Judgment :- 1. Petitioner is a private limited company. Third respondent is a woman worker employed by the petitioner in Pambanar Tea Estate. The erd respondent availed of maternity leave in 1982 and she was delivered of a child on 29-9-1982 She claimed maternity benefit from the petitioner under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. Since she had actually worked only for 157 days apart from four half days during 12 months immediately preceding the date of the delivery, the petitioner took the stand that she was not entitled to maternity benefit u/s. 5(e) of the Act. Thus she was not paid any benefit. She complained to the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent by Ext. P1 order held that the four half days should also be treated as full days and so calculated she must be deemed to have worked for 161 days within the 12 months immediately preceding the date of her delivery. In this view, the petitioner was directed to pay the maternity benefits to the third respondent. The petitioner challenged that order before the first respondent. By Ext. P2 order the first respondent upheld the stand taken by the 2nd respondent. Hence this Original Petition. 2. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the four days during which the third respondent worked for half a day each can be counted as full days for computing the period of 160 days as contemplated in S.5 (2) of the Act. S.5 (2) of the Act reads: "No woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she has actually worked in an establishment of the employer from whom she claims maternity benefit for a period of not less than one hundred and sixty days in the twelve months immediately proceeding the date of her expected delivery: Provided that the qualifying period of one hundred and sixty days aforesaid shall not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of Assam and was pregnant at the time of the immigration. Explanation:-- For the purpose of calculating under this sub-section the days on which a woman has actually worked in the establishment, the days for which she has been laid-off during the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be taken into account." The argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that a woman can become entitled to maternity benefit only if she has actually worked for a period of not less than 160 days in the 12 months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery. If the woman has not actually worked for 160 days, it is argued that she is not entitled to maternity benefit. According to counsel, actual work for 160 days is a condition precedent for claiming the benefit. If that condition is not satisfied a woman worker will not be entitled to that benefit. 3. The explanation to S.5 (2) quoted above shows that the period during which a woman worker was laid off during the 12 months immediately preceding the date of expected delivery should also be taken into consideration for ascertaining the eligibility. During the lay off period, woman worker cannot be expected to have actually worked in the establishment. So, actual work for 160 days cannot be insisted as a condition precedent for claiming the benefit. 4. It is admitted that 3rd respondent attended to half days work each on four days within the period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery. On those four days eventhough she worked only for half days each, she reported for duty. Can those half days be counted as full days? 5. S.2SB of the Industrial Disputes Act defines 'continuous service'. According to sub-clause (a) of clause (2) of that Section, a workman who has actually worked under an employer for not less than two hundred and forty days within a period of one year, will be deemed to be in continuous service under that employer. The mode of calculating the period of 240 days came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India & Others (1985 LAB.I C. 1733). In that case the employee had worked for 202 days from July, 1975, to July, 1976. The mode of calculating the period of 240 days came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India & Others (1985 LAB.I C. 1733). In that case the employee had worked for 202 days from July, 1975, to July, 1976. According to the employee, if 52 Sundays and 17 holidays is that year are added to the actual days during which he worked, the total number of days on which he worked will come to 271 days. Accordingly, he wanted to be treated as on continuous service under the employer. This plea of the employee was accepted by the Supreme Court and held that the workman had worked for more than 240 days from July, 1975, to July, 1976. From this, it is evident that in computing the days during which the employee has actually worked under the employer for finding out whether he was on continuous service or not, Sundays and holidays should also be reckoned. 6. S.30 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951, deals with the right of workers to have leave with wages. Every adult worker is entitled to one day's leave with wages for every 20 days of work performed by him. First explanation to S.30(1) lays down the manner in which the working days have to be computed. Any day on which the worker performed half or more than half a day's work should be counted as one day. If for computing annual leave with wages, half or more than half a day's (less than a full day) work is to be reckoned as one day, I do not find any reason to take a different view in computing 160 days under the Maternity Benefit Act. This view will advance the object of the Act. The Maternity Benefit Act is a beneficial piece of legislation which is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to woman workers employed in factories, mines or plantations. The Plantations Labour Act has also been enacted for the benefit of workers engaged in plantations. Third respondent is also a recipient of the benefits under that Act. She is entitled to annual leave with wages at the rate of one day for every 20 days work and in calculating that 20 days, half a day's work should be counted as one day. Third respondent is also a recipient of the benefits under that Act. She is entitled to annual leave with wages at the rate of one day for every 20 days work and in calculating that 20 days, half a day's work should be counted as one day. The same mode of calculation must be adopted in computing the number of actual days of work u/s. 5(2) of the Act as well. A beneficent rule of construction which would enable a woman worker to get the benefits under the Act has to he adopted by courts. 7. In B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore (AIR. 1978 SC.12) the Supreme Court examined the duration of 12 weeks period provided by S.5(e) of the Act. In that case a learned Single Judge of the High Court took the view that twelve weeks for which the maternity benefit is provided for in sub-section (e) of S.5 of (he Act must be taken to mean 12 weeks of work and the computation of the benefit had to be made with reference to the actual days on which a woman would have worked but for her inability. This was dissented to by the Division Bench observing that the maternity benefit which a woman was entitled to receive was for the period of her absence before delivery including the day of delivery and also six weeks there-after, each week consisting of seven days including Sundays. The Supreme Court took the view that: "computation of maternity benefit has to be made for all the days including Sundays and rest days which may be wageless holidays comprised in the actual period of absence of the woman extending upto six weeks preceding and including the day of delivery as also for all the days falling within the six weeks immediately following the day of delivery thereby ensuring that the woman worker gets for the said period not only the amount equalling 100 per cent of the wages which she was previously earning in terms of S.3 (n) of the Act but also the benefit of the wages for all the Sundays and rest days falling within the aforesaid two periods which would ultimately be conducive to the interests of both the woman worker and her employer". This observation also goes to show that a strict interpretation of the provision is not to be resorted to. This observation also goes to show that a strict interpretation of the provision is not to be resorted to. That which advances the purpose of the Act should be adopted. 8. On the facts it is admitted that the third respondent had worked for 157 full days and for four half days. As stated earlier, four half days must be counted as full days. If so counted she has worked for 161 days within the period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery. Thus she has qualified herself to get maternity benefit under the Act. In view of what has been stated above, I find no merit in this Original Petition. It is accordingly dismissed.