JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—This revision petition under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is directed against the order of the learned Additional Session Judge, Mandi, Kullu and Lauhal Spiti Districts, camp at Kullu, dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner Jit Ram herein, against the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lauhal and Spiti District at Kullu, dated September 29, 1986 in proceedings under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code whereby respondent No. 2 Guddi, minor daughter of respondent No. 1 Smt Cheli was allowed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200 per month. 2. The facts are that the respondent Cheli Devi filed a petition under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code for herself and on behalf of the minor daughter Guddi as her next friend against the petitioner whereby she prayed that she be allowed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300 and the minor daughter Rs. 200 per month. In that petition, she claimed that she was legally wedded wife of the petitioner which marriage took place in the month of April, 1983 in accordance with the local custom and they thereafter cohabited as husband and wife in village Kishori in tehsil Udaipur and their union resulted in the birth of respondent No. 2 on June 5, 1985, but soon after the birth of respondent No. 2, the petitioner left the society and also refused to maintain her and the child and hence the petition, as she had no independent means of livelihood to maintain herself and the child and s he was residing with the child in her parental house and her parents also were not in a position to maintain them, whereas the petitioner was having an annual income of Rs. 40,000 or 50,000. The petitioner contested that petition in the trial court and in his reply he denied that the first respondent was legally wedded wife of the petitioner or that their union resulted in the birth of respondent No. 2. 40,000 or 50,000. The petitioner contested that petition in the trial court and in his reply he denied that the first respondent was legally wedded wife of the petitioner or that their union resulted in the birth of respondent No. 2. His case was that as a matter of fact the first respondent was a legally wedded wife of one Krishan Lal son of Chandu resident of village Sandwari in the same tehsil which marriage took place on March 26, 1973 and since polyandry is prevalent in their community, the first respondent also subsequently became the wife of the younger brother of Krishan Lal, named Shamsher and her union with Shamsher resulted in the birth of one daughter named Kanta alias Hira Devi on April 28, 1974 and that she still continued to be joint wife of said Krishan Lal and Shamsher and the petitioner had nothing to do with her. He further averred that he himself was a married man whose marriage with one Smt. Dev Devi, daughter of Baldev resident of village Kishori, Tehsil Udaipur. took place on November 20, 1977 and his cohabitation with said Dev Devi after the marriage has resulted in the birth of three children, namely, one son and two daughters and they were still leading a happy married life and as such the question of his contracting a second marriage with the first respondent did not arise. 3. The trial court then examined evidence adduced on either side and vide order dated September 29, 1986 found that since no divorce between the first respondent and her joint husbands Krishan Lai and Shamsher was proved on record, she legally continued to be their wife and even if it is presumed that she contracted marriage with the petitioner, the same was void under law and as such she was not entitled to any maintenance from the petitioner. The court further held that since it was proved that the minor girl Guddi, second respondent, was born as a result of illicit union between the petitioner and the first respondent, the petitioner was liable to maintain the child, second respondent though illegitimate and it, therefore, ordered that the petitioner shall pay Rs. 200 per month to the second respondent by way of maintenance. 4. 200 per month to the second respondent by way of maintenance. 4. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged this finding in revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who vide the impugned order affirmed the finding of the trial court and dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case carefully, and for reasons to be recorded presently, this revision deserves to be allowed. 6. Both the courts below have come to a categorical finding that no divorce has taken place between the first respondent and her joint husbands, Krishan Lal and Shamsher which means that this relationship of husband and wife inter se them still subsists. Under these circumstances the provisions of section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act come into play which read as follows :— "The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other any time when he could have been begotten." No doubt the lower revisional court has taken note of these provision of law but, I have no hesitation in holding that it has completely misconstrued the law on this point. 7. The law is that there is a presumption in favour of the legitimacy in respect of the birth of a child born during subsistence of marriage unless non-access between the two spouses is proved and the standard of proof required in such cases is the same which obtains in a criminal trial, namely, proof beyond all reasonable doubt. In other words, the law is very jealous and zealous in vouch-safing the fact that a child born in the circumstances laid down in the aforesaid provisions of law ought not to be illegitimised or bastardised on frivolous and weak evidence with regard to the proof of non-access and the courts are duty bound to see that the evidence adduced before them has made them morally certain that the factum of non-access inter se the spouses has been proved. In AIR 1981 Cr LJ 156, Padmanabhan Kesavan v. Bhargavi Krishnamma and another, a single Bench of Kerala High Court has observed as under :— "The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock can be rebutted only in the manner contemplated by section 412. If once access is present or non-access is not proved, the presumption becomes irrebuttable. The presumption cannot be displaced and the contention of non-access accepted on a mere balance of probability. The standard of proof required is similar to the standard of proof required to establish the guilt of an accused in a criminal case. Access or non-access connotes only the existence or non-existence of opportunity for marital intercourse, the burden of proving which entirely rests upon the person disclaiming it. Even where it is shown that the wife is living in adultery, it is insufficient to prove non-access." 8. No doubt that that was a case where the wife and minor son were claiming maintenance from the husband who was refuting the claim on the ground that the child was illegitimate as his wife had been living in adultery and that during the period the child had been begotten the husband had no access to her but this plea was repelled by the trial court as well as High Court and it was held that the claimants were rightly allowed the maintenance. In the instant case, however, the fact situation is somewhat different since the respondent herein are claiming maintenance against a person who is not the husband of the first respondent and her marriage with her joint husband, Krishan Lal and Shamsher still subsisted. This, however, is of no consequence so far as the law is concerned and it was incumbent in the instant case upon the first respondent to prove that there was non-access between her and her two husbands at the time when the second respondent was begotten, and the standard of proof on her part was also the same as proof of guilt in a criminal case, namely, "beyond all reasonable doubt". There is, however, no proof worth the name in this case by way of proof of non-access between her and said Krishan Lal and Shamsher. The first respondent has only stated that she had divorced the aforesaid two husbands before contracting the marriage with the revisionist which has been rightly repelled by the two courts below. There is, however, no proof worth the name in this case by way of proof of non-access between her and said Krishan Lal and Shamsher. The first respondent has only stated that she had divorced the aforesaid two husbands before contracting the marriage with the revisionist which has been rightly repelled by the two courts below. The lower courts, however, have been swayed by the fact that had the second respondent not been born as a result of sexual relations between the first respondent and the revisionist it was highly improbable that the first respondent would have made this wild allegation against the revisionist as being father of the minor child and further according to the revisional court, the distance between village Kishori where the first respondent was living with her parents when the child was born or begotten and village Sandwari where her two husbands Kishan Lal and Shamsher were living was 9 kms whereas the revisionist was resident of the same village, Kishori and that in these circumstances it can well be presumed that there was non-access between the first respondent and her two husbands. Both these grounds which have weighed with the courts below are, however, ridiculous on their very face and could not have been legally taken into consideration in proof of non-access. There is not a word either from the first respondent or her two witnesses which were none-else but her father and fathers sister that there was any non-access inter se the first respondent and her husbands. The two courts below strangely enough did not realise that on these assumptions they were committing a grave error in illegitimising the second respondent on such scant and unsatisfactory evidence who in the eyes of law is the legitimate child of the first respondent and her two husbands. A ruling of Kerala High Court reported in AIR 1960 Ker 119, Raghavan Pillai v. Gourikutty Amma and another, may be cited there with advantage as to the standard of proof even in a case of the type in hand, which says : "The presumption under section 112 of the Evidence Act would arise not only in a case in which the question of legitimacy is raised for the purpose of inheritance by succession but also in an application under section 488. Law does not recognise a distinction between legitimacy for purposes of succession or maintenance. Law does not recognise a distinction between legitimacy for purposes of succession or maintenance. Presumption under section 112 can be rebutted by evidence that the husband and wife had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten. Such evidence must be strong, distinct, clear, satisfactory and conclusive. Proof per se that the woman was living with the paramour is no evidence of non-access by the husband. The fact that the husband has been living with another woman for a number of years, does not amount to clear proof of non-access. The mere fact that the husband and wife are living separately in two different houses is insufficient to prove non-access. The question whether the husband and wife had access to each other is one of fact and the party interested in denying the legitimacy of the chi Id must set up a plea of non-access and prove the same. Consequently in an application under section 488 by a woman against her paramour for the maintenance of their alleged child, where the husband of the woman is living and their marriage is not dissolved, the woman must prove the non-access of the husband with her during the relevant period." 9. In the instant case, as I have already observed, there is hardly any evidence worth the name of proof of non-access between the first respondent and her two husbands. So far as the evidence adduced by the first respondent on record is concerned, I am of opinion, that the two courts below have fallen into error in appreciating the same. The first respondent has admitted in her statement that she never resided with the revisionist in his house even after her marriage with him and she continued living in her parental house since the parents of the revisionist had not agreed to this marriage. Apart from the statement of her father and her fathers sister, not a single independent person of the village, however, has come forward to say that any such marriage had taken place between them. Apart from the statement of her father and her fathers sister, not a single independent person of the village, however, has come forward to say that any such marriage had taken place between them. On the contrary, it is highly improbable that any such marriage, even if illegal in the eyes of law, could have taken place since it is an admitted fact that at the time of solemnisation of this so called marriage, the revisionist was having a wife and children and he was living a happy married life in the society of his legally wedded wife Dev Devi in his house. 10. In these circumstances, it is highly improbable that the first respondent should have contracted this marriage with the revisionist but continued living in her parental house. It is an admitted fact that the house of the first respondent and the residence of the revisionist are in the same village Kishori but strangely enough the first respondent was not ready to admit that the revisionist was living in his house with his wife Dev Devi and was having children from her whereas the lower courts have held that the first respondent is a very truthful witness. The revisionist had brought documentary proof on the record with regard to his marriage with Dev Devi and the birth of children. The first respondent has, however, not even been able to prove that after the birth of second respondent she was recorded in the Register of Birth as daughter of revisionist. It is also pertinent to note that there is documentary evidence on record and even admitted by the first respondent that she had borne a daughter named Kanta alias Hira Devi to her joint husbands Krishan Lal and Shamsher who was born on April 28, 1974, and was still living with her but she never claimed any maintenance for herself or for said Hira Devi from her husbands Krishan Lal and Shamsher. 11. In view of the above discussion, the revision petition is allowed, the impugned order as also the order of the trial court, dated September 29, 1986 are set aside and the petition for maintenance filed by the two respondents is dismissed. Revision allowed.