Ram Babu v. Padam Chand — 1989 DIGILAW 60 (RAJ)

S.C. AGRAWAL, J.—Both these second appeals arising out of suits filed by the respondents, who are common in both the appeals, raise common questions for consideration and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 21/1985 arises out of Civil Suit No. 266/1979 filed by the respondents against the appellant, Ram Babu, for his eviction from a shop situate at Tonk. Appellant Ram Babu is in occupation of the said shop as a tenant since 1968 on a monthly rent of Rs. 45/- per month and he is running a Ration shop in the premises. 3. S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 37/1985 arises out of a Civil Suit No, 225/1979 filed by the respondents against the appellants, Gopi Lal and Gopal, for their eviction from the shop situate in Tonk. The said shop was let out to the appellants on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-and the appellant are running a Barber shop in the said premises. 4. The shop which are the subject-matter of dispute in these appeals are adjacent to each other. The plaintiff respondents have sought eviction of the appellants in both the cases on two grounds, namely,(1) reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiffs for the purpose of Padam Chand (respondent No. 1 in both the appeals) running his clinic in the said shop; and. (ii) material alteration in the suit premises by closing the Verandah in front of the shops. The case of the plaintiff-respondents is that Padam Chand is a qualified medical practitioner, having obtained the M.B.B.S. Degree in the year 1974, and that he sat in the clinic of his cousin brother, Ratan Chand, in Tonk from 1975 to 1978 but since he could not obtain vacant possession of the shops in question he could not establish his own clinic at Tonk and that he has shifted temporarily to Jaipur but he wants to establish his clinic in Tonk. It is also the case of the plaintiff respondents that Padam Chand is at present running an X-Ray Clinic behind shops in question since 1974-75. It is also the case of the plaintiff respondents that Padam Chand is at present running an X-Ray Clinic behind shops in question since 1974-75. As regards material alteration in the premises the case of the plaintiff respondents is that the appellants have constructed walls on both the sides in the Verandah in front of the shops and have put a door in front whereby they have closed the Verandah and have included the same in the shops and have thereby made material alteration in the suit premises. 5. The suits were contested by the defendants-appellants who claimed that they had taken the shops on rent from Ratan Chand Dasot and that Ratan Chand Dasot has been receiving the rent from them and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not the landlords and they cannot seek eviction on the ground of their personal need. It is also the case of the appellants that the plaintiffs want to sell the shops after getting them vacated and that the premises are not required for the personal use of Padam Chand. The appellants also denied that they have made any alteration in the suit premises and submitted that whatever alteration has been done was made by Ratan Chand Dasot for the reason that part of the suit premises in the rear was required by him and in lieu of that portion the Verandah was included in the suit premises. On the basis of the pleadings issues were framed which were common in both the suits. Issue No. 1 was as to whether the appellants were in possession of the suit premises as tenants of the plaintiffs. Issue No. 2 was with regard to reasonable and bonafide personal necessity. Issue No. 3 was with regard to comparative hardship and Issue No. 4 was with regard to the material alteration. In suit No. 225/79 the plaintiff-respondents examined four witnesses, namely, Padam Chand P.W. 1, Sujan Mal, P.W. 2, Ratan Chand P.W. 3, and Hussain Khan P.W. 4 and the defendant appellants examined five witnesses, namely, Gopai, D.W.T, Prahlad D.W. 2, Urnar D.W. 3, Shamshuddin D.W. 4, Chittar D.W. 5. In suit No. 225/79 the plaintiff-respondents examined four witnesses, namely, Padam Chand P.W. 1, Sujan Mal, P.W. 2, Ratan Chand P.W. 3, and Hussain Khan P.W. 4 and the defendant appellants examined five witnesses, namely, Gopai, D.W.T, Prahlad D.W. 2, Urnar D.W. 3, Shamshuddin D.W. 4, Chittar D.W. 5. In Civil Suit No. 226/79, the plaintiff-respondents examined five witnesses, namely, Padam Chand P.W.1, Sujan Mal P.W. 2, Roshan Lal P.W. 3, Ratan Chand P.W. 4 and Hussain Khan P.W 5 and the defendent-appellant examined five witnesses, namely, Ram Babu D.W. 1, Prahlad D.W. 2, Umar D.W. 3, Shamshuddin D.W. 4. and Chittar D.W. 5. The evidence of the plaintiff-respondents in both the suits is practically the same except that in Suit No. 226/79 there is an additional witness Roshan Lal P.W. 3, who is attesting witness of the rent-note (Ex. 1) executed by the defendant-appellant Ram Babu in favour of Bahadur Mal Daost, the father of the plaintiff-respon-dants. 6. In Suit No. 225/79, the Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate, Tonk, by his judgment dated 21st September, 1981 found that Padam Chand, in his statement as P.W. 1 has stated that the shop in dispute was given on rent to the defendants, Gopi Lal and Gopal, by his father Bahadur Mal Dasot on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/- and that this fact was also mentioned in the notice (Ex. 1) dated 6th April, 1979 given to the defandents and no reply was given to the said notice and that there was no evidence in rebuttal to the same. The Munsiff has also observed that Shri Manzoor Alam, the learned counsel for the defendents, had admitted that the defendants do not challenge the fact that they are tenants in the suit premises under the plaintiffs. In view of the said evidence as well as the concession made by Shri Manzoor Alam, the learned counsel for the defendants, the Munsiff found Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintifls and held that the defendants were in possession of the suit premises as tenants of the plaintiffs. As regards reasonable and bonafide personal necessity the Munsiff found that from the evidence of Padam Chand, it is eatablished that he is a qualified medical practitioner and that he would start a clinic by combining both the shops in question and that behind these shops he is also runing an X-Ray clinic. As regards reasonable and bonafide personal necessity the Munsiff found that from the evidence of Padam Chand, it is eatablished that he is a qualified medical practitioner and that he would start a clinic by combining both the shops in question and that behind these shops he is also runing an X-Ray clinic. The Munsiff has observed that near the shops in question there is a shop and clinic of Ratan Chand who is son of Sujan Mal, the brother of father of Padam Chand but their business is separate and that Padam Chand has also stated that temporarily he is running a clinic at Jaipur and the reason for that is that he could not get vacant possession of the suit premises. The Munsiff found that the evidence of Padam Chand finds corroboration from the evidence of Sujan Mal P.W. 2 and Ratan Chand P.W.3. The Munsiff has also observed that Gopal Lal D.W.I, during the course of his statement in cross-examination, has admit-ted that Padam Chand, after passing the M.B.B.S. Examination, was silting in the clinic and had given a notice for vacating the shop and since the shop was not vacated he has ppened the clinic at Jaipur. After taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties, the Munsiff found that the plaintiff have succeded in establishing that the suit premises are required reasonably and bona fide for use of Padam Chand and that he is a qualified doctor and would start a clinic in the suit premises and would also run an X-Ray clinic in the suit premises. The Munsiff has also held that no oblique motive has been established and it has not been established that any other alternative accommodation is available with the plaintiffs. As regards the clinic which is being run by Padam Chand at Jaipur, the Munsiff found that by evidence of Padam Chand, it is clear that he is only temporarily running the clinic at Jaipur and the reason is that he could not obtain vacant possession of the suit premises. As regards the clinic which is being run by Padam Chand at Jaipur, the Munsiff found that by evidence of Padam Chand, it is clear that he is only temporarily running the clinic at Jaipur and the reason is that he could not obtain vacant possession of the suit premises. While dealing with the submissions urged on behalf of the defendants that the Padam Chand can sit-in the clinic of Ratan Chand Dasot at Tonk the the Munsiff has held that Ratan Chand P. W.3 has stated that the shop of Dasot Brothers and the Dasot Clinic adjacent to it are his shops and be is carrying his independent business there and that he is a registered medical practitioner and that in view of the said statement of Ratan Chand P.W. 3 it could not be said that the said shops are available for use of Padam Chand. The Munsiff, therefore, held that the suit premises are required reasonably and bonafide by the plaintiffs As regards 6omparation hardship, the Munsiff held that the defendants are runing a barber shop in the suit permises which can be carried out at any other place where if the plantiffs are not able to obtain the possession of the suit premises, Padam Chand would not be able to start the clinic and since he is also running an X-Ray clinic behind the suit premises, the plantjiff would suffer greater hardship as compared to the defendants. As regards material alteration also, the Munsiff found that the alteration has been made by defendants and not by Ratan Chand as claimed by the defendant and that the said alteration is material in nature. In view of the said findings the Munsiff decred the suit of the plaintiffs and passed a decree for eviction against the defandants. 7. Similarly in Civil Suit No. 226/79, the Munsiff and Judicial Magitrate Tonk, by his judgment dated 21st Sepetember, 1981 found that the defendant Ramt Babu is a tenant under the plantiffs and that the suit premises were let out to him by Bahadur Mal Dasot on the basis of the statement of Padam Chand P.W. 1 and Roshan Lal P.W. 2 who proved the rent-note (Ex.P-1), as well as the contention made by Shri Manzoor Alam, learned counsel for the defendant in that suit, that the defendant was tenant in the suit permises under the plaintiffs. As regards the reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship the Munsiff recorded the same findings as were recorded by him in Civil Suit No. 225/79 and hold that the plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing that the suit premises are required reasonable and bonafide by the plaintiffs and that the plantiffs Would suffer greater hardship as compared to the defendant. The Munsiff also found in favour of the plaintiff on the issue of material alteration and held that the said alteration was not made by Ratan Chand Dasot as claimed by the defendant but was made by the defandant himself and the said alteration was a material alteration. The Munsiff, therefore, passed a decree for eviction, against the defendant in this suit also. 8. The defendants in both the suit filed appeals against the said judgments and decree of the Munsiff and the said appeals were heard and decided by the Distrist Judge, Tonk by a common judgment dated 22nd December, 1984. 9. Before the District Judge it was submitted on behalf of the defendant appellants in both the appeals that the admission made by Shri Manzoor Alam. the learned counsel for the defendants in both the cases before the Trial Court has not been, made under the instruction from his clients and therefore, no reliance should be placed on the said admission and the defendants could not be held to be the tenants of the plaintiffs. The District Judge rejected the said contention of the view that Shri Manzoor Alam has not stated that he did not make the statements as mentioned in the judgment of the Munsiff and that inspite of the fact that the learned counsel for the appellants was asked to file an affidavit of Shri Manzoor Alam that he did not make any such admission, no such affidavit of Shri Manzoor Alam had been filed and in the circumstances the statement in the judgment of the trial Court that Shri Manzoor Alam had conceeded that the appellants were tenants of Bahadur Mal Dasot could not be discarded and in view of the said admission it must be held that the defendant appellants were tenants of Bahadur Mal Dasot and after his death they are the tenants of the plaintiffs. With regard to the reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the suit premises for use of Padam Chand, the District Judge found that there is on dispute that Padam Chand belongs to Tonk and that there is also no dispute that he is a medical graduate and is competent to open a clinic. It has also been observed by the District Judge that the fact that Padam Chand is a person having a clinic at Jaipur does not deprive him of the choice to shift his clinic to his native place as a doctor and that it is a reasonable and bonafide necessity for a young doctor and moreover the X-Ray clinic of Padam Chand is behind the suit premises and the suit premises are very much apt for opening a clinic by Padam Chand. The District Judge has also observed that the defendants have not proved that Padam Chand has other suitable accommodation at Tonk for opening a clinic and in view of the aforesaid findings, the District Judge found that the plaintiffs have proved their bonafide and reasonble personal necessity. As regards comparative hardship also the District Judge has held that Padam Chand was compelled to leave Tonk and set-up his clinic at Jaipur in order to make his both ends meet, and that the suit premises are required by him for opening a clinic near his already existing X-Ray clinic so that more facilities are there, with regard to material alteration also the District Judge affirmed the finding recored by the trial Court and has held that by covering the open Verandah and making it into a room the defendants have changed the very shape of the shop and that the same was not done with the consent of Ratan Chand as claimed by the defendants. In view of these findings, the District Judge, affirmed the decrees for eviction passed" by the Munsiff in both the suits. Hence these second appeals. 10. I have heard Shri D.L. Bardar, the learned counsel for the defendant appellants in both the appeals and Shri S.M. Mehta, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents. 11. At the outset it may be mentioned that in the memorandum of appeal of both the appeals, the appellants have not challenged the findings recorded by the courts below on the issue of material alteration. 11. At the outset it may be mentioned that in the memorandum of appeal of both the appeals, the appellants have not challenged the findings recorded by the courts below on the issue of material alteration. During the course of hearing of the appeals applications were submitted by the appellants in both the appeals under Order 41 Rule 2 read with Section 100(5) proviso and Section 153 C.P.C. for premission to urge additional grounds so as to incorporate a challenge to the finding on material alteration. The said applications have been opposed by the respondents. I will first deal with question raised in the appeals relating to reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship and shall thereafter deal with the question of material alteration and the applications referred to above in case it becomes necessary to go into the said question. 12. As regards the findings recorded on the issue of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship it may be stated that the said findings are findings of fact and the said findings can be upset in the second appeal only if it can be shown that the said findings suffer from any error of law or are perverse and based on no evidence or are arbitrary or unreasonable or have been arrived at without taking into consideration the relevant evidence. 13. The first contention that has been urged by Shri D.L. Bardar, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that the District Judge has erred in not allowing applications submitted by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. for permission to adduce additional evidence. I have perused the record of the appeals before the District Judge in both the cases. It appears that appellants had submitted applications dated 13th September, 1982 under Order 41 Rule 27 C P.C. whereby they wanted to bring on record, by way of additional evidence, certain documents of the Nagar Parishad, Tonk regarding the assessment of tax in respect of the suit premises, to show that Sujan Mal Dasot was described as the owner of the permises in which the defendants are in occupation as tenants. In addition to these documents the appellants also wanted to bring on record an advertisement published in Rajasthan Patrika dated 8th November, 1980 with regard to starting of X-Ray Clinic by Dr. In addition to these documents the appellants also wanted to bring on record an advertisement published in Rajasthan Patrika dated 8th November, 1980 with regard to starting of X-Ray Clinic by Dr. Padam Chand at Dasot Clinic, Ajmeri Gate, Jaipur and certain prescriptions and X-Ray plates issued from Dasot Clinic, Ajmeri Gate, Jaipur The said applications were opposed by the respondents and were rejected by the District Judge by his order dated 28th October, 1983. The District Judge held that documents which were sought to be adduced by way of additional evidence were filed at a very belated stage and moreover they were not absolutely necessary for pronouncing the judgment in the appeals. It has been observed that the documents pertain to the years 1979-80 and it could not be said that the appellants had no knowledge of payment of House Tax. As regards the prescriptions of Dasot Clinic, Ajmeri Gate, Jaipur the District Judge observed that the said prescriptions were only photo copies and that some of them were similar to documents which have been filed in the Lower Court. 14. I have looked into the documents which were sought to be produced by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C and in so far as the records of Nagar Parishad, Tonk are concerned which relate to the suit premises being shown in the ownership of Sujan Mal Dasot and the appellants being tenant under him, it may be stated that in view of the evidence of Padam Chand and the admission by Shri Manzoor Alam, Advocate, on behalf of the defendant before the trial Court it is not open to the appellants to agitate the question that they were not tenants .under Bahadur Mal Dasot and after the death of Bahadur Mal Dasot they have not become the tenants of the plaintiffs. As regards the documents relating to the opening of Dasot Clinic at Ajmeri Gate, Jaipur, by Padam Chand it may be stated that it has been admitted by Padam Chand; in his statement during the course of cross-examination, that he has been sitting at Dasot Clinic at Jaipur but he is doing it only temporarily because he could not obtain the vacant possession of the suit premises. The said documents, therefore, do not make much difference and it cannot be said that as a result of the rejection of the applications submitted by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., the appellants have suffered any prejudice. It may also be mentioned that the rejection of the applications submitted by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. by the District Judge has not been questioned by the appellants in the memo of appeal in these appeals. I find no force in the first contentions that has been urged by Shri Bardar. 15. Another contention that has been urged by Shri Bardar is that under Sub-section(2) of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) a duty has been cast on the Court that before passing a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity under clause (h) of Section 13 it must satisfy itself that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. The submission of Shri Bardar is that it was incumbent upon the courts below to examine as to whether any other reasonable accommodation is available to the plaintiffs for Padamchand to start a clinic. In this connection Shri Bardar has, in the first place, submitted that Dr. Padam Chand has been sitting at Dasot Clinic at Jaipur since 1979 and, therefore, it cannot be said that he does not have any other reasonable accommodation for carrying on his profession as a medical practitioner. Shri Bardar, has also urged that Bahadur Mal Dasot, the father of the plaintiff-respondents, had left Tonk as far back as in 1955-56 and since then the family of Bahadur Mal Dasot has been staying at Jaipur where they have got their other business and, therefore, it cannot be said that Dr. Padam Chand really wants to settle down and start his clinic at Tonk. Shri Bardar has also urged that the family of the plaintiffs is having a Petrol Pump at Jaipur and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the suit premises are reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiffs for the use of Dr. Padam Chand. Padam Chand really wants to settle down and start his clinic at Tonk. Shri Bardar has also urged that the family of the plaintiffs is having a Petrol Pump at Jaipur and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the suit premises are reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiffs for the use of Dr. Padam Chand. It is no doubt true that Dr. Padam Chand has started sitting at Dasot Clinic at Jaipur some time after the filing of the suits. Dr. Padam Chand (as PW. 1) has stated that he is sitting at Dasot Clinic at Jaipur temporarily for the reason that he has not been able to obtain vacant possession of the suit premises Sujan Mal P.W. 2, the uncle of Dr. Padam Chand, has stated that Padam Chand has opened a temporary clinic at Jaipur He has also stated that the Petrol Pump at Jaipur belongs to him and that the premises in which Dr. Padam Chand is having the clinic at Jaipur have been taken on rent by his son, Mahakam Chand and that Bahadur Mal and his children have no share in the Petrol Pump. Similarly Ratan Chand Dasot(P.W. 3 in Civil Suit No. 225/1979 and P.W. 4 in Civil Suit No. 226/1979) has stated that his real brother Mahakam Chand is the owner of the Petrol Pump near which Dr. Padam Chand is sitting in his clinic and that the said business is not a joint business. From the statements of these two witnesses, namely. Sujan Mal and Ratan Chand it appears that the Petrol Pump at Jaipur is run by Mahakam Chand, the son of Sujan Mal and the plaintiffs who are the issues of Bahadur Mal have no interest in the same and further that the clinic which is being run by Dr. Padam Chand at Jaipur is in the premises which have been let out to Mahakam Chand. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dr. Padam Chand has any premises in his own name where he can run his clinic at Jaipur. This lends support to the case of Dr. Padam Chand that the clinic which is being run by him at Jaipur is temporary only because he has not been able to obtain vacant possession of the suit premises. In this context, it may also be mentioned that inspite of the fact that Dr. This lends support to the case of Dr. Padam Chand that the clinic which is being run by him at Jaipur is temporary only because he has not been able to obtain vacant possession of the suit premises. In this context, it may also be mentioned that inspite of the fact that Dr. Padam Chand is sitting at Jaipur since 1979-80, the X-Ray Clinic behind the suit premises is being run by him at Tonk. This fact is established from the evidence of Dr. Padam Chand P.W. 1, Sujan Mal, P.W. 2, and Ratan Chand (P.W. 3 in Civil Suit No. 225/79) who have deposed that the said X-Ray Clinic at Tonk belongs to Dr Padam Chand. Umar (D.W.3 in Civil Suit No. 226/1979) during the course of cross-examination has stated that Dr. Padam Chand has set-up an X-Ray Clinic in Tonk and work of the said clinic is looked after by the servant of Dr. Padam Chand. Thus it is established that Dr. Padam Chand is running the X-Ray Clinic at Tonk eversince 1974-75 inspite of the fact that he is sitting in the Clinic at Jaipur. 16. Another contention that has been urged by Shri Bardar is that even if it be assume that Dr. Padam Chand would like to settle down in Tonk there is other alternative accommodation available to him in Tonk in asmuchas he can use the medical store and the clinic where he was earlier sitting during the period 1975 to 1978. The submission of Shri Bardar is that all the properties at Tonk are joint properties of the family and there is nothing on the record to show that Ratan Chand has rasied an objection to Dr. Padam Chand sitting at that place. In my view, the said contention of Shri Bardar is without substance in asmuchas Ratan Chand (as P.W. 4 in Civil Suit No. 225/79 and as P.W 4 in Civil Suit No. 226/79) has categorically stated that the medical store and clinic at Tonk are his personal independent business and that he is a registered medical practitioner. In view of the fact that Ratan Chand is a registered medical practitioner, and the medical store and the clinic which are run by him are his personal and independent business it cannot be expected that Dr. In view of the fact that Ratan Chand is a registered medical practitioner, and the medical store and the clinic which are run by him are his personal and independent business it cannot be expected that Dr. Padam Chand can also carry on his profession as a medical practitioner at the same place along with Ratan Chand. The fact Dr. Padam Chand left Tonk after 1978 indicates that he was not satisfied with that arrangement and, therefore, he preferred to shift to Jaipur since he could not get the vacant possessions of the suit premises. In these circumstances, is cannot be said that other alternative accommodation is available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of Dr. Padam Chand carrying on his medical practice at. Tonk In this regard it may also be stated that the X-Ray Clinic which is being run by Dr. Padam Chand at Tonk is located just behind the suit premises and if suit premises become available to him he can convert the same for the purpose of establishing his clinic there. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the courts below have failed to take into considerstion the provisions of sub-sections (8) of section 14 of the Act in coming to the conclusion that the premises are required reasonably and bonafide by the plaintiffs for the use of Dr. Padam Chand and that the plaintiffs would suffer great hardship as compared to the defendants. 17. Shri Bardar has lastly urged that in view of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act it was incumbent upon the court below to examine the question of partial eviction and that since other accomodation is available to the plaintiffs the courts below should not have derceed the suit of the plaintiffs in entirety. In my view this contention is also without substance because the case of the plaintiffs is that they require both the shops for the purpose converting them into a clinic for Dr. Padam Chand and the reason that into a clinic for Dr. Padam Chand and the reason that has been given by them is that the existing X-Ray clinic of Dr. Padam Chand is located just behind the suit premises and if the suit premises are vacated they can be suitably converted into a clinic with attached X-Ray facilities. Padam Chand and the reason that into a clinic for Dr. Padam Chand and the reason that has been given by them is that the existing X-Ray clinic of Dr. Padam Chand is located just behind the suit premises and if the suit premises are vacated they can be suitably converted into a clinic with attached X-Ray facilities. Shri Bardar has urged that there is sufficient accommodation available in the X-Ray Clinic which can be used by Dr. Padam Chand for settings up a clinic. No material has, however, been placed in this regard to show the additional accommadtion is available in the X-Ray clinic where Dr. Padam Chand set up his clinic. More over such clinic, must have an opening on the main road and this is possible only by having a passage through the suit premises. It is not possible to devide the premises so as to pass a decree for partial eviction. 18. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that no case is made out for interference with the findings recorded by the courts below on the issue of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity as well as comparative hardship. Since on findings recorded by the courts below on the issue of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship do not call for interference. I do not consider it necessary to go into the question of material alternations. 19. Shri Bardar has submitted that the appellants may be given some reasonable time to seek alternative accommodation. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I consider it just and proper that the appellants may be given six months time to obtain suitable alternative accommodation. 20. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed but it is directed that the decrees for eviction passed against the appellants in both the appeals may not be executed for a period of six months, i.e. till 21st July, 1989, provided the appellants in both the appeals furnish an undertaking in writing in this Court that they will act transfer the possession of the suit premises during this period and will hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent on 22nd July 1989. The said undertaking should be sumbitted within a period of six weeks. The said undertaking should be sumbitted within a period of six weeks. The appellants should also deposit or pay the arrears of rant, if any, and the future rent upto 21st July, 1989, in advance, within a period of one month. In case any of the appellants failed in submit the written under taking or to pay or deposit the rent within the time prescribed in this order, it will be open to the respondent to execute the decrees forthwith. No order as to costs.