Judgment :- SATHIADEV, J. 1. Petitioner in W.P. No. 9325 of 1982 is the Appellant. The three respondents therein are the three respondents herein 2. The appellant owns lands of an extent of 3.22 acres in S. No. 22/1-B in Viswanathan village. First respondent issued a S. 4 (1) Notification for acquisition of the said land in G.O.Ms. No. 58 Transport, dated 12-1-1982 This was done pursuant to a requisition made by Pandian Roadways Corporation Ltd., by letter dated 7-2-1981, stating that it proposed to construct a depot for maintenance of buses, and therefore, acquisition proceedings will have to be initiated by invoking urgency provisions as there are no structures on the land. Hence the enquiry under S. 5-A had been dispensed with by invoking S. 17 (4), S. 6 declaration was published in the gazette on 10-2-1982. Notices under Ss 9 (1) and 10 were issued on 11-2 1982, and possession came to be taken oh 26-2-1982. When the award enquiry stood adjourned to 25-11-1982. W.P. No. 9325 of 1982 was filed and interim stay was obtained on 23-11-1982. The writ petition was dismissed on 20-8-1983. The writ appeal was filed on 25-8-1983 and interim stay was obtained on 7-9 1983. This order of interim stay granted in C.M.P. No. 11815 of 1983 in this appeal was vacated on 3-12-1984. So far ho award had been passed. 3. Though different contentions were put forth before the learned Judge pending disposal of this appeal, C.M P.No 15038 of 1988 was filed raising an additional ground to the following effect: “The impugned acquisition proceedings shall apse due to the fact that no award is passed under S 11 within the stipulated period even though there is no order of stay after 3-12-1984 preventing the authorities from passing orders Within the stipulated time.” 4. Mr. K. Govindarajan, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that as per S. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, in any event, within two years from 3-12-1984 the Collector having not passed the award, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of appellants lands have lapsed. Mr. K. Govindarajan, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that as per S. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, in any event, within two years from 3-12-1984 the Collector having not passed the award, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of appellants lands have lapsed. S.ll-A as inserted by Central Act 68 of 1984 reads as follows: “The Collector shall make an award under S 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation;—In computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” 5. Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned Counsel for the second respondent, submits that S. 11-A is subject to S. 17 (1) because when special powers” in cases of urgency” are exercised and possession is taken, “such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”, and hence, when appellant had lost title to the lands on and from 26-2-1982, there is no scope for revesting of the lands to the appellant by receiving upon S. 11-A. It is further contended that when urgent provisions a re invoked for achieving a public purpose without loss of time which occasions by holding a S 5-A enquiry; such a public purpose cannot be thwarted by invoking S.ll-A which had come into existence by the Amendment Act of 1954, and therefore, it has to be read as subject to S 17 (1) which had formed part of the enactment when framed in 1984. Being fully conscious of the concept of vesting that would take place under S. 17 (1), the amendment haying been brought about later by incorporating S.ll-A, it has to be read as an exception, thereby excluding from its purview the acquisition made under the urgency provision. 6. Being fully conscious of the concept of vesting that would take place under S. 17 (1), the amendment haying been brought about later by incorporating S.ll-A, it has to be read as an exception, thereby excluding from its purview the acquisition made under the urgency provision. 6. For such an approach to be made, he placed reliance on Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills 1, in which it was stated that in construing a social welfare legislation, the Court has to adopt a beneficient rule of construction i.e., if a Section is capable of two constructions, then the construction which would fulfil the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed, will have to be adopted. Land Acquisition Act in its implementation results in deprivation of right to property by the concept of eminent domain being exercised by State, and therefore, in interpreting it a construction now put by him would not be beneficial to the person who is deprived of bis property. Later on, the purposes for which the Amending Act had been passed would be referred to and which would show that it is to prevent the authorities from delaying acquisition proceedings indefinitely, time limit came to be fixed, so that citizens whose properties are acquired for public purpose, are not deprived of just compensation being paid within a reasonable time. Swift conclusion of proceedings is the main intendment behind the Amending Act. 7. The other decision relied upon is Winifred Ross v. IVY Fonseca 2, in which while dealing with S. 13-A1 of Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1987), it was held that since the liberal interpretation of it is likely to expose it to a successful challenge on the basis of Art. 14; it has to read down. 8. As far as S. 11-A is concerned, it being specific, and when its intendment is to fix a time limit within which an award will have to be passed, there is very little scope for reading down the effect of S. 11-A. 9. 8. As far as S. 11-A is concerned, it being specific, and when its intendment is to fix a time limit within which an award will have to be passed, there is very little scope for reading down the effect of S. 11-A. 9. If really it had been intended by Parliament that S. 11-A would have no application to acquisitions by invoking S. 17 of the Act; then suitable exception would have been made in S. 11-A itself, and which could have provided that it would have no application in such of those cases where urgency provisions are invoked. 10. Statement of Objects and Reasons to Act 68 of 1984 is to the following effect: “It is proposed to provide for a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under S. 6 of the Act within which the Collector should make his award under the Act. If no award is made within that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse. He has also been empowered to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award within a certain period from the date of the award” 11. In S.ll-A, there is no dichotomy made relating to acquisition under urgency provisions and non-urgency provisions. It is obligatory on the part of the Collector to pass an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of S. 6 declaration, irrespective of the nature of acquisition proceeding initiated by Government. Whether it is ore under Part II or Part VII or one initiated by invoking urgency provisions, a definite time limit had come to be fixed. Takins note of what had happened in the past, in that, acquisition proceedings were kept pending for eight or ten years without passing awards, the Parliament having in its wisdom chosen to fix a firm time limit, if it is to be read down as claimed by learned Counsel Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, it would defeat the object sought to be achieved by the insertion of S. 11-A. In respect of acquisition which is initiated for subserving an urgent public purpose, no public authority could thereafter lethargically deal with the matter. R. Krishnamurthy, it would defeat the object sought to be achieved by the insertion of S. 11-A. In respect of acquisition which is initiated for subserving an urgent public purpose, no public authority could thereafter lethargically deal with the matter. Having acted swiftly to take possession of the land even before an award is passed; by the Amending Act, the Acquisition Officer is compelled to maintain the same tempo and complete the passing of the award within two years from the date of publication of S. 6 declaration. When deprivation of possession of property could be done swiftly, it is not unreasonable to expect from the concerned authority to act swiftly in passing the award. 12. Further for non-urgency acquisition of property, if a period of two years for passing of sward could be followed, nothing is made out to hold that in respect of urgent acquisitions, an indefinite period should be available to the Collector for passing the award. 13. Therefore, S.U-A would be applicable irrespective of the kinds of acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. 14. One other contention put forth is that, when vesting had taken place under S. 17 (1), there could be no revesting of property. Here again, Mr. Govindarajan, learned counsel for the appellant, quite justifiably points out that there could be no legal impediment in revesting, because in such of those instances wherein the acquisition proceedings are declared illegal by Courts, it would result in the title to the property reverting to the erstwhile owner. By operation of law, vesting takes place under S. 17(1). Hence equally, under S. 11-A, when there is a failure to adhere to the time limit fixed therein, the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. The resultant effect will be the revesting takes place by operation of law. 15. The last submission made by Mr. Krishnarnurthi appearing for the second respondent was that since under S. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act interest is payable on the failure to pay or deposit the compensation, the delay in the making of the award, particularly when urgency provisions are invoked, is enough to compensate the land owner and therefore the run-making of the award within the prescribed period of two years under S. 11-A of the Act, would not render the proceedings bad in urgency/acquisition matters. For what follows, this contention cannot be accepted. 16. For what follows, this contention cannot be accepted. 16. S. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows:— “Payment of interest - When the amount of sued compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within the period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.” This provision is general in its application and is not confined to urgent acquisitions. The Legislature provided for payment of interest with a view to compensate the party for being deprived of his profit of usufruct of the land from the date he loses possession thereof, unless payment has been made by the Collector before taking possession. The payment of interest, therefore, cannot, in any way, whittle down the requirements of S. 11-A of the Act (supra). The Section talks of the interest becoming payable from the date of taking over possession at the specified rate on the award amount when the compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. The failure to adhere to the time limit prescribed under S. 11-A of the Act would render the entire acquisition proceedings bad. 17. Therefore, the writ appeal is allowed with costs resulting in S. 4(1) notification being quashed, Counsels fee is fixed at Rs. 1000 payable by second respondent. This would not preclude the Government by initiating acquisition proceedings afresh since the purpose for which it had been acquired is indisputably a public purpose.