JUDGMENT A.S. Anand, C.J. 1. With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, the main writ appeal itself is taken up for hearing and disposal today. 2. The writ appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P.No. 9853 of 1983 decided on 31.10.1988. 3. The facts giving rise to the filing of the writ appeal may be noticed in short. The writ petitioner, the respondent herein, entered the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service as a Sub-Inspector of Police in 1976. A departmental enquiry was initiated against him on the basis of certain charges drawn against him. The enquiry was concluded and seven out of the eight charges were held proved. The writ petitioner was issued with a second show cause notice directing him to show cause as to why the punishment of dismissal he not inflicted on him. There was some delay in submitting the reply to the show cause notice; but eventually the writ petitioner was granted time to submit his reply to the second show cause notice upto 31.8.1978. The reply was sent by him through the proper channel on 29.8.1978. But it transpires that the same was not forwarded by the authorities for reasons best known to them to the competent authority before the order of dismissal came to be passed by the third respondent in the writ petition on 11.9.1978. 4. The writ petitioner questioned the dismissal through the writ petition which was allowed by the learned Single Judge finding that there has been a violation of the rules of natural justice, and besides, the order of dismissal was passed by the competent authority without considering the representation made by the writ petitioner against the second show cause notice. It was noticed by the learned single judge that under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, the writ petitioner was entitled to be granted a reasonable opportunity of making a representation on the penalty proposed, and as the right to receive such a notice under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India was a vested right, the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment by which the necessity of the second show cause notice was done away with, could not take away the right which had already vested in the writ petitioner. The issuance of a second show cause notice is a mandatory requirement and the representation made to the second show cause notice was of necessity to be taken into consideration by the punishing authority before imposing the punishment. But since the same had not been done, the learned single judge held that the dismissal could not be justified. It was also noticed that certain documents asked for by the writ petitioner to defend himself before the enquiry officer were withheld and therefore there was a denial of proper opportunity to the writ petitioner to defend himself properly. 5. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants submitted that requirement of issuing a second show cause notice under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution could not be invoked in view of the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment which came into force with effect from 3.1.1977. He, however, could not dispute that the charge had been drawn up against the writ petitioner prior to the Forty-Second Amendment and that a right had vested in the writ petitioner to be treated under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The right could not be taken away simply because the proceedings continued even after the coming into force of the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the submission made by the learned Government Pleader has no force. The learned Single Judge rightly found that since the disciplinary enquiry had started against the writ petitioner prior to the coming into force of the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment, the second show cause notice was a mandatory requirement. 6. The learned Government Pleader then pleaded that the learned Single Judge after quashing the impugned order of dismissal and directing reinstatement of the writ petitioner within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the order and granting all the consequential benefits to him, has debarred the State Government from holding a fresh enquiry against the writ petitioner. It is urged that since the order of dismissal was set aside primarily on the ground of violation of the mandatory requirement of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as it existed prior to the amendment, it was not open to the learned Single Judge to take away the right of the State Government to hold the fresh enquiry in case it so chooses. We find force in this submission. We find force in this submission. learned Counsel for the writ petitioner (respondent herein) is also not able to convince us about the desirability of the embargo placed by the learned single Judge on the State Government to hold a fresh enquiry, if they so choose. We accordingly find that the embargo placed by the learned single judge is not justified. 7. For what has been noticed above, we uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge in so far as it relates to the quashing of the order of dismissal and reinstating him in service with all consequential benefits, but set aside the further direction given by the learned Single Judge restraining the State Government from holding a fresh enquiry against the petitioner. We leave it open to the State Government to hold a fresh enquiry, if so advised, into the charges, and in the event any enquiry is held, it shall be open to the writ petitioner to defend himself and take all such pleas as are available to him in law before the enquiry officer of the competent authority. 8. With the aforesaid observations, the writ appeal is disposed of No costs.