ORDER Sathiadev, J. 1. Second defendant in O.S. No. 379 of 1978 on the file of the Sub-Court, Vellore is the appellant, who died during the pendency of the appeal, and his legal representatives have been brought on record as appellants 2 to 6. Plaintiff and the first defendant are the two respondents herein: (ranking of parties as in trial court). 2. The suit was laid for a specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 11-1-1978 executed by the first defendant who had remained ex-parte. Plaintiff claimed that the suit property was agreed to be sold for Rs. 29,000 and on the different dates, Rs. 18,000 has been paid and endorsements have been made to that effect in the agreement itself, and that when he learnt that first defendant was colluding with second defendant to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, he sent notices to them not to flout the agreement and demanded the first defendant to execute the sale deed, but in spite of such notices, they have colluded and brought into existence the sale deed dated 27-6-1978 for an alleged consideration of Rs. 25,000 and therefore, he had to file the suit for directing them to execute a sale deed in his favour and deliver possession of the property to him. 3. Second defendant claimed that he was never made aware of the suit agreement, and that he had been a cultivating tenant of the first defendant, and for valid consideration, he had purchased the property under Exhibit B-1, dated 27-6-1978 and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. On the trial Court decreeing the suit, and on the learned Judge dismissing the appeal, this L.P.A. is filed by second defendant alone. 5. 4. On the trial Court decreeing the suit, and on the learned Judge dismissing the appeal, this L.P.A. is filed by second defendant alone. 5. The learned Judge held that second defendant, the cultivating tenant of the first defendant on purchasing the suit property under Exhibit B-1, dated 27-6-1978 and by acquiring title thereunder, had lost his right as a cultivating tenant, further there being merger of rights, and by following the decision in Palaniswami Chetti v. Mumganna Gounder (1979) 1 M.L.J. 47 , it was held that he cannot resist the relief of delivery of possession, and further it was found that the sale deed had been brought about by collusion between defendants in spite of being put on notice about the suit agreement (Exhibit A-1) by issue of notice under Exhibit A-3 and which was served upon them under Exhibits A-5 and A-6 on 24-6-1978 i.e. three days before the execution of the sale deed (Exhibit B-1) 6. Though in the initial stages of the appeal, more than one point had been taken by learned Counsel Mr. R. Thiagarajan, and in particular by referring to Section 117 of Transfer of Property Act; in the concluding stages, the crucial point which had turned out for determination is, whether the appeal as filed be fore the learned Judge was maintainable or not. On this aspect, learned Counsel Mr. M. N. Padmanabhan having laid considerable emphasis by taking it as a preliminary point, it has to be first determined as to whether in the nature of the decree passed by the trial Court, on a finding rendered about cultivating tenancy right, the appeal could have been preferred and in turn whether this L.P.A. is maintainable or not. 7. In the plaint, reliefs claimed are for directing the first defendant to receive the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 11,000 and to direct defendants 1 and 2 to jointly execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff; and to direct them to deliver possession of schedule mentioned property to the plaintiff and for other reliefs. 8. Issue No. 4 framed in the suit is "Whether the second defendant is a cultivating tenant?" A finding was arrived at in para. 14 of the Judgment of the trial Court that he is not a cultivating tenant. 8. Issue No. 4 framed in the suit is "Whether the second defendant is a cultivating tenant?" A finding was arrived at in para. 14 of the Judgment of the trial Court that he is not a cultivating tenant. While filing A.S. No. 694 of 1980, second defendant had restricted the appeal only to the reasoning in para. 13 of the judgment, and in the valuation para of the appeal, he had stated as follows: This appeal is restricted to the Appellant's claim as cultivating tenant only and not to other reliefs claimed in the suit. Again it is stated: Appeal relates only to appellant's claim and status as cultivating tenant and hence is incapable of valuation. Quite justifiably Mr. M.N. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel submits that in the absence of any decree relating to tenancy claim, and when the decree as granted is for joint execution of the sale deed and to deliver possession, no appeal is maintainable on a finding alone. In support of this contention, he would rely upon the decision of the Division Bench in Rama Shankar v. Hubraji in which it was held that a finding in a judgment is a mere opinion and it is neither an order nor a decree and it can bind none nor can it be treated as a judicial and enforceable determination of a matter. Learned Counsel Mr. Thiagarajan had placed the following two decisions, but they do not in any manner help him in overcoming the preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel Mr. Padmanabhan. 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Pakkran v. Pathuamma 25 M.L.J. 279 while dealing with the scope of Section 11, C.P.C. read with Order 22, Rule 5, C.P.C. held that any decision on a collateral matter would not operate as res judicata. Another Division Bench of this Court in Rama Krishna Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu 36 M.L.J. 641 also held that if any findings are rendered which are wholly inconsistent with the decree or other findings in the previous suit, they would not operate as res judicata. 10. Another Division Bench of this Court in Rama Krishna Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu 36 M.L.J. 641 also held that if any findings are rendered which are wholly inconsistent with the decree or other findings in the previous suit, they would not operate as res judicata. 10. In this context, Section 22 of Specific Relief Act is pertinently relied upon by learned Counsel for the plaintiff and which states that, notwithstanding anything containing in the Civil Procedure Code, any one praying for specific performance, can ask for the relief of possession in addition to such performance, and even if the plaint does not contain such a relief, the Court shall at any subsequent stage of the proceeding allow amendment of the plaint to be carried out to grant such relief. In the instant case, the relief of possession having been sought for as a substantial relief, and a decree having been passed to that effect, that part of the relief had not been assailed in the appeal. Being fully conscious of the nature of the relief as obtained by plaintiff, when second defendant had confined the appeal only to the finding on the aspect of cultivating tenancy right, and when the relief relating to possession having thus become final an appeal confined to such a finding is not maintainable. Certain submissions have been made by learned Counsel for plaintiff that the proper court-fees had not been paid to set aside the relief of delivery of possession in both the appeals. Once it is held that an appeal against a finding is not maintainable it is not necessary to deal with the point taken about non-payment of court fees, which submission is no doubt impressive. 11. It must be stated that indisputably the plaintiff had established that ha had put both the defendants on notice about the intended sale in favour of the second defendant under Exhibit B-l, and in spite of receiving notice by registered post with acknowledgement due, second defendant had taker the sale deed under Exhibit B-l from first defendant. 12. Yet another point against the appellant is that, by getting the sale deed in his favour, he had lost his cultivating tenancy right over the suit lands by merger of both the rights as held in Palaniswami Chetti v. Muruganna Gounder (1979) 1 M.L.J. 47 . 12. Yet another point against the appellant is that, by getting the sale deed in his favour, he had lost his cultivating tenancy right over the suit lands by merger of both the rights as held in Palaniswami Chetti v. Muruganna Gounder (1979) 1 M.L.J. 47 . That is the reason why in Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand (1954) 1 M.L.J. 69 , it was held that in such a case the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor of the plaintiff and also direct subsequent transferee to joint in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. It was further stated therein: ...He does not joint in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. Therefore by sale deed executed in his favour under Exhibit B-l, he having acquired title to the suit lands, he had lost his tenancy rights by merger of rights. 13. Hence, looked at from any angle, the claims of the second defendant are devoid of substance and hence it is held that against a finding rendered in a suit, which does not form part of the decree, no appeal would lie. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed with costs.