JUDGMENT M.P. Singh, J. - Respondent No. 3 Krishna Avtar is the landlord of the building comprising of two shops on the ground floor and a residential accommodation in the first floor. 2. The eastern shop on the ground floor was let out to Ratan Marwari, at the rate of Rs. 22 per month where he was carrying on the business of general merchandise. 3. The western shop on the ground floor and the residential portion of the first floor was let out to one Ram Chandra, who died on 4.12.1973 leaving behind his widow Smt. Reshma Devi and two sons Sumer Chand and Kailash Chand. Out of these two sons, Kailash Chand has also died leaving behind respondent Nos. 6 to 11, as his heirs. Sumer Chand is said to be doing the business of goldsmith in this shop and using the first floor for residential purposes. 4. Ram Chandra died after executing a Will on 1.4.1971 in favour of his son Sumer Chand, the petitioner in writ petition No. 1591 of 1988, which was duly registered on 5.7.1971. 5. The landlord filed an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the year 1982 on the ground that he was a student of B.A. final and after finishing the education in August, 1982 he would start the business of general merchandise in the two shops, one occupied by Ratan Marwari and the other occupied by Sumer Chand. The two shops are extremely small. After getting them release, he intended to convert them into one big shop for his business purposes. 6. It was also pleaded by him that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for his residential purposes after demolition and new construction. It was further stated that he was living with his mother Smt. Ashok Lata in a part of 'Dayal Bhawan' in the town of Moradabad. After his marriage, he wanted to settle separately along with his wife in the first floor of the said house. 7. The landlord filed a joint application against Ratan Marwari and Sumer Chand who were occupying different portions of the building. 8. After his marriage, he wanted to settle separately along with his wife in the first floor of the said house. 7. The landlord filed a joint application against Ratan Marwari and Sumer Chand who were occupying different portions of the building. 8. Both the tenants filed separate objections stating that the need of the landlord was not bonafide, the building was not in a dilapidated condition and did not require demolition or reconstruction. The landlord has an alternative huge accommodation in 'Dayal Bhawan' where he could very well reside with his mother and could also carry on the business. It was also alleged that they have been the tenants for the last more than 40 to 50 years, they would suffer greater hardship in case an order of release was passed against them. A joint application under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act against the different tenants was not maintainable. 9. The Prescribed Authority by means of the order, dated 13.2.1986, rejected the release application. 10. The Appellate Authority allowed the application for the release of the two shops on the ground floor occupied by Ratan Marwari and Sumer Chand separately. 12. Against this order of the Appellate Authority the tenants have filed two separate writ petitions. The points involved in both the cases are identical and as such they are being disposed of by a common judgment. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 14. The only point which survives now in these two writ petitions is whether the need of the landlord is bonafide for the release of the two shops on the ground floor or not. 15. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that a joint application was not maintainable. The contention is misconceived in as much as in the case of Janki Prasad v. VIth Additional District Judge and others, reported in 1978 ARC 137 it has been held :- "A common application for eviction of two tenants from a building is perfectly maintainable. The law does not envisage separate applications against these tenants". 16. The contention is misconceived in as much as in the case of Janki Prasad v. VIth Additional District Judge and others, reported in 1978 ARC 137 it has been held :- "A common application for eviction of two tenants from a building is perfectly maintainable. The law does not envisage separate applications against these tenants". 16. In another case reported in 1976 AWC 819 , Jagdish Chandra v. Ist Additional District Judge and others while considering a similar point it has been held :- "Where there are more than one tenant in a building and eviction of each one of them is sought on the same ground or cause of action one application would be sufficient. There is nothing in Section 21(1) of the Act to show that the law envisages separate application against each tenant". 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 1984 ALJ 143, Ram Chandra v. Judge, Small Causes Court and others. The point decided in that case was entirely different. In that case, several rooms of a building had been let out separately in the names of different tenants. There was separate tenancy for separate tenements. One suit for ejectment was filed in the Court of Judge, Small Causes. It was held that one suit cannot be filed against two tenants. 18. Section 21 of the Act stipulates that a landlord has to make an application for seeking eviction of a tenant from a building under tenancy on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) of the Act. The use of the word "an application" and "a tenant" does not mean that there has to be one application for each tenant to be evicted. What is emphasised is that the order of eviction of a tenant from a building under tenancy can only be passed if the lessor makes an application setting forth one or more than one ground mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) of the Act. It is well settled that the words used in singular may be read in plural and vice versa. The word "an application" only emphasizes that there must be one application at least before an order under Section 21(1) of the Act can be passed. Similarly, the word "a tenant" includes a particular tenant against whom the eviction was sought. It is well settled that the words used in singular may be read in plural and vice versa. The word "an application" only emphasizes that there must be one application at least before an order under Section 21(1) of the Act can be passed. Similarly, the word "a tenant" includes a particular tenant against whom the eviction was sought. Assuming that the landlord has given on tenancy a building to one or more tenants, the law does not envisage that the eviction can be sought only against one of them. The eviction can be sought against the entire body of tenants who held that building under tenancy. Thus the word "a tenant" does not relate to one single tenant but to the particular tenant against whom the eviction is sought. There may be one or more tenants in a tenancy. Thus, the words "an application" and "a tenant" do not mean that there has to be separate application for each tenant. 19. Thus, the joint application against these two different tenants was maintainable. 20. Now I concentrate on the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide need of the landlord. 21. At the time when the application for release was filed, the landlord was a student of B.A. final. It has come in evidence that he has obtained the Bachelor's degree and is fully equipped to start his business of general merchandise in the said shops. 22. The expression "bonafide required" appearing in Section 21(1)(a) of the Act has been the subject matter of judicial interpretation in various cases. 23. In the case reported in AIR 1974 SC 1596 , Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, while laying down the criteria to find out whether the need was bonafide or not, it has been held :- "The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one. The word "required" signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show the burden being upon him that he genuinely required the accommodation for his purpose". 24. In another case reported in 1979 ARC 73, Ajit Prasad v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others, while interpreting this word "bonafide" the Court took a view that the need should be honest. 24. In another case reported in 1979 ARC 73, Ajit Prasad v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others, while interpreting this word "bonafide" the Court took a view that the need should be honest. The application should not have filed with an oblique motive or should not be a device to evict a tenant. This word "required" does not mean a mere desire but the need has not to be shown as an absolute one. 25. In another case reported in 1979(UP) RCC 599 at p. 601, Smt. Gindori Devi v. IInd Addl. District Judge and others, it has been held :- "It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need the premises bonafide if he requires it honestly. Similarly, the word "required" has also been interpreted in several cases and the connotation of the said words shows that the landlord must need the premises. In order to succeed in such an application it is not necessary that the landlord must be on the street. Connotation of the word "need" or "requirement" should not be unnecessarily or artificially extended so as to give it a meaning that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. No doubt the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not be based on the ipse dixit of a landlord but that does not mean that he must stand on extreme need before he could succeed". 26. Thus, in order to decide whether the need of the landlord is bonafide, it is not necessary that he must prove his absolute need and necessity. He has only to prove that he genuinely, sincerely and in good faith in contradiction to mala fide, needed the accommodation. Good faith always includes absence of any intention to deceive. 27. Now the question is whether the case of the landlord of starting a general merchandise business in the shop was really bonafide. It is admitted that the landlord after his graduation in 1982 has been trying to get the accommodation released to start his business. The petitioner has filed no documents to show that the landlord has started some other business or is employed anywhere. He has also not filed any evidence to show that the application was mala fide or in any way expressed any dishonest intention on the part of the landlord. The petitioner has filed no documents to show that the landlord has started some other business or is employed anywhere. He has also not filed any evidence to show that the application was mala fide or in any way expressed any dishonest intention on the part of the landlord. 28. The case of the petitioner was that the landlord could start his own business in any shop in 'Dayal Bhawan'. There is nothing on record to show that the landlord owns or is in possession of any one of the shops in 'Dayal Bhawan'. On these faces the Appellate Authority has recorded a finding of fact that the need of the landlord was bonafide. 29. In the case of Smt. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, reported in 1986 SCFBRC 346, it has been held :- "Section 11(1)(h) of the Act use the words "reasonable requirement" which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. The connotation of the term "need" or "requirement" should not be artificially extended nor its language so extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds". It has further been held :- "The Act is a piece of social legislation aimed at easing the problem of accommodation, protecting the tenants from evictions inspired by profit hunting motives and providing certain safeguards for tenants and saving them from great expense, inconvenience and trouble. But the Act does not completely overlook the interest of the landlord and has under certain conditions granted a clear right to the landlord to seek eviction on proof of the grounds mentioned in Section 11 of the Act. Thus, the Act appears to have struck a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and great inconvenience and trouble of the tenants on the other". 30. Thus, the Act appears to have struck a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and great inconvenience and trouble of the tenants on the other". 30. In the aforesaid case while considering the question of comparative advantages in Para 19 it has been said that in all such cases of eviction tenants will have to be ousted and they will feel a hardship. The Court has only to consider the extent of hardship that will be caused to one party or the other in such cases. It was further said that while deciding this aspect of the matter each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiff to prove that lesser disadvantage will be suffered by the defendants and they are remediable. It was further held by the Supreme Court. "Being the owners of the house they cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to live below the poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business, at the cost of the appellant. This shows the great prejudice that will be caused to the plaintiff if their suit is dismissed". 31. In the instant case the Appellate Authority has recorded a finding after considering the evidence that the need of the landlord is bonafide and on comparing the same it was found that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord in case his application was rejected. I am in full agreement with the finding thus recorded. 32. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Rule 16(2) of the Rules has not been taken into consideration. Rule 16(2) of the Rules is as follows :- "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement. (1).... I am in full agreement with the finding thus recorded. 32. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Rule 16(2) of the Rules has not been taken into consideration. Rule 16(2) of the Rules is as follows :- "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement. (1).... (2) While considering an application for release under Clause (2) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following :- (a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application; (b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application.; (c) the greater the existing business of the landlords own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the Prescribed Authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the Prescribed Authority; (d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government Service, and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration". 33. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on his point is also devoid of merit in as much as in Paragraph 20 of the judgment the Appellate Authority has applied its mind to the question and recorded a finding that the tenant who was only doing a small business had not earned any goodwill. 33. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on his point is also devoid of merit in as much as in Paragraph 20 of the judgment the Appellate Authority has applied its mind to the question and recorded a finding that the tenant who was only doing a small business had not earned any goodwill. The business of general merchandise or goldsmith is not of such a nature which actually affects the goodwill of the tenant in case if he is asked to shift his business to some other place. 34. In the case reported in 1983(1) ARC 427, Suraj Prasad Sharma v. IInd Additional District Judge, Mirzapur and others, this Court held :- "The consensus of opinion appears to be that granting or refusing release on the basis of comparison of hardships cannot be reduced to a mechanical formula or to a rule of the thumb. It is not enough to say that the tenant has an old business and has established goodwill in the accommodation of the like nature in close proximity. Enquiry has to be pushed further and other surrounding circumstances have to be examined such as the possibility of the tenant being able to make the second best arrangements so as not to be reduced to a state of object helplessness. Unless these conclusions are also drawn the balance cannot tilt in the tenant's favour". 35. In the case reported in 1982(1) ARC 783, Kamil Khan v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, it has been observed :- "Now the question of comparative hardships on the parties is to be considered from the stand point that no alternative accommodation is available to the tenant. As said earlier, the need of the landlords to have more accommodation for residential purposes is quite genuine and bonafide as well as pressing. The application of the landlord cannot be rejected on the ground that no alternative accommodation is available to the tenant for shifting his residence. The law does not provide for rejection of the application of the landlords on such a ground". 36. In the case reported in 1984(1) ARC 587, Mahammad Fahim and another v. IXth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, Hon'ble Mr. The law does not provide for rejection of the application of the landlords on such a ground". 36. In the case reported in 1984(1) ARC 587, Mahammad Fahim and another v. IXth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.D. Ojha, as he then was, took the view :- "It is true that Rule 16(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, provides that greater the period since when the tenant has been carrying on his business the less the justification for allowing the application for release but that rule certainly cannot be interpreted to mean that on this ground alone no application for release is to be allowed. What is contained in Rule 16(2)(a) is one of the circumstances which has to be taken into consideration while considering the question of comparative hardship along with other circumstances in this behalf which may be brought on record by the parties". 37. Thus, it is the settled view of law that each party has to prove its relative advantage and disadvantage and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiff to prove that lesser advantage will be suffered by the defendant. The defendant has also to prove by means of cogent evidence that in case release application is allowed, he will suffer greater hardship. It is the duty of the Court to weigh the evidence properly and then record its own finding as to which party will suffer greater hardship before passing the final orders on the said application. In the instant case the Appellate Authority has recorded a clear finding that in case the release application is not allowed, then in that case the landlord will suffer greater hardship than that tenant. He has also taken into consideration that the proceedings had no initiated about 8-10 years back, there was no effort on the part of the tenant to apply for the allotment of some other shop or to find out some alternative accommodation. This also indicates that the tenant's need was not as strong as that of landlord. 38. He has also taken into consideration that the proceedings had no initiated about 8-10 years back, there was no effort on the part of the tenant to apply for the allotment of some other shop or to find out some alternative accommodation. This also indicates that the tenant's need was not as strong as that of landlord. 38. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to a large number of authorities which need not be referred to because practically in each one of them it has been said even if the tenant is to be ousted from the accommodation, they should not be taken to mean that the need of the tenant was greater than that of the landlord. It depends upon the facts of each case. On this question no hard and fast principle can be made applicable. Suffice it to say that following cases have been referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent :- (1) 1983(1) ARC 269 Mahendra Prakash v. IV Additional District Judge, Jalaun and others. (2) 1984(1) ARC 596 Jagdish Gandhi v. Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge Malihabad) Lucknow and another. (3) 1984(1) ARC 378 Dr. Munni Lal v. IV Additional District Judge, Etah and others. (4) 1984(1) ARC 113 N.S. Datta and others v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad. (5) 1984(1) ARC 510 Mangali Prasad v. XIII Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others. (6) 191984(1) ARC 381 Des Raj v. District Judge, Kanpur and others. (7) 1988(2) ARC 355 Kalwa Halwai v. XII Additional District Judge, Meerut and others. 39. Agreeing with the views expressed in the above mentioned cases I hold that in all such cases of release some hardship has to be met by the tenant. The authorities have only to weigh them. 40. The point which has weighed with the learned District Judge is that the landlord is still unemployed and he wants to set up his own business in the shops in dispute and the landlord is entitled for the release of the accommodation. 41. For the reasons given above, I am of the view that the order passed by the Appellate Authority does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. 42. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a prayer that the petitioners may be granted six months time to vacate the premises. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. 42. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a prayer that the petitioners may be granted six months time to vacate the premises. Under the circumstances of the present case, I permit the petitioners to continue in possession of the shops in dispute till 30.11.1989 subject to the condition that they file an undertaking in this Court within five weeks from today, that they will hand over peaceful vacant possession of the shops in dispute to the landlord and also deposit the entire amount of rent due upto 30th November, 1989 by 20.9.1989. It case of default, this part of the order shall stand automatically deleted.