal, both of whom were statutory tenants, had no heritable interest in the demised premises and on their death the right to prosecute the appeal in the High Court did not survive to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenants and reliance was placed upon the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court. His Lordship A.C. Gupta J., speaking for the Court, held : "Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy, a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been passed against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists. The incident of such tenancy and contractual tenancy must therefore be same" Difficulties of English law were pointed out by his Lordship by quoting the observations of Scrulton LJ in Haskins v/s Lewis (24) "making bricks with very insufficient statutory straw" and of Lord Denning in Saloman V. Orwell (Supra). Damadilals case (Supra) was referred to by O. Chinnappa Reddy J., in Vithal Dattatraya Kulkarni & Ors. v/s Smt. Shamrao Tuka Ram Power and Others (25) dealing with a case under Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1949. 28. Damadilals case (Supra) was referred to by O. Chinnappa Reddy J., in Vithal Dattatraya Kulkarni & Ors. v/s Smt. Shamrao Tuka Ram Power and Others (25) dealing with a case under Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1949. 28. Here, one is stamped to the following observations of Chief Justice M.H. Beg in Ganpat Ladha v/s Shashi Kant Vishnu Shinde(supra); "If the quest for certainty in law is often baffled, as it is according to Judge Jerome Frank in "Law and the Modern Mind", the reasons are mainly two : firstly, the lack of precise formulation of even statutory law so as to leave lacunae and loopholes in it giving scope to much avoidable disputation; and secondly, the unpredictability of the judicial rendering of the law after every conceivable as well as inconceivable aspect of it has been explored and subjected to forensic debate-Even the staunchest exponents of legal realism, who are apt to treat the quest for certain in the administration of justice in accordance with law, in an uncertain world of imperfect human beings, to be practically always futile and deemed to failure, will not deny the desirability and the beneficial effects of such certainty in law as may be possible." In Ganpat Ladhas case (Supra), the Supreme Court was considering the definition of tenant as contained in Sec.5(l 1) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 which included in its definition any member of the tenants family residing with him at the time of his death as may be decided, in default of agreement, by the Court. It was held that the legislative intent was never to confer protection in respect of business premises of a member of tenants family residing with him at the time of his death. 29. Then came the seven-Judges judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Vesodai Ammal (supra) which laid down that for eviction of a tenant under State Rent Control Act, giving of notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for determination his lease was not necessary and the Supreme Court approved the law laid down in Puwade Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana (26). 30. Conflict, as there was, on the question of heritability of statutory tenancy, the matter came to be examined before a five-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Gain Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (Supra). 30. Conflict, as there was, on the question of heritability of statutory tenancy, the matter came to be examined before a five-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Gain Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (Supra). The question in Gain Devi Anands case (Supra) was whether the determination of a deceased tenant whose contractual tenancy in respect of commercial premises had been determined are entitled to the same protection against eviction afforded by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to the tenant. In that case, the tenant holding the demised commercial premises even after the determination of his contractual tenancy, died during the pendency of the landlords appeal. When the matter came before the Delhi High Court, it held that on the death of the statutory tenancy, the heirs of the statutory tenant had no right to remain in possession of the premises as statutory tenancy was not heritable and the protection afforded to a statutory tenant by the Delhi Act was not available to the heirs and legal representatives of the statutory tenant. The correctness of this view of the Delhi High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court. The counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased tenant placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Damadi Lal Vs. Parashram and V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Vesodai Ammal (both supra). As against this, counsel for the landlord relied upon the decisions in Anand Nivas (Private)Ltd. Vs. Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd. and J.C. Chatterji Vs. Shri Kishan Tandon (both supra). The decisions given under English law were referred to wherein the Court in England had held that a statutory tenant has no estate or property in the premises he occupies because he retained possession by virtue of Rent Acts and not as being entitled to a tenancy. It had been said in England that he had only a personal right to remain in occupation, the statutory right of irremovability" and nothing more. His Lordship A.N. Sen J., speaking for the majority, said that they found it difficult to appreciate how in India we can proceed on the basis that a tenants whose contractual tenancy has been determined, but who is protected against eviction by statute has no legal right or property, but only a personal right to remain in occupation without ascertaining what his rights were under the statute. It was stated that it could not be assumed that with the determination of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation. It was not possible to claim that sanctity of contract cannot be touched by legislation. Reference was made to the definition of "tenant" in Sec. 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Act which included in its definition also any person continuing in possession after determination of his tenancy. His Lordship observed that the incident of such tenancy and contractual tenancy must be the same unless any provision of the Act showed a contrary intention. Such a tenant retains interest in the premises and not merely a personal right of occupation. His Lordship noted the objects behind the Kent Control Legislation and the observations of the Supreme Court in seven-Judges judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (Supra), while considering the question of requirement of a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and held that the termination of contractual tenancy in view of the definition of tenant in the Delhi Act did not bring about any change in the status and legal position of a tenant unless there were contrary provisions in the Act: and, the tenant continuing after the termination of tenancy does enjoy as estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or estate that the tenant under the Act, despite termination of the contractual tenancy continues, to enjoy creates a heritable interest, in the absence of any provision to the contrary and it would devolve on all the heirs of so-called statutory tenant on his death and the heirs of such tenant would, in law, steps into possession. His Lordship noticed the particular fact that in the Delhi Act, the Legislature itself treated commercial tenancy differently from residential tenancy in the matter of eviction of the tenant and the grounds for eviction of a tenancy of a residential premises were not made grounds for eviction of a tenant in respect of commercial premises. Non-user of residential tenancy by the tenant for a period of six months was a good ground for eviction from residential premises though in case of commercial premises no such provision was made. Non-user of residential tenancy by the tenant for a period of six months was a good ground for eviction from residential premises though in case of commercial premises no such provision was made. Sec. 14 (7) (e) of the Delhi Act made bona fide requirement of the landlord of the premises let out to tenant for residential purposes a ground for eviction of the tenant, but this ground was not made applicable to commercial premises. His Lordship noted that, "We have earlier held that the mere termination of the contractual tenancy toes not bring out any change in the status of the tenant and the tenant by virtue of definition of tenant in the Act and the other Rent Acts continues of enjoy the same status and position unless there is any provision in the Rent Act which enacts to the contrary". 31. It was then observed that the mere fact that in Delhi Act no provision had been made with regard to heirs of a tenant in respect of commercial tenancy on the death of the tenant, after termination of the tenancy as had been done in the case of heirs of tenant of residential premises, does not indicate that the Legislature intended that the heirs of the tenants of commercial premises will cease to enjoy the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. The Legislature could never have possibly intended that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried on by the tenant, however, flourishing it may be, and even if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must necessarily came to an end on the death of the tenant only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the entire family of a tenant depending upon the business carried on by the tenant will be completely stranded and the business carried on for years in the premises which had been let out to the tenant must stop functioning at the premises which the heirs of the deceased tenant must necessarily vacate, as they are afforded no protection under the Act. Their Lordships were of the view that in case of commercial premises governed by the Delhi Act, the Legislature has not thought it fit in the light of the situation in Delhi to place any kind of restriction on the ordinary law of inheritance with regard to succession. In case of commercial premises the heirs of the deceased tenant not only succeed to the tenancy rights in the premises but they succeed to the business as a whole. It might have been open to the Legislature to limit or restrict the right of inheritance with regard to the tenancy as the Legislature had done in the case of tenancies with regard to the residential house but it would not have been open to the Legislature to alter under the Rent Act, the Law of Succession regarding the business which is a valuable heritable right and which must necessarily devolve on all the heirs in accordance with law. The absence of any provision restricting the heritability of the tenancy in respect of the commercial premises only establishes that commercial tenancies not withstanding the determination of the contractual tenancies will devolve on the heirs in accordance with law and the heirs who step into the position of the deceased tenant will continue to enjoy the protection afforded by the Act and they can only be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The majority of the Judges held that the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Ganapat Ladhas case (supra) and the observations made therein, do not lay down the correct law. The said decision did not properly construe the definition of the tenant as given in the Bombay Act and did not consider the status of the tenant as defined in the Act even after the determination of the contractual tenancy. Their Lordships said that in Damadilals case (Supra), the Supreme Court has correctly appreciated the status and the legal position of a tenant who continued to remain in possession after termination of the contractual tenancy. Their Lordships also referred to the decision in Dhanapal Chettiars case and said that these decisions correctly laid down that determination of contractual tenancy by the landlord does not bring out the change in the status of the tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act. Their Lordships also referred to the decision in Dhanapal Chettiars case and said that these decisions correctly laid down that determination of contractual tenancy by the landlord does not bring out the change in the status of the tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act. A proper interpretation of the definition of tenant in the light of the provisions made in the Rent Act makes it clear that the tenant continues to enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises despite the termination of the contractual tenancy. Accordingly, their Lordships held that if the Rent Act in question defines a "tenant in substance to mean a tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed, the tenant even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position of the deceased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenant under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. It was open to the Legislature to make appropriate provisions in the Act with regard to the nature and extent of the benefit and protection to be enjoyed, and the manner in which the same is to be enjoyed and it is entirely for the Legislature to decide whether the Legislature will decide to make such provision or not. In the absence of any provision regulating the rights of inheritance, and the manner and extent thereof and in the absence of any condition being stipulated with regard to the devolution of tenancy rights on the heirs on the death of the tenant, the devolution of tenancy right must necessarily be in accordance with the ordinary law of succession. In Delhi, the Legislature has thought it fit to make provisions regulating the right to inherit the tenancy rights in respect of residential premises, but in regard to the commercial premises, it did not think it fit to make any such provision. In Delhi, the Legislature has thought it fit to make provisions regulating the right to inherit the tenancy rights in respect of residential premises, but in regard to the commercial premises, it did not think it fit to make any such provision. Their Lordships noticed that in some Rent Acts provisions regulating heritability of commercial premises have also been made whereas in some Rent Acts no such provision either in respect of residential tenancies or commercial tenancies has been made. As in Delhi, there was no provision regulating the rights of heirs inheriting the tenancy rights of the tenant in respect of the tenanted premises which was commercial premises, the tenancy right, which was heritable, devolved on the heirs under the ordinary law of succession. Their Lordships suggested to the Legislature that it may consider the advisability of making bona-fide requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial premises as well. His Lordship P.N. Bhagwati J. in a separate concurring judgment stated that though genetically the parentage of these two legal concepts is different, one owing its origin to contract and the other to rent control legislation, they are equated with each other and their incidents are the same. If a contractual tenant has an estate or interest in the premises which is heritable, it is difficult to understand why a statutory tenant should be held not to have such heritable estate or interest. Quality of the estate or interest is the same in both cases. He explained the decision in Ganpat Ladhas case (supra) by stating that the Supreme Court was not concerned in that case with the question of heritability of statutory tenancy. In Ganapati Sita Ram Balvalkar and Another vs. Waman Shripad Mage (27) and Jaspal Singh Vs. Addl. District Bulandsahar(28), with respect to the provisions in the Bombay Act and U.P. Act respectively, it was held that under the provisions of the relevant Acts transfer of a tenancy, after it ceases to be contractual, is not permissible. 32. In Ganapati Sita Ram Balvalkar and Another vs. Waman Shripad Mage (27) and Jaspal Singh Vs. Addl. District Bulandsahar(28), with respect to the provisions in the Bombay Act and U.P. Act respectively, it was held that under the provisions of the relevant Acts transfer of a tenancy, after it ceases to be contractual, is not permissible. 32. The matter, thus, so far as India is concerned, stands concluded by the decision in Gian Devi Anands case (supra), in which it has been unanimously laid down that the tenant both in respect of residential premises as well as commercial premises, after the determination of his tenancy continues to have estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the so-called statutory tenancy rights in respect of both character of premises are heritable. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Anand Niwas (Private) Ltd. Vs. Anandji Kalyanji and J.C. Chatterji Vs. Srikishan Tandon (both supra) must be held on this point to have been impliedly overruled. Both the Courts below were, therefore, wrong in holding that on the death of Phool Chand, the statutory tenancy in respect of the demised shop premises did not devolve on the appellants. The Addl. District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur was wrong in referring to the provisions contained in Sec. 3 (vii) (b) of the Act which, as a matter of fact, did not stand on the Statute Book on June 15, 1973 when the statutory tenant Phool Chand died. The restricted devolution of both the contractual and statutory tenancy was made by an Amending Ordinance in the year 1975 and prior to that in view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gian Devi Anands case (supra), was heritable without any restriction. It may be some what strange and interesting that while in the year 1975, Rajasthan State Legislature intended to extend the benefit to certain restricted category of heirs of a statutory tenant, which benefit was not available to such heirs prior to 1975 when the decisions of the Supreme Court in Anand Niwas (Private) Ltd. and J.C. Chatterjis case held the field and when the Supreme Court declared the law in Gian Devi Anands case that the statutory tenancy was unrestrictably heritable, the amendment made in the Act in the year 1975 by Ordinance No. 25 of 1975 had the effect of restricting the devolution. The law laid down in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case will, in any event and in any case, prevail. I therefore, reverse the findings of both ihe courts below with respect to issue No. 7A and hold that on the death of Phool Chand on June 15, 1973, appellants No. 1 to 3 who are son and daughters of deceased Phool Chand became tenants of the respondents in the demised shop as a result of devolution of tenancy on them. Vinod Kumar, appellant No. 4, was grand son of Phool Chand and in the life-time of his father Rajendra Kumar, the tenancy could not devolve on Vimal Kumar. Vimal Kumar therefore, did not become tenant on the death of Phool Chand. 33. As already stated, respondents landlords have filed cross-objections challenging the findings of the Addl. District Judge on issues No. 3, 4 and 7B, which relate to the question of defaults in the payment or tender of rent, and reasonable and bona fide requirement of the demised premises for the purpose of Kailash Chandra respondent No. 3. 34. I shall, now, deal with the cross-objections on these points. On the question of need for the demised premises of the respondents for the purpose of Kailash Chandra, both the Courts have concurrently found that Kailash Chandra was in service in Indian Post & Telegraph Department since quite a long time and whatever need might have been some 21 years back when he did his diploma in mechanical engineering, the need no longer subsists as Kailash Chandra is in employment of the Central Government since last more than 21 years. It is a settled law that personal necessity must continue to exist till final determination of the case. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Hasmal Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad (29). It is equally well-settled that the High Court does not disturb the findings of fact in second appeal unless any substantial question of law is involved. No such substantial question of law is involved in the instant case. 35. It may be mentioned that on July 10, 1989, when this second appeal was being heard, an application was filed on behalf of Rajendra Kumar, appellant No. 1, that the respondents have recently got possession of a vacant shop which was formerly in occupation of another tenant Durgalal Nai. 35. It may be mentioned that on July 10, 1989, when this second appeal was being heard, an application was filed on behalf of Rajendra Kumar, appellant No. 1, that the respondents have recently got possession of a vacant shop which was formerly in occupation of another tenant Durgalal Nai. This vacant possession was taken about a month back and that shop was still lying vacant and was in possession of the respondents. It is contended that the shop vacated by Durga Lal Nai was of equal dimension with the suit shop and was also near the suit shop. A reply to this application was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents and they have stated that there had been an oral partition between Kanhaiya Lal and his son and the shop in which Durga Lal Nai was sitting had fallen to the share of Subhash Chandra son of respondent No. 1 and, it was Subhash Chandra who got it vacated from Durga Lal Nai because he needed it for his wife who was going to start her own business of beauty parlour in the near future. The shop vacated by Durgalal Nai, thus, did not belong to respondents or any of them. Both the sides have filed affidavits and counter-affidavits. In any event, I have already stated, as Kailash Chandra for whom the demised premises were said to be required reasonably and bona fide is a permanent employee of the Post & Telegraph Department for the last over 17 or 18 years and there is nothing to indicate that he is resigning from that post, the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the suit premises cannot be said to have been proved. When the plaintiffs have failed to establish reasonable and bona-fide necessity for the suit shop, the question of comparative hardship becomes only academic. 36. I, therefore, maintain the findings of the first appellate Court on issue No. 4 as against the plaintiffs respondents. 37. Next comes the question of defaults. It is an admitted position that the suit shop had been taken on rent by Phool Chand under rent-note Ex. 1 dated March 14, 1963. Amount of Rs. 60/- had been deposited as advance. This advance deposited had to continue till the demised premises were vacated. 37. Next comes the question of defaults. It is an admitted position that the suit shop had been taken on rent by Phool Chand under rent-note Ex. 1 dated March 14, 1963. Amount of Rs. 60/- had been deposited as advance. This advance deposited had to continue till the demised premises were vacated. It was, therefore, held by the trial Court that when the suit was filed, rent of six months was in arrears and there was default in the payment or tender of rent of a period of six months. However, the trial Court made a determination of the amount of rent to be deposited by the tenant in Court under Sec. 13 (3) of the Act and, it is not disputed that the appellants had deposited in Court the amount of rent determined under Sec. 13 (3) of the Act together with interest thereon in Court within time. 38. It may be mentioned that according to Sec. 13 (4) of the Act, the tenant has also to continue to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord, month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the Court. If the tenant failed to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub section (4) of Sec. 13, the Court can order defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. As already stated, on February 23, 1968, the tenant had fitted a suit under Sec. 6 of the Act against the respondents for determination of standard rent in relation to the suit premises and in that suit provisional rent was fixed as Rs. 25/- per month which, according to sub-sec. (l)of Sec. 7, was to remain binding on all parties concerned and was to remain in force till a decree fixing standard rent was finally made in such suit. The appellants, therefore, deposited in Court under Sec. 13 (4) of the Act, rent month by month of Rs. 25/- per month, which was the provisional rate of rent. As already mentioned, the trial Court decided the suit for fixation of standard rent on October, 31, 1974 and had fixed the standard rent of Rs. 30/-per month, which was also the agreed rent. 25/- per month, which was the provisional rate of rent. As already mentioned, the trial Court decided the suit for fixation of standard rent on October, 31, 1974 and had fixed the standard rent of Rs. 30/-per month, which was also the agreed rent. An appeal was filed against that decree by Rajendra Kumar and Smt. Kapuri Devi son and widow of the deceased tenant, Phool Chand and the first appellate Court specified October 31, 1974 as the date from which the standard rent fixed by the trial Court had to take effect. The result of this was that throughout the amount remained Rs. 30/- per month. Upto October 30, 1974, Rs. 30/- remained agreed rent and from Oct. 31, 1974, it became standard rent. The trial Court noticed that on some occasions, the tenant had not deposited monthly rent in time. It also noted that when the standard rent had been fixed at Rs. 30/- per month with effect from October 31, 1974 and the agreed rent and the standard rent remained the same, the tenant did not deposit the difference of amount of Rs. 5/- i.e. the difference between the provisional rent and the agreed rent upto October 30, 1974 and the standard rent at the same rate from October 31, 1974 in the trial Court till it decided the suit on November 21, 1978 and, thus, the defence of the tenant was liable to be struck out and the tenant was not entitled to any benefit under Sec. 13 (4) of the Act. The trial Court also noted that the rent for the month of June 1976 was tendered on July 16, 1976 and deposited in Court on July 17, 1976 and, no application had been made for extension of time for the benefit. These findings have not been sustained by the first appellate Court for the reasons already mentioned in the beginning of this judgment. It may be mentioned that the first appellate Court had determined the standard rent at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month to be effective from October 31, 1974. This decision was given on August 2, 1979. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 7 makes it clear that the provisional rent was to remain in force till the decree fixing the standard rent was finally made in the suit under Sec. 6 of the Act. The decree was finally made by the Addl. This decision was given on August 2, 1979. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 7 makes it clear that the provisional rent was to remain in force till the decree fixing the standard rent was finally made in the suit under Sec. 6 of the Act. The decree was finally made by the Addl. District Judge No. 4 on August 2, 1979 and, before that the suit for ejectment out of which this appeal arises, had been decided by the trial court on November 21, 1978. The tenants could, therefore, only deposit the rent at the rate of provisional rent fixed by the Court trying the suit for fixation of standard rent and that was done by the tenants. It is true that after the fixation of standard rent of Rs. 30/-, a difference of Rs. 5/- per month was not deposited. However, it has been laid down in Kamaruddin vs. Wahid Ali (30) that deposit of rent every month pending appeal after the decision of suit is not required to law. Sec. 13(4) is applicable to pending suit only and appeal is not a continuation of suit for the purpose of Sec. 13(4) of the Act. The tenants were not depositing rent at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month during the pendency of the suit because during its pendency the provisional rent was in force throughout and the tenants were to make deposit of rent at the rate of provisional rent only. As to the non-deposit of the rent for the month of June, 1976, in time, suffice it to say that there was strike of advocates on July 15, 1976 and this fact was not controverted. Tender of rent for this month was, therefore, made on July 16, 1976 and it will be treated as a deposit within time. 39. It may be mentioned that during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondents urged that there had been defaults in the deposit of monthly rent even at the rate of Rs 25/- on three or four occasions. When the suit was pending in the trial Court and that had rendered the defence against eviction of the tenants liable to be struck out. It may be mentioned in this connection that this has not been mentioned by the respondent in their cross-objections. When the suit was pending in the trial Court and that had rendered the defence against eviction of the tenants liable to be struck out. It may be mentioned in this connection that this has not been mentioned by the respondent in their cross-objections. In the cross-objections filed in this Court, the respondents have said that at the time of arguments before the first appellate Court it was specifically argued that no rent from the month of December, 1978 and onwards, as detailed in para 4 of the cross objections, had been made in time and as, the deposits during various months from December 1978 to February 1983 were not made in time, the tenants could not claim benefit of Sec. 13 (6) of the Act. In this respect, suffice it to say that this period is not a period when the suit was pending before- the trial Court. It was the period when the first appeal was pending before the first appellate Court. I have already referred to the decision in Kamaruddins case (supra) in this regard and, it is clear that Sec. 13(4) was not applicable during the pendency of the first appeal. The result is that the finding of the first appellate Court on issue No. 3 is correct and does not call for any interference. 40. In view of reversal of the findings given by the first appellate Court on issue 7A and in view of upholding of findings of the first appellate Court on issues No. 3 and 4 by me, this second appeal deserves to be allowed and the cross-objections filed by the plaintiffs-respondents deserves to be dismissed. 41. I, therefore, allow this second appeal, set aside the decree of the Addl. District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City dated August 24, 1983 and dismiss Civil Original Suit No. 58/1968, filed by the plaintiffs-respondents. The cross-objections filed by the respondents are hereby dismissed. 42. In the circumstances of the case, I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. A decree be prepared accordingly.