JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal is by the plaintiff against the order refusing temporary injunction. ( 2. ) THE plaintiffs case is that he advanced a loan of Rs. 5,000/- to Kalloolal against the delivery of possession of the suit plot with an agreement that Kalloolal shall, with the approval of his family members, execute a sale-deed of the suit plot and in the event of failure shall repay the loan without interest. In pursuance of the agreement, Kalloolal delivered possession of the suit plot and the plaintiff started his business by raising a temporary structure on the said plot. In August, 1956, the plaintiff constructed a room on the suit plot with prior intimation to Kalloolal. Kalloolal served a quit notice dated 18-8-1956 on the plaintiff treating him as a tenant. On receipt of the notice, the plaintiff reminded Kalloolal to execute the sale-deed. In reply Kalloolal offered to sell his adjacent plot, which was rejected by the plaintiff. Meanwhile Kallolal died in November 1957, and the plaintiff remained in possession of the suit plot as owner peacefully continuously without interruption of the defendants. The plaintiff made further additions by constructing a godown and boundary wall. Thus, the plaintiff pleaded that from December 1955, he is in peaceful continuous and uninterrupted possession, hostile to the defendants as exclusive owner of the plot. The plaintiff perfected his title over the suit plot in July 1968. Meanwhile, in C. S. No. 16a of 1964 for partition a decree, on compromise between the parties, namely, heirs of Kalloolal, was passed in which, the suit plot, along with other property, fell to the share of defendant No. 1 Narendralal. The plaintiff was not a party to that suit. One Rajendra Kumar Gupta, the son of defendant No. 1, appraised him and also proposed that the plaintiff should accept him as landlord of the suit plot, else he threatened to execute the decree, disclosing his relations with the Judges of High Court and the orders of Additional Distict Judge. These threats created clouds on his title and apprehension of dispossession in execution of the said decree. Hence he filed suit for declaration of title by adverse possession, and perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from executing decree in Civil Suit No. 16-A/64 and not to disturb his possession over the suit plot. These threats created clouds on his title and apprehension of dispossession in execution of the said decree. Hence he filed suit for declaration of title by adverse possession, and perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from executing decree in Civil Suit No. 16-A/64 and not to disturb his possession over the suit plot. The plaintiff also applied for temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from executing the decree in the said partition suit. The application was dismissed by the learned trial Court. Hence this appeal. ( 3. ) AS seen above, the plaintiffs suit is based on possessory title acquired by adverse possession. The question for decision is whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case in his favour. Admittedly, he entered into possession of the suit plot under oral agreement of sale in case Kalloolal failed to repay the loan within six months. Since Kalloolal allegedly failed to repay the loan the plaintiff, continued in possession of the suit plot. There is no document to evidence the alleged loan or the agreement to sell. The plaint allegations also do not clearly specify, whether the consideration for alleged sale was the amount representing the loan or the contract was to be further negotiated and discussed after consultation by Kalloolal with his family members. Even if the plaint case is accepted for disposal of application for temporary injunction, putting the plaintiffs case at the highest, is that the plaintiff entered into possession as a prospective purchaser or in part performance of the agreement, in other words with the permission of Kalloolal. A possession by permission or licence from the owner, is not adverse and cannot ripen into title, no matter how long continued or however exclusive it may be, Kodoth Ambu v. Secretary of State, AIR 1924 PC 150. So long as the occupation is under permissive possession, it cannot be adverse, but when the permission is (a) withdrawn, or (b) terminated by efflux of time, or (c) the occupant disclaims, or (d) gives notice of such disclaimer to the person under whom he entered, he holds adversely, Mahendra Bahadur v. Chandrapal, 1955 NLJ 519, AIR 1955 Nag. 221. There is no reliable evidence on record to show any of these. His initial entry on the suit plot was with the consent and permission of Kalloolal. ( 4. ) IN Padma Vithoba v. Mohd. 221. There is no reliable evidence on record to show any of these. His initial entry on the suit plot was with the consent and permission of Kalloolal. ( 4. ) IN Padma Vithoba v. Mohd. Multani, AIR 1963 SC 70 , it was held that when a person gets into possession of properties as mortgagee, he cannot by any unilateral act of declaration of his, prescribe a title by adverse possession against the mortgagor, because in law his possession is that of the mortgagor. But if the mortgagor and mortgagee subsequently enter into a transaction under which the mortgagee is to hold the properties thereafter not as a mortgagee but as owner that would be sufficient to start adverse possession against the mortgagor. In Lilachand v. Mallappa, AIR 1960 SC 85 it was held that a mere assertion of an adverse title on the part of mortgagee, cannot affect the subsisting equity of redemption of the mortgagors. ( 5. ) I may also usefully refer to Kanbi Ladha v. Joshi Jestaram, AIR 1971 Gujarat 239, in which it was held that where the person admittedly enters into possession of the suit lands as a mortgagee on the basis of unregistered document and remains in possession for more than 12 years, he having so entered into a consent of the mortgagor does not acquire ownership by adverse possession. Similar view was taken in M. A. Hassan v. Kunjulakshmi Amma, AIR 1977 Kerala 204. ( 6. ) ADVERSE possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. See S. M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 . ( 7. ) CONSIDERING the aforesaid state of law, the plaintiff having entered into possession of the suit plot in lieu of loan advanced by him, coupled with the agreement to sell it his entry must be held with the consent of Kalloolal, and in the absence of any notice disclaiming Kalloolals title, plaintiffs possession was not adverse to the interests of Kalloolal, or his heirs viz. the present defendants. The overt acts enumerated in the plaint cannot be construed as change in his animus in the absence of asserting hostile title over the suit plot. the present defendants. The overt acts enumerated in the plaint cannot be construed as change in his animus in the absence of asserting hostile title over the suit plot. Further, the plaintiff failed to specify the date from which his animus changed. Therefore, it must be held that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. The other two requirements for grant of temporary injunction need not be examined. The trial Court rightly dismissed the application. ( 8. ) BEFORE parting with this appeal, I must record my strongest disapproval to the insinuations made by the plaintiff in para 12 of the plaint, in his overenthusiasm to fortify his stand, casting aspersions to the Judges of the High Court and the Additional District Judge, in nut shell the entire judiciary. This mudslinging is nothing but an outcome of his recklessness and scant regard for judiciary. I am surprised why the trial Court failed to take any action against use of such uncharitable and intemperate language. It is hoped that the trial Court shall take appropriate steps now. ( 9. ) THE appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 200/if certified.