JUDGMENT 1. - Though the above numbered 10 writ petitions are in respect of acquisition of agricultural lands by the Erstwhile Urban Improvement Trust, Hindaun, now Municipal Board Hindaun after abolition of the Improvement Trust and the last two writ petitions No. 11 and 12 are in respect of acquisition of agricultural lands by Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar, but because in each of the above numbered writ petitions, the question is as to whether by extension to the State of Rajasthan of the Land Acquisition Act, 1898 (for short, the Central Act) with effect from September 24, 1984 vide Section 2 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment Act 1984) (Act No. 68/84) (for short, the Amendment Act of 1984), the Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (for short, the UIT Act) stands repealed, and if so, what is its effect. If the UIT Act stands repealed then whether the acquisition proceedings shall be continued and possession, if any, can only be taken under the provisions of the Central Act. Therefore, all the writ petitions are being disposed of by a common order. 2. The subject matters in respect of which the Parliament and the State have powers to make laws are enumerated in List I (Union List); List II, (State List) and List III, (Concurrent list) in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Parliament has exclusive power to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in List 1 and the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 11. Both the Parliament and the State Legislature have powers to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the concurrent list. So far as any territory of India not included in the State is concerned notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List, the Parliament has power to make laws. The residue power to legislate by virtue of Article 248 of the Constitution vested in Parliament and it has exclusive powers to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the concurrent list or State List. We need not deal with the other Articles which also deal with the legislative powers of the Parliament and go straight away to Article 254 of the Constitution of India. We need not deal with the other Articles which also deal with the legislative powers of the Parliament and go straight away to Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The said Article can only be attracted in case the law has been made with respect to the matters contained in the Concurrent List (List III). Under clause (1) of the aforesaid Article if any provision of law made by Legislature of the State is repugnant to any provision of law made by Parliament, which Parliament is competent to enact or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State, to the extent of the repugnancy, be viod. But under clause (2) of Article 254 even if the law made by Legislature of the State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or any existing law with respect to that matter, then, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, it shall prevail in that State and the law made by Parliament shall not prevail. But under the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, a power is vested in the Parliament and it can enact at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law made by the Legislature of the State. 3. But under the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, a power is vested in the Parliament and it can enact at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law made by the Legislature of the State. 3. A controversy has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the UIT Act was enacted by the State Legislature with respect to a matter enumerated in entry (5) of the State List and as far as its chapter (VII) and more so its Sections 52(2) to 59 are concerned, they too were not enacted with respect to a matter enumerated in entry 42 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and at best the said provisions can be said to have been made in exercise of incidental powers which a Legislature has while enacting law within a sphere assigned to it under the various Lists of the Constitution. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand is that so far as 'Acquisition and Requisition of property' matter contained in entry 42 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is concerned, it is a specific entry and such matter cannot be an incidental matter and while making law with respect to those matters under the State List, the State Legislature cannot encroach and cannot make laws in respect of the said entry. 4. It may be stated that there was not and could not have been any controversy about competence of the State Legislature to enact the UIT Act prior to the extension of the Central Act to this State and other States except Jammu and Kashmir with effect from September 24,1984, when the Central Act was extended to this State. Whether the said law (UIT Act) was made either whole or including chapter (VII) in exercise of the legislative power with respect to a matter in the State or the Concurrent List, the State Legislature had the power to make that law. It may further be stated that the UIT Act was reserved for the assent of the President and received his assent on 24th day of July 1959. It may further be stated that the UIT Act was reserved for the assent of the President and received his assent on 24th day of July 1959. But because now the Central Act has been extended to the State also with effect from 24th September, 1984, a question has arisen as to whether the Central Act will apply to the acquisition of property or the UIT Act alone shall be applicable ? We may state that besides the UIT Act, there was another State Legislation namely the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (the Rajasthan Act No. 24 of 1953) (for short, the State Act) but by virtue of Section 59A of the UIT Act so far as the acquisition of land required for the purpose of improvement or any other purpose under the UIT Act is concerned no proceeding could be taken under the State Act and had to be taken under the UIT Act. It has become necessary to see as to whether the UIT Act was enacted by the State Legislature with respect to any matter in the State List or it enacted with respect to any matter in the list or in other words, it is to be seen as to whether the UIT Act was enacted by the State Legislature with respect to entry 5 of the State List or entry 42 of the Concurrent List ? Entry 5 of the State list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is 'Local Government, i.e. to say, Constitution and powers of Municipal Corporations, Improvement Trusts, District Boards, Mining Settlement Authorities and Local Authorities for the purpose of the Local Self Government or Village Administration. Entry 42 in the Concur,rent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is 'Acquisition and Requisition of Property'. Till the Constitution (Seventh Amendment Act) 1956, there were entries 33 in List I, 36 in List II and Entry 42 in List III. Entry in List I, was 'State Acquisition or Requisition of Property for the purpose of the Union', entry 36 (List II) was 'Acquisition or Requisition of the property, except for the purpose of the Union, subject to the provisions of the Entry 42 of List III'. Entry in List I, was 'State Acquisition or Requisition of Property for the purpose of the Union', entry 36 (List II) was 'Acquisition or Requisition of the property, except for the purpose of the Union, subject to the provisions of the Entry 42 of List III'. Entry 42 (List III) was 'the principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or of State of any other public purpose is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given'. The aforesaid three entries in the aforesaid three lists were deleted by the aforesaid Seventh Amendment of the Constitution which came into force from November 1, 1956 and the following new entry 42 was substituted in List-III 'Acquisition and Requisition of Property'. In a Federal Constitution like ours, it is of the absence that there should be a distribution of legislative powers between the Central and the Provinces. In such a situation, therefore, even when the Constitution enumerates elaborately the topics or matters on which Centre and the State could legislate, some overlapping of the fields of legislation is inevitable. To deal with such a situation, the Judicial Committee evolved the rule whereby the impugned statute is examined in its 'pith and substance' its 'true nature and character' for the purpose of determining whether it is a legislation with respect to matters in one list or the other and that rule of interpretation has been applied throughout, not only to the Government of India Act, 1935 but also our present Constitution. 5. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that if applying the above rule of 'pith and substance', the UIT Act is looked into it will be clear the it the same or atleast except chapter VII was enacted by the State Legislature under its power and with respect to a matter covered by entry 5 of the State List and so far as chapter (VII) of that Act is concerned, it was necessary to be enacted because otherwise the various developmental schemes framed under the UIT Act could not have been executed and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the State Legislature while enacting the UIT Act under entry (v) of the State Trust had incidentally to encroach so far as the matter enumerated in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution but the legislation was still under entry 5 of the State List and not under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List not only with respect to the matters of Improvement Trusts but also with respect to the matters 'Acquisition' one of the matters of entry 42 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. As stated earlier minor encroachment, some overlapping on the fields of legislation with respect to matters in the List III, or in respect to matters or other lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution can hardly by avoided and is permissible. The question is as to whether with respect to a matter 'Acquisition' or 'Requisition' of Entry 42 of the Concurrent List can it be said that while making law with respect to the matters enumerated in entry 5 of List II, the State Legislation only incidentally or marginally encroached. 6. As already stated earlier that UIT Act was reserved for the assent of the President and it received the assent of the President on 24th day of July 1959. If the whole of the said Act had been enacted by the State Legislature and if it had fallen either in entry 5 of the State List or for that matter in any other entry of State List, it was not necessary that the Act would have been reserved for the assent. If the whole of the said Act had been enacted by the State Legislature and if it had fallen either in entry 5 of the State List or for that matter in any other entry of State List, it was not necessary that the Act would have been reserved for the assent. No doubt mere reserving of the State Act for assent of the President and the mere fact that it received assent of the President will not be of much consequence if the statute is such for which the State Legislature has exclusive power to legislate under List II. But it can be said that the UIT Act was reserved for the assent of President and received his assent. It goes to show the legislative intendment that the said Act was enacted if not wholly atleast partly so far as the aforesaid provisions of chapter (vii) of the UIT Act are concerned in exercise of the powers under entry 42 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. When the UIT Act was enacted, there was Article 31 in respect of 'Compulsory Acquisition of Property' and its sub-clause (3) provides that no law in respect of compulsory acquisition of property made by the Legislature of the State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the assent of the President has received assent of the President. It was omitted by Section 6 of the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from June 20, 1979. As the State Legislature can legislate with respect to matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, any enactment made by it is not to be necessarily reserved for the Presidential assent. The question of reserving a State Act for the Presidential assent and receiving President's assent will be necessary because in case of repugnancy, if any, in the provisions of that Act and Central Act, the State Act shall to the extent of repugnancy will apply. Therefore, it can be said that because Chapter VII of the UIT Act moreso its Section 52 and onwards contain the provisions for compulsory acquisition of property, it was reserved for the assent of the President and the assent of the President was received as aforesaid. 7. Therefore, it can be said that because Chapter VII of the UIT Act moreso its Section 52 and onwards contain the provisions for compulsory acquisition of property, it was reserved for the assent of the President and the assent of the President was received as aforesaid. 7. It has been said in the earlier part of this order that even if the legislature, whether the Parliament or of the State does its best to enact laws with regard to matters assigned to it but some over-lapping or encroachment by one on the field of the other can hardly be avoided. We are of the opinion that so far as chapter VII of the UIT Act and more so its Sections 52 and onwards in respect of compulsory acquisition of property is concerned, it cannot be said that they could be enacted by the State Legislature in respect of the matters of the State List and more so its entry 5. It cannot be said that the acquisition or requisition of property is incidental matter and therefore it is in respect to the matters of the State List. Therefore, if the State Legislature enacts a law and it contains provisions in respect of 'acquisition or requisitioning of property', a field specially covered by entry 42 of the Concurrent List, it cannot be said that the State Legislature by encroaching over that field does not exceed its competence. We have already said in the earlier part of this order that till the Constitution VIIth Amendment Act, 1956, there were entries in each of the three lists in respect of acquisition or requisition of property. The relevant entries in Lists I, H and III were entries 33, 36 and 42 respectively. They dealt with 'Acquisition or Requisitioning of Property' for the purpose of Union, 'Acquisition or Requisition of the property, except for the purpose of the Union, subject to the provisions of the Entry 42 of List III' and 'principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of State or any other public purpose is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given'. The above three entries in the aforesaid three lists were deleted by the aforesaid 7th Amendment of the Constitution which as already stated earlier came into force with effect from November 1, 1956 and entry 42 in the present form was substituted in list III. The deletion of the aforesaid entry from List I and H of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and substitution of entry 42 of the Concurrent List which deal with respect to matters 'Acquisition or Requisitioning of Property' goes to show that so far as the matters 'acquisition or requisitioning of property' are concerned, they are matters only covered by entry 42 of List III. If any legislation or part of it is made in respect of that matter it can only be made under entry 42 of list III as aforesaid. A scrutiny of the above three lists will go to show that the Constitution uses different expressions in different places, appropriate to the context and these entries indicate an awareness on the part of the Constitution of the distinction between various kinds of property, as said by the Supreme Court in the case of Accountant & Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India and others, 1988 III SVLR (C) 42 (Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1987 decided on July 20, 1988). So far as matters in respect of Acquisition or Requisitioning of Property are concerned, they will fall under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. The Supreme Court in the case of R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 , in para 40 (page 591, Col-1) has said that before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, entry 43 list I, invested the Parliament with power to enact laws with respect to acquisition or requisitioning for the purpose of the Union, and entry 36 of List II conferred upon the State Legislature the power to legislate with respect to acquisition or requisitioning for the remaining purposes. But those entries are now deleted and single entry 42 list III invests the Parliament and the State Legislature with power Jo legislate with respect to acquisition and requisitioning of property. But those entries are now deleted and single entry 42 list III invests the Parliament and the State Legislature with power Jo legislate with respect to acquisition and requisitioning of property. The Supreme Court specifically said "Power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III, and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists." The aforesaid case was relied upon by the Supreme Court in its latter case of K.S.E. Board v. Indian Aluminium Co., AIR 1976 SC 1031 . In the aforesaid case it was held that where an entry is in general terms in one list and part of that entry is specific in other list, the entry in the other list takes the effect notwithstanding the general entry as aforesaid. This is on the principle that 'special' excludes 'general' and general entry is subject to the special entry-Again in the case of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1955 placing reliance on the aforesaid case of R.C. Cooper (supra) and other cases that power of acquisition or requisitioning of property in Entry 42, List III is independent and separate power and not incidental to other power to legislate the court in the aforesaid case said that the controversy is at to whether the power of acquisition or requisitioning is independent power or incidental and gave its answer that after the deletion of entry 33 in List I and substitution of Entry 42 in List III the power of acquisition or requisitioning of property was not incidental to other power and independent power provided in a specific entry. Reference may be made to the case of L.N. Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change Patna v. State of Bihar and others, 1988(2) SCC 433 and moreso its para 37. Reference may be made to the case of L.N. Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change Patna v. State of Bihar and others, 1988(2) SCC 433 and moreso its para 37. Thus, a matter in respect to 'acquisition or requisitioning of property' will fall under Entry 42 of List III and it cannot be said while enacting law with respect to matters of entry 5, if the law has been made it only an incidental encroachment and as already stated in the earlier part of this order, it cannot be denied that the State Legislature was competent to enact the UIT except its chapter VII under entry 5 of the State List and chapter VIII under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List so far as the acquisition or requisitioning of property is concerned. In such a case even if the doctrine 'Pith and Substance' will apply to it, it will only be permissible so long as there is no conflict between the law passed by the Parliament and that enacted by the State Legislature and in case of conflict the Central Legislation must prevail. In the case of State of Kerala v. M.T. Devasia and another, AIR 1977 SC 331 the court said that- "The Kerala Act provides for the relief of indebted agriculturists in that State. This Act in pith and substance falls within Entry 30 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Central Act relates to Entry 43 of List I in the Seventh Schedule. A statute which is in pith and substance within the competence of a State Legislature may incidentally encroach on subjects reserved for Parliament under List I of the Seventh Schedule. Such encroachment are permissible to long as there is no conflict between the law passed by Parliament and that enacted by the State Legislature but in the case of a conflict between the two statutes the Central legislation must prevail." The Supreme Court did not express any view on the aforesaid reasoning of the High Court but holding that there was no repugnancy in the State and Central Act and the appeal of the State of Kerala was allowed and the order of the High Court was set aside. In the case of A.L.S.P.P.L. Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Gourdan, Advocate General of Madras FCR 1940 page 188 , a contention was raised that the Madras Agriculturists Reliefs Act, 1938 (Madras Act No. IV of 1938) was not wholly invalid and it was invalid in part in so far as it affects promissory notes. Sir M. Gwyer C.J. said that- "It was then contended that even if not wholly invalid, either the Act was invalid in part, in so far as it did or might affect promissory notes, or that it ought to be construed as not applying to promissory notes at all. But these questions do not in my opinion arise in the present case because the liability on which the Act operated was a liability under a decree of the Court passed before the commencement of the Act." But Sulaiman J. who gave a minority judgment said at page 292 that- "Then-. Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down in several cases that part of an Act can be held valid and another part invalid, if they are severable. If the offending provisions are so interwoven into the scheme that they are not severable, the whole is ultravires. In re the Initiative and Referendum Act, In Att. Gen. for British Columbia v. Att. Gen. for Canada their Lordships found the whole texture the Act so inextricably inter woven, that one part could not be contemplated as existing independently of the other. In Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh , I had relied on these cases and pointed out that it is a well established principle that if the invalid part of Act is really separate in its operation from the other parts, and the rest are not inseverably connected with it, then only such part is invalid unless of course the whole object of the Act would be frustrated by the partial exclusion. If the object which is beyond the legislative power is perfectly distinct from that which is within such power, the Act can be ultra vires in the former, while intra vires in the latter." There can hardly be any dispute that even if it is assumed, and should be assumed, that UIT Act except chapter VII and more so its Sections 52 to 59, fall under Entry 5 of the State List. Chapter VII and more so its aforesaid Sections relating to the acquisition of property which is not an incidental matter, could not be enacted under item 5 of List III. The provisions of chapter VII and moreso its Sections 52 to 59 are severable from other chapters of the UIT Act and therefore applying the above principle it can be said that the UIT Act was enacted and as a whole it was within the competence of the State Legislature but the provisions other than chapter VII and more so its sections 52 to 59 are with respect to matters of entry 42 of List III dealing with compulsory acquisition of property and other chapters of that Act fall under entry 5 of List II of the VIIth schedule of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in a case of conflict with the provisions of Central Act which as already stated was also extended to this State with effect from September 24, 1984, the provisions of Central Act will apply. We are of the opinion that chapter VII of the UIT Act being severable from other provisions of the Act was enacted by the State Legislature under Entry 42 and other chapters were enacted with respect to matters in Entry 5 of the State List. Therefore, the Central Act being the latter law will apply to the acquisition of property for the UIT also to the extent of repugnancy, if any, in between the Central Act and the State Act. 8. We may state here that even the UIT Act was amended by the State Legislature by the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987 and as shall be presently shown except to some extent the said Amendment Act has been made to bring the provisions of chapter VII in conformity with the provisions of Central Act. Now even under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act a notice has to be published in the official gazette under and in accordance with the Central Act. Sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 52 have been deleted. Sub- section (7) has been re-numbered as sub-section (2) and for the expression 'Section 52' the expression 'Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) has been substituted. Sub-section (8) of Section 52 has been deleted. Sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 52 have been deleted. Sub- section (7) has been re-numbered as sub-section (2) and for the expression 'Section 52' the expression 'Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) has been substituted. Sub-section (8) of Section 52 has been deleted. Similarly Sections 53 to 59A and 59 of the UIT Act have been deleted. Section 60A was inserted by the aforesaid Act which reads as under : "60-A- Transitory provisions for pending matters relating to acquisition of land-(1) Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in sub-section (1) of Section 52, where in any matter relating to the acquisition of land pending on the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987, (hereinafter in this section referred to as the date of commencement) an action, thing or order has been taken, done or made under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act as it stood before the date of commencement such action, thing or order shall not be re,opened or reviewed or be liable to be challenged on the ground that such action, thing or order was at variance with that provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) (hereinafter in this Section referred to as the Land Acquisition Act) subject, however, that any further proceeding, action or order in such matter conducted, taken or made on or after the date of commencement shall subject to the other provisions of this Section be made under and in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act. (2) The amount of compensation or interest or that payable for any other reason shall, in a matter pending on the date of commencement, be payable under and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the money paid prior to the date of commencement shall be deducted from or adjusted against the said amount. (2) The amount of compensation or interest or that payable for any other reason shall, in a matter pending on the date of commencement, be payable under and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the money paid prior to the date of commencement shall be deducted from or adjusted against the said amount. (3) Where in a matter pending on the date of commencement, a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 52 or a notice under sub-section (1) thereof has been served or as the case may be, published, such notice shall be deemed to be the notification or declaration published or made under sub-section (1) of Section 4 as the case may be, under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the declaration or award in such a matter shall be made within a period of one year or, as the case may be two years from the date of commencement. (4) Where any land. has, prior to the date of commencement vested in the State Government or its possession has been taken in accordance with the provisions of this Act as it stood before the date of commencement such vesting or possession of land shall not be liable to be challenged on the ground that no amount of compensation was tendered and paid in accordance with sub-section (3 A) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act subject, however, that such amount shall be tendered and paid within a period of six months from the date of commencement. (5) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a matter pending on the date of commencement the market value of the land at the date on which the notice was published in the Official Gazette under clause (b) of section 53, as it stood before the date of commencement, shall be taken ' into consideration. (6) As appeal filed under section 54 or section 56 or a dispute referred under section 55 or section 59 and pending on the date of commencement shall be decided having regard to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act." 9. The amendment Act of 1987 as per its sub-section (2) of Section 1 shall be deemed to come into force on August 1, 1987. The amendment Act of 1987 as per its sub-section (2) of Section 1 shall be deemed to come into force on August 1, 1987. Prior to it the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Ordinance 1987 was promulgated and the said Ordinance was replaced by the Amendment Act of 1987. Sub-section (1) of Section 60A saves an action, thing or order which has been taken, done or made under the UIT Act as it stood before the date of commencement and provides that the same shall not be challenged on the ground that the such action, thing or order was at variance with that provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It also provides that further proceedings, action or order in such matter conducted, taken or made on or after the date of commencement shall subject to the other provisions of the Amendment Act of 1987 be made under and in accordance with the Central Act. Sub-section (2) provides that the amount of compensation and interest or any sum payable for any other reason shall, in a matter pending on the date of commencement, be payable under and in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act though adjustment of any amount paid earlier has been permitted. Sub-section (3) of Section 60A is in respect of publication of a notice either under sub-section (2) of Section 52 or sub-section (1) of Section 52 and provides that if the same has been served or published, it shall be deemed to be the notification or declaration published or made under sub-section (1) of Section 4 or as the case may be under sub- section (1) of Section 6 of the Central Act and the declaration or award in such a matter shall be made within a period of one year or, as the case may be, two years from the date of commencement. Sub-section (4) refers to the possession and according to it if prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act of 1987 any land vested in the State Government or its possession has been taken in accordance with the provisions of UIT Act, as it stood before the Amendment Act of 1987 such vesting or possession of land shall not be liable to be challenged on the ground that no amount of compensation was tendered and paid subject however that such amount has been tendered or paid within six months from the date of commencement. Sub-section (5) is in respect of the determination of amount of compensation to be awarded and the market value of the land at the date on which the notice was published in the official gazette under clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 54 as it stood before the date of commencement shall be taken into consideration. Sub-section (6) provides that appeal if any pending under Section 54 or Section 56 of the UIT Act or a dispute referred under Section 55 or Section 59 and pending on the date of commencement shall be decided having regard to the provisions of the Central Act. There is no dispute that so far as the Amendment Act is concerned, it was neither reserved nor received the assent of the President. A perusal of the Statement of Objects and reasons of the said Act will show that the necessity for the amendment arose because the Central Act was amended by the Parliament extensively. The said Central Act was at the same time extended to such of the States including Rajasthan which were earlier not covered by it. As a consequence of such extension not only the State Act stood repealed, it also became necessary to amend the special provisions regarding land acquisition under the UIT Act so as to bring them in line with the provisions of the Central Act. Certain transitory and special provisions for disposal of pending proceedings as well as for the payment of compensation, interest etc. in accordance with the Central Act had also to be made in the aforesaid UIT Act. It will therefore be clear that the Act of 1987 was introduced to bring the provisions of UIT Act and more so its Sections 52 and onwards, in conformity with the provisions of Central Act. in accordance with the Central Act had also to be made in the aforesaid UIT Act. It will therefore be clear that the Act of 1987 was introduced to bring the provisions of UIT Act and more so its Sections 52 and onwards, in conformity with the provisions of Central Act. Therefore, if there is no repugnancy in between the UIT Act as it stands after the amendment by the Amendment Act of 1987 both will hold the field and only in case of repugnancy the provisions of UIT Act to the extent of repugnancy will not hold the field 'and will yield to the provisions of the Central Act. There can be hardly any dispute and we may say that there is no dispute that so far as UIT Act as it stands after the amendment by the Amendment Act of 1987 is concerned, there is no repugnancy in the Central Act and in the UIT Act as now the acquisition of land for any of the schemes of the UIT Act is to be under the Central Act.By virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amendment Act of 1987, it shall be deemed to have come into force on August 1, 1987. The Central Act as stated earlier was extended to this State vide Section 2 of the Amendment Act of 1984 w.e.f. September 24, 1984. Therefore, the question which only remains to be examined is as to how the matters for acquisition of land which were initiated under chapter VII of the UIT Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act of 1987 are to be dealt with in between the period of September 24, 1984 and August 1, 1987 and what is the fate of such pending matters ? As already stated earlier, in case of repugnancy, if any, in between the provisions of chapter VII of UIT Act as it then stood, and the provisions of the Central Act, the question of applicability of the provisions of Central Act will arise even during the aforesaid period. A comparison of the provisions of chapter VII of the UIT Act as it stood prior to the aforesaid amendment and the provisions of Central Act will show that in some matters the repugnancy is writ large. A comparison of the provisions of chapter VII of the UIT Act as it stood prior to the aforesaid amendment and the provisions of Central Act will show that in some matters the repugnancy is writ large. So far as Section 4(1) of the Central Act and sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act are concerned, to us there appears to be no repugnancy, rather the aforesaid provisions of UIT Act are more beneficial to the owner of the land sought to be acquired inasmuch as besides publishing the notice in the official gazette atleast 30 days in advance and pasting it on some conspicuous place in the locality where the land to be acquired is situate, a notice has to be individually served on the owner of the land and any other person who may be interested in the opinion of the State Government. In sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Central Act serving of notice on the owner or a person interested in the land sought to be acquired is not necessary. Under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Central Act a notice is to be published in the official gazette and also in two daily news papers one of which shall be in the regional language but individual service of a notice upon the owner of the land or any other person who in the opinion of the State Government may be interested. is much more important and merely because sub-section (1) of Section 4 also provides that besides being published in the official gazette the notice has to be published in two daily news papers, of which one shall be in regional language, it cannot be said that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood before the aforesaid amendment as aforesaid are repugriant to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Central Act. Similarly, there appears to be no repugnancy in the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as well as Section 5A of the Central Act. Coming to sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act it may be stated that corresponding provision in the Central Act is Section 6. Similarly, there appears to be no repugnancy in the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as well as Section 5A of the Central Act. Coming to sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act it may be stated that corresponding provision in the Central Act is Section 6. But there appears to be repugnancy in Alte provisions of ' Section 6, Section 9, Section 11, Section IIA, Section 12, Section 16, Section 17(3A) of the Central Act, and the provisions of Section 52(1), Sub-section (2) of Section 4, sub-section (5) of Section 52, sub-section (7) of Section 57 of the UIT Act as it stood prior to the aforesaid amendment. Sub-section (1) of Section 52 does not fix any maximum period of publication of the notice which period is fixed in Section 6(1) of the Central Act. Section I IA of the Central Act contains the provisions of automatic derequisition of the property if the award is not made within two years of the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Central Act, but there is no provision of derequisition, what to say automatic derequisition after the lapse of a particular period in the UIT Act, whereas as per sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the U1T Act immediately after the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) in the official gazette the land shall on and from the date of publication vest in the State Government free from all encumberances. In the Central Act only after the award is made under Section 11, the Collector can take possession of the land which only thereupon versed absolutely in the Government free from all encumberances. Even under sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Central Act the Collector has to tender 80% of the payment of compensation for the land as estimated by him and under sub- section (7) of Section 52 of UIT Act only after the vesting and possessing of the land the amount of compensation to be awarded is to be determined by the Collector. Therefore, for the period aforesaid i.e. September 24, 1984 when the Central Act was extended to the State of Rajasthan as aforesaid and August 1, 1987, when the Amendment Act of 1987 shall be deemed to have come into force, there was repugnancy in between the aforesaid provisions of the UIT Act and Central Act and to that extent the provisions of Central Act will hold the field and the provisions of UIT Act will give way. But the Act of 1987 inserted Section 60A which has already been extracted in the earlier part of this Order. The said Section contains the transitory provisions for pending matters relating to acquisition of land. As stated earlier, Section 60A while saving the action already taken, it further provides that further action shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act. In the cases which are being disposed of by this order there is no dispute that the notice under sub-section (2) of Section 52 as well as sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act have been published, but possession of the land has not been taken of which the aforesaid notification was issued. We will examine the legality of the aforesaid notifications while dealing with the cases of Hindaun U1T as well as Alwar UIT, but suffice to say that the Act of 1987 was neither reserved nor received the assent of the President. The vesting of the land had taken place much before the extension of the Central Act to this State with effect from September 24, 1984 vide the Amendment Act of 1984 and sub-section (4) of Section 60 A provides that where any land has prior to the date of commencement (commencement of the Act of 1987 i.e. August 1, 1987) vested in the State Government or its possession has been taken in accordance with the provisions of UIT Act as it stood prior to August 1, 1987, such vesting or possession of the land shall not be liable to be challenged on the ground that compensation was not tendered or paid in accordance with sub- section (3A) of Section 17 of the Central Act, but it also provides that the amount shall be tendered and paid within six months from the date of commencement as aforesaid. When the vesting of the land under the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it stood earlier to its amendment took place, it was in accordance with law and sub-section (4) of Section 60A of the Act of 1987 only saves such vestings of land also. To us there appears to be no repugnancy in the aforesaid provision moreso when the further action in respect of the possession is taken in accordance with the provisions of Central Act, i.e. possession can only be taken after paying 80% of the amount of compensation estimated by the Collector in accordance with sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Central Act. Thus, we are of the opinion, that if the land has vested in the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood, then such vesting cannot be called in question but the possession of land can only be taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Central Act and that too within six months from the commencement of the Act of 1987 i.e. August 1, 1987, unless there was some stay from some court in respect of acquisition proceedings or possession in respect of the land is disputed. But so far as provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as it now stands after the amendment are concerned, we are of the opinion that the provisions being repugnant to Section 11 A of the Central Act in so far as it extends the period of publication of notification and passing of the award is concerned, the Amendment Act of 1987 having not been reserved and having not received the assent of the President will give way to the Central Act. But in the cases in hand we are not directly concerned with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the Amendment Act. 10. Before we proceed to take up the cases or batch of cases, we will deduce the following principles of law : (1) The State Legislature was competent and is competent to enact the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, the same being with respect to matters partly enumerated in Entry-5 of State List (List II) and partly entry 42 of the Concurrent List (List in). (ii) Acquisition or Requisitioning of property' is not an incidental matter and therefore while enacting law under Entry 5 for Improvement Trusts under the State List (List II) (Chapter VII) of the UIT Act and more so to its Sections 52 to 59A could not be enacted. They were enacted under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. (iii) The doctrine of 'Pith and Substance' as evolved by the Judicial Commit,tee and as applied to the laws made under the three lists of the VIlth Schedule of the Constitution of India in order to see under which Entries of the three lists of the VII schedule of the Constitution will apply, but even if the said adoctrine is applied it only permits some overlapping or encroachment so long there is no conflict between the laws passed by the Parliament and that enacted by the State Legislature in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List but in case of conflict in view of the provisions of clause (2) of Article 254 alongwith its proviso the Central Legislature must prevail. (iv) The principle is well established that if an Act contains several parts and if invalid part is really separable in its operation from the other part and rests are not inseverably connected with it, then only such part is invalied unless of course the whole object of the Act would be frustrated by the partial exclusion. If the object which is beyond the legislative power is perfectly distinct from that which is within such power, the Act can be ultra vires in former while intravires in the latter. (v) The expression 'Acquisition or Requisitioning of property' in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule is a particular or specific expression and therefore as per the rules of construction that the general language in one head yields to particular expression in the other where the latter is unambiguous will be attracted and so far as the above quoted expression in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List is concerned, it being a specific entry will hold the field with respect to the matters in that expression. (vi) As the subject of 'Acquisition or Requisitioning of Property' is a subject of Entry 42 of the Concurrent List and as such the law can be made by both the State Legislature and Parliament, by extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended and extended, to this State by the Amendment Act of 1984 w.e.f. September 24, 1984 in view of clause (2) including the proviso to Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Central Act to the extent of repugnancy as aforesaid shall prevail over the aforesaid provisions of Chapter VII of the UIT Act because the Parliament intended to make complete law in respect of acquisition or requisitioning of property. (vii) Only sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted vide Section 4 of the Act of 1987 is repugnant to the provisions of Section 11-A of the Central Act. (viii) If ork or before the date of extension of the Central Act i.e. September 24, 1984, any land has vested in the State Government, under the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as then stood, or if possession had been taken either under sub-section (5) or (6) or Section 52 of the UIT Act, then by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 60 A of the UIT Act, the same cannot be challenged on any ground whatsoever, but the amount of compensation under the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Central Act shall be tendered within 6 months from the date of commencement of Act of 1987, and further action shall be taken under the provisions of Central Act. (ix) Applying the principle (iv) aforesaid, the provisions of chapter VII of the UIT Act being separable from the other part of that Act after the extension of the Central Act with effect from September 24, 1984, to this State, the provisions of Central Act will hold the field and the provisions of chapter VII and more so its Sections 52 to 59A will give way. After the aforesaid extension of the Central Act the proceedings for acquisition of property under the UIT Act will not come to an end but will be continued under the provisions of the Central Act." 11. After the aforesaid extension of the Central Act the proceedings for acquisition of property under the UIT Act will not come to an end but will be continued under the provisions of the Central Act." 11. CASES OF HINDAUN UIT (i.e. cases from S.No. 1 to 10 in the title).These writ petitions are in respect of acquisition of land and property for the Erstwhile Improvement Trust Hindaun. The then UIT Hindaun had decided to frame schemes Nos. 3 and 4 and various notifications under various Sections of UIT Act were issued. In each of the writ petitions, the petitioner has challenged the scheme and also come out with the case that no notification under Section 38 of the UIT Act was issued and therefore there is no such approved scheme No. 3 and 4 in force for which the land can be said to be required. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the acquisition of land under the then provisions of chapter VII of the UIT Act could only be made once there was approved scheme in force. We may state that present is the second inning and earlier writ petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings had been filed and a reference in this respect is made to S.B. Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 471/1975 and 470/1975, wherein the notifications issued under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was challenged. The writ petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge under his order dated November 23, 1983. In the aforesaid cases before the learned Single Judge the validity of the aforesaid notification was challenged also on the ground that the provisions of chapter VII, Section 52 and 53 of the UIT Act are violative of right of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as in the State of Rajasthan, there are two parallel enactments for acquisition of the land for development purposes, including the housing, one contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the UIT Act. Learned Single Judge placed reliance on the case of Hastimal v. The State of Rajasthan, SBCWP No. 583/1968, (Raj.). Learned Single Judge placed reliance on the case of Hastimal v. The State of Rajasthan, SBCWP No. 583/1968, (Raj.). D/d. 3.5.1971 wherein it has been laid down that the Act is a special law enacted for improvement of towns and urban areas and it makes provision for acquisition of land if the lands are required to be acquired for the improvement of towns and urban areas and that the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 cannot be invoked to acquire the land for that purpose. Another Bench of this Court in the case of Man Mohan v. The State has also taken the similar view and that view was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge in view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court held that Notifications issued under Section 52(1) and (2) of the UIT Act are valid. The court also held that the provisions of Section 52 of the UIT Act are intravires and not ultravires. An argument was advanced before the learned Single Judge that the petitioners have been residing and carrying on their business for a considerable period over the lands sought to be acquired under the impugned notification and that if they are disturbed from those places, they would suffer great hardship. The court said "In this regard, it may be stated that in sub-section (2) of Section 60, it has expressly been provided that the power of the Trust with respect of disposal of land under sub-section (1), shall be so exercised as to secure so far as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land, shall, if they desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the Trust and are willing to comply with any requirements of the Trust as to its improvement and use have an opportunity to obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them. The Urban Improvement Trust, Hindaun, while disposing of the land sought to be acquired under the impugned notification, will surely bear in mind the aforesaid provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 60 of the Act." Against the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge D.B. Civil Special Appeal was filed and the Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 361/1983 upheld the above judgment of the learned Single Judge. It may be stated that the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was issued on December 19, 1974 for acquisition of the land in dispute and it was mentioned in the notice that from the date when the notice will be published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra, the land shall vest in the State Government. It was legality of that notice which was challenged on various grounds. A perusal of the writ petition which has been made Annr. 2 to the reply will show that a ground was taken that no scheme under chapter V of the UIT Act has been framed and no sanction was obtained from the State Government. But during the course of arguments only few points were raised. It can therefore be said that in the aforesaid writ petition the validity of the scheme was challenged but no argument appears to have been made. At any rate, it can be said that the writ petition was dismissed by this Court and thereby impliedly the validity of the scheme/schemes was upheld. The law is settled that the principles of res judicata are attracted even to writ proceedings and if earlier in the litigation between the same parties the notice issued under sub- section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was held to be valid and so far as other grounds are concerned, they were not decided in favour of the petitioners, and therefore it can be said to have been impliedly decided against the petitioner, the second writ petition on the same ground will not lie. That apart, there is even otherwise no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that unless a scheme is finalised under the provisions of chapter V of the UIT Act, the acquisition proceedings cannot take place. In this connection we will make a reference to the State of Rajasthan & ors. That apart, there is even otherwise no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that unless a scheme is finalised under the provisions of chapter V of the UIT Act, the acquisition proceedings cannot take place. In this connection we will make a reference to the State of Rajasthan & ors. v. Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. and others, DBSA No. 318 of 1982 (Raj.). D/d. 21.2.1986 . An argument was advanced before this Court in the aforesaid Special Appeal that the land could not be acquired under chapter VII of the UIT Act unless' there was scheme framed under chapter V of the UIT Act. The court repelling that argument said- "The above argument sounds plausible but in our opinion, it does not stand scrutiny. It is true that when the scheme is framed, the scheme may it prove for acquisition of any land or other property. Simply because such a provision can be made in a scheme, it does not mean that the power of acquisition of land cannot be exercised in the absence of a scheme. After acquisition of land, a scheme can be framed in respect of the acquired land. It may be mentioned that all improvements as defined in Section 2(1) (vi) in an urban area need not be made under the scheme. Improvement can be made under the scheme, as well as without a scheme." 12. An argument has also been advanced that the State Government before publishing a notice under Section 52(1) of the UIT Act did not provide opportunity of hearing and thereby the principles of natural justice contravened. We may state that this argument has no force. Firstly, because it is the Officer on Special Duty or any other officer appointed by the State Government for the purpose to whom objections, if any, to the acquisition of land under chapter VII are to be made. Such officer is required to give the objector an opportunity of being heard and after hearing all such objections and after making such enquiry as he deems necessary, he is required to submit the case for the decision of the State Government together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections. It is thereafter that the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. It is thereafter that the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. The decision of the State Government thereon shall be final. Thus, opportunity to file objections to the show cause notice, a personal hearing has been provided at a certain stage. Merely because the State Government after receiving the report and recommendations of the officer-in-charge or other officer appointed by it, as the case may be, does not provide any opportunity of hearing to the person aggrieved, it cannot be said that the principles of natural justice are violated. It depends on the nature of proceedings as to at what stage the opportunity to show cause is provided and if at the stage before the Officer on Special Duty or any other officer appointed by the State Government an opportunity to show cause or hearing is provided it will meet the ends of principles of natural justice. Secondly, because a similar argument was advanced before the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Samiti (supra) and this Court under its order February 21, 1986 repelled the contention and said that "In our opinion, there is no breach of the rule of audi alteram partem or of any principle of natural justice. The State Government itself could have invited such objections and considered them if the law so provided. Instead of such law, what we find in sub-sec. (3) is, that there is double consideration of the objections first by the officer thereafter by the State Government. The State Government is further in an advantageous position to know the view on the objections submitted by the owners or persons interested. Affording an opportunity of personal hearing, is not the essential requirement of the rule of audi alteram partem or principles of natural justice. Similarly, there was no "1c obligation in law for the officer to have supplied a copy of the Report." 13. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that they have not challenged the Notifications issued under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act but he challenged the notice issued to the petitioners in the month of August 1986,under the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. We find no substance in this submission. We find no substance in this submission. The reason is that after the publication of the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act on December 19, 1974 by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of that Act the land on and from the date of publication vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrance. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the UIT Act where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (4), the State Government may by notice in writing order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. It appears that it was on December 17, 1972 that to each of the petitioners a notice under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was issued and each of the petitioners whose land was sought to be acquired challenged the notice in the earlier proceedings. It was only as a result of pendency of proceedings and stay order that the possession could not be taken by having recourse to the provisions of sub-section (5) or (6) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. It may be stated that the writ petitions were filed in 1975 challenging the Notification under Section 52(1) of the UIT Act which were disposed of only in the year 1983 and Special Appeals were dismissed in the year 1984. Therefore, the petitioners cannot now be allowed to challenge the notice issued under sub- section (5) or (6) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. If the petitioners are now allowed to challenge the same, firstly because they cannot be allowed to challenge because of earlier decision and secondly because allowing the petitioners to challenge the notice on the ground of delay, will mean giving premium to their own acts, they having come earlier in the writ petitions having sought stay order and special appeals having been dismissed as aforesaid in the year 1984, notice under sub- section (5) of Section 52 of the UIT Act could be again issued. It has already been said earlier that the land which stood vested in the State Government by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, the State Government cannot be divested more so in view of sub-section (4) of Section 60A inserted in the UIT Act by Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1987. The further proceedings no doubt including taking of possession have to be in accordance with provisions of the Central Act including sub- section (3A) of Section 17 thereof, after tendering 80% of the estimated amount of compensation within a period of 6 months from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act of 1987. 14. So far as argument of the petitioner that the UIT Hindaun had been abolished in 1976 and therefore there is no question of acquisition of any land for erstwhile) UIT and that only such of the schemes of the UIT which remain un-executed could have been transferred to the Municipal Board Hindaun, we find no merit in it. A look at the provisions of chapter V of the UIT Act will show that the Trust can frame scheme for improvement of urban area for which it has been constituted whether under the orders of the State Government, or on its own initiative or on a representation made by the Municipal Board. The Trust has also the powers under the municipal law by virtue of Section 47 of the UIT Act. It was under the provisions of Section 105 of the UIT Act that the UIT Hindaun was dissolved and its assets and liabilities were transferred to Municipal Board Hindaun. A Notification dated August 20, 1976 was published in that behalf in the Rajasthan Gazette dated August 20, 1976 Part VI Kha page 013. A perusal of the aforesaid Notification dissolving the UIT Hindaun alongwith UIT Gangapurcity will show that the said Notification was issued dissolving the aforesaid two tiffs because in the opinion of the State Government it was not necessary to continue the two Trusts. That apart, when the State Government could have constituted/established the Trusts under Section 8 of the UIT Act for the purpose of carrying out improvement of any urban area in the State, whether a master plan in respect whereof has been prepared or not, it could abolish the Trust also. That apart, when the State Government could have constituted/established the Trusts under Section 8 of the UIT Act for the purpose of carrying out improvement of any urban area in the State, whether a master plan in respect whereof has been prepared or not, it could abolish the Trust also. Merely because no scheme had been sanctioned, or if the sanction has not been executed wholly or partly, it cannot be said that the Trust could not be abolished by the State Government who has power to constitute or create it as aforesaid. By virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 105 of the UIT Act as well as by virtue of the aforesaid Notification of the State Government abolishing the UIT Hindaun, all liabilities and assets vested in the Municipal Board Hindaun and the Municipal Board has to discharge all the functions of the Trust as if it is a Trust. 15. The acquisition proceedings started in 1974 and no doubt generally if for no fault of the owners or persons interested in the land, the acquisition proceedings were dragged on for years a case may be made out to quash the acquisition proceedings but in the instant case as already stated earlier, after issue of the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act in the year 1974 and issue of the Notification under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of that Act the writ petitions were filed challenging the aforesaid two notifications which could only be disposed of in 1983 and special appeals were filed which were disposed of in 1984. Therefore, the petitioners and even if some of them did not earlier challenge the acquisition proceedings, but because some had challenged, the proceedings could not be finalised, they cannot be allowed to now say that because of lapse of 12 years, the acquisition proceedings should not be continued. We may state that it has already been said in the earlier part of this order that as the land vested in the State Government long back, in the year 1974 and vesting of land cannot be challenged now, not only because the earlier writ petitions challenging the same were dismissed, principles of res judicata are attracted, but also because of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted by Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1987. As said earlier, now the possession of land vested in the State Government, if not taken shall be taken, and the compensation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Central Act and not in accordance with the provisions of UIT Act because the provisions of Section 53 of the UIT Act have been repealed and even otherwise the provisions of the Central Art cover the same field and are beneficial, shall govern the case. 16. It has already been said in the earlier part of this order that in the earlier writ petition a ground had been raised that some of the petitioners were doing their business and their houses are there and therefore the land should not be acquired and this Court had repelled the said contention in view of the provisions of Section 60 of the UIT Act which safeguard the interest of the owner or persons who are interested in the land in dispute subject to acquisition. That apart, as appears from the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and material on record (Ex. 6 in Writ Petition No. 1610/1986) a high power committee formed by the State Government in respect of schemes Nos. 2 and 4 of Hindaun, held its meeting on January 17, 1985 and took some decisions regarding the constructions over the land. The Committee is said to have taken a decision that the land for which the applications for conversion have been filed and conversion charges have been deposited should be considered as left out of the scheme. Thus if despite the fact that the land vests in the State Government w.e.f. from the date of publication of the notice under sub- section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as stood before, the aforesaid amendment, if the State Government or the Municipal Board considers that such of the land for which conversion charges have been deposited or on which some constructions are raised, should be left out of the scheme, it is always free to do so. But for the reasons as aforesaid, that cannot be a ground to hold that the State Government is divested of the land which vests in it under sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act free from all encumberances from the date of publication of the Notification under Section 52(1) of the UIT Act. But for the reasons as aforesaid, that cannot be a ground to hold that the State Government is divested of the land which vests in it under sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act free from all encumberances from the date of publication of the Notification under Section 52(1) of the UIT Act. The land will continue to vest in the State Government and in this case vested in the State Government on December 19, 1974. 17. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Officer on Special Duty had no power or jurisdiction to issue the notice under sub-section (5) or (6) of Section 52 of the UIT Act may state that this contention too has no force. A look at sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the UIT Act will show that even the objections to the show cause notice under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act have to be made in writing before the Officer on Special Duty. It is that officer who has to give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and after hearing all such objections and after making enquiry as he may deem necessary, he has to submit his decision to the State Government. Earlier also a notice was issued under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the UIT Act on August 20, 1974 calling upon the petitioner to hand over the possession. That notice was issued by the Officer on Special Duty and it was also challenged in the earlier writ petition which was dismissed. The authority of the Officer on Special Duty to issue the notice was also challenged. The necessity of fresh notice has only arisen because despite the earlier notice the possession of the land was not delivered which vested in the State Government free from all encumberances. The petitioners therefore cannot be allowed to challenge the authority of the Officer on Special Duty to issue notice and we are of the opinion that the said officer has power to issue the notice. 18. The petitioners therefore cannot be allowed to challenge the authority of the Officer on Special Duty to issue notice and we are of the opinion that the said officer has power to issue the notice. 18. We find no merit in any of the writ petitions except to the extent of observations made and no case for interference is made out and further proceedings in respect of taking possession and payment of compensation should be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act and in accordance with the provisions of UIT Act as amended by the Amendment Act of 1987, which amendments have been made to bring the provisions in conformity with the Central Act. 19. CASES OF ALWAR UIT (i.e. cases from S.No. 11 to 12).These two writ petitions relate to the acquisition of approximately 10,000 sq. meters property known as 'Rani Oil Mills' in Aiwar. The UIT Al war took a decision to frame a scheme for the aforesaid property under Section 32(1) of the UIT Act. A notice dated July 27, 1987 was published under Section 33 of the UIT Act and rule 4 and 5 of the Rajasthan Improvement (General) Rules, 1962 (for short, the Rules). The name which was given to the aforesaid housing and commercial scheme is 'Jayanti Nagar'. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the aforesaid Jayanti Nagar scheme on various grounds including that it is not in accordance with Master Plan, there has been non-compliance with Section 33, rules 4 and 5, Section 32(2) and rule 34, Section 36 and that the Scheme has not yet been finalised. The framing of the scheme is also challenged on the ground of malafide of one V.K. Rastogi, Dy. Secretary to the Government, Urban Improvement and Housing Department. 20. A notice under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act dated February 11, 1986 was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated April 3, 1986 in the names of Khatedars, Harmukhram and Govindram. Thereafter, the Officer on Special Duty submitted a report to the Government under the provisions of sub,section (3) of Section 52 of the UIT Act and the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on August 21, 1986. Thereafter, the Officer on Special Duty submitted a report to the Government under the provisions of sub,section (3) of Section 52 of the UIT Act and the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on August 21, 1986. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid notice primaiily on the ground that recorded khatedars Harmukhram and Govind Ram died about 50 years ago, Govind Ram did not have any issue and Harmukhram became the sole owner of the property. He too died and his adopted son Shantilal became the sole owner of the property. The said property was mortgaged by the owner to the Joint Hindu Family Totalal Champalal carrying on the business in the name and style of 'Champalal Ramswaroop' and a suit for fore-closure of mortgage was filed by M/s Totalal Champalal against Shantilal and others in the High Court at Bombay and the said suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 214/1958. In the said suit ultimately on the basis of compromise, decree was passed by the Bombay High Court on May 12, 1957 and the property came under the ownership of HUF Totalal Champalal. A certified copy of the decree passed by the High Court has been filed as Annr. 1. According to the petitioner Niranjanlal (Writ Petition No. 1840/86) one Sunderlal adopted son of Ramswaroop happened to be Karta of undivided family and he leased out the property known as Rani Oil Mills to the petitioner and to Shailendra Bhargava together with all lands, buildings and rights acquired in appended thereto for a period of 95 years except the land already sold by three registered sale deeds, to Prabhat Kumar Jain, Kanhaiyalal and Chagganlal. The possession was also delivered to the lessees and since then the lessees are in possession of the land in dispute. 21. So far as challenge to the legality of the scheme framed under the provisions of Chapter V of the UIT Act is concerned, we may state that the allegations that a decision to frame the scheme was taken because of the bias and malafide of V.K. Rastogi do not hold good. No material in fact regarding malafides and bias of VK Rastogi has been brought on record. No material in fact regarding malafides and bias of VK Rastogi has been brought on record. Under Section 29 of the UIT Act the Trust on the orders of the State Government or its on initiative or on a representative made by the Municipal Board and subject to availability of financial resources, may frame scheme for the improvement of the urban area for which the Trust is constituted. It can frame more than one scheme and there appears to be no bar to frame a scheme for a part of urban area. It appears that it was the Trust who framed the housing/commercial scheme for the lands inslispute in its 143rd meeting held on July 15, 1981 (See Annr. 5). Thereafter, a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the UIT Act was issued and objections were filed. For framing a scheme under chapter V of the UIT Act existence of a master plan is not a condition precedent. A look at Section 8(1) of the UIT Act will show that the State Government has power by notification in the official gazette to establish for the purpose of carrying improvement whether a master plan has or has not been prepared, a Board of Trustees to be called the Improvement Trust of the place where its principal office is situated. Thus, an Improvement Trust can be constituted for the urban area whether a master plan in respect of such area has or has not been prepared. Section 31 of the UIT Act only provides that if for and in respect of urban area for which the trust was constituted a master plan is prepared and approved and in operation, every scheme framed by the 'trust in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V shall conform to such master plan and shall not be framed so as to affect an alteration in different zones defined byk the plan. It appears from the reply filed by the non-petitioner No. 3 that though a master plan for the urban area of Alwar has been prepared but it has not been approved by the State Government. Thus, despite the fact that no master plan has been approved, the Trust has powers to frame a scheme for any urban area. It appears from the reply filed by the non-petitioner No. 3 that though a master plan for the urban area of Alwar has been prepared but it has not been approved by the State Government. Thus, despite the fact that no master plan has been approved, the Trust has powers to frame a scheme for any urban area. We find no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Government has no powers to acquire property where the business is being run or commercial activities are taking place. A look at the provisions of the UIT Act as well as Central Act will show that there is no such bar. In the case of Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 Bombay 183 on the facts of that case it was held that the Government cannot acquire a running business or any commercial undertaking under the garb of acquiring land. The Government cannot acquire the business and say that it is mainly an acquisition of land and incidental of the business. In that case the Government wanted to acquire the theatre as an outlet of the films and it was held that the acquisition became the acquisition of commercial undertaking for the purpose of release of their own pictures, and substantially it is an acquisition of running concern. In the case in hand it is not the case of acquiring any running business, rather the land is being acquired for the purpose of housing/commercial scheme framed by the UIT and all that the owners/persons interested may be entitled is the compensation of land and buildings etc. in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act. It may also be stated that it is a disputed question of fact whether any business is being carried or not, but assuming that any business activities are being carried on it may be said that it is not the acquisition of that business activity or commercial undertaking which is sought to be acquired but it is the land which is sought to be acquired and a bare perusal of the definition of land as given in the Central Act will show that it includes the things attached to earth and permanently fastened to it. 22. 22. We will not go into the interse dispute, if any, in respect of the disputed property in between Sunderlal, the allegadly adopted son of Ramswaroop and others and the right of Sunderlal to lease the property to Niranjanlal and will confine ourselves to the legality of acquisition proceedings and the scheme framed by the UIT. It may be stated that as already stated earlier, besides the writ petition of Niranjanlal and others (Writ Petition No. 1840/86), another writ petition No. 1878 of 1986 has also been filed by one Surendra Kumar Raniwala. But it can be said that the Bombay High Court had decreed the suit for fore-closure filed by Totalal Champalal, Joint Hindu Family carrying on the business in the name and style of Champalal Ramswarcop and they became the owners of the property. It can also be said that the Board of Revenue on a reference to it under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 1956 under its order dated February 6, 1984, (Annr. 8 to the writ petition No. 1840/86) held that the land in dispute was abadi land on which houses etc. have been constructed and the entries of khateclarl in the name of Harmukh Ram Govind Ram is cancelled. In the aforesaid judgment of the Board of Revenue also reference to the facts of the case including the decree of the Bombay High Court and also the fact that the land in dispute has been leased out to Niranjanlal and Shailendra Bhargava, is made. Section 32 of the UIT Act provides that whenever the Trust decides to frame a scheme for any urban area the State Government may at the request of the Trust, issue a notification specifying such area and declaring that the Trust has decided to frame a scheme for such area. Such notification shall remain in force for six months from the publication thereof, but a power is vested to extend the said period under sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the UIT Act in the Government, as it may think fit by further period not exceeding six months. Such notification shall remain in force for six months from the publication thereof, but a power is vested to extend the said period under sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the UIT Act in the Government, as it may think fit by further period not exceeding six months. We may state that the scheme has not ye been finalised by the State Government and as and when the scheme is finally sanctioned, the petitioners who are said to have filed objections will be free to challenge the scheme in case the same is not in accordance with the provisions of the UIT Act. 23. We may state that the framing of scheme for acquisition of any property under chapter VII of the UIT Act is not a condition precedent. We have already said earlier that to bring the provisions of chapter VII of the UIT Act in conformity with the Central Act, the UIT Act has been amended by the Amendment Act of 1987 and the acquisition has now also to take place in accordance with the provisions of Central Act. In the instant case, we are of the opinion that as the notice under sub-section (2) of Section 52 as well as sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published containing wrong particulars of the owners and have been issued against dead persons, this ground alone is sufficient to quash the notice issued under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. We may therefore not go into other grounds advanced in respect of challenge to the acquisition proceedings. A look at the gazette notification dated February 11, 1986 published in the Rajasthan gazette dated April 3, 1986 will show that the names of khatedar: have been given as Harmukhlal son of Nanag Ram and Govind Ram son c.' Shantilal, Hissa Barabar. There can hardly be any dispute that said Harmukh Ram died 50 years ago and this was ordered in the judgment of Board of Revenue dated February 16, 1984. The said judgment also contained the fact that the property has been leased out to Niranjanlal, one of the petitioners. The Bombay High Court in its judgment and decree dated May 12, 1967 has also made a decree against Shantilal who is alleged to be the adopted son of Mewaram son of Harmukh Ram. The said judgment also contained the fact that the property has been leased out to Niranjanlal, one of the petitioners. The Bombay High Court in its judgment and decree dated May 12, 1967 has also made a decree against Shantilal who is alleged to be the adopted son of Mewaram son of Harmukh Ram. Therefore if any efforts would have been made to know who were the owners of the property, notice would have been given to the owners as the individual service of the notice on the owners or interested persons was necessary. May be that as per the revenue record, the names of Harmukhram and Govind Ram appears in the mutation, but it did not absolve the State Government from correctly describing the owner of the property. At any rate notice could not have been and can hardly be served on the dead persons. This court in a number of cases has taken a view that if a notice under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act is given to a wrong person, the acquisition proceedings are bad. In the case of Indrapuri Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan, SBCWP No. 1349/1972 (Raj.). D/d. 4.5.1983. , this court said that "It is obvious that the Notification has been issued in the name of a dead person which was declared to be dead by earlier judgment of this court in 1971 and the respondents even after this notice has not amended the Notification by issuing fresh Notification. The persons who are interested and who are concerned have not been issued notice because of this mistake and therefore, the entire proceedings of the land acquisition are void." A reference was also made to the earlier judgment of this Court dated March 31, 1971 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1719/1970. It is a view of other High Courts as well. In 1980 Land L.R. 73, a view was taken that where a notice was issued id the name of an owner who was dead at the time of issuance, but was served on the legal heir, the same would be invalid. Non- compliance with the statutory requirement would render the entire acquisition proceedings invalid. 24. Thus the notice was issued in the name of dead persons and not to the owner and the persons interested. Non- compliance with the statutory requirement would render the entire acquisition proceedings invalid. 24. Thus the notice was issued in the name of dead persons and not to the owner and the persons interested. There has been non-compliance with the statutory provisions of law and the entire acquisition proceedings are rendered invalid. Both the writ petitions deserve to be allowed on this ground. 25. Consequently, we find no force in the D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1666/1986- Bishambhar Dayal v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1610/1986, Chiranjeelal v. The State of Rajasthan , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1636/1986 Suraj Mal Agrawal v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1619/1986 Surendra Kumar and another v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1611/1986, Bholey Ram v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1608/1986 Ramkishore v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1607/1986 Ghanshyam Das v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1648/1986 Durgalal and others v. The State of Rajasthan and others , D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1649/1986, Jamna Lal and others v. The State of Rajasthan and others , and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1620/1986 Hindaun Kriya Vikriya Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Hindaun v. The State of Rajasthan and others , and they are hereby dismissed. D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1840/1986 Niranjanlal v. The State of Rajasthan and others and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1878/1986 Surendra Kumar Raniwala v. The State of Rajasthan and others are hereby allowed and the notice Annr. 10 (in writ petition No. 1840/86) dated February 11, 1986, published in Rajasthan Rajpatra dated April 3, 1986 and the notification dated August 5, 1986 published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated August 21, 1986 (Annr. 5 in Writ Petition No. 1878/1986) under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act are hereby quashed. Costs made easy.Writ Petitions Dismissed. *******