JUDGMENT S.H A. Raza. J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order passed by the III Additional District Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri in a revision under section 25 of Small Causes Court Act whereby hp had dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner challenging the judgment passed by opposite party No. 2 Both the Courts have decreed the suit of ejectment filed by opposite party no. 3. The opposite party no. 3. filed the suit against the petitioner alleging therein that the petitioner was in arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation amounting to Rs. 1215 for a period of 42 months, that is from 1180 till the date of institution of suit. The petitioner was served with a notice under section 106 of the T.P. Act read with section 20 (2) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. As the petitioner did not pay the arrears and did not vacate the premises within the stipulated period, the suit was filed. The petitioner in his written statement denied that he was in arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation. On plaintiff's refusal to accept the re it the petitioner deposited the rent under section 30(1) of the aforesaid Act and arrears of rent stood paid on the date the service of the notice was effected upon him. The petitioner has contended that both the courts below have committed manifest error of law in holding that the deposit made under section 30(1) of the Act was not based on refusal because the certificates of the PostMaster regarding refusal of Money Order raise a valid presumption both under Post Office Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act and the decisions of the courts below to the contrary cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It was further contended that deposit of rent under section 30(1) of the Act cannot be held to be invalid by the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 so as to ignore the grant of the protection of section 20(4) of the Act. It was further contended that as the petitioner had deposited all the amount as provided under section 20(4) on the first date of hearing the opposite parties 1 and 2 were bound to pass an order relieving the tenant petitioner against his liability for eviction on that ground. 2. It was further contended that as the petitioner had deposited all the amount as provided under section 20(4) on the first date of hearing the opposite parties 1 and 2 were bound to pass an order relieving the tenant petitioner against his liability for eviction on that ground. 2. Admittedly on the first date of hearing the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs 400 before the trial Court and claimed adjustment of Rs. 1550 which he had deposited under section 30(1) of the Act. The contention of the land lady, opposite party no. 3, before the trial court was that as the rent was never refused by her hence the deposit under section 39 (1) of the Act was not valid, The Court below gave a finding that it was not at all proved that the opposite party ever received any Money Order which she refused to accept. The certificate issued by the Postmaster regarding the refusal of the Money Order by the landlady is a forged one. The postal receipts for sending the money order were also net relied upon. I have gone through the judgment of both the courts below with great care and caution. Both the courts have given a finding to the effect that the certificate regarding the refusal of the Money Order was a forged one and it was also not proved that the Money Order was ever sent. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding of the courts below is perverse and is based on no evidence to justify the order and hence it has resulted into manifest injustice. 3. It is a settled decision (position) that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court in exercise of its special jurisdiction does not act as a court of appeal. It interferes only when there is a jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record committed by the court below. It is true that a finding based on no evidence or purely on surmises and conjectures or which is manifestly against the basic principles of natural justice may be said to suffer from an error of law. It has been held in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram AIR 1987 SC 117 that High Court should decline to interfere where the question depends upon appreciation of evidence and two views are possible. It has been held in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram AIR 1987 SC 117 that High Court should decline to interfere where the question depends upon appreciation of evidence and two views are possible. In the instant case both the courts below after appreciation of evidence found that there existed no evidence to the effect that the Money Order was ever sent to the landlady which she refused to accept, the documentary evidence filed on behalf of the petitioner did not inspire confidence for the reason stated in the order and the same was found to be Farzi. 4. It was further held in AIR 1978 SC page 955 that a finding as to whether circumstances justify the exercise of a discretion or not, unless clearly perverse and patently unreasonable is, after all a finding of fact only, which could not be interfered with either under Art. 226 or under Art. 227 of the Constitution. 5. It was further laid down in AIR 1977 SC 898 that Court will not grant relief when the case involves determination of disputed questions of fact or when the petitioner has an alternative remedy. It was also indicated in AIR 1976 SC page 2512 that High Court is not justified in interfering on a wrong assumption on question of fact. In dealing with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction of the trial court and revisional court and cannot reexamine or disturb a finding of fact arrived at by an inferior court. In AIR 1976 SC 386 it was indicated that in a case where the basic facts are disputed and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The right course for the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 is to dismiss the petition on this preliminary ground without entering upon merits of the case. 6. As such, the impugned order did not suffer from any error' of law so as to warrant interference in this writ petition and the writ petition is dismissed with costs. 7. The right course for the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 is to dismiss the petition on this preliminary ground without entering upon merits of the case. 6. As such, the impugned order did not suffer from any error' of law so as to warrant interference in this writ petition and the writ petition is dismissed with costs. 7. After the above judgment was pronounced a prayer has been made by the counsel for the petitioner that he may be given six weeks time to vacate the premises to which the counsel of opposite party has no objection provided the petitioner just after completion of six weeks from to day will deliver the peaceful possession of the premises to the land lady and pay the arrears of rent uptodate, if the same is due, and also pay the rent till the delivery of possession. In case the petitioner does not vacate the premises within six weeks from today, the trial court will dispossess the petitioner according to law. (Petition dismissed)