MAJUMDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from the Judgment and Order, date of June 15, 1984 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court on an application of the appellant for an order that the defence of the defendant against the delivery of possession in the suit be struck out. ( 2 ) THE case of the appellants, who are the landlord, is that the respondent committed a default in payment of rent within the time prescribed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and by reason of such default the defence of the respondent in the suit should be struck out under Section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ). It may be mentioned here that the appellants had filed a suit against the respondent for eviction on the grounds mentioned in the said Act. ( 3 ) M/s. Khaitan and Co. , Advocates-on-record for the plaintiffs in the suit (the appellants before us), enquired from M/s. Orr, Dignam and Co. Advocates-on-record for the defendant (the respondent before us), as to whether the defendant had deposited the amount for the month of June 1980. Not having been favoured with any reply, the appellant's Advocates-on-record enquired of the Registrar, Original Side of this Court, as to whether such deposit had been made and therefrom the appellants came to know that no such amount had been deposited by the respondent or their Advocates-on-record for the month of June 1980. M/s. Orr, Dignam and Co. by a letter, dated 6. 1. 83 stated that for the month of June 1980 a cheque was deposited with the Reserve Bank of India on July 12, 1980 but the receipted challan had not been given by the Reserve Bank of India. Thereafter by a further letter, dated 10. 9. 83 M/s. Orr, Dignam and Co. , enquired of the appellants' Advocate-on-record, M/s. Khaitan and Co. , as to whether they were agreeable to accept Rs. 3200/- on account of the payment for the month of June 1980. The appellants' Advocates-on-record refused to accept the same, inasmuch as it was a case of the appellants that the respondent was bound to deposit the amount equivalent to rent in Court within the period mentioned in the said Act. 3200/- on account of the payment for the month of June 1980. The appellants' Advocates-on-record refused to accept the same, inasmuch as it was a case of the appellants that the respondent was bound to deposit the amount equivalent to rent in Court within the period mentioned in the said Act. The respondent deposited the amounts earlier with the Reserve Bank of India by cheques drawn in favour of the Reserve Bank of India and filed the challans received from the Reserve Bank of India on such deposit with the Registrar, Original Side of this Court. It was also the case of the appellants before the trial Court that the defendant did not deposit any challan issued by the Reserve Bank of India or by any other Bank acknowledging receipt of any amount equivalent to rent for the month of June 1980. ( 4 ) THE case of the respondent before the trial Court was that by virtue of the order of the Appeal Court, dated 15. 6. 77, the respondent was required to deposit in Court an amount of Rs. 3200/- each month in respect of the previous months. The procedure for making, such deposit was governed by Rules 39a, 39b, 39c and 39d of Chapter 14 of the Original Side Rules of this Court. Further, case of the respondent was that a cheque was drawn on Bank of India in favour of the Reserve Bank of India for the said sum of Rs. 3200/- for the month of June 1980, and the cheque was sent along, with the challan in duplicate to the Reserve Bank of India for the purpose of deposit on July 12, 1980. The dealing clerk of the Advocates-on-record for the respondent took another cheque with the corresponding challan to make deposit in another suit, being suit No. 485 of 1974. It was a case of the respondent before the trial Court that the Reserve Bank of India issued a single token, bearing No. 133510 dated 12. 7. 80, in respect of both sets over challans and cheques. It was a case of the respondent before the trial Court that the Reserve Bank of India issued a single token, bearing No. 133510 dated 12. 7. 80, in respect of both sets over challans and cheques. On July 22, 1980 when the said dealing clerk went to the Reserve Bank of India and presented the token the Officials of the Reserve Bank of India delivered to him, receipted challan in respect of the second suit, but the challan deposited in respect of the instant suit, according to the Reserve Bank of India, could not be traced by the Reserve Bank of India. As stated above, the Advocates-on-record for the respondent offered to pay the said sum to the Advocates-an-record for the plaintiffs, but the said offer was declined. It was, therefore, the contention of the respondent before the trial Court that if there was any default, that default was not due to the fault of the respondent and such default, if any, in making the deposit was under circumstances beyond control of the parties. In the present case, as found by the learned trial Judge, the cheque could not be encashed not because of the fault of either party but for the neglect of the Reserve Bank of India in rot presenting the cheque in due time and under the Rules of this Court, whatever formalities had to be compiled with had been done by the respondent, in this case. ( 5 ) THE learned trial Judge, considering the respective contentions of the parties, held that the Rules of this Court provided for making payment to the Registrar by way of deposit after submission of the lodgment schedule and due deposit of the cheque for the exact amount with the Reserve Bank of India which all the litigants had to do in compliance with the order of the Court. The learned trial Judge was, in the facts and circumstances of the case, of the view that due to some unavoidable circumstances deposit could not be made for the month of June 1980 and under such circumstances the learned Judge refused to make any order on the application of the appellants for striking out the defence of the defendant. ( 6 ) THE respondent in this appeal takes a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal. ( 6 ) THE respondent in this appeal takes a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal. The learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent, submits that this order is not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure nor is it appealable under the provisions of the said Act. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent, that in any event this order passed by the learned Trial Judge is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, inasmuch as the order passed by the learned trial Judge did not adjudicate any rights of the parties nor did settle the rights of the parties finally. ( 7 ) IT has also been contended by the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent, that assuming that it is an appealable order and an appeal lies from the order as passed by the learned trial Judge, the learned trial Judge in the facts and circumstances of the case exercised the discretion in a proper manner and exercising such discretion refused to strike out the defence of the respondent. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the respondent has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. B. P. Khemka Private Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1010 . It has been held by the Supreme Court that even if the Proviso was viewed in a limited sense as being attracted only to those cases where there has been full and complete compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or (2) or (2a) of Section 17 and would not apply to a case as the one on hand, the appellant cannot be denied relief because the words "shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out" occurring in Section 17 (3) had to be construed as a directory provision and not a mandatory provision as the word "shall" had to be read as "may". Such a canon of construction was warranted because otherwise the intention of the legislature will be defeated and the class of tenants for whom in beneficial provisions were made by the ordinance and the amending Act will stand deprived of them. Such a canon of construction was warranted because otherwise the intention of the legislature will be defeated and the class of tenants for whom in beneficial provisions were made by the ordinance and the amending Act will stand deprived of them. The Supreme Court has further observed that once the word "shall" used in Section 17 (3) is read as "may" and consequently the provision for striking out the defence is to be read as directory and not mandatory, then it follows that the Court is vested with the discretion, to order either striking out the defence or not, depending upon the circumstances of the case and the interest of justice. ( 8 ) SECTION 17 (3) of the said Act reads as follows:"sec. 17 (3 ). If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred, to in sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (2) within the time specified therein or within such extended time as may be allowed under Clause (a) of sub-Section (2a), or fails to deposit or pay any instalment permitted under Clause (b) of sub-Section (2a) within the time fixed therefor, the Court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. " ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants has, however, strenuously contended that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one learned single Judge of the High Court to the other learned Judges of any Division Court as contemplated in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the order of the learned Trial Judge has denied a right of the appellants accrued under the said Act, viz. , in the event of default in making payment of deposit under Section 17 of the said Act would give a right to the landlord under Section 17 (3) of the said Act to have the defence of the defendant struck out. In that view of the matter, according to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the order of the learned Trial Judge is the judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In that view of the matter, according to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the order of the learned Trial Judge is the judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. ( 10 ) WITH regard to the discretionary power of the Court dealing with an application under Section 17 (3) of the said Act, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that since the provision of Section 17 (3) of the said Act is mandatory in nature, the Court is not left with any discretion in the event it is established that there has been any default on the part of the defendant-tenant under the said Act. Dealing with the case cited by the respondent, viz. , the case of M/s. B. P. Khemka (supra), it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that there the discretion in the context of Section 17 (3) of the said Act is only limited to Section 17 of the said Act and if there was any default within the meaning of the said Act, then the Court dealing with such application should have made an order for striking out the defence. ( 11 ) IT is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that in the present case under the order of the Appeal Court, the defendant was supposed to deposit rent for the amount of Rs. 10,000/- per month, but the defendant had been depositing Rs. 3200/- per month. The learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the fact that it was althrough the contention of the appellants-landlords that there had been a default on the part of the defendant in making a deposit of Rs. 3200/- per month for the month of June 1980 and that would be evident from the petition before the trial Court (vide, paragraph 4 thereof) that the respondent preferred an appeal against the said judgment and/or order, dated 21. 4. 1978 and obtained stay of operation of the said order and as such they remained liable to go on depositing rent @ Rs. 3200/- per month in accordance with the order of this Court. 4. 1978 and obtained stay of operation of the said order and as such they remained liable to go on depositing rent @ Rs. 3200/- per month in accordance with the order of this Court. ( 12 ) IN any event, we are not going to express our view on that since that matter was not agitated before the learned Trial Judge and the only contention before the learned Trial Judge was that the respondent committed a default in making payment of rent @ Rs. 3200/- per month for the month of June 1980 and the learned Trial Judge proceeded on that basis. ( 13 ) WE have considered the respective submissions of the parties. We are of the view that the order as made by the learned Trial Judge is not appealable order under Order 43 Rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure. We also hold that there is no provision for appeal in the said Act from any order under Section 17 (3) of the said Act. ( 14 ) WE also are of the view that the order appealed from is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as, in our view, it does not settle finally the rights of the parties. ( 15 ) ASSUMING that it is appealable, we feel that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Trial Judge has exercised the discretion in proper manner. It will also appear from the judgment appealed from that the learned trial Judge has found as a fact that there has not been any default on the part of the respondent in making the deposit of rent for the month of June 1980, inasmuch as the cheque could not be encashed, by the Reserve Bank of India, not because of the fault of any of the parties but due to the negligence of the Reserve Bank of India in not presenting the cheque in due time. The learned Trial Judge has also held that under the Rules of this Court whatever formalities the party was required to comply with, had been duly complied with. The learned Trial Judge has also, in the facts and circumstances of the case, condoned the default, if there was any, and we feel that such discretion which is with the Trial Court has been exercised properly in the facts of the case. The learned Trial Judge has also, in the facts and circumstances of the case, condoned the default, if there was any, and we feel that such discretion which is with the Trial Court has been exercised properly in the facts of the case. ( 16 ) MOREOVER, the point as to the nature of the provisions of Section 17 (3) of the said Act, which has been set out earlier, has been discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. B. P. Khemka (supra ). It has been held by the Supreme Court that the Court is vested with the discretion to order either striking out the defence or not depending upon the circumstances of the case and interests of justice. If the Court has the discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant committing default in payment of or depositing rent as required by the provision of any Tenancy Act, then the Court surely has further discretion to condone the default and extend the time in making payment or deposit and such a discretion is the necessary implication for not striking out the defence. ( 17 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants has cited a decision in the case of Modula India vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo, reported in AIR 1989 SC 162 , to contend that in case of default in payment of rent the tenant had a restricted right, viz. , that the tenant could cross-examine the plaintiff's witness but could not adduce any evidence on its own. In our view, this case has no application to the case with which we are concerned. In that case, the question before the Supreme Court was what was the effect of the order striking out the defence and if there was any order striking out the defence, what was the right of the tenant in the eviction suit instituted by the landlord against the tenant. ( 18 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. ( 19 ) WE hereby affirm the judgement and order passed by the learned trial Judge dated 15, 1984. ( 20 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. Abani Mohan Sinha, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed.