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1989 DIGILAW 59 (BOM)

Nandlal Hiralal Gupta v. Narayan Dillidas Sahu

1989-02-17

M.S.RATNAPARKHI

body1989
JUDGMENT - RATNAPARKHI R.M.S., J.:—The decree passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Amravati on 11th July, 1988 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1985 dismissing the appeal and confirming the order of the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati passed on 31st January, 1985 in Small Cause Suit No. 276 of 1982 directing the defendant to pay Rs. 2970/- with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of suit till realisation with costs, has been challenged in this revision. 2. The plaintiff who is respondent in this revision, came before the trial Court with a suit for recovery of Rs. 2970/- on the allegations that the defendant was his tenant and the monthly rent was Rs. 110/-. It was his case that the defendant was in arrears of rent from 1-6-198- to 31-8-1982. He, therefore, served a notice on the defendant. In spite of this notice, the defendant did not repay the amount. Hence this suit. 3. The defendant denied the claim of the plaintiff. He denied that he was in arrears of rent. He, however, contended that the defendant had deposited Rs. 1500/- with the father of the plaintiff at the time of creation of tenancy and it was agreed that the deposit should be adjusted towards the rent. It was his contention that the plaintiff has not kept any accounts and no receipts have been passed. The suit was resisted on these grounds. 4. It appears that the suit was instituted as a Small Cause Suit, but it came to be transferred to the XIIth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati, who had no small cause powers. The learned Judge, therefore, tried this suit as a regular civil suit. Both the parties went to trial and adduced their respective evidence. On merits, the learned Judge found that the defendant was in arrears of rent of Rs. 2970/- for the period 1-6-1980 to 31-8-1982. The trial Court negatived the contention of the defendant that he had kept Rs. 1500/- in deposit with the plaintiff's father at the time of the inception of the tenancy. He also negatived the contention that the rent was to be adjusted towards this deposit. The Court, therefore, decreed the claim with interest. 5. This decree came to be challenged before the District Court at Amravati, but the learned Additional District Judge also dismissed this appeal. He also negatived the contention that the rent was to be adjusted towards this deposit. The Court, therefore, decreed the claim with interest. 5. This decree came to be challenged before the District Court at Amravati, but the learned Additional District Judge also dismissed this appeal. It is from this decree that the present revision is filed. Mr. Labde, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, strenuously contended before me that the suit was exclusively triable by the Court of Small Causes and, therefore, the decree passed by the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati was without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on (Kiransingh v. Chaman Paswan)1, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340, (Chokhiah Thever v. Shanmughasundaram)2, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 610 and (Khairullah v. Badri)3, A.I.R. 1973 Allahabad 340. The ratio in all these cases is that if a Court devoid of jurisdiction adjudicates any controversy, the consent of the parties does not vest the jurisdiction in that Court. The principle as is enunciated is salutary. The real question that arises for decision in this case is, whether the Court of the XIIth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati was devoid of any jurisdiction. Mr. Labde did contend before me that the Court of the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati was devoid of his jurisdiction. He invited my attention to sections 15 and 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The scheme of these two sections will definitely require scrutiny. Section 15 of the Act reads as follows: "15(1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Second Schedule as suit excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. (2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed two thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. (2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed two thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. (3) Subject as aforesaid, the State Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order." Section 16 of the Act reads as follows: "Save as expressly provided by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit cognizable by a Court of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other Court having jurisdiction within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes by which the suit is triable." 6. Before going to scrutinise the scheme of these two sections, some factual aspects, regarding which there is no dispute, will have to be considered. There is no Court of Small Causes established at Amravati. A Civil Judge, Senior Division is empowered under section 28 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act to try the suits of small cause nature, the valuation whereof does not exceed a particular limit. Other Judges of the Junior Division are also conferred with the powers under section 28 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act. At Amravati where the suit was instituted the position was quite clear. The present suit undisputedly was filed on 6-9-1982. From the Civil List that has been made available to me from the record of the High Court and (as it stood on 1st July, 1982) Mr. S.G. Hartalkar was a Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Amravati and he was invested with the small cause powers upto Rs. 2,700/-. The suit was instituted when Mr. Hartalkar was the Civil Judge, Senior Division. He could not take cognizance of the suit on the small cause side on the day the suit was instituted. Mr. Labde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, invited my attention to the Notification published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 2nd December, 1982, page 916 (Part I). A notification issued by the High Court on 22nd November, 1982 bearing No. A-3908/82 has been published and it shows that Mr. Mr. Labde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, invited my attention to the Notification published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 2nd December, 1982, page 916 (Part I). A notification issued by the High Court on 22nd November, 1982 bearing No. A-3908/82 has been published and it shows that Mr. S.G. Hartalkar, Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati was invested with the small cause powers upto Rs. 3,000/-. Thus it is clear that when this suit was instituted there was no Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Amravati having small cause powers beyond Rs. 2,700/-. The suit is for Rs. 2,970/-. Thus no Judge empowered with the small cause jurisdiction upto Rs. 3,000/- was posted at Amravati. The Judge, who admitted this suit must have admitted it not on the small cause side, but on the regular side. It appears that the suit was registered as a Small Cause suit, but it appears to be a misnomer as there was no Small Cause Court capable of taking cognizance of this monetary value at Amravati. It is true that subsequently in November, 1982 Mr. Hartalkar was conferred with the powers to take cognizance of small cause suits upto the value of Rs. 3,000/- The enhancement in the powers came subsequently. Perhaps by that time the suit was transferred to the Civil Judge, Junior Division. What Mr. Labde urged before me is that at least during the pendency of the suit there was a Court competent to take cognizance of this suit and, therefore, other courts had absolutely no jurisdiction. 7. In this context it will be necessary to examine section 32 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. It reads as follows: "32(1) So much of (Chapters III, VI and IV-A) as relates to- (a) the nature of the suits cognizable by courts of Small Causes, (b) the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other Courts in those suits. (c) the practice and procedure of courts of Small Causes, (d) appeal from certain orders of those courts and revision of cases decided by them and, (e) the finality of their decrees and orders subject to such appeal and revision as are provided by this Act. applied to courts invested by or under any enactment for the time being in force with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes so far as regards the exercise of that jurisdiction by those courts. applied to courts invested by or under any enactment for the time being in force with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes so far as regards the exercise of that jurisdiction by those courts. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) with respect to courts invested with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small causes applied to suit instituted or proceedings commenced in those courts before the date on which they were invested with that jurisdiction." 8. Thus an exception to sub-section (1) is carved out by sub-section (2), and it is that the provisions of sub-section (1) will not be applicable to the courts who have taken the cognizance of the suit, when it was not invested with small cause powers. What is pertinent to note at this stage is that section 16 of the Small Cause Courts Act also is not applicable to such category of cases and suits. Section 16 bars the jurisdiction of ordinary courts in entertaining and deciding the small cause suits. It means that the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Courts will be barred only when a Small Cause Court empowered with that much jurisdiction is in existence. If the Small Cause Court empowered with that jurisdiction is not in existence, then the jurisdiction of the Regular Court will not be barred. 9. This is exactly what has happened in the present case. When the suit was instituted on 6-9-1982, the Civil Judge, Senior Division was empowered to take cognizance of suits only upto the value of Rs. 2,700/-. The suit was valued at Rs. 2,970/-. Thus there was no Court established or existing at Amravati which could take the cognizance of the small cause suits of the value of Rs. 2,970/-. The suit came to be instituted in such a situation where the Small Cause Court competent to take that cognizance was not in existence. The suit ought to have been registered as a regular civil suit. As a result civil suit it could have been transferred to any Judge, who had jurisdiction. 10. What happened actually is that, the suit came to be transferred to the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati. There is no dispute that the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division had pecuniary jurisdiction to take the cognizance of this matter. As a result civil suit it could have been transferred to any Judge, who had jurisdiction. 10. What happened actually is that, the suit came to be transferred to the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati. There is no dispute that the 12th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division had pecuniary jurisdiction to take the cognizance of this matter. The learned Judge has made a specific note that as she had no small cause powers, she is trying the suit as a regular suit. She has tired this suit as she had jurisdiction to try it. That jurisdiction could no be barred by section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act because no Court to take cognizance of that small cause suit was in existence at Amravati. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the arguments of Mr. Labde that the Court, which passed the decree was devoid of any jurisdiction. To repeat it once again, the ratio laid down in Kiransingh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 and Chokhiah Thever v. Shanmughasundaram, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 610 cannot be applied to the present case because the Court which decided the suit was not devoid of jurisdiction. Similarly, the ratio laid down in Khairullah v. Badri, A.I.R. 1973 All. 340, cannot be applied to the present case because there was no Small Cause Court empowered with this much jurisdiction existing at Amravati. Thus the point as far as jurisdiction is concerned fails. 11. In (Bhaiyyalal v. Tikaram)4, 1970 M.P.L.J. 622 : A.I.R. 1970 Madhya Pradesh 237, the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in paragraph 102 of the judgment has taken the view that irrespective of the provisions of section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the judgment and decree passed by the regular Court in the suit of small cause nature is not void and without jurisdiction. In view of this position of law, this argument cannot be sustained. 12. Mr. Labde then urged that the trial Court was not justified in rejecting his defence about the deposit. The trial Court has given cogent reasoning. There are also circumstances which go against the defendant-petitioner. He says that the deposit was kept with the plaintiff's father long back in 1963. According to him, there was a contract that rent should be adjusted from this deposit. The trial Court has given cogent reasoning. There are also circumstances which go against the defendant-petitioner. He says that the deposit was kept with the plaintiff's father long back in 1963. According to him, there was a contract that rent should be adjusted from this deposit. His case is that throughout the rent was never adjusted. The defendant continued to pay rent throughout. This, according to me, appears to be rather inconsistent with the ordinary human conduct. When a tenant has already deposited Rs. 1,500/- with the plaintiff with a contract to adjust the rent from this deposit, no man of ordinary prudence will continue paying rent keeping the deposit intact. Apart from this, there is no cogent evidence to corroborate this case. This is after all a finding of fact, based on good material, which cannot be interfered with under the revisional jurisdiction. 13. Civil App. No. 3179 of 1988 filed by petitioner for permission to file two receipts on record has no merits in view of the observations made earlier. It is rejected. 14. There is hardly any merit in this revision, with the result that the revision is dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no orders as to costs. Revision dismissed. -----