JUDGMENT S.D. AGARWALA, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of an application filed for release under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. THE property in dispute is a portion of premises no. 77 (Old No. 15), Rajas Road, Dehradun. THE petitioner Ramesh Kumar Gupta is the landlord. Rai Singh, respondent no. 3 is the tenant. A release application was filed on the ground that the petitioner is an employee in a local private mill at Rs.700/- per mensum which income is not sufficient for his family. The family of the petitioner consists of himself, his wife, four sons and one daughter. The premises in question is required for establishing a business and, consequently, it was alleged that the need of the petitioner was most genuine, pressing and bonafide. 3. THIS application was contested by the tenant. 4. THE Prescribed Authority dismissed the application by its judgment dated 2-9-1978. Aggrieved by the said order, an appeal was filed under section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Dehradun by his judgment dated 30th April, 1982. 5. THE petitioner, has, now, challenged both the orders dated 2-9-1978 and 30th April, 1982 of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively by means of the present petition. 6. I have heard Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner landlord and Sri L. P. Naithani, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord has urged firstly that the view taken by the Appellate Authority that clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21 (1) is applicable to the case is a view manifestly erroneous. His second submission is that the building in question is a non-residential building. The view to the contrary taken by the Appellate Authority is manifestly erroneous and the third contention is that in view of the subsequent events, it is a fit case which should be remanded for a fresh decision in accordance with law. 7. I will now consider the first contention raised by the learned counsel. 8. The view to the contrary taken by the Appellate Authority is manifestly erroneous and the third contention is that in view of the subsequent events, it is a fit case which should be remanded for a fresh decision in accordance with law. 7. I will now consider the first contention raised by the learned counsel. 8. THE Appellate Authority has recorded a finding that two back rooms of the accommodation are being used for the purpose of residence and the front room which was originally a Varandah, is being used for business purposes. In effect the definite finding is that out of three rooms which are in a row, the front room is being occupied for carrying on the business and the two back rooms are being used for residence. THE contention of the learned counsel is that even if it is not accepted that the entire building was let out and used for business purposes then too his application for release was maintainable in respect of the front room which is being used for business purposes. In this connection, his further submission is that in respect of a building in which a specific part is being used for business purposes this specific part should be treated as a building within the meaning of clause (ii) of proviso three of section 21 (1) of the Act and his release application will be maintainable at least for this portion of the building let out. Section 21 (1) (ii) of the third proviso which is relevant for the purposes of deciding this question reads as follows:- "21-Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant- (1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely- (a)..................... (b)..................... Provided............... Provided...............Provided also that no application under clause (a) shall be entertained. (i)........................ (ii) In the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes. (iii)....................." 9. SECTION 21 (1) read with clause (ii) of the third proviso clearly lays down that an application for release under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act can be entertained for occupation for business purposes in the case of any residential building. (i)........................ (ii) In the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes. (iii)....................." 9. SECTION 21 (1) read with clause (ii) of the third proviso clearly lays down that an application for release under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act can be entertained for occupation for business purposes in the case of any residential building. The question which arises is that what meaning should be given to the word 'building' used in clause (ii) quoted above. Does the word 'building' mean the entire building let out or does it mean a unit of accommodation which has been let out. Judicial notice is to be taken of the fact that in India often a building is let out which consists of two units-one, the residential unit and the other non-residential unit. Both the units of a building are let out for residential-cum-business purposes. There is no prohibition in SECTION 21 for filing a release application under clause (a) in respect of a building let out for residential-cum-business purposes. Since there is no such prohibition, the expression 'building' used in clause (ii) has to be interpreted in that context. In SECTION 21 (1) the words used are 'building under tenancy' while in clause (ii) only the word 'building' has been used. The word 'building' in clause (ii) cannot be given the same meaning in the circumstances as the words 'building under tenancy' used in clause (1). If the Legislature had intended that clause (ii) of the proviso should be applicable to the entire building under tenancy when let out for residential-cum-business purposes, then the Legislature would specifically have provided for such a contingency which has not been done. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the intention of the Legislature in using the word 'building' in clause (ii) of the third proviso means only the 'unit of accommodation' which may be a part of a building let out. Clause (ii) of the third proviso would apply only to a unit of accommodation. In case of a building let out for residential-cum-business purposes, clause (ii) would only apply in relation to unit of accommodation used for residential purposes and not for unit of accommodation used for business purposes. Clause (ii) of the third proviso would apply only to a unit of accommodation. In case of a building let out for residential-cum-business purposes, clause (ii) would only apply in relation to unit of accommodation used for residential purposes and not for unit of accommodation used for business purposes. If this interpretation is not taken then the result would be that whenever an accommodation is let out both for residential and business purposes and the said accommodation contains two distinct units one for residential and the other for business purposes, the same can never be released in favour of the landlord for business purposes. This could not possibly be the intention of the Legislature. The Legislative intention is further clear from the fact that in clause (1) of SECTION 21 it has been specifically provided that Prescribed Authority can release the 'building under tenancy' or any specified part thereof. Reading sub-clause (1) along with clause (ii), it is clear that a release application would lie in respect of the unit of accommodation let out for business purposes and will not lie in respect of a unit of accommodation let out for residential purposes when the need is set up for business purposes. 10. LEARNED counsel for the respondent has vehemently urged that in a case where the property is let out both for residential and business purposes, the dominant purpose has to be seen. I do not agree. The question of dominant purposes would only arise where a building is let out either only for residential purposes or for the purposes of business and the same is being used both for residential and business purposes and there is no specified portion in that building where it can be said that it is being used for business purposes or for residential purposes exclusively. Where the building is being used for residential and business purposes both and it is not possible to specify exclusively for which purpose it is used, it is then only that the question of examining the dominant purpose arises and not otherwise. In Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr, 1978 AWC 105 this Court had an occasion to consider what meaning is to be given to the word 'business' used in clause (ii) of the third proviso to section 21 of the Act. In Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr, 1978 AWC 105 this Court had an occasion to consider what meaning is to be given to the word 'business' used in clause (ii) of the third proviso to section 21 of the Act. The court also considered the question as to whether the accommodation in dispute in that case was a residential accommodation or not. It was observed that the dominant purpose for which an accommodation is being used must be discovered for the purpose of determining as to whether a particular accommodation is being used for residential purpose or otherwise. The accommodation in the said case was only of one room and a Varandah described as Tidri. Since it was only a one room accommodation which was used both for residential and business purposes both, this court held that the dominant purpose for which the accommodation is being used has to be discovered. It is not a case where a building under tenancy had two distinct units of accommodation one being used for residential purposes and the other for business purposes. In this view of the matter, the principle laid down in this case does not apply to the facts of the present case. 11. IN Smt. Kanti Khare v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1982 AWC 638 it was observed as follows:- "IN India, it is not unknown that a building is used both for residence as well as for commercial purpose. IN such an event the controversy required to be decided is as to what is the dominant or the main purpose. It is the dominant purpose which could determine the nature of building." I respectfully agree with this proposition, but in my opinion, this proposition would apply only to a building which is being used both for residential as well as commercial purposes. Where two distinct units in a building let out are being used separately for residential and business purposes, the question of finding out the dominant purpose does not arise because the purpose for which each unit is being used is prima facie there. IN the circumstances, the principle laid down in this case would not apply to the facts of the case where two units of an accommodation in a building let out are separately used for business and residential purposes and there is no mixture between the two. 12. IN the circumstances, the principle laid down in this case would not apply to the facts of the case where two units of an accommodation in a building let out are separately used for business and residential purposes and there is no mixture between the two. 12. LEARNED counsel for the respondent has also relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand v. District Judge, Dehradun, 1977 ARC 117. He has relied on the following passage of paragraph 5 of the said decision, which is quoted below:- "The appellant has only two small rooms in which he resides with his wife, two young sons and one daughter and although he may have a tailoring shop in one of his rooms it is not unlikely that very rooms is utilised as bed room for one or two members of his family at night. The fact that he runs a tailoring shop in one of the rooms is not sufficient to convert what otherwise to all intents and purposes is a residential building." In my opinion, from the facts of this case, it is clear that before the Supreme Court, the accommodation was of only two rooms which were used both for residence as well as tailoring shop business and the tailoring shop was also used in the night for residential purposes. It is not a case where the units of accommodation in a building was separately used exclusively for residential and business purposes. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that in a case where a building under tenancy consists of two distinct units of accommodation one being used for business purposes and the other for residential purposes then the unit of accommodation which is used for business purposes can be released for the purposes of business and an application for release is maintainable and the bar of clause (ii) of third proviso to section 21 Will not apply. 13. IN regard to the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner landlord, in my opinion, the receipt issued in respect of the building clearly stated that the building was given on rent as shop/residence. The primary purpose appears to be a shop unless there is evidence to the contrary. 13. IN regard to the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner landlord, in my opinion, the receipt issued in respect of the building clearly stated that the building was given on rent as shop/residence. The primary purpose appears to be a shop unless there is evidence to the contrary. The appellate authority has relied on the above two affidavits filed on behalf of respondent tenant, wherein it was stated that the tenant started living in this accommodation more than 20 years back and he then started running his business of Gold Smith in the outer room. The initial user of the property should not have been the sole test to determine whether the building is being used for residential or business purposes. The court has to examine the purpose for which the property was let out, the actual user and other relevant circumstances to find out whether the building in dispute is a residential building or not. If a property has been let out for business purposes, a tenant cannot convert it into a residential building with a malafide object of making the application for release not maintainable under clause (iii) of third proviso of Section 21 (1) of the Act. IN the circumstances, in my opinion, the finding that the dominant purpose for which the building was let out was the residential purpose is a finding vitiated in law and it is necessary for the Appellate Authority to re-examine the matter in the proper perspective. If it is found that the entire building is a non-residential building then the petitioner is entitled for a consideration of his release application for the entire building in dispute. 14. IN regard to the last submission made by the learned counsel, the learned counsel has filed two supplementary affidavits in this court. IN the supplementary affidavit of Raj Narain which has been filed on 28th September, 1982, it has been stated in paragraph 2 that respondent no. 3, the tenant has acquired a property no. 32-A, Dhamawala, Dehradun in the name of his two daughters-in-law. It has been further stated that he has obtained vacant possession of the property. IN another supplementary affidavit of Ramesh Kumar Gupta filed on 24th September, 1985 it has been stated that the sale deed of the alleged house purchased by respondent no. 32-A, Dhamawala, Dehradun in the name of his two daughters-in-law. It has been further stated that he has obtained vacant possession of the property. IN another supplementary affidavit of Ramesh Kumar Gupta filed on 24th September, 1985 it has been stated that the sale deed of the alleged house purchased by respondent no. 3 has been attached, from which it is clear that the property has been purchased in the name of daughters-in-law of respondent no. 3. A further supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner stating therein that he has now left the services of the company where he was working. The petitioner has not been ousted but he has left Amitabh Textile Mill Limited because of the fact that the Mill has been closed. IN the circumstances, he is no longer in the service of the company. Though these facts have been denied, but in my opinion, they are material facts which require serious consideration. Being subsequent events, it is necessary to consider them before a release order is passed. The third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is substantiated. In the result, the petition is allowed. The orders dated 2-9-1978 and 30-4-1982 are, hereby, quashed. The case is remanded to the Appellate Authority for decision afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.