JUDGMENT : 1. - The following questions have been referred for answer by the Division Bench:- (1) WHETHER the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act in the absence of specific pleading, issue and evidence in that regard and for that purpose the ground set out in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act stands on a different footing from the other grounds of eviction contained in Section 13 (1) of the Act? (2) CAN a tenant be said to have committed default in payment of rent on the first day after the expiry of the month even though in view of sub-sec. (1) of Section 19A of the Act, the rent can be paid upto 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable? (3) DOES the decision of this Court in Premlal v. Jadav Chand hold good after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yeshodai Animal ? 2. A few relevant facts may, briefly, be stated, so that, it may be known as to how the questions arose for consideration by a Larger Bench. 3. The appellant Lallu Narayan filed a suit against the defendant Shri Ratan Chand Lunia for eviction from the shop. The eviction was sought on the grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting and reasonable bona fide and personal necessity. The Additional Civil Judge (Small Causes) Jaipur City, Jaipur decreed the suit on 27-11-79 on the ground of default in payment of rent for the period from June 1967 to December 1967 and also on the ground of denial of title by the defendant. 4. The two grounds of sub-letting and personal necessity were found against the plaintiff. On appeal, the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur City, Jaipur dismissed the suit on 25-2-1942. The findings on sub-letting and reasonable bona fide and personal necessity and comparative hardship were affirmed. 4. The two grounds of sub-letting and personal necessity were found against the plaintiff. On appeal, the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur City, Jaipur dismissed the suit on 25-2-1942. The findings on sub-letting and reasonable bona fide and personal necessity and comparative hardship were affirmed. As regards, the default in payment of rent, the Additional District Judge held that there was proper and valid tender of rent for a period upto May 1967 to Smt. Bhanwari Bai and in respect of the period subsequent to May 1967, it could not be said that there was default in payment of rent for the period of six months because the rent for the month of November, 1967 could be paid upto 15th December 1967, and the suit had been filed on 9-12-67 i.e. prior to 15th December, 1967 and, therefore, it could not be said that on the date of filing of the suit, the respondent had committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months. On the ground of denial of title, it was held that a decree could not be passed on that ground in favour of the plaintiff as no such plea was raised in the plaint. 5. The learned Single Judge noted three decisions in the following cases, wherein, the decree was passed on the ground of denial of title under Section 13 (1)(f) of the Act:- Shree Kishan v. Khemchand (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 320/70, decided on 25.1.82 by Hon'ble Shri G. M. Lodha, J.), Basanta and another v. Mandir Shree Sitaramji Maharaj & Others (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 216/84, decided on 8.1.86 by Hon'ble Shri M. B. Sharma, J.), and Noor Mohammed v. Nathulal (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 8/82, decided on 15.9.87 by Hon'ble Shri G. M. Lodha, J.). 6. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant Lallu Narayan had placed reliance on the aforesaid unreported decisions of this Court. 7. On behalf of the defendant respondent, Shri S. M. Mehta, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Bhinwa Ram v. Satya Narain and Others, decided on 10.12.85. 6. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant Lallu Narayan had placed reliance on the aforesaid unreported decisions of this Court. 7. On behalf of the defendant respondent, Shri S. M. Mehta, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Bhinwa Ram v. Satya Narain and Others, decided on 10.12.85. In Bhinwa Ram v. Satya Narain (decided by Hon'ble Shri K. S. Lodha, J.), it was held that unless the ground is pleaded and the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity of rebutting it, it would not be proper for a court to pass decree for ejectment on the ground of denial of title of the landlord plaintiff. Noticing the conflict in the decisions of this Court, the learned Judge felt that the conflict should be resolved by a Larger Bench, hence he framed question No. I to be answered by a Larger Bench. 8. With regard to . the second question, the decision of this Court in (5) Hanuman Das v. Sanwal Ram, ( 1982 RLR 916 ) was relied upon by Shri S. C. Agrawal learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. In that case, the suit was filed on 13.8.76. The plaintiff's case was that the tenant committed default in payment of rent for a period from July 1976. On behalf of the tenant, however, it was urged that default in payment of rent for a period from July 1976 could not be taken into consideration in view of the provision contained in sub-sec. (I) of Section 19A of the Act, inasmuch as, the rent for the month of July, 1976 could be paid or remitted upto 15.8.76. In the aforesaid case, it was observed that sub- sec. (4) of Section 19A of the Act creates a legal fiction and the said fiction is attracted only when rent is paid or tendered within the specific period by 15th day of the next following month and not otherwise and since, the rent for the month of July 1976 was neither paid nor remitted within the permissible period and as such, it cannot be deemed to have been paid or tendered within the time for the purpose of Clause (a) of sub-sec (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Hon'ble Shri S. C. Agrawal, J. did not agree with the aforesaid view expressed in the said decision. Hon'ble Shri S. C. Agrawal, J. did not agree with the aforesaid view expressed in the said decision. On that basis, the second question was framed by him. 9. Similarly, the learned Judge noticed the conflict in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Premlal v. Jadav Chand, (1977 (2) RLW 265) and a decision of the Supreme Court in V.Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yeshodai Ammal. (AIR l979 SC 1745) , wherein, it was held that making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceedings on the basis of determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court, the question No. 3 was framed. 10. We shall now proceed to deal with question No. 1. 11. Section 13 (1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 sets out various grounds of eviction. If any one or more grounds exist, a decree or order for eviction of the tenant can be passed by the court in favour of the landlord. Unless the court is satisfied that any one or more of the grounds exist, no decree or order for eviction can be passed by the court. It is for the landlord to aver and allege in the plaint the ground or grounds of eviction and it is for him to prove and establish the grounds on the basis of which he wants the tenant to be evicted. One of the grounds mentioned in Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 is that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant. If the landlord establishes this ground at the trial, he is entitled to obtain a decree or order of eviction. 12. There may be cases, where it may be in the knowledge of the landlord that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title and there has been no waiver or condonation on his part. He may allege these facts in the plaint and set up this ground in his pleading. 12. There may be cases, where it may be in the knowledge of the landlord that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title and there has been no waiver or condonation on his part. He may allege these facts in the plaint and set up this ground in his pleading. But there may be cases, where the plaintiff may simply allege that the defendant is a tenant and he wants a decree for eviction on any of the grounds specified in the various clauses of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 other than Sec-13 (1) (f) and for the first time, the tenant in his written statement, comes out with the plea that he is not in possession of the premises in his character as tenant or he comes out with the plea denying the title of the landlord or he may set up the title in some one-else other than the plaintiff or may come forward with the plea that he is in possession of the premises in his own right. 13. The question that arises for consideration is whether on the basis of the plea taken by the defendant in the written statement, the plaintiff landlord can obtain any advantage of that particular plea, when he establishes that the defendant is a tenant of the plaintiff. The Rent Act presupposes existence of the oral relationship of landlord and tenant. It is only when the landlord establishes his relationship with the defendant as tenant, his action against the tenant would be maintainable else the provision of Section 13 itself would not at all be attracted. The very basis of the provision is the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Without any averment in the plaint and without any issue, relating to Cl. (f) of Section 13 (1), if the parties went to trial and the parties lead evidence and cross- examine each other and the witnesses, the question arises as to whether in that situation. the court can pass a decree for eviction on the basis of the ground contained in Cl. (f) of Section 13 (1) of the Act. 14. In Shreekishan v. Khemchand (supra), the defendant contested the suit for eviction alleging that the property was not an evacuee property and, that was not sold in any auction and the defendant was the owner of the property. (f) of Section 13 (1) of the Act. 14. In Shreekishan v. Khemchand (supra), the defendant contested the suit for eviction alleging that the property was not an evacuee property and, that was not sold in any auction and the defendant was the owner of the property. Issue was framed as to whether the defendant came in occupation of the suit-house as a tenant of the custodian and whether the suit-house was purchased by the plaintiff. The court found that the property belongs to Evacuee Department and then, it was sold to Girraj who sold it to the plaintiff and the plaintiff became the owner of the property and the defendants are the tenants of the property. In the light of the plea taken by the defendant the applicability of provisions of Section 13 (I) (f) was considered. The learned Judge observed that there is not only denial by the defendant that the plaintiff was the landlord, the defendant asserted that the property was owned and possessed by him and it was held that the decree passed by the first appellate court can be maintained under Section 13 (1) (f) and there is no necessity of remanding the case at this belated stage. It would appear that the defendant set up his own title to the property and claimed ownership. 15. In Basanta & another v. Mandir Shree Sitaramji Maharaj & others (supra), the suit for eviction was filed on the ground of default and the same was contested by the defendant-appellants and they denied that the suit-shop was taken on rent or they are the tenants in the suit-shop. The appellants denied the title of the landlord and set up the title in themselves. In para 18 of the additional pleas, it was pleaded that the suit-shop was owned by the defendant-appellants and they are in possession of it since the time of their father in the capacity of the owner thereof. Relying on the decision in Shier Kishan's case (supra), the learned Judge expressed the opinion that the decree for eviction can be upheld on the ground as contained in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. The defendant-appellants in that case, went to Supreme Court but their Special Leave Petition No. 7036/86 was dismissed as submitted by Shri S.C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff- appellant. 16. The defendant-appellants in that case, went to Supreme Court but their Special Leave Petition No. 7036/86 was dismissed as submitted by Shri S.C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff- appellant. 16. A similar view was further taken in Noor Mohamood v. Nathulal (supra) and it was observed that the law is well-settled so far as this Court is concerned, that if the tenant contests the title or renounces his character as contemplated by Cl. (f) of Section 13 (1) then, landlord can get decree for eviction without having formal pleading in the plaint, issue and requirement of remand on that point. It was observed in that case that the tenant not only denied the title but he has renounced his character as tenant, which is evident from reply of paras 2, 3 and 5 and also the additional pleas in which, he has consistently pleaded that he never took the premises as a tenant but it was one Mehboob Khan Mohammed Mehboob Alam who is the relation of the defendant and it is Mohammed Mehboob Alam who took the premises on rent who is in possession. It was held that obviously the present case fulfils the requirement of renouncing the character of tenant as contemplated by Cl. (f) of Section 13 (1) of the Act. 17. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Mst. Kamla Bai alias Bhanwari v. Sitaram, (S B. Civil Second Appeal No. 121 of 1988, decided on 13.9.1988) . In that case, the defendants had set up the plea that she is not the tenant of the plaintiff and she is not liable to pay any rents for the premises and she has been in possession of the premises for the last 40 years and has acquired proprietary rights by adverse possession. The court found that the defendant was the tenant of the plaintiff and in view of the finding, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for the reason that the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff-landlord. The judgment was affirmed in appeal and in the second appeal, this argument was turned down that no issue was framed by the trial court on the question of denial of title and in the absence of such issue no decree for eviction could be passed. The judgment was affirmed in appeal and in the second appeal, this argument was turned down that no issue was framed by the trial court on the question of denial of title and in the absence of such issue no decree for eviction could be passed. Hon'ble Agrawal, J. observed that it is true that no specific issue for denial of title was farmed by the trial court but the parties went to trial on the basis of the defence set up by the defendant. The defence of the defendant was denial of title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises and there was issue No. 1 as to whether the suit premises were let out to the defendant. The decree for eviction was maintained on the ground of denial of title and it was observed that no substantial question of law arises in the second appeal. 18. A contrary view was taken in Bhinwaram's case (supra). The plaintiff's suit for ejectment was decreed and in appeal, the defendant-appellant's case was that the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiffs can get a decree in their favour only if they prove their title that the defendant is the tenant. The learned District Junge held that in this suit, the plaintiff, are not required to establish their title and it w.is proved that the defendant was the plaintiff's tenant. With regard to the ground contained in Section 13 (1) (f) an application was filed praying that the plaintiff, may be allowed to amend the plaint. It was also prayed that either this ground may be taken into account as such or the plaintiffs may be allowed to amend the plaint to incorporate the plea. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondents it was urged that the defendant had denied the plaintiff's title not only in the written statement but had made denial the ground before the first appellate court and this Court can take note of the denial and on the basis of admission of the defendant to the effect that he has denied the title of the defendant, decree of ejectment may be maintained on this additional ground under Section 13 (I) (f) of the Act. The learned Judge observed that no doubt, it does appear that in the written statement as also before the first appellate court, the defendant appears to have denied the plaintiffs' title and has also asserted his own but the question is whether at this stage, this ground of ejectment can be taken into consideration without any pleading or any further proof. Learned Judge observed as under:- "I am clearly of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, this cannot be done in view of the requirements of S 13 (1) (f). Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act lays down that a decree for ejectment can be passed against a tenant if the Court is satisfied that the tenant has renounced the character of the landlord as such or denied the title of the landlord and the the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant. Now even if it is held that the tenant has, in the written statement as well as before the first appellate court renounced his character as such or has denied the title of the landlord which by itself may furnish a ground for the landlord to file a suit for ejectment against the tenant and in that suit it will also have to be established to the satisfaction of the Court that the landlord has not waived his right of ejectment on this ground nor has he condoned the conduct of the tenant in renouncing the title of the landlord. Now in the present suit, the landlord has claimed ejectment only on the grounds of default and his personal bona fide necessity but now on account of the denial of his title in the written statement by the tenant if he wants to take advantage of this additional ground, he can do so only if he can plead it by way of amendment and not by merely relying on the so-called denial of his title in the written statement. The plaintiff has also to plead and prove that he has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant on account of this ground of ejectment. Therefore, unless this ground is pleaded and the defendant has the reasonable opportunity of rebutting it, it would not be proper for this Court to base the decree for ejectment on this ground." 19. Therefore, unless this ground is pleaded and the defendant has the reasonable opportunity of rebutting it, it would not be proper for this Court to base the decree for ejectment on this ground." 19. In Moolchand v. Poonamchand ( 1987 (1) RLR 396 ) the plaintiff's suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title and default but the ground of reasonable necessity was rejected. The suit for eviction was based on the ground of default in payment of rent, denial of title and reasonable and personal necessity. In appeal, it was held that the plaintiff is not entitled for eviction on the ground of denial of title but decreed the suit on the ground of default. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, it was submitted in the second appeal that both the courts- below had rejected the contention of the plaintiff only on the ground that the allegations made in the plaint are vague both with respect to the denial of the title and reasonable & bonafide necessity. The defendant did not ask for better particulars which he ought to have done and, therefore, when the issues had already been framed and parties have led evidence, he cannot take up the plea now at this stage. He ought to have pressed that no cause of action had been shown or the pleading is insufficient. This point cannot be taken up in appeal for the first time and since no prejudice has been caused to the defendant, he cannot be allowed to raise this plea in appeal. It was also submitted that the defendant was fully aware about the fact that he had denied the title of the plaintiff in his earlier suit and, therefore, denial of title entitles the landlord for a decree on this ground. The defendant's case was that the pleas are vague and insufficient and the prejudice to the defendant is obvious. It was contended that the defendant had no notice as to when he denied the title of the plaintiff under what circumstances and in what words and if this would have been mentioned in the plaint, the defendant would have taken the plea that his case is covered by Section 13 (1) (f) proviso that the landlord has waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant denying the title of the landlord. It was stated that in the present case, the defendant has admitted in the written statement that he was a tenant and it was for the plaintiff to have given more particulars. It was held that the pleadings regarding the denial of title are vague. It was further observed that with regard to the ground of denial of title, the prejudice to the defendant is obvious. The tenant is not aware as to when he had denied the title of the plaintiff in what words under what circumstances. It was further observed that more-over, if the date, time etc, with regard to denial of title of the plaintiff had been given, the defendant could have pleaded that the land-lord had waived his right and condoned the denial. It would appear that the observations have been made having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's pleadings. In this case. the ground of denial of title was taken in the plaint itself but the plea was found to be vague and as such, was of no avail to the plaintiff. 20. In Kundan Mal v. Gurudutta, (1989 (1) UJ (SC) 413) the tenant was in possession of the structure in question since 1953, when he was inducted by the owner one Nawab M Ali Khan, The owner died in 1969. Some dispute arose between his legal representatives and the present respondent-landlord. The dispute was settled in favour of respondent No. 1 and according to the case of the appellant he duly recognised him as his landlord and started paying rent. In 1973 the appellant-tenant received a notice from the Municipal authorities asking him to remove the disputed structures on the ground that it was erected on the Government land. According to the appellant-tenant, the notice was issued at the instance of respondent No. 1. The tenant in that situation was forced to file a suit for injunction against the Municipal authorities. The respondent No. 1 filed a suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and denial of his title. The suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title but the case of default in payment of rent was rejected. The appellant's first appeal was dismissed and his second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court in limine. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the courts-below. The suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title but the case of default in payment of rent was rejected. The appellant's first appeal was dismissed and his second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court in limine. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the courts-below. The matter was considered in the light of the averments made in the plaint filed by the tenant against the Municipal Authorities. Their Lordships observed that even interpreting the plaint in a manner as favourable to the landlord as may be possible it has to be accepted that the document cannot be construed to clearly deny the respondent's title in unambiguous terms. It was observed that firstly, it has to be noticed that although the respondent was wrongly described as an heir, his title to the property was acknowledged. It was further observed that the principle of forfeiture on disclaimer is founded on the rule that a man cannot approbate or reprobate at the same time. Since the consequence of applying the rule is very serious, it must be held that the denial has to be clear and in unequivocal terms. 21. Shri S.C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaint if appellant submitted that the plaintiff in the present suit has averred that the defendant had taken the suit-shop on rent through a registered rent-note on 25-1-58 from the plaintiff and his father Shiv Narayan on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-for a period of three years and after three years, the defendant executed another rent-note in favour of his father on 11.9.62 in the absence of the plaintiff and got the same registered. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff that the defendant agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 101/- per month, after some alterations if made as agreed. The defendant executed an agreement to that effect in favour of the plaintiff and his father and that was also signed by the plaintiff and his father being the owners of the suit shop. In this agreement the defendant categorically stated that the plaintiff had let out the shop to the defendant at the rate of Rs. 80/-per month. After alteration having been effected in the premises, the defendant paid the rent upto Dec. 1965 at Rs. 101/- per month. In this agreement the defendant categorically stated that the plaintiff had let out the shop to the defendant at the rate of Rs. 80/-per month. After alteration having been effected in the premises, the defendant paid the rent upto Dec. 1965 at Rs. 101/- per month. It was averred by the plaintiff that the father of the plaintiff died on 19.2.66. He was survived by the plaintiff being his adopted son, his widow Smt. Bhanwari Devi and daughter Kamla Devi. Both these ladies had executed a release-deed in favour of the plaintiff on 27.5.67 and got the same registered. 22. The defendant admitted himself to be the tenant of the shop in question at Rs. 80/-per month but he pleaded that the shop was not taken on rent from the plaintiff and he also denied that Shiv Narayan was the plaintiff's father. He admitted to have executed the rent-note in favour of Shiv Narayan on 11.9.62 and he denied that it was done in the absence of the plaintiff With regard to the agreement as alleged in para 4 of the plaint it was stated that it was executed as per the desire of the deceased Shiv Narayan. The fact of adoption was denied and it was denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the property of Shiv Narayan. It was averred that the suit-shop was initially taken on rent from Shiv Narayan and rent-note was executed in his favour. Since August 1951 he is in possession of the suit-shop as a tenant. With regard to the registered rent-note executed in January 1958 it was averred that it was executed as per the desire of Shiv Narayan and Shiv Narayan give out his thinking of taking the plaintiff in adoption. After the death of Shiv Narayan, the payment of rent is alleged to have been made to Smt. Bhanwari Devi, issue No. 1 was framed regarding the plaintiff being the adopted son of Shirt Shiv Narayan Issue No. 11 (a) was framed with regard to the execution of the release deed in favour of the plaintiff by Smt. Bhanwari Devi and Smt. Kamla Devi and if it is decided in favour of the plaintiff whether the same is bad on account of misrepresentation, fraud and collusion. Issues No. 7 and 8 related to the payment of rent upto December 1965 at Rs. Issues No. 7 and 8 related to the payment of rent upto December 1965 at Rs. 101/- per month and claim of rent at the same rate w.e.f. 1.1.66. Issue No. 20 was to the effect as to whether the defendant is estopped to challenge the plaintiff's right as landlord. 23. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submitted that the parties went to trial knowing it fully well that there is a denial of the plaintiff's title by the defendant. The defendant conducted the whole case on that basis. The entire proceedings amply demonstrate it. The plaintiff's application dated 6.2.70 under Section 13(6) of the Act was rejected on 6.4.70 holding that the provision of Section 13(4) and Section 13(5) could not be invoked and defence could not be struck out. The defendant deposited rent without prejudice. On 20.12.75, the application under section 13A was rejected on this very basis that the defendant has not admitted himself to be the tenant of the plaintiff and relationship between the landlord and the tenant is disputed. The application was held to be not entertain able. The application under Section 19A was also dealt with on the basis that the tenant would not be entitled to take any benefit of the provision of Section 19A and payment of rent deposited by the tenant was ordered to be made to the plaintiff on the basis that this would not in any way affect the rights of the parties. The tenant had admitted in the rent-note (Ex. 2) dated 1.12.54 that he has been inducted as tenant in the suit-premises. After the remand of the suit, the defendant in his statement. categorically stated on oath that despite execution of the lease-deed in favour of the plaintiff in 1958, he denies the title of the plaintiff as the plaintiff's name was written in the rent-note at the behest of Shiv Narayan. He stated that the name of the plaintiff appeared in the agreement in 1965 but it was written at the instance of Shri Shivnarayan. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submitted that the finding on issue No. 20 was recorded in favour of the plaintiff and the same was not even disputed by the tenant in the first appeal filed by him. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submitted that the finding on issue No. 20 was recorded in favour of the plaintiff and the same was not even disputed by the tenant in the first appeal filed by him. When the defendant tenant has been estopped from challenging the title of the landlord, the finding clearly makes out the case of denial of title. Shri Agrawal, therefore, contended that when the parties went to trial with open eyes on the question of denial of title and no prejudice whatsoever has been shown to have been caused to the tenant. it is not only competent for the court to take into consideration the ground of denial of title but the court should pass a decree for eviction when the ground of denial of title is fully proved, more particularly, when there has been no waiver or condonation of the said plea on the part of the land-lord and when no such plea of waiver or condonation has been raised by the tenant. 24. Shri Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant placed reliance on Nagubai Ammal and others v. B. Shama Rao and others ( AIR 1956 SC 593 ) . In that case, it was argued that no plea of Lis pendens was taken in the pleadings, the evidence bearing on the question could not be properly looked into and that no decision could be given based on Ex. J series that the sale dated 30.1.20 was affected by it and reliance was placed on the observations of Lord Dunedin in Siddik Mohamed Shah v. Mt. Saran ( AIR 1930 PC 57 ) . that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward." Their Lordships observed as under:- "The true scope of this rule is that evidence let in one issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to it case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto. But that rule has no application to it case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto. The rule applicable to this class of cases is that laid down in Rani Chandra Kunwar v. Narpatsingh. 34 Ind. App. 27 (B) . There, the defendants put-forward at the time of a trial a contention that the plaintiff had been given away in adoption and was in consequence not entitled to inherit. No such plea was taken in the written statement, not was any issue framed thereon. Before the Privy Council, the contention was raised on behalf of the plaintiff that in view of the pleadings, the question of adoption was not open to the defendants. It was held by Lord Atkinson over-ruling this objection that as both the parties had gone to trial on the question of adoption and as the plaintiff had not been taken by surprise, the plea as to adoption was open to the defendants and indeed the defendants succeeded on that very issue. This objection must accordingly be over-ruled." 25. Reference was also made to Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandri (A.I.R. 1966 SC 735) . Their lordships observed in para 10:- "But in considering the application, of this doctrine to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the other principle that considerations of form cannot over-ride the legitimate considerations of substance. If a plan is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties know that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief' should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them then the argument that a particular matter vas not expressly taken in the pleadings would he purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. But where the substantial matters relating to title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them then the argument that a particular matter vas not expressly taken in the pleadings would he purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial and did they lead evidence about it? It appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial & one of them has had (illegible) opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another. Therefore, in dealing with Mr. Setalved's argument, our enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings as their substance; we must find out whether the ground of licence on which the plaintiffs claim for ejectment has been confirmed by the High Court was in substance the subject matter of the trial or not; did not defendant know that alternatively, the plaintiff would rely upon the plea of licence and has evidence been given about the said plea by both the parties or not ? If the answers to these questions are in favour of the plaintiff then the technical objection that the plaint did not specifically make out a case for licence, would not avail the defendant." 26. On the facts of that case, it was observed that the plaintiff led evidence about the tenancy set up by him and the defendant led evidence about the agreement on which he relied. When the parties led evidence in this case. clearly they were conscious of this position. and so, the tenancy had not been proved but the defendant's agreement also had not been established it clearly followed that the defendant was in possession of the suit premises by the leave and licence of the plaintiff. When the parties led evidence in this case. clearly they were conscious of this position. and so, the tenancy had not been proved but the defendant's agreement also had not been established it clearly followed that the defendant was in possession of the suit premises by the leave and licence of the plaintiff. Once this conclusion was reached, the question as to whether any relief can be granted to the plaintiff or not, was a mere matter of law and in deciding this point in favour of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the defendant. 27. In Chiranjilal v. Shankarlal and another, (AIR 1951 SC 56) , the Division Bench of this Court held that where inspite of the commission to frame issues a party has adduced evidence without any objection and the evidence adduced clearly shows that he fully knew what case he had to meet, there can be no prejudice to him by the omission and the decision would not be set aside in Second Appeal". 28. Reliance was also placed on State of Punjab v. Rua Das Kaushal ( AIR 1971 SC 1676 ) wherein, it was observed that plea is not waived if necessary facts were present in the mind of the parties and gone into by Court. Absence of specific plea in written statement and framing of specific issue of waiver by Court is immaterial. 29. In Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana v. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah and another ( 1987 (1) SCC 254 ) it was observed that all ingredients of statutory ground of eviction must be pleaded and proved by landlord. 30. Reference was made to Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ) , in which, it was observed that any amount of proof offered without appropriate pleading is generally of no relevance. But their Lord- ships declined to interfere in the impugned order of eviction in that case, although agreeing with the above statement of law. Their Lordships said that a clean and clear case with reasons and without suppressing any fact, was put forward by landlord and eviction order was passed by the Rent Controller on the basis of the findings regarding bonafide requirement and appeal and revision filed by tenant were dismissed. 31. Their Lordships said that a clean and clear case with reasons and without suppressing any fact, was put forward by landlord and eviction order was passed by the Rent Controller on the basis of the findings regarding bonafide requirement and appeal and revision filed by tenant were dismissed. 31. Reference was also made to Prabhulal v. Kaluram, (1985 RLW 713 : 1986 RLR 413) . In that case, there was no specific plea of material alteration, still, the Court held that on a thoughtful consideration and analysis of the provisions of law, the pleadings and evidence. the court is convinced that they are not sufficient to reverse the findings of the two courts below. 32. In Narsingh Das v. Mst. Amar Kanwar, (1966 RLW 222) the learned Single Judge found that the courts below were right in holding that there has been denial of title of the landlord by the tenant. It was further observed that according to Section 13 (f) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1959 denial of the title of the landlord by the defendant-tenant was sufficient to disentitle him from claiming the protection of Section 13 of this Act. The legislature has not qualified or conditioned the expression -denied the title of the landlord" by providing for any consideration such as of there being any honest belief in the mind of a tenant that the assignee was not his landlord. The denial of the title of the landlord is a fault condonable at the hands of the landlord. but the present is not a case of waiver and, therefore, there is no occasion to examine whether there was any waiver or not by the landlord". It was observed in para 7 that whether there has been denial of title of the landlord by a tenant in a particular case will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and no formula of general application to cover all kinds of cases can be pressed in service. 33. It was observed in para 7 that whether there has been denial of title of the landlord by a tenant in a particular case will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and no formula of general application to cover all kinds of cases can be pressed in service. 33. In Ram Niwas and another v. Rakesh Kumar and others (A.I.R. 1981 P&H 397) relying on the decision Nagu Bai Ammal v. B Sharma Rao (A.I.R. 1956 SC 593) , it was observed that it is well-settled that if the parties know that a point arises in a case and they produce evidence on it, though it does not find place in the pleadings and no specific issue has been framed on it, the Court can still adjudicate thereon. None of the parties can be allowed to say that the Court cannot decide the matter because it was not raised in the pleadings." 34. Shri S. M. Mehta, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent submitted that the Division Bench is only required to answer the question as framed by the learned Judge and is not required to decide the Second Appeal itself, so it is not necessary for the Division Bench to enter into the merits of plea based on See. 13 (1) (f). It will be for the Judge hearing the Second Appeal to decide as to whether there has been denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendant-tenant in the present case. The question before the Division Bench is whether the plea can be considered in the absence of specific pleading, issue and evidence and whether the ground under Section 13 (1) (f) stands on different footing than the other grounds. In the absence of pleading, such a plea cannot be allowed to be taken or raised. Reliance was placed on Hasmat Rai's case (supra) of which reference has been made in Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satya Narayan's case (supra). 35. Shri Mehta, also, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Shiv Narayan v. Bal Kishan ( 1979 (2) RCJ 30 ) . The plea of denial of title was raised by the plaintiff in the plaint but on merit, it was held to be not sustained. The plea was based on para 2 of the Additional Pleas of the written statement of the defendant (Ex. 7) filed in a previous suit for rent. The plea of denial of title was raised by the plaintiff in the plaint but on merit, it was held to be not sustained. The plea was based on para 2 of the Additional Pleas of the written statement of the defendant (Ex. 7) filed in a previous suit for rent. The plea taken by the tenant was to the effect that the rent-note was not produced before filing of the written statement and so, an objection was taken that in the absence of the rent-note, it is not definitely known, who are the owners of the demised premises and as such the defendant stated that the plaintiff has not impleaded necessary parties in the suit according to the rent-note viz. the heirs of Raghunath Dass and other owners and, therefore, the suit cannot proceed. The contention was that there is direct repudiation of the relation hip of landlord and tenant. But it was held that such a plea cannot amount to repudiation of the plaintiff's title as this cannot be construed as a denial of the landlord's title in clear and unequivocal terms. 36. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submitted that the plaintiff can be granted decree for possession on the basis of title as the question of plaintiff's title is very much in issue in the suit. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Pushpa Sharma v. Gopal Lal Rawat (1986 RLW 618 : 1986 RLR 623) and reference was also made to Ram Niwas v. Rakesh Kumar and others (supra). Suffice it to say that this question can be gone into by the Judge hearing the Second Appeal and it is not necessary for us to examine this submission. 37. Answer to Question No. 1 has to be found on the basis of case law discussed and considered above. Normally and generally, there should be a clear and specific pleading and there should be issue thereon and the parties should have full opportunity to adduce evidence. The same is true with regard to the grounds mentioned in Section 13 (1) and the ground set out in Section 13 (1) (f) does not stand on a different footing, from the other grounds. However. looking to the nature of the ground. The same is true with regard to the grounds mentioned in Section 13 (1) and the ground set out in Section 13 (1) (f) does not stand on a different footing, from the other grounds. However. looking to the nature of the ground. under Section 13 (1) (f), if the same is not pleaded and specific issue is not framed, still, if the parties went to trial in the suit and had led evidence and no real prejudice is shown to have been caused, then, the court is competent and is entitled to consider and decide as to whether the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1)(f) is proved or not and decree for eviction can be passed if the same is found in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. If no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant, the merit of the plea based on Section 13 (1) (f) can be examined by the Court when the parties have gone to trial on that plea. Rule propounded in Nagu Bai Ammal's case (supra) and followed in Bhagwati Prasad's case (supra) is salutary in character and it appears to be based on the principle that the dispute between the parties should see its end by granting or refusing the relief as the case may be when the parties had already gone to trial on the dispute. It would be unjust to drive the parties, in further litigation when the parties in fact, have joined the issue at the trial. It appears that the earlier unreported decisions of this Court and the law propounded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as considered above were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge, in Bhinwaram's case (supra). We do not agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that if the landlord on account of denial of title in the written statement by the tenant, wants to take advantage of this additional ground, he can do so only if he can plead it by way of amendment and not by merely relying on the so called denial of his title in the written statement. It may be stated that a decree for eviction can be founded on the basis of admission unless the admission is explained. It may be stated that a decree for eviction can be founded on the basis of admission unless the admission is explained. If the tenant has renounced his character as such or has denied the title of landlord and he does not explain as to why he denies the title of the landlord and unless any prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant a decree for eviction can be founded on the basis of such admission of the ground mentioned in Section 13 (I) (f). As already stated in Bhinwaram's case (supra), an application for amendment of the plaint was made and the learned Judge thought it proper to allow the amendment. Thus it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether any real prejudice is caused to the tenant in the absence of the pleading and issue and equally it would all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (f) is made out or not. It would be for the Court to decide as to whether there has been renunciation by the tenant of his character as such or there has been denial of the title of the plaintiff landlord or whether there has been any waiver or condonation of conduct of the tenant on the part of the landlord. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to Question No. 1, therefore, is as under:- 39. The landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act, in the absence of specific pleading and issue, if the parties went to trial on that ground when no real prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant. Although, the ground set out in Section 13 (I) (f) does not stand on a different footing from the other grounds, still, the ground mentioned in Section 13 (I) (f) of the Act can be examined on merits in the aforesaid situation.Question No. 2. 40. For answer of the second question, it is necessary to read Section 13 (1) (a) and Section 19A (1) as inserted by Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act (Act No 12 of 1965) and as amended by Rajasthan Act (Act No. 14 of 1976, Section 13 (1) (a) reads as under:- Section 13. 40. For answer of the second question, it is necessary to read Section 13 (1) (a) and Section 19A (1) as inserted by Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act (Act No 12 of 1965) and as amended by Rajasthan Act (Act No. 14 of 1976, Section 13 (1) (a) reads as under:- Section 13. Eviction of tenants- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree or make any order, in favour of landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act unless it is satisfied:- (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months," 41. Section 19A (1) as inserted by the Act No. 12 of 1965 reads as under:- "Sec. 19A. Deposit of rent by tenant- (1) Every tenant shall pay rent within time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable." Sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of Section 19A as amended by Act No. 14 of 1976 read as under : "Sec. 19A. Payment, remittance and deposit of rent by tenant-Subject to the provisions of this section every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. (2) ............ ............ ............ ............ (3) A tenant may, apart from personal payment of rent to the landlord, remit or deposit rent by any of the following methods:- (a) he may remit the amount of any rent due from him by postal money order at the ordinary address of the landlord; or (b) he may, by notice in writing, require the landlord to specify within ten days from the date of receipt of the notice by the latter, a bank and account number into which the rent may be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specifies a bank and account number, the tenant shall deposit the rent in such bank and account number and shall continue to deposit in it any rent which may subsequently become due in re;pest of the premises ; Provided that such bank shall be one situated in the city or town in which the premises is situated; Provided further that it shall be open to the landlord to specify from time to time by a written notice to the tenant and subject to the proviso aforesaid, a Bank different from the one already specified by him under this clause; (c) Where he has remitted the rent by postal money order under clause (a) and the money-order is received back by him under a postal endorsement of refusal or unfound and where the landlord does not specify a bank and account number under clause (b) or where there is bonafide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant may deposit such rent with the court within fifteen days of the expiry of the period of ten days referred to in clause (b) and in the case of such bonafide doubt as aforesaid, within fifteen days of the time referred to in sub-sec. (1) and further continues to deposit with the court any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the premises. (4) For the purpose of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13, a tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of any rent due from him, if he has paid, remitted or deposited the amount of rent by any of the methods specified in sub-section (3)." 42. Section 13 (1) (a) provides a ground for eviction for passing any decree for evicting the tenant. The court is required to satisfy itself that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for 6 months. It is only in this situation that a decree for eviction can be passed on this ground. If the tenant has not committed such a default, in payment of or tendering the amount of rent due, the decree for eviction cannot be passed. 43. Sub-sec. It is only in this situation that a decree for eviction can be passed on this ground. If the tenant has not committed such a default, in payment of or tendering the amount of rent due, the decree for eviction cannot be passed. 43. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 19A as inserted by Act No. 12 of 1965, simply provides that the tenant is required to pay rent within time fixed by the contract and where there is no contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. It may be stated that where there is a contract fixing the time for payment of rent, the tenant is under an obligation to abide by contract in payment of rent but where there is no such contract fixing the time for payment of rent, sub-sec. (1) of Section 19A provides that the payment of rent is required to be made by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. 44. Section 19A (1) as amended by Act No. 14 of 1976 makes the same provision but it is further subjected to the provision of Section 19A. By subjecting to the provision of Section 19A, the requirements of conditions of sub-sec. (1) Section 19A are not in any way altered. In our opinion, payment under the contract is saved and is not in any way affected by the expression "subject to the provision of this section" occurring in the beginning of this provision, and the obligation of the tenant continues, to make payment of rent within the time fixed by the contract. Where the contract does not specify the time for payment of rent, sub-sec. (1) of Section 19A of the Act provides that the tenant shall pay the rent by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. The tenant would not be saved or protected in case the tenant does not pay the rent within the time fixed by the contract but pays the rent by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. Where there is no contract fixing the time for payment of rent and if the tenant pays, remits and deposits the amount of rent by any of the methods specified in sub-sec. (3), sub-sec. Where there is no contract fixing the time for payment of rent and if the tenant pays, remits and deposits the amount of rent by any of the methods specified in sub-sec. (3), sub-sec. (4) of Section 19A, would be attracted and it will he deemed that the tenant has paid or tendered the amount of rent due from him for the purposes of Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13. The provisions of sub-sec. (3) and sub-sec. (4) of Section 19A do not in any way absolve the tenant to make payment of rent within the time fixed by the contract. 45. In the present case, the suit was filed on 9.12.67 and according to the plaintiff the rent for the month of November had fallen due on 1st December 1967, so the default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1967 was committed. However, the learned Additional District Judge held otherwise. 46. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Hanumandass and others v. Sanwalram (1982 R.L.R 916) . The learned Judge in Hanumandass v. Sanwalram , first did not agree with the contention that there was no default in payment of rent for the month of July 1976 as the suit was filed on 13.8 76. It was observed that the rent for month of July 1976 became due on the expiry of that month and the same became payable as soon as it fell due. The learned Judge has also referred to Section 19A and stated that on account of Section 19A, in case the tenant makes payment of rent, in the absence of any contract, by the fifteenth day of the next following month, then such payment shall be deemed to have been made within time. The learned Judge has also referred to Section 19A and stated that on account of Section 19A, in case the tenant makes payment of rent, in the absence of any contract, by the fifteenth day of the next following month, then such payment shall be deemed to have been made within time. The learned Judge has made reference of that position only in the absence of contract but while dealing with the matter at a later stage in para 3 he however, made an observation, after stating that the default in payment of rent occurred when the rent fell due and became payable by the tenant and thus, six months rent had fallen due on the date of the institution of the snit.That situation could have been remedied if the payment of rent or tender would have been made in accordance with the provisions of Section 19A(1)of the Act within the period provided therein and in the manner prescribed in that Section or even the rent of July 1976 would have been paid or remitted by money-order before 15th August, 1976. It was observed that as the provisions of Section 19A were not complied with so far as the payment of rent for the month of June, September, November and December, 1975 and March and July 1976 are concerned, the tenant should he considered to have committed defaults in payment of rent for a period of six months." 47. The learned Single Judge was right in expressing his disagreement with the aforesaid view in Hanumandas v. Sanwalram (supra) and the learned Judge was also right in observing that the effect of Section 19 (1) is that the general rule with regard to the payment of rent in the cases, where the contract does not fix the time of such payment, stands Modified and in such case, the rent is to be paid or tendered by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable and a tenant can be said to have committed defaults in payment of rent only if he has failed to pay or tender the rent by the fifteenth day of the month net following the month for which it is payable. 48. As already stated above, where there is a time fixed for payment of rent under the contract it will have full effect. 48. As already stated above, where there is a time fixed for payment of rent under the contract it will have full effect. The expression "subject to the provision of this Section would apply to the provisions of sub-sec. (3), and sub-sec. (4) of Section 19A. Where the tenant complies with the provision of sub-sec. (3), in the absence of any contract fixing the time within which the payment of rent is to he made, by fiction of law as embodied in sub-see. (4), the tenant will not be deemed to be a defaulter and he will he deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of rent due from him for the purposes of Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13. 49. Our answer to question No. 2 therefore, is that if the tenant has committed default in payment of rent on the first day after the expiry of the month for which rent is payable under the contract the payment of rent upto the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable under sub-sec. (1) of Section 19A, would not save him for the purposes of Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of section 13 of the Act.Question No. 3: 50. Question No. 3 is based on the conflict noticed in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Prem Lal v. Jadhav Chand (1977 RLW 265) . and the decision of Special Bench of seven Judges of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal v. Yasddai Ammal ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) . In V. Dhanpal's (supra), their Lordships held as under : "In order to get a decree for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act, it is not necessary to give Notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the question of requirement of such notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act the difference in the language of various State Rent Acts does not bring about any distinction. It is not correct to say that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act merely providing for termination of a lease either by the lessor or the lessee by giving the requisite notice is an extra protection is merely to terminate the contract which the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated. Even if the lease is determined by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise." 51. It would appear from the above observations, that the determination of the tenancy by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary as the tenancy continues under the Rent Act and making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of a tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts under Article 141 of the Constitution. The observation of this Court in Premlal's case (supra) is that Section 13(1) of the Act is nothing but a procedural restriction and does not create a substantive right. It was observed, no doubt, that the plaintiff has to allege the existence of one or more of the grounds specified in Section 13 (1) but the existence of the grounds is not a part of the cause of action. It was observed, no doubt, that the plaintiff has to allege the existence of one or more of the grounds specified in Section 13 (1) but the existence of the grounds is not a part of the cause of action. That was the matter relating to amendment of the plaint introducing a new ground for eviction and in that connection, it was observed that the effect of allowing the amendment, will not alter the nature and character of the suit nor will it cause any prejudice to the defendant. It still remains a suit based on the original cause of action i.e. on determination of the jural relationship of the landlord and the tenant. The observation regarding furnishing of cause of action based on determination of the tenancy, does not hold good in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and the suit for eviction is to be founded on the grounds set- forth in the Rent Act. So far as the question of amendment of the plaint is concerned, it may be stated that adding a new ground stands altogether on a different footing. The view taken in the decision of the Division Bench, in our opinion, does not hold good in view of the aforesaid and Supreme Court decisions. To that extent, the view taken in Premlal's case (supra) stands over-ruled and courts are bound by the view of the Supreme Court irrespective of the above observations in the Division Bench decision of this Court. 52. In Nemichand v. Bhanwarlal, ( 1981 (2) RCJ 524 ) relying on v. Dhanpal Chettiar's case (supra), the contention was negatived that a proper notice to quit was not served on the defendant-respondent. It was observed that the absence of service of a valid notice terminating the tenancy is of no avail when the decree for eviction is sought on one of the grounds specified in Section 13 of the Act. 53. Our answer to Question No. 3, therefore, is that the decision of this Court in Premlal's case (supra) does not hold good after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal's case (supra) to the extent indicated above. 54. The case will now go to the Single Bench hearing the Second Appeals for decision.Reference Answered. *******