ORDER Abdul Hadi, J. 1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal by the Claim petitioner is against the dismissal of his claim petition E.A.No. 50 of 1987 on 6.7.1989. The execution petition for attachment and sale of the property of the judgment-debtor for the realisation of the money decree against the judgment-debtor was dismissed on 7.10.1985 for default in not complying with certain returns and on 11.10.1985, the claim petitioner, who is none other than the brother's son of the judgment-debtor, had purchased the said property. There was attachment of the said property prior to the dismissal of the E.P. and on dismissal, the executing Court also expressly raised the said attachment. But, subsequently, on the judgment-creditor filing application to set aside the dismissal order, the E.P. was restored. On restoration, the executing Court also expressed that the attachment effected earlier revived. The Court below also held that the claim petitioner was not a bona fide purchaser and that he was also bound by an earlier order of this Court dated 19.9.1988 in C.R.P.No. 102 of 1987 holding such revival. The said C.R.P. was against the order in the same execution proceeding, reducing the upset price for the above said property. Therefore, the Court held that there was no merit in the claim of the petitioner and dismissed the said E.A. Against the said dismissed order, the petitioner has filed this C.M.A. 2. Now, regarding the above said revival of attachment on the restoration of an Execution petition a Division Bench of this Court in Annapurna v. Lakshmana, which is also relied on by the Court below, holds that such revival takes place. In the said case, no doubt the dismissal of the E.P. was set aside on appeal. But the Bench observes that the said revival applies whether the restoration was, on appeal or otherwise. The actual observation of the Bench runs as follows: We have no doubt that the principle here applied is one of very wide application and that in general where an order of any kind is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the consequential and ancillary orders are restored. (emphasis is mine) The Division Bench relies on an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Veeraswami v. Ramanna 68 M.L.J. 444 : A.I.R.1935 Mad. (emphasis is mine) The Division Bench relies on an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Veeraswami v. Ramanna 68 M.L.J. 444 : A.I.R.1935 Mad. 365 (F.B.) holding that such revival takes place in the case where a suit was dismissed for default after attachment before judgment was effected and where subsequently the dismissal was set aside on an application under Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. In Nancy John Lyndon v. Prabhati Lal the Supreme Court also approves this decision in Veeraswami v. Ramanna 68 M.L.J.444 : A.I.R.1935 Mad. 365 (F.B). In the Supreme Court case also, the restoration of the E.P. was by way of an application. So, when the order in E.P. in the present case is restored on an application, the said revival does take place and the contention contra, of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard has no merit. In the above said Division Bench case, as in the present case, sale was effected after the E.P. was dismissed and before the above said restoration, that is, "at a time when in fact no attachment was subsisting." In the said case the Bench posed the following two questions: (1) Whether, upon the allowing of the appeal, the consequential order raising the attachment was automatically set aside; and (2) Whether, even if it did no, it would affect, the transaction that had been entered into at a time when in fact no attachment was subsisting. The Division Bench finally came to the conclusion on those two questions as follows: The appeal fails on both the points and is dismissed with costs. The above said decision of the Division Bench of this Court has been also followed in the decision reported in S. Appanna v. R. Narasinga Rao. 3. The said Division Bench decision equally applies to the present case and the above said sale effected in favour of the appellant on 11.10.1985 is certainly affected by the attachment, which was effected earlier and got revived on the above said restoration of the E.P. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner no doubt cited the decision reported in Patringa Koer v. Madhavanand Ram (1911)14 Cal.L.J.476, which no doubt holds that there is no such revival when the transferee is a bonafide third party purchaser, after the dismissal of the E.P. and before its restoration. The learned Counsel for the petitioner no doubt cited the decision reported in Patringa Koer v. Madhavanand Ram (1911)14 Cal.L.J.476, which no doubt holds that there is no such revival when the transferee is a bonafide third party purchaser, after the dismissal of the E.P. and before its restoration. But, I am bound by the above said Division Bench judgment of this Court. Further, referring to the above said Patringa Koer v. Madhavanand Ram (1911) 14 Cal.L.J.476, the Supreme Court also observed in the above said Nancy John Lyndon v. Prabhati Lal Chowdhury as follows: We are not called upon to consider as to whether the aforesaid decision lays down good law.... Further, in the said Supreme Court decision, after preferring to the abovesaid decision in Annapurna v. Lakshmana A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 740, the Supreme Court did not express any opinion contrary to it. No doubt in the above said Supreme Court case, the sale took place before the E.P. dismissal, but in the abovesaid Division Bench case, the sale took place only after the E.P. dismissal, as in the present case. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited the decision in Balaraju Chettiar v. Masilamani Pillai 58 M.L.J. 675 : A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514 (F.B.). But it should be noted that even in the decision reported in Annapurna v. Lakshmana, it was observed that the value of the decision in Balaraju Chettiar v. Masilamani 58 M.L.J. 675 : A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514 (F.B.) was considerably weakened, by the later decision in Veeraswami v. Ramanna A.I.R.1935 Madras 365 (F.B.). 6. All these apart, the petitioner is also bound by the above said judgment dated 19.9.1988 in C.R.P.No. 102 of 1987, which confirmed the order dated 1.12.1986 in E.A.No. 519 of 1984. The question in the abovesaid C.R.P. was, whether there would be the abovesaid revival of the attachment effected before the dismissal of the E.P. That question was considered fully in the said C.R.P. and it was held on the basis of the decision reported in Annapurna v. Lakshmana and other decisions that the said revival did take place and the above sale in favour of the appellant herein shall not be valid as against the claims enforceable under the attachment as per Section 64, C.P.C. 7. Though the petitioner was not nominee party to the said judgment, he, being only a transferee from the judgment-debtor, who was a party in the said C.R.P. will also be bound by it on the principle aires judicata under Section 11, C.P.C. read with Explanation VII therein, since res judicata not only affects the parties, but their privies also, claiming under them. 8. Therefore, there is no merit in this C.M.A. and hence it is dismissed. No costs.