Judgment :- 1. This civil revision petition by the tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, is against the order dated 10-8-1989 in I. A. 46 of 1989 in R C.A. 119 of 1984, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. The said R.C.A. was filed by the respondent-landlord against the dismissal of R.C.O.P. 49 of 1981 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif) Cuddalore for eviction of the petitioner herein. The above said order dismissed the above said I.A. which prayed for stay of the said R.C.A. under S. 10, C.P.C. The said I.A was filed on the ground that the respondent ceased to be the petitioners landlord in view of the respondent losing the exclusive title to the demised building in the decree dated 8-4-1985 in O S. 167 of 1981 on the file of the Subordinate Judge Cuddalore, though the said decree is the subject matter of a pending appeal in A.S. 232 of 1986 on the file of this Court. So, he prayed in the said I.A. that the said R.C.A. should be stayed till the final disposal of the said A.S. 232 of 1986. But the lower Court held that the said I.A. would not lie either under S. 10, C.P.C, or under its inherent powers and that further the issues in both the proceedings were not same. 2. The Court below is right and it also rightly relied on the decision reported in Subbaramayya v. B.N. Swami 1, which held as follows :— “On a plain reading of the section, it is manifest that S. 10 is attracted only when the previously instituted proceedings and the subsequently instituted proceedings are suits. If one is suit and the other not, S 10, C.P.C, is not attracted. Inherent powers cannot be invoked in a case where a particular procedure have been laid down to meet a particular contingency. Under S. 10(6) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, if the tenants deny the title of the landlord or claim permanent tenancy, then the Rent Controller has to determine the bona fides of that plea, raised by the tenants.” (It is needless to say that corresponding to the above referred to provisions in the Andhra Act, there is a provision in the corresponding Tamil Nadu Act also). 3. 3. No other contra decision directly dealing with S. 10 C.P.C, or even the principle behind it, as applicable to Rent Control proceedings, was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He no doubt cited the decision reported in Aravan Servai v. Kamugan Servai 1 which arises out of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. It was no doubt held there that the salutary provisions of S. 10, C.P.C., were applicable to the proceedings under the said Act. But the said principle was applied in that case, because prima facie decision has been rendered in a civil court that the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant did not exist and the opposite party rushed to the revenue Court in order to obtain a decision to the contrary. But, the facts are different in the present case, where there is no such decision that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the respondent and the petitioner. 4. However, the learned counsel for the etitioner cited the decision reported in Ganapati v. Kandasami Chettiar 2 to urge that the above said subsequent event of decree dated 8-4-1985 in O.S. 63 of 1981 should have been taken note of by the Court below. He particularly referred to the following passages:— “ The property may in execution of the decree be either divided or it may be allotted to the share of one or two co-owners, or the whole property may be sold and the money might be distributed between the three co-owners. The rights of the two landlords, therefore, depend on the nature of the interest in the suit property which will be finally determined only after the execution of the final decree. Today therefore they cannot claim any right to evict the tenant as owners of the entire property.” But, this decision does not deal with the question of stay under S. 10, C.P.C., or under inherent powers. If the petitioner thinks that the said ruling applies to the facts of this case before the court below, it is open to him to urge it in the above said R.C.A. proceedings. 5. If the petitioner thinks that the said ruling applies to the facts of this case before the court below, it is open to him to urge it in the above said R.C.A. proceedings. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that having regard to the fact that the petitioner-tenant paid, the rent as borne out by the cheque issued by him to the respondent landlord on 20-5-1981 and the further recognition by him of the respondent as landlord in a notice dated 28-7-1981. the respondent squarely comes within the definition of ‘landlord’ under S 2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, whatever the final outcome of the title suit in the above said civil court proceedings and that hence also there is no scope for the application of S 10. C.P.C. or the inherent powers. I agree with his contention. He also pointed out that even the decision in O.S. 167 of 1981, which itself is challenged in appeal, only held that the respondent herein was co-owner of the building, along with the plaintiff therein. The learned counsel for petitioner however pointed out that decision reported in Apparao v. Maragathammal 3 particularly the following passage therein— “Thus, it will be seen that the definition is an inclusive one and does not actually define the term ‘landlord’. Therefore, the inclusive definition adds to the normal concept of landlord certain other categories of persons also. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the denial of title of the landlord contemplated bv the second proviso to S. 10(1) will have to be read in the context of the definition of the term ‘landlord’ occurring in S 2(6) and that, if so read it will merely mean denial of the right of the persons to file an eviction petition; in other words to question the maintainability of the petition itself.” But this decision does not advance his case for stay of the abovesaid R.C.A. As stated above, it is open to the petitioner to advance any argument based on denial of title if the law allows him to do so. The other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not germane to the question actually involved in the present petition, I, therefore, dismiss the C.R.P. No costs.