JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---By this petition the petitioner seeks action against respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 2-A under the Contempt of Courts Act for having committed wilful breach of the undertaking dated the 26th November, 1986 given by respondent No. 1 to this Court in Writ Petition No. 4805 of 1985. 2. The petitioner being the landlord of a one room premises admeasuring about 18ft. x 13 ft had filed Suit No. 61 of 1976 against respondent No. 1 under the Rent Act for possession. By a judgment and decree dated the 13th September, 1982 a decree for possession was passed against respondent No. 1. She challenged the said decree by filing Appeal No. 151 of 1982, but that appeal was dismissed on the 21st September, 1985. Being aggrieved, she preferred in this Court Writ Petition No. 4805 of 1985 and that petition met the same fate and was rejected on the 7th November, 1985. However, time to vacate the suit premises was granted up to 6th December, 1986 on her giving an undertaking which she gave on the 26th November, 1986. By this undertaking she stated that she was residing in the suit premises and she undertook to this Court to quit and vacate the suit premises and and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the same to the petitioner and to none else on or before the 6th December, 1986. She further undertook not to induct any third party to the suit premises and not to create any 3rd party interests in respect of the suit premises. 3. Some time after the aforesaid undertaking was given by respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 who is none else but the son of respondent No. 1 filed Suit No. 12 of 1986 for a declaration that he was the tenant in respect of the suit premises. The claim set up by him was one under section 5(11)(c) of the Rent Act. According to him his father was the original tenant and after his death on the 14th May, 1962 he had become the tenant under section 5(1)(c) as he was the member of the father's family residing with him at the time of his death. The claim set up by him was one under section 5(11)(c) of the Rent Act. According to him his father was the original tenant and after his death on the 14th May, 1962 he had become the tenant under section 5(1)(c) as he was the member of the father's family residing with him at the time of his death. According to him the mere fact that on the death of his father, the tenancy stood in the name of respondent No. 1, the same did not detract from his claim of being a tenant under section 5(11)(c). Respondent No. 1 applied for an interim injunction restraining the petitioner from executing the decree obtained against respondent No. 1 as against him. However, no interim relief was granted in his favour. However, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2 of 1987 filed by respondent No. 2 an ad-interim injunction was isued restraining the petitioner from executing the decree against him. Though the time granted to respondent No. 1 to vacate was up to the 6th of December, 1986, the petitioner filed the present contempt petition in June 1986 in view of the aforesaid suit filed by respondent No. 2. 4. The petitioner thereafter filed Darkhast No. 29 of 1986 for executing the decree obtained in Suit No. 12 of 1986 but respondent No. 2-A who is none else but the daughter of respondent No. 1 obstructed. She on the 31st December, 1986 filed Suit No. 152 of 1986 for a similar relief claimed by respondent No. 2 in Suit No. 12 of 1986. Though the trial Court refused to grant any interim injunction respondent No. 2-A appears to have obtained an order status quo in the Miscellaneous Appeal filed by her against the refusal of interim relief. 5. Shri Shah, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that all the three viz. respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 2-A are guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by respondent No. 1. The petitioner had filed his suit for possession as far back as in the year 1976 and obtained a decree after full contest on the 13th September, 1982. respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 2-A are guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by respondent No. 1. The petitioner had filed his suit for possession as far back as in the year 1976 and obtained a decree after full contest on the 13th September, 1982. Though that decree was confirmed in appeal by the Appeal Court and in writ petition by this Court, the petitioner has been unable to reap the fruits of his decree; and this was despite the solemn undertaking given by respondent No. 1 to vacate. He pointed out that the suit premises was one single room wherein respondent No. 1 along with respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A who were none else but her son and daughter were residing. He also pointed out that the tenancy in respect of the suit premises stood all along in the name of respondent No. 1 alone. Respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A had obviously the knowledge of the litigation as also the undertaking and they were responsible for committing breach of the undertaking dated the 26th November, 1986 given by respondent No. 2. In the alternative, according to Shri Shah, respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A would be guilty of aiding and abetting respondent No. 1 in committing breach of the undertaking and were liable to be suitably punished. 6. I my judgment, there is no difficulty in holding that the respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A had the knowledge of the litigation between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 as also the undertaking given by respondent No. 1 to this Court on the 26th November, 1986. The suit premises consisting of single room are situate at village Baman Dongri in Panvel Taluka and it would be reasonable to infer that the present litigation which had gone on for over ten years was to the knowledge of respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A especially when respondent No. 1 is a lady and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are her son and daughter. It is pertinent to note that the suit filed by respondent No. 2 was soon after respondent No. 1 had given her undertaking and the suit filed respondent No. 2-A was filed some time therefore. Hence respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A can be impugned with the knowledge of the undertaking given by respondent No. 1. 7. The next question, however, that arise for consideration is whether respondent Nos. Hence respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A can be impugned with the knowledge of the undertaking given by respondent No. 1. 7. The next question, however, that arise for consideration is whether respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 2-A can be held guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by respondent No. 1. Shri Kaulgekar the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 and Shri Karandikar, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2-A placed reliance on sections 8, 9 and 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act and contended that respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A cannot be held guilty of wilful breach of the undertaking given by respondent No. 1. As far as respondent No. 1 is concerned, Shri Limaye, the learned Advocate appearing on her behalf placed reliance on the affidavit of respondent No. 1 and contended that though it was true that she has been unable to comply with her undertaking, that was on account of the non-co-operation of respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A. Respondent No. 1 was helpless and though she made sincere efforts to pursuade respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A she was unable to have them to vacate the suit premises and hand over the same to the petitioner. He prayed for mercy. 8. In order to appreciate the contentions of Shri Kaulgekar and Shri Karandikar, it may be convenient to reproduce the provisions of sections 8, 9 and section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 :--- "8. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any other defence which would have been a valid defence in any proceedings for contempt of Court has ceased to be available merely by reason of the provisions of this Act." "9. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of Court which would not be so punishable apart from this Act." "2(b). In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--- 'Civil Contempt' means wilful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court." It is the contention on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A that the tenancy of the suit premises originally stood in the name of their father. On his death respondents Nos. 2 and 2-A that the tenancy of the suit premises originally stood in the name of their father. On his death respondents Nos. 2 and 2-A along with respondent No. 1 would be the tenants under section 5(11)(c) of the Rent Act. According to them respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A had a valid defence to the execution of the decree obtained against respondent No. 1. They had therefore, obstructed the execution of that decree and filed their Declaratory Suits. The assertion of the defence which respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A bona fide believed to possess would not come in their way in the present contempt proceedings. In any event, the undertaning was given by respondent No. 1 alone and not by them. Breach, if any, would be that of respondent No. 1 alone and they could not be made liable along with respondent No. 1 for the said breach. 9. Placing reliance on section 9 it was contended that since there was no undertaking given by them, they cannot be held guilty of breach of the same and they also could not be held guilty for aiding and abetting respondent No. 1 as there was no provision under the Act which made the aiding or abetting an offence. According to them it was only wilful breach of an undertaking that was made punishable under the Act. Hence, it was contended that it would not be permissible to take any action against respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A. 10. In my judgment, the provision of section 8 will have no application to the facts of the case and would not assist respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A in their defence. All that section 8 provides is that if any defence is available as a valid defence in any proceedings for contempt of Court, the same would continue to be available despite any of the provisions of the Act. We are not considering any defence which would be available as defence to the present contempt proceedings and we are not concerned whether such a defence is available to respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A in any other proceedings by reason of any of the provisions of this Act. The first limb of the arguments on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A must be negatived. However, on the second limb of the arguments, it must be held that the same is not devoid of merit. 2 and 2-A in any other proceedings by reason of any of the provisions of this Act. The first limb of the arguments on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A must be negatived. However, on the second limb of the arguments, it must be held that the same is not devoid of merit. In my view section 9 makes it abundantly clear that it is only such disobedience that is made punishable as contempt of Court which is made specifically punishable under the Act. There is no provision in the Contempt of Courts Act like section 34 or section 114 of the Indian Penal Code with the aid of which respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A can be punished for aiding or abetting respondent No. 1. These are quasi criminal proceedings and unless there is a specific provision which penalises an Act of vicarious liability, it would not be permissible to punish such a contempt. However, having regard to the fact that in a number of cases contempts are committed by parties other than the ones against whom judgment, decree or directions or orders of the Court are passed or other than the ones who have given an undertaking to the Court which has the effect of bringing the Courts into disrepute, it would, in my view, be appropriate for the concerned authorities to consider appropriate amendments to the Act so as to bring within the compass of the Act contempts with the aid of provisions of sections 34 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 11. Shri Shah, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of (Seaward v. Paterson)1, reported in 1 Ch. 1897 Page 545 and contended that it was not necessary that the party found to be guilty of contempt should himself be bound by an order of injunction. If such a party is found to have aided and abetted a defendant in a breach of an injunction, he should be suitably dealt with for contempt. Shri Shah further relied upon the decision of (Kuchwar Lime Co. v. Secretary of State)2, reported in A.I.R. 1987 Patna Page 65 which has taken a view similar to the view taken in the aforesaid case. Shri Shah further relied upon the decision of (Kuchwar Lime Co. v. Secretary of State)2, reported in A.I.R. 1987 Patna Page 65 which has taken a view similar to the view taken in the aforesaid case. He also relied upon the case of (A.B. Gyrymurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai)3, reported in A.I.R. 1936 Madras Page 651 for the proposition that an undertaking given by a party amounted to an order of injunction and, therefore, the Court had the power to deal with the breach of such undertaking. So far as the third case is concerned, one would require no authority for the proposition that the undertaking given to the Court are as effective and efficacious as orders of injunction issued by the Courts and moreover the breach of an undertaking has been made specifically punishable under the Act. 12. In my judgment, the first who two decisions relied upon by Shri Shah will not assist him in as much as it is not possible to determine whether there existed a provision like the one found in section 9 in the enactments under which the aforesaid pronouncements were made. 13. Shri Kaulgekar and Shri Karandikar submitted that on the death of a tenant, the members of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of his death would be tenants under section 5(11)(c) of the Rent Act. According to them, respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A have an independent right and do not claim through respondent No. 1. They are, therefore, justified in obstructing the executing of the decree and filing the Declaratory Suits. 14. In my judgment, there is no merit in the aforesaid contention. The phrase "any member of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of his death" would not enable each and every member of the tenant's family to claim an independent right of tenancy in respect of the tenanted premises. Any member would mean any one member. I am fortified in the aforesaid view by the decision of this Court in the case of (Miss Gool Rustomji Lala v. Jal Rustomji Lala)4, reported in 73 B.L.R. at page 600. In the present case the original deceased tenant had died as far back as in 1962 and it was respondent No. 1 alone who was recognised as the tenant. In the present case the original deceased tenant had died as far back as in 1962 and it was respondent No. 1 alone who was recognised as the tenant. Till the decree was finally passed against her, no claim of whatever nature was set up by respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A. It is obvious that this is a belated effort on the part of respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A to delay and defeat the execution of the decree passed against respondent No. 1. Had there been a provision for punishing a contemner by taking resort to the vicarious liability, this would undoubtedly be a fit case to take action against respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A. 15. As far as respondent No. 1 is concerned, it will have to be held that she has been guilty of breach of the undertaking. She has, however, stated that she is helpless and has not been able to pursuade respondent Nos. 2 and 2-A to vacate the suit premises. She herself has left the suit premises and this fact has specifically not been controverted by the petitioner in the affidavit in rejoinder filed in the present proceeding. Though this is a case of breach of undertaking, it may not be possible to hold that this is a case of wilful breach of that undertaking. In this view of the matter, I do not consider this to be a fit case to take any action against respondent No. 1. 16. In the result, the petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----