Veerayi Ammal v. Minor Masilamani, By Next Friend And Mother Saroja
1989-12-21
BELLIE
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Bellie, J. 1. Genuineness of a will is in question in this second appeal. The defendant Veerayiammal is the appellant here. 2. The suit was filed on the following allegations: The suit property originally belonged to one Ramasami Pillai. He married one Sivabagyam but within sixty days of the marriage they separated and Ramasami Pillai was living with Ponnusamy Pillai a son of one of his brothers. The first plaintiff Vaiyali is the son of Ramasami Pillai's an other brother. While so Ramasami Pillai executed a will dated 21.12.1963 bequeathing the suit properties to the first plaintiff Vaiyali and Ponnusami Pillai. Ponnusami Pillai died. Thereafter Ramasami Pillai was living with the heirs of Ponnusamy Pillai viz., plaintiffs 2 and 3. Ramasami Pillai's Brother's daughter Veerayi defendant was living in Pendamangalam. While Ramasami Pillai was living with her for some time and was not in a sound and disposing state of mind, she and her husband created a false will purporting to have been executed by Ramasami Pillai on 16.1.1979. Ramasami Pillai died on 18.1.1979 itself. Originally the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that the suit property belongs to them and for pursuant injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their possession. It appears an interim injunction petition filed by them was dismissed and thereafter alleging that after the dismissal of the petition the defendant has trespassed into the properties the plaintiffs have got the plaint amended and prayed for possession of the properties. 3. As against this the defendant contended that as the plaintiffs did not take proper care of Ramasami Pillai he while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind executed a registered will in favour of the defendant on 16.1.1979 revoking the earlier will. After the death of Ramasami on 18.1.1979 the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the properties. The plaintiffs were never in possession of the properties at any time. As the will executed in favour of the defendant is the last will of Ramasami Pillai the plaintiffs will not have right in the property. Therefore the suit must be dismissed. 4.
The plaintiffs were never in possession of the properties at any time. As the will executed in favour of the defendant is the last will of Ramasami Pillai the plaintiffs will not have right in the property. Therefore the suit must be dismissed. 4. The trial Court (District Munsif, Namakkal) believed the case of the defendant and held that the will in question which is Ex.B1 dated 16.1.1979 is true and genuine and it was executed while Ramasami Pillai was in a sound and disposing state of mind and therefore only the defendant will be entitled to the suit property and the plaintiffs will have no right. On these findings he dismissed the suit with costs. 5. On appeal by the plaintiffs the first appellate Court (Subordinate Judge, Namakkal) differed from the findings of the trial Court and held that Ex.B1 will is not a genuine one and at the time of the will Ramasami Pillai was not in a sound and disposing state of mind. It therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence the second appeal by the defendant. 6. The first appellate Court came to the finding that Ex.B1 will is not genuine on the basis of several suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. It is not in dispute that Ramasami Pillai had executed a Will Ex.A1 on 21.12.1963 in favour of the first plaintiff Vaiyali and Ponnusamy. The Will in question i.e., Ex.B1 is dated about 16 years thereafter i.e., 16.1.1979. The first appellate Court has found that Ramasami Pillai had been living in Kitchipalayam with Ponnusamy's sons all along, and only for a few days before Ex.B1 he was living in Pandamangalam with the defendant. There is no credible reason for discarding the plaintiffs and favouring the defendant. It is argued that even in Ex.B1 itself it is stated that it was because Ramasami Pillai's brother's sons did not look after him properly he wanted to execute a Will in favour of Veerayi cancelling the earlier Will executed by him. Of course there is such a recital but the genuineness of Ex.B1 itself is in question and therefore that recital cannot be considered as an evidence for Ramasami favouring the defendant. 7. Now, admittedly Ramasami Pillai used to sign in documents but in Ex.B1 there is no signature.
Of course there is such a recital but the genuineness of Ex.B1 itself is in question and therefore that recital cannot be considered as an evidence for Ramasami favouring the defendant. 7. Now, admittedly Ramasami Pillai used to sign in documents but in Ex.B1 there is no signature. It bears thumb impressions which are said to be Ramasamy Pillai's. This circumstance certainly gives rise to a very strong suspicion. For this it is stated that his hand was shaking and therefore his thumb impression was obtained. It maybe true or not but however certainly there is no doubt that it does give room for suspicion. The document bears two thumb impressions, one at the end of the recitals at the last page and another below an endorsement purporting to be of the testator made at the Registrar's office admitting execution of the document. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs the two thumb impressions do not appear to be of the same person and the thumb impression at the last page is very illegible. It is quite possible that none of the thumb impressions is that of Ramasami Pillai's and he has been impersonated, or the thumb impression of the last page had been obtained from him under some pretext without himself knowing the purpose for which it was obtained. Admittedly Ramasami Pillai was ill at the time. It is in evidence that it was told to neighbours by the defendant that Ramasami Pillai was being taken to the hospital. 8. It is argued that there is no question of impersonation because that is not the case of the plaintiffs at all and their case is Only that the Will has been obtained while Ramasami Pillai was not in a sound and disposing state of mind. But a reading of the plaint with some attention shows that the plaintiffs have never admitted that the thumb impressions in the Will are, that of Ramasami Pillai. It is not their specific case that the defendant has obtained the Will while Ramasami Pillai was not in a sound and disposing state of mind. They have only stated that the defendant has created a false document when Ramasami Pillai was in an unsound state of mind. Therefore the propounder has to prove that Ramasami Pillai affixed his thumb impression and he was in a sound and disposing state of mind.
They have only stated that the defendant has created a false document when Ramasami Pillai was in an unsound state of mind. Therefore the propounder has to prove that Ramasami Pillai affixed his thumb impression and he was in a sound and disposing state of mind. Hence from the pleadings it cannot be ruled out that Ramasami Pillai might have been impersonated and that is the reason that rather easily the thumb impressions have been affixed. 9. Then Ramasami Pillai died soon after Ex.B.1 i.e., in two days' time on 18.1.1979, From this it is possible that knowing that Ramasami Pillai would die soon the defendant dared to forge a Will as if it was executed by Ramasami Pillai and register it. D.W.2 Kandasami and D.W.3 Nachiappa Gounder have been examined as attestors to Ex.B.1. It has been elicited from the defendant (D.W.1) herself that these two persons were associates of her husband in betel nut business. Therefore, their evidence without any corroboration cannot be believed as true. In these circumstances the scribe of the Will should have been examined but the defendant has not chosen to do so. Apart from the evidence of the defendant herself as D.W.1 and the evidence of D.Ws.2 and 3 there is no other evidence as regards execution of the Will. From all these certainly there is grave suspicion as to the truth of the Will. May be it is a forgery or it may be that the thumb impression of Ramasami Pillai has been obtained on some pretext without himself knowing the purpose, or it may also be that he was not in a sound and disposing state of mind. 10. Mr. V. Krishnan, learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant would read out Section 60 (2) of the Registration Act and referring to the abovesaid endorsement of admission of execution in the document would submit that by virtue of this Section is must be presumed that the testator had admitted execution of the document. But a careful reading of the Section along with the related Section 59 and Section 58 would only show that the endorsement purporting to be admission of execution by the testator would be admissible to prove that the testator has made such an endorsement.
But a careful reading of the Section along with the related Section 59 and Section 58 would only show that the endorsement purporting to be admission of execution by the testator would be admissible to prove that the testator has made such an endorsement. But such an admission in evidence of the endorsement of admitting execution is only for the purpose of proving that the testator has made such an admission but such admission in evidence of such endorsement will not be conclusive evidence, as indeed it cannot be, that truly it was the testator himself who has made the endorsement admitting execution. In a case when the genuineness of the document itself is questioned such endorsement admitting execution of the document certainly will not prove that indeed the alleged testator himself has made that endorsement. May be if there is other credible evidence regarding execution such an endorsement in the document might be considered to be true. In this connection Mr. V. Krishnan has relied on an Andhra Predesh ruling in Ryali Kameswara Rao v. Bendapudi Suryaprakasa Rao and Ors. But the facts in that case are different from those in our case. In that case three witnesses viz., D.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 have given evidence stating that the alleged testator had in truth signed the Will and the Court did not find any reason to disbelieve their evidence. Along with that evidence the endorsement of admission purporting to have been made by the testator was considered and then it was held that the Will was genuine. Therefore this ruling will not be of much use to the appellant-defendant in our case. 11. Mr. V. Krishnan also relied on a Privy Council decision in Gangomoyi Devi v. Troiluckhyanath Choudhry I.L.R. 33 Cal.537, and Jhunkaribahu alias Katravali and Anr. v. Phoolchand alias Manickchand Chhotelal Jain and Ors. These two decisions deal with presumption as to official acts that they were duly performed. He also relied on Rani Purnima Debi and Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and Anr. (1962) 2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 27 for the proposition that the registration of a Will would be an important circumstance in favour of the Will being genuine. There is no quarrel with the propositions decided in these cases.
He also relied on Rani Purnima Debi and Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and Anr. (1962) 2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 27 for the proposition that the registration of a Will would be an important circumstance in favour of the Will being genuine. There is no quarrel with the propositions decided in these cases. But the suspicious circumstances discussed above concerning the alleged execution of the Will by Ramasami Pillai are so grave so much so that mere presumptions without strong evidence will not be enough to dispel those suspicions. The learned Counsel would also citing Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahy v. Jwaleswari Pratab Narain Singh and Ors. contended that the appellate Court should not lightly brush aside the finding of the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. That is true. But I do not think that the trial Court has considered the circumstance and the evidence in this case in the proper perspective, and the appellate Court is right in disagreeing with the findings of the trial Court. 12. In the result I find no merit in the second appeal. Accordingly it is dismissed with costs.