Judgment : The petitioners were arrayed as ‘A’ party before the Taluk Executive Magistrate and Tahsildar, Wallajah, in his proceedings Roc.B1 10823/88 dated 29.9.1988 initiated under Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C. The petition filed under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C., seeks calling for the records, from the file of the Taluk Executive Magistrate and Tahsildar, Wallajah, in the aforesaid proceedings and to quash the same in the interests of justice. 2. The first respondent on the basis of the first information report in Crime No.165 of 1988 on the file of me Ranipet Police Station dated 3.8,1988, prayed for initiation of proceedings under Sec.145 of Criminal Procedure Code against the petitioners and respondents belonging to ‘B’ Party. 3. By an order dated 29.9.1988, purported to be one under Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C., the Executive Magistrate directed both the parties to attend his Court either in person or through pleader on 11.11.1988 and put in written statements of their respective claims in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject matter of the dispute. This preliminary order also directed both the parties to refrain from entering upon the disputed property till the disposal of the case by him. 4. In pursuance of the summons issued, both the parties appeared before the Court below and ultimately the Executive Magistrate directed the issue of summons to one Mohan Krishnadoss, who was residing at Madras, to appear for an enquiry on 17.5.1989. Meanwhile the present petition to quash the impugned proceedings was admitted by this Court on 3.4.1989 and stay of the pending proceedings was also ordered. 5. The dispute appears to relate, in the words of the Magistrate to the ownership of a tiled house in Bajanai Koil Street, Avarakarai Village, which dispute was likely to cause breach of peace of tranquility in the concerned area. 6. Mr.V.Sairam, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there was no whisper in the preliminary order passed by the Executive Magistrate, regarding the satisfaction about the existence of a likelihood of breach of peace, between the rival parlies, due to a dispute. He further submitted that it was mandatory on the party of the Executive Magistrate to state the grounds and reasons which had influenced him to arrive at a satisfaction regarding the likelihood of breach of peace, which was absent in the preliminary order promulgated by him. He further submitted that it was mandatory on the party of the Executive Magistrate to state the grounds and reasons which had influenced him to arrive at a satisfaction regarding the likelihood of breach of peace, which was absent in the preliminary order promulgated by him. It was also argued that throughout the preliminary order, the Magistrate has stated about the dispute regarding ownership, in a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., and not about possession, and therefore, the initiation of the proceedings was merely mechanical not supported by any application of mind. Finally it was submitted that the preliminary order was not in consonance with law in that the Executive Magistrate had restrained both the parties from entering into the disputed property till the disposal of the case. 7. Per contra, Thiru L.Mohan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, contended that it will not be beyond the scope of Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., to pass preliminary order even if there was a dispute regarding ownership of property, which was likely to cause breach of peace, though ultimately the decision will be limited to fix the party, who was in actual possession of the subject matter of dispute. It was his argument, that the ground for satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate, was the report of the Inspector of Police, Law and Order, which has been stated in the preliminary order and, therefore, there was no illegality in the order made under Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C. He also submitted that the petitioners having participated in the enquiry before the enquiring Magistrate, they should not be encouraged to challenge the preliminary order at a later stage before this Court. As far as the direction of the Executive Magistrate restraining both the parties from entering upon the disputed property, he had no argument to advance. 8. The question involved in this case has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court and other High Court. As far as the direction of the Executive Magistrate restraining both the parties from entering upon the disputed property, he had no argument to advance. 8. The question involved in this case has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court and other High Court. The three fundamental requisites to maintain an order under Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., are as follows.- (1) There must be a report of a police officer or other information that a dispute was likely to cause breach of peace concerning property mentioned in the section; (2) TheMagistrate must be satisfied on such police report or other information that the dispute was likely to cause breach of peace; and (3) On the satisfaction of the Magistrate, he must make an order in writing, stating the grounds for satisfaction, in the order he intends making under Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C. 9. In Nagammal v. Mini, 1966 L.W. (Crl.) 101, Ananthanarayanan, C.J., as he then was, held that it was the Magistrate who must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace existed and it was mandatory that he should stated the grounds of his being so satisfied, even if that particular word was not used, the matter was that the order must make it evident that the Magistrate had applied his judicial mind to the information and had come, to the conclusion that he should take action under Sec.145(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He should not take action merely on a police report. 10. Krishnaswamy Reddy, J., in Peria Manappa Gounder alias Pachamuthu and others v. Marappa Gounder, 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 179, observed that this provision of making the order in writing and stating the grounds of his satisfaction appears to be mandatory. The preliminary order should state clearly the reasons and grounds on which the satisfaction was based indicating that the Magistrate had applied his mind in passing the preliminary order. The judgment in Nagammal’s case, 1966 L.W. (Crl.) 101, was referred to and followed by Krishnaswamy Reddy, J. 11. The preliminary order should state clearly the reasons and grounds on which the satisfaction was based indicating that the Magistrate had applied his mind in passing the preliminary order. The judgment in Nagammal’s case, 1966 L.W. (Crl.) 101, was referred to and followed by Krishnaswamy Reddy, J. 11. P.K.Sethuraman, J., in Janaki Ramachandran v. State, 1988 M.L.J. (Crl.) 33: 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 147, reiterated the position that the requirement for passing a preliminary order under Sec.145(1), of the Criminal Procedure Code was the satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate about the information with regard to breach of peace and that the ground of his being so satisfied should be stated in the order. 12. K.M.Natarajan, J., in Natesa Thevar v. Executive Magistrate and Tahsildar, Tiruthuraipoondi and others, 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 50, after referring to the decision of Krishnaswamy Reddy, J., in Peria Mannadha Gounder’s case, 1968 L.W. (Crl.) 179, held that it was the duty of the Magistrate to state in his preliminary order the grounds of his satisfaction clearly to show that the Magistrate had applied his mind in the passing of the preliminary order. The said requirement was mandatory and noncompliance would certainly vitiate the preliminary order as one passed without jurisdiction. It was further observed that it cannot be satis that in every case such satisfaction would automatically follow from a report of a police officer or upon other information. 13. Ratnavel Pandian, J., as he then was, in Nanikyaraj Ballal v. K.Jayaraja Ballal and others, 1981L. W. (Crl.) 10, observed that an Executive Magistrate exercising powers under Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., gets jurisdiction only when there was a dispute likely to cause breach of peace concerning immovable property. The learned Judge was of the view that it was no doubt mandatory on the part of the Executive Magistrate while passing the preliminary order under Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C. to state in writing the grounds of his being so satisfied of the existence of a dispute and the likelihood of a breach of peace, but at the same time the Magistrate was not obliged to elaborately set out the entire details of the information received by him. That is to say, the preliminary order, on the face of it, should be set out the ground of his being so satisfied or at least employ language to similar effect so as to indicate that the Magistrate had applied his judicial mind to the information in coming to conclusion that there was in existence a dispute and the likelihood of breach of peace and, therefore, was a fit case for initiation of proceedings under Sec.145 of the Cr.P.Code. 14. The trend of the above decisions, clearly postulates that twin requirements of the satisfaction of the Magistrate and the ground of his satisfaction were different, if a Magistrate has stated that he is satisfied from a police report or other information that a breach of peace was likely to be caused, he was recording the fact of his satisfaction but not the grounds of satisfaction, the grounds or reasons which had led him to assume cannot merely be that there was a police report or other information, since that is necessarily the pre-requisite for action. The order, therefore, must indicate the grounds for finding that there were likelihood of breach of peace. Useful reference in this context could be made to the decision of the Kerala High Court reported in Cabriel Thankyyar and another v. Narayanan Nadar Perumal Nadar and others, 1979 M.L.J. (Crl.) 149. 15. Now if we peruse the preliminary order passed in the impugned proceedings, it shows that the Inspector of Police, Law and Order, Ranipet, has stated that the claim or ownership for a tiled house in Bhajanai Koil Street, Avarakarai village, was under dispute between two parties and it would cause breach of peace and tranquility in the area, requiring enquiry under Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C. The Executive Magistrate, after noting all that the Inspector of Police had stated, had proceeded to incorporate in the preliminary order that this dispute was likely to induce breach of peace in this connection between the two parties and he was satisfied to proceed under Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C. Apparently, the order does not disclose the grounds for finding that a breach of peace was likely. Noncompliance with the provisions of Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C., certainly vitiates the preliminary order, as it is one which is passed without jurisdiction. 16. Noncompliance with the provisions of Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C., certainly vitiates the preliminary order, as it is one which is passed without jurisdiction. 16. On the question as to whether Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., can be invoked even in respect of a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace in respect of the right to own or use immovable property, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a decision in Fate Mohammed v. The Crcel, 51 Crl.L.J. 55, wherein the Lahore High Court took the view that though the Magistrate initiating the proceedings on the existence of such disputes is required to make an enquiry into the fact of possession and to make certain in orders according to his findings, on this question there was no reason to limit the words descriptive of the dispute which give jurisdiction to the Magistrate to initiate the proceedings to disputes relating only to the fact of possession. The object of the section is the prevention of disputes as to immovable property likely to cause a breach of the peace and the words used “a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof” are wide enough to cover all kinds of disputes, not only disputes or to the fact of possession but also disputes or to the right to possess or the right to own or use immovable property, if they are likely to cause breach of the peace. 17. Ratnavel Pandian, J., in Manikyaraj Ballal’s case, 1981 L.W. (Crl.) 10, held that if the dispute was only in respect of the management of the company and not with regard to any possessory right of its immovable property leading to a breach of the peace, then certainly Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., cannot be invoked. This question need not have to be gone into elaborately, since this petition can be disposed of on the other grounds. 18. This question need not have to be gone into elaborately, since this petition can be disposed of on the other grounds. 18. The legality of the preliminary order, restraining both the parties from entering into the property till the petition was decided according to law by the Magistrate, was considered by this Court in Crl.M.P.No.1093 of 1987 and by an order dated 10.3.1987, Maheswaran, J., held that retraining both the petitioner and the counter petitioner from entering into the property in question was not warranted by the provision of Sec.145(1), of the Cr.P.C. The learned Judge also pointed out that the Magistrate had to pass an order if he was satisfied on a report of a police officer, stating the ground of his being so satisfied and there was no provision in Sec.145(1) of the Cr.P.C., empowering the Executive Magistrate to restrain both the parties from entering into the said property. 19. P.K.Sethuraman, J., in Janakari Ramachandran’s case, 1988 M.L.J. (Crl.) 33:1988 L.W. (Crl.) 147, was referred to the view expressed by Maheswaran, J., on this aspect of the case. 20. Janarthanam, J., in Venkatakrishnar. and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others , (1989)1 Crimes 236, expressed his opinion that the order passed by the Magistrate prohibiting both the parties from entering into the property in dispute, was totally without jurisdiction, calling for the setting aside of such an order. 21. This infirmity of restraining both the parties from entering into the subject matter of the dispute is a serious infirmity sufficient to vitiate the preliminary order in the impugned proceedings. 22. As stated earlier, it appears from the order in this case, that Executive Magistrate thought, that when the police laid some information concerning a dispute about a property in his jurisdiction, which may lead to a breach of peace, the Magistrate was thereupon bound to exercise his power under Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C. That is not the law, and in that case action under this section would merely mean a form of police procedure and not a judicial proceeding. Even on this ground the pending proceedings are liable to be quashed. 23. Even on this ground the pending proceedings are liable to be quashed. 23. At this stage reference will have to be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.H.Bhuttani v. Miss Mani J.Desai and others, 1969 M.L.J. (Crl.) 321, cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, wherein the Supreme Court held that the language of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.145 of the Cr.P.C., was clear and unambiguous that the Magistrate could arrive at his satisfaction from the police report or from other information which must include an application by the party concerned. The Supreme Court while dealing in that case with the observation of the High Court that a Police report ought to have been called, held that it was not warranted. It may be a safe rule, but not indispensable. In that case the Magistrate passed his preliminary order on the petition filed by one of the parties and examined the petitioner on oath before expressing his satisfaction as to the existence or a dispute relating to immovable property and the likelihood of breach of peace on the basis of the allegation in the petition. The decision will not be applicable to the facts of this case, because all that we are concerned in this case, is non application of the mind of the Magistrate to the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace and his non-stating of the ground of his satisfaction. The other decision referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in Ghulam Mohammed v. Hari Chand, 1978 Crl.L.J. 299, was to canvass the proposition that the party who had taken part in the proceedings after the passing of the preliminary order, by submitting his objections and proceeding evidence in the form of affidavits and other documents should not be allowed to challenge the preliminary order at this stage. That was a case where the final order was challenged and not at the initation of the proceedings as in this case. A perusal of the records also shows that no document had been produced by the petitioners and no witness had been examined on their behalf. This ruling also does not help the respondents. 24. In view of the legal infirmity in the preliminary order, the continuation of the proceedings in the Court below, will not have the sanction of law and, therefore, decree to be quashed. This ruling also does not help the respondents. 24. In view of the legal infirmity in the preliminary order, the continuation of the proceedings in the Court below, will not have the sanction of law and, therefore, decree to be quashed. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the proceedings in Roc.B No.10823 of 1988, dated 29.9.1988 on the file of the Taluk Executive Magistrate and Tahsildar, Wallaja are quashed.