P. M. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONERS the occupants of several survey numbers of the agricultural lands situated at village Ichhapore taluke Choryasi District Surat have challenged the acquisition of their lands for the public purpose the extension of the township for the employees of the Krishak Bharti Co-operative Limited (hereinafter referred to as KRIBHCO) a project for the production of fertilizers viz. Ammonia Urea etc. The share capital of the Government of India in the said project is 340 crores out of the total cost of the project estimated over Rs. 980 crores. Notification No. AM/83/132/m/jst/1683/484/gh dated 16/03/1983 was issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Notification No. AM/83/466/44/jsn/1683/484/gh dated 19/09/1983 was issued by the State Government under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and urgency clause under S. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act was also supplied for the acquisition of various survey numbers for the said public purpose. The Notification under S. 4 was challenged by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 2035 but was subsequently withdrawn. The Notification under S. 4 was challenged by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 2035 but was subsequently withdrawn. The acquisition is challenged by the petitioners mainly on the grounds that the acquired lands are very fertile agricultural lands and are placed in the agricultural zone by Surat Urban Development Authority which prepared the Development Plan under S. 6 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as T. P. Act) and the said lands can only be used for the purpose for which they are demarcated; that the KRIBHCO had in the year 1978 proposed to establish a plant near Hajira near Vihardham Surat which is popularly known as Hajira Fertilizers Complex for which purpose the Union Government had appointed an Expert Team which alongwith the members of the World Bank Team visited the site and the Members of the Gujarat Pollution Board also visited and ultimately it was announced that for the project KRIBHCO would require about 1000 to 1100 acres of land and in spite of that 1314 acres 24 gunthas of land of village Limla and 467 acres 25 gunthas of village Kavas is acquired and therefore the land acquired is not required for public purpose; that when representation was made in the year 1978 when the proposals for acquisition of the land for the project were being considered the Minister of Revenue by letter dated 22/11/1978 had informed Mohanbhai Jagdishbhai Patel that the State Government intended to acquire only fallow land which is not cultivable and no fertile land would be acquired. The then Chairman of KRIBHCO also informed Shri Mohanbhai Jagdishbhai Patel that as far as possible the land belonging to the State Government would be acquired and accordingly in 1978 the lands of village Ichhapore being very fertile were not acquired for the project; that the policy of the State Government is not to acquire fertile land and the lands of the petitioners being fertile agricultural lands should not have-been acquired; that the survey number 174-A which is contiguous to S. No. 195 which is already acquired of Mora village is Government fallow land and if at all the Government is genuinely satisfied of the need of KRIBHCO that land can be allotted to the acquiring body; that the KRIBHCO does not require the land as there is no real ganuine and bonafide need for any public purpose as it is in possession of large area of lands which is in excess of requirement of the project and therefore the exercise of. the power by the State Government for the purpose of KRIBHCO is colourable exercise of powers and is fraud on the statute and that if at all the KRIBHCO is in real genuine and bonafide need of the lands the contiguous lands of village Kavas are also available for that purpose and similarly Survey Numbers 435 and 255 fallow Govt. lands of village Damka are also available and could have been acquired for the aforesaid purpose; that in the Notification issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act it is mentioned that the lands are likely to be needed for Hajira Fertilizer Complex Township and that purpose is neither a public purpose nor the KRIBHCO require the lands genuinely and therefore the notification is illegal ultravires void in colourable exercise of power and fraud on the statute; that the central Government and the State Government had examined the entire issue and was of the view that the fertile lands of Ichhapore village should not be acquired and relying upon the said promise the petitioners spent considerable amount for making the lands more fertile and therefore on the principle of promissory estoppel the respondent no. 1 is estopped from acquiring the said lands; that the survey no. 1 is estopped from acquiring the said lands; that the survey no. 702 belongs to public trust and should not have been acquired as it will offend the religious feelings of agriculturists of Ichhapore village especially when the mosque building was not acquired while acquiring the lands of Limla village for the said project; that the report of the inquiry under S. 5 was submitted by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the State Government and the State Government after that issued Notification under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 19/09/1983 and also applied the urgency clause under S. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and by notice dated 28/09/1983 under sub-S. (1) of S. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act directed that possession be taken on 25/10/1983 Accordingly the notification under S. 6 and invoking of urgency clause under S. 17 of the Act are arbitrary unjust and void and that the Notification under S. 6 suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and colourable exercise of power. Even though the above referred contentions were raised in the petition Mr. G. N. Desai and Mr. P. G. Desai learned Counsels for the petitioners urged some of the contentions which we will discuss at the later stage. ( 2 ) THE petition was filed by 21 petitioners but subsequently 13 of the petitioners withdrew probably because of the compromise with KRIBHCO and they agreed for the acquisition of their respective lands and only 8 petitioners have challenged the acquisition of their lands. Original petitioners Nos. 1 4 7 8 9 11 13 15 and 17 to 21 who were occupants of the lands bearing S. Nos. 706 716 699 698 694 691 702 698 704 715 735 705 716 and 716 respectively holding about 9 hactares 8 are 82 sq. mts. out of 17 hectares 21 acre 89 Sq. Mts. land under acquisition have withdrawn from the challenge and have agreed for the acquisition. The original petitioners Nos. 2 3 5 6 10 12 14 and 16 who have challenged the acquisition are occupants of respective survey numbers 693 700 and 701/5-6 617 733 701 and 701 692 698 697 and 703. ( 3 ) THE petitioners joined KRIBHCO as respondent no. The original petitioners Nos. 2 3 5 6 10 12 14 and 16 who have challenged the acquisition are occupants of respective survey numbers 693 700 and 701/5-6 617 733 701 and 701 692 698 697 and 703. ( 3 ) THE petitioners joined KRIBHCO as respondent no. 3 but subsequently by Civil Application No. 367 after about a period of 6 years after filing of the petition at the time of hearing of the petition sought to delete it as a party respondent and this Court by order dated 5/04/1989 allowed KRIBHCO to be deleted as party respondent. ( 4 ) MR. R. R. Solanki Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer Surat and Mr. M. R. Pandya Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer Surat filed affidavits on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr. K. Dar Manager (Personnel and Adiministration) of KRIBHCO filed affidavit dated 16/12/1983 and Sur-rejoinder dated 18/09/1986 The petitioner No. 3 Chandulal Gopalbhai Patel filed the Affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 28/12/1983 and Dhirubhai Thakorebhai Patel power of attorney of petitioner no. 1 filed affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder dated 23/08/1988 ( 5 ) THE acquisition of the land is for the purpose of extension of the township for the employees of KRIBHCO. KRIBHCO is continued in the co-operative sector from 17/04/1980 for owning and operating a fertilizer complex plant commissioned from November 1985 and has gone in commercial production since March/april 1986. Hazira complex will be employing about 1400 employees for the ferilizer plant. KRIBHCO is also given an assignment of Heavy Water Project Kawas by the Central Atomic Energy Department Central Government and in this Heavy Water Project about 500 employees would be employed. The project is to be completed in two phases each consisting of one ammonia plant of 1350 M. T. per day capacity and two streams of Urea of 1100 M. T. per day capacity each. As per the schedule the first phase had to go into production by the end of 1984 and as is clear from the Affidavit of Mr. Dar the plant has now gone into commercial production since March/april 1986. As per the schedule the first phase had to go into production by the end of 1984 and as is clear from the Affidavit of Mr. Dar the plant has now gone into commercial production since March/april 1986. In the year 1980 1811 acres of land was acquired for the purpose of housing the project and for the purpose of meeting the requirements of houses for the employees the proposal was submitted on 20/09/1982 to the Collector for acquisition of land for the extension of the township and that proposal inter alia included the acquisition of 25 survey numbers of village Ichhapore. The proposal was made for acquisition as the said lands are contiguous to the area of lands already acquired for the existing township. The Government issued notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and then 11 petitioners out of 21 original petitioners filed objections. The objections were considered by the Land Acquisition Officer in the inquiry held before him and subsequently the notification under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. The parties were also served with the notices for handing over possession on October 16 1983 but the petitioners challenged the acquisition in the court. ( 6 ) MR. G. N. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners asserting the contention that the land is situated in the agricultural zone specified by Surat Urban Development Authority under the provisions of S. 16 of the T. P. Act submitted that the same cannot be used for non-agricultural purpose and therefore the acquisition for the purpose of extension of the township i. e. for the houses of the employees a non-agricultural use is basically void and illegal and the lands should not have been acquired for that purpose. It is true that at the initial stage the acquired lands were included in the Draft Development Plan submitted by Surat Urban Development Authority to the Government of Gujarat for sanction under the provisions of the T. P. Act but the Government of Gujarat considered it necessary to make modification in the Draft Development Plan submitted by the Surat Urban Development Authority and therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (a) of Sub-S. (1) of S. 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 Government of Gujarat published the modifications by Govt. (ii) of cl. (a) of Sub-S. (1) of S. 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 Government of Gujarat published the modifications by Govt. Notification dated 30/04/1985 and called upon to submit the objections or suggestions with respect to the proposed modification and after considering the suggestions and/ or modification in exercise of the powers under cl. (c) of sub-S. (1) of S. 17 of the T. P. Act finalised the said modifications and sanctioned the said Draft Development Plan Regulations subject to the modifications. Third day of March 1986 was specified as date on which the final development plan came into force. In the said notification the lands bearing survey numbers 691 701 702 703 704 705 706 715 716 733 and 735 ect. of village Ichhapore which were designated as lands in agricultural zone in the draft development plan were deleted from the said agricultural zone and it was provided that the said lands shall be reserved for the houses of KRIBHKO under S. 12 (2) (k) of the Act. Several other survey numbers of Ichhapore village which were designated in the agricultural zone in the draft development plan were also deleted and were reserved for the commercial purpose. The Government has accordingly modified the draft development plan and the said lands are no more reserved for agricultural purpose. It should however be noted that some of the petitioners challenged that modification in Special Civil Application No. 5011/86 in this Court on 22/09/1986 and that is pending disposal. Dhirajbhai Thakorebhai Patel Power of Attorney holder of petitioner No. 1 Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel who subsequently expired and his heirs were brought on record has in his Affidavit dated 23/08/1988 referred to the Special Civil Application No. 5011 and the interim relief granted by this Court on 21/10/1986 which according to him is in the following terms: Pending admission hearing and final desposal of the petition the officers of the State Government. as well as all the Authorities including SUDA has been directed not to implement the notification as finalised by the aforementioned notification and/or to disturb possession and enjoyment of the lands in question of the petitioners. as well as all the Authorities including SUDA has been directed not to implement the notification as finalised by the aforementioned notification and/or to disturb possession and enjoyment of the lands in question of the petitioners. With a view to ascertain the interim relief said to have been granted by this Court in the aforesaid terms we called for the record of Special Civil Application No. 5011/86 and to our surprise we found that no order as quoted in the Affidavit is passed by this Court and in the Affidavit false statement is made on oath. The Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5011/86 passed the following interim order on 31/03/1987 Rule o be heard with Spl. C. A. No. 2379/84 1145 and 3125/81. Interim relief to the effect that the possession of the petitioners land will not be disturbed without the express permission of the Court. It is apparent from the interim order passed by this Court on 31/03/1987 that the Notification of the Government modifying the Draft Development Plan is not stayed and no direction is given to the Officers of the State Government and the authorities of SUDA for not implementing the modifications as finalised by the State Government. We note with concern that such false affidavit should not have been filed by the Power of Attorney Holder of deceased Kalidas. In view of the above it should be held that the lands are not reserved for agricultural purpose but are specifically reserved for the construction of the houses for the employees of KRIBHCO and therefore cannot be used for any purpose other than the purpose specified in the final development plan i. e. Housing for KRIBHCO. Hence the acquisition is therefore not bad on that ground. ( 7 ) MR. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners asserted that when the land was to be acquired for the project in the year 1. 978 the representation was made to the Government as well as to the Chairman of IFFCO and it was assured that the Government intends to use the fallow lands and the lands used for agricultural purpose will not be acquired and therefore also the lands of the petitioners should not have been acquired. 978 the representation was made to the Government as well as to the Chairman of IFFCO and it was assured that the Government intends to use the fallow lands and the lands used for agricultural purpose will not be acquired and therefore also the lands of the petitioners should not have been acquired. A close perusal of the letter dated 22/11/1978 of the Minister for Revenue does not indicate that the lands of Ichhapore village are fertile lands and would not be acquired at all. It was not promised that only Government lands would be acquired and the lands of the petitioners would never be acquired. It appears that when the KRIBHCO project was to be established the inquiries were being made for the location etc. in the year 1978 and at that time one Mohanbhai J. Patel of Ichhapore village apprehending that the lands of Ichhapore village will be acquired wrote letter dated 11/11/1978 to Shri Keshavbhai Patel Minister for Revenue Gujarat State and the reply was given by the aforesaid letter dated 22/11/1978 (Annex. A) in which Mohanbhai J. Patel was informed that he had made representation that efforts were being made to acquire the agricultural lands of Ichhapore village for the project but the Government intended to use the fallow lands not useful for agricultural purpose for the proposed project and therefore as such there was no substance in the apprehension. It therefore does not transpire from the said letter that assurance was given not to acquire the lands of Ichhapore village by the Minister for Revenue Gujarat State and hence the question of promissory estoppel does not arise. In reply dated 5/12/1978 to the letter of Mohanbhai the Chairman IFFCO informed Mohanbhai that it was not in contemplation to acquire more than required land and as far as possible the effort would be to acquire Government land to the extent possible. No promise was made by that letter. It is also clear from the maps and record produced on record that at that time the lands of village Kavas and village Limla which are the adjoining villages to village Ichhapore were acquired for the purpose of the Project and the lands of Ichhapore village were not acquired. No promise was made by that letter. It is also clear from the maps and record produced on record that at that time the lands of village Kavas and village Limla which are the adjoining villages to village Ichhapore were acquired for the purpose of the Project and the lands of Ichhapore village were not acquired. The petitioners have only made vague statement that relying on the promise they have improved the agricultural potential of their lands but except the vague statements in the Affidavit they have not produced any acceptable evidence to hold that any improvement is made in the lands after 1978. No change in the position on the basis of the alleged promise is established by the petitioners. As such at that particular time it was never in contemplation of acquiring the lands of Ichhapore village and the proposal was made only in the year 1982 In view of the fact that there was no such promise in either of the letters for not acquiring the lands for the extension of township or for any other purpose the question of promissory estoppel does not erise nor the petitioners can seek protection on that ground. Even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments that any such promise was made by the Government and the Government was bound by any such promise the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be asserted in favour of the petitioners in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and for reasons of conflict between the public interest and the private interest. By this we do not mean to observe that we accept the contention of the petitioners that the respondent no. 1 was estopped from acquiring the lands by promissory estoppel. By this we do not mean to observe that we accept the contention of the petitioners that the respondent no. 1 was estopped from acquiring the lands by promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 806 observed: the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine it must yield when the equity so requires if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise of representation is made and enforce the promise of representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because on the facts equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. This contention therefore deserves to be rejected. ( 8 ) ASSERTING the contention that more than the required land is acquired in the year 1978 and therefore the lands of the petitioners are not genuinely required by the KRIBHCO Mr. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the power of eminent domain should be exercised with utmost restraint and for actual requirement which should be genuine and bonafide. According to the petitioners when the project was intended to be established the Union Government had appointed the expert team which had visited the site accompanied by the World Bank Team and that site was also visited by the Gujarat Pollution Board and it was then announced that about 1000 to 1100 acres of land would be required. Mr. K. Dar Manager (Personnel and Administration) of KRIBHCO IN his Affidavits deposes that Hazira Fertilisers Complex which is the largest in co-operative sector in the entire world and largest fertilizer project in Asia was visited by the expert team and the acquisition of the lands admeasuring 1811 acres is already made and that acquisition is not questioned. Mr. K. Dar Manager (Personnel and Administration) of KRIBHCO IN his Affidavits deposes that Hazira Fertilisers Complex which is the largest in co-operative sector in the entire world and largest fertilizer project in Asia was visited by the expert team and the acquisition of the lands admeasuring 1811 acres is already made and that acquisition is not questioned. He stated that the entire land so far acquired in the past and also the lands which are under acquisition at present are required for the purpose of meeting the requirement of the project and the housing of the employees and no land is being acquired in excess of the requirement. He also stated that considering the magnitude of the whole project the lands earlier acquired were not found sufficient to meet the needs acquired of KRIBHCO and the lands earlier acquired are put to their proper use and The railway siding and yard are also made and in some of the lands the building for Central School is under construction. He also stated that the lands which are already acquired in the year 1980 were not found to be sufficient and therefore the lands of Ichhapore village are proposed to be acquired since they are contiguous to the lands already acquired and the township is already constructed for the employees of the KRIBHCO. It is therefore evident that for the plant 1810 acres of lands of Kavas and Limla villages were acquired in the year 1980 and the township is established on the said lands. It is clear from the Affidavits of Mr. Dar that the lands acquired in the year 1980 have been utilised for the purposes for which they were acquired and no land more than requirement is acquired. As such there is no reason for not accepting the statement of Mr. Dar. It is clear from his affidavits that the project the estimated cost of which is over Rs. 980 crores is to be completed in two phases each consisting of one ammonia plant of capacity of 1350 M. T. per day and two streams of Urea of capacity of 1100 M. T. per day each. The commercial production is already started in the year 1986. Such a huge project will require sufficient land for the plant transport facilities houses for the employees and for various other purposes. The commercial production is already started in the year 1986. Such a huge project will require sufficient land for the plant transport facilities houses for the employees and for various other purposes. It is also clear that the Railway Yards and Sidings are also constructed. If at all no such facilities are provided it will be very difficult for such project to function and to transport the production to the various parts of the country. If at all the lands admeasuring 1810 acres were not necessary it would not have been acquired in the year 1980 as the acquiring body is required to pay the market price of the land. The lands of the petitioners are required for the purpose of extension of the township for constructing the houses of the employees. It is clear that about 1400 employees will be required to man the project. The petitioners have vaguely stated that the lands already acquired are not required and much of the land is lying vacant. If at all more land was not required there was no reason as such to make proposal and to acquire the land for the extension of the township as the KRIBHCO would be required to pay the market price of the said lands. It is also clear that 13 out of 21 petitioners who had initially challenged the acquisition have accepted the genuineness of the acquisition and have handed over the possession of the lands obviously on accepting the satisfactory prices of the lands. It should therefore be accepted that the requirement is genuine bonafide and is not in excess of the requirement and is not malafide. ( 9 ) MR. R. L. Solanki Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer Surat has stated that technical opinion was submitted and as per the technical opinion the lands in question are being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. M. R. Pandya Special Land Acquisition Officer and Mr. Solanki both have stated that the lands are acquired for the public purpose for the extension of township of KRIBHCO. Mr. Solanki has denied the other contentions of the petitioners. ( 10 ) AS provided in S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act it should appear to the Government that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for the public purpose or for a Company. Mr. Solanki has denied the other contentions of the petitioners. ( 10 ) AS provided in S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act it should appear to the Government that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for the public purpose or for a Company. The Notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued only after the satisfaction of the Government about the requirement of the acquiring body. The objections under S. 5-a of the Land Acquisition Act are also required to be invited and in fact in the present acquisition proceedings objections were invited and only some of the petitioners filed objections which were considered and after that notification under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. Declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act shall be made only when the Government is satisfied after considering the Report if any made under S. 5-a of the Land Acquisition Acts that the land is needed for the public purpose or the Company. Sub-3. (3) of S. 6 of the 1and Acquisition Act specifically provides that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for public purpose or for the Company as the case may be. It is now well settled that the declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is conclusive evidence that the land proposed to be acquired is needed for the public purpose and the Court cannot go into the question as to whether the need is genuine or not unless the Court is satisfied that the action taken is fraudulent or colourable exercise of power or malafide. The Supreme Court in the case of Ratilal v. State of Gujarat AIR 1970 S. C. 984 while repelling the contention that the housing scheme for the limited number of persons cannot be considered a public purpose and there was no need for acquiring the land for the scheme observed:. . . S. 6 (3) of the land Acquisition Act provides that a declaration under S. 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land proposed to be acquired is needed for a public purpose. Therefore this Court cannot go into the question whether the need was genuine or not unless we are satisfied that the action taken by the Government was a fraudulent one. . . . Therefore this Court cannot go into the question whether the need was genuine or not unless we are satisfied that the action taken by the Government was a fraudulent one. . . . The Government is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is a public purpose or not and further the declaration made by it under S. 6 is a conclusive evidence of the fact that the land in question is needed for a public purpose. See Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab 1963 (2) SCR 774 : ( AIR 1963 SC 151 ). That decision lays down that conclusiveness in S. 6 (2) must necessarily attach not merely to a need but also to the question whether the purpose was a public purpose. Reiterating the same legal position in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1971 SC 1033 the Supreme Court observed that so long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose the declaration of the Government that it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge. S. 6 (3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless it is shown that there was a colourable exercise of power it is not open to this Court to go behind that declaration and find out whether the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not. ( 11 ) IF at all the Government was not satisfied the notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act would not have been issued for acquiring the lands of the petitioners. There is nothing on record to doubt the bonafides of the acquiring body or the Government and vague allegation that the acquisition is made in colourable exercise of the power of the Government and is malafide cannot be accepted for want of any convincing material on record. Considering the facts and the evidence on record and the magnitude of the project and the production we do not find any colourable exercise of power want of bonafide or fraudulent intention on the part of the Government to acquire the said lands. Considering the facts and the evidence on record and the magnitude of the project and the production we do not find any colourable exercise of power want of bonafide or fraudulent intention on the part of the Government to acquire the said lands. On the contrary it is clear that the lands are required for extension of township of such a huge project. The declaration under S. 6 of the Act is made after the inquiry as provided in S. 5 of the Act. On the facts and circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the lands under acquisition are required bonafide and that too for public purpose. ( 12 ) IT is also contended that the purpose for which the lands are acquired is not a public purpose. But in view of the discussion above that contention deserves to be repelled. The project is already established and the lands of the petitioners are required for the extension of the existing township. The Supreme Court in the case of Land Acquisition Collector v. Durga Pada A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 1678 expressed the same view as in the case of Ratilal (supra) and Jage Ram (supra) and observed that the declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act raises the presumption that the land is required for the public purpose and to dislodge the presumption by alleging malafide or colourable exercise of power the heavy burden lies on the party making such allegations. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Promodbhai B. Desai v. Officer on Special Duty No. 2 and ors. 30 (1) GLR 194 in which one of us (the Chief Justice) was the party on consideration of relevant provisions of S. 6 I and Acquisition Act and the various judgments of the Supreme Court expressed the similar view. In view of the provisions of S. 6 Land Acquisition Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court as discussed above and facts purpose and object of acquisition we should accept that the purpose for which the lands are required is a public purpose. ( 13 ) IT is vehemently urged by Mr. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Government fallow lands are available in the vicinity and those lands should have been acquired if at all the Govt. ( 13 ) IT is vehemently urged by Mr. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Government fallow lands are available in the vicinity and those lands should have been acquired if at all the Govt. would have been satisfied that the requirement for the extension of the township is genuine. In support of his contention Mr. Desai referred the plans produced on record at annexure C plan at page 64 with the Affidavit of Mr. K. Dar Manager (Personnel and Administration) KRIBHCO and plan at Annex. H (page 84) produced with the Affidavit of Chandulal Gopaljibhai Patel petitioner no. 3. In all the three plans the lands of village Kavas and Limla which are acquired and the land under acquisition and the situation of the lands which are stated to be the Government lands are shown. The land under acquisition is situated on the north east direction of the township and is adjecent to land previously acquired. The other survey numbers of Ichhapore village are situated on other three sides of the lands of petitioner under acquisition. Only 17 hectares 21 acres and 89 sq. mts. of land is acquired for the extension of the township. ( 14 ) IT is contended by the petitioners that S. Nos. 174 and 195 situated in Mora village are Government lands available for acquisition and those lands should have been acquired by the respondents. It is also contended that S. Nos. 435 and 255 and other fallow pieces of the land of the ownership of the Government situated at village Damka are also available which could have been acquired by the respondents. Petitioner No. 3 Chandulal Gopalji Patel in his affidavit has stated that Government land bearing S. No. 435 of Damka village is most suitable for the extension of the township and out of that survey number the Collector has given lands bearing S. Nos. 435/a and 435/b for the purpose of cultivation. It is also stated that the lands out of S. Nos. 148 230 and 241 situated at Mora village are given to the Larson and Toubro by the Collector by order dated 23/11/1983 and that land also could have been acquired for the extension of the township. ( 15 ) MR. 435/a and 435/b for the purpose of cultivation. It is also stated that the lands out of S. Nos. 148 230 and 241 situated at Mora village are given to the Larson and Toubro by the Collector by order dated 23/11/1983 and that land also could have been acquired for the extension of the township. ( 15 ) MR. Dar in his affidavit and Sur-rejoinder has categorically stated that the alternative sites including the Government lands were also considered for acquisition and on detailed scrutiny and examination it was found that the lands which are under acquisition are most suitable as the said lands are contiguous to the land already acquired and used for the existing township. The land which is suggested by the petitioners is khadi land (Creek land) and not only that it is not suitable but it is far away from the land already acquired. Survey Nos. 174-A and 195 of Mora village are not suitable as they are far away from the project and other colony which is already under construction. Besides the fact that they are creek lands the expert has expressed the opinion that the said lands are marshy lands and are not fit for any construction. Survey No. 435 of Damka village is not suitable as it is a creek and marshy land and no construction on it is possible. It is also staled that the KRIBHCO project is a public project and is a co-operative society with a substantial holding of the Government of India and if the alternative lands at distant places or not properly situated are acquired different infrastructure will be required to be set up which will involve a huge capital outlay and expenditure. If the lands under acquisition are acquired they being contiguous lands to the lands already acquired the infrastructure and facilities will be made available to the houses to be constructed on the land. He has asserted that technically and for above consideration the lands under acquisition are most suitable and convenient for the extension of the township. The existing township is already constructed all he lands under acquisition are contiguous to the township. He has asserted that technically and for above consideration the lands under acquisition are most suitable and convenient for the extension of the township. The existing township is already constructed all he lands under acquisition are contiguous to the township. About the creek lands he has stated that huge expenditure will be involved in filling in the creek and making the land suitable for any construction purpose and that there is no certainly that even with filling the lands under the creek will not give its way. He has also stated that the housing colonies are required to be con- structed near the project as the presence of the employees may be necessary at any time for the operation and/or maintenance of the machineries and the plant. The Central School Building is under consideration on the previously acquired land and there is no approach road to that build- ing and that is to be provided only from the lands sought to be acquired. ( 16 ) WE may consider the rival contentions and suitability of the said Government lands for the extension of township even though it is not necessary as primarily it is within the power of the Land Acquisition Officer to consider the suitability of the land. It is evident from the affidavits of Mr. Dar that all the alternative available lands were considered for the exten- sion of the township but the lands under acquisition are the only suitable lands for various reasons stated by him. The existing township is contiguous to the land under acquisition. It is quite obvious that infrastructure would be required to be provided for the township to be constructed in the acquired lands and if at all the buildings are constructed at a distance away from the existing township much costs will be required to be incurred for providing infra- structure and facilities. It is clear from the maps that the creek is situated on the north of the land which is already acquired and on construction can be made on that land W. No. 435 of Damka village is marshi land and it is situated beyond creek on the north of KRIBHCO and it is at consideration distance away from the land under acquisition. In the map (Annex. H) pro- duced by the petitioners it is stated that it is a salty land. In the map (Annex. H) pro- duced by the petitioners it is stated that it is a salty land. It should therefore be accepted that it is a marshi land not suitable for the extension of township. Merely because some north-west part of the S. No. 435 is given to two persons for cultivation it cannot be said that the land is suitable for the construction of the building. Survey No. 174-A and portion of S. No. 195 of Mora village are not suitable for the construction of township. S. No 174-A is situated on the south-west adjacent to that creek. Mr. Dar has described it as creek land. S. No. 195 is situated on west of S. No. 174. Many survey numbers are situated between already acquired land of Limba village and Survey No. 195. Such lands are certainly not suitable for the purpose of exten- sion of township. S. Nos. 148 and 230 which are acquired for the Larson and Toubro are faraway from the acquired lands and the lands under acquisition. The Government lands and other lands which are suggested by the petitioners are therefore not suitable for the extension of the town- ship. Mr. Hava learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has stated that even out of already acquired lands for the KRIBHCO project 600 acres are Government land acquired for that purpose. As such we have no reason to disbelieve the statement of Mr. Hava. Considering the various reasons we agree that the Government lands referred to by the petitioners are not suitable for the extension of the township and rightly not acquired for that purpose. We therefore do not accept the contention that the possibility of acquiring the governmental fallow lands was not considered and that it is a case of non-application of mind. ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Ramgir Uttamgir Goswami v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 29 GLR 502 in which the contention that the Land Acquisition Authority failed to consider the availability of other more convenient lands for acquisition was raised observed that the assessment of suitability of the lands proposed to be acquired for the concerned public purpose is primarily the Land Acquisition Officer to consider. 29 GLR 502 in which the contention that the Land Acquisition Authority failed to consider the availability of other more convenient lands for acquisition was raised observed that the assessment of suitability of the lands proposed to be acquired for the concerned public purpose is primarily the Land Acquisition Officer to consider. ( 18 ) IT was next contended that the fertile agricultural lands of the petitioners which are the main source of their maintenance are being acquired and therefore also the acquisition should be struck down. It was also contended that the contesting petitioners are having no other lands or source of income and in respect of most of the petitioners the lands under acquisition are the only source of livelihood. Except stating that fact vaguely no other details of the petitioners and their occupation are given Subsequently Dhirajbhai Thakorebhai Patel Power of Attor- ney Holder of petitioner No. 1 who has ultimately agreed for the acquisition of the land of the petitioner No. 1 in his affidavit stated that the petitioner No. 1 has only Survey No. 706 which is under acquisition and has to maintain 14 family members out of the income of that land. It is clear that the petitioner No. 1 has already agreed for the acquisition and has handed over the possession of the land. It is stated that the petitioner No. 3 is not having any other land except the land under acquisition. The petitioner No. 3 Chandulal Gopaljibhai Patel has not clearly stated that he has no other sources of income and the land under acquisition is only source of his maintenance. He should have slated that fact specifically. It is further staled that the petitioner No. 18 Lalbhai Devabhai and others are solely dependent on the land S. No. 715 and have to maintain 26 family members out of the agricultural income of the said land which is under acquisition. As such petitioner No. 18 has also agreed for the acquisition and handed over the possession of the land. It therefore cannot be accepted that the acquired land is the only source of income of the contesting petitioners. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1988 S. C. 2181 the contention was that the agricultural lands should not have been acquired in view of the policy decision of the Government. Repelling the said contention it was observed :. . . In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1988 S. C. 2181 the contention was that the agricultural lands should not have been acquired in view of the policy decision of the Government. Repelling the said contention it was observed :. . . . We are unable to accept the contention. In a welfare state it is the duly of the Govern- ment to proceed with the work of development and take slops for the growth of industries which are necessary for the countrys progress and prosperity and for solving the question of unemployment. It is true that agricultural land is necessary and should not ordinarily be converted to non-agricultural use but keeping in view the progress and prosperity of the coun- try the State has to strike a balance between the need for development of industrialisation and the need for agriculture. The allegation that before initialing the acquisition proceedings the Government has not applied its mind to the need for agricultural land is a very vague allegation without any material in support hereof. The contention is overruled. ( 19 ) MR. Desai learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners referring to the Govern- ment Resolution No. SMN-2280-KH dated 2/08/1980 by which the instructions were issued by the Government to consider the availability of fallow Government lands within the radius of 3 to 4 kms. of the land to be acquired for the purpose of Co-operative society and in case such fallow land is available the willingness of the acquiring body for that land should be inquired submitted that the same principle should be applied here. Said instruc- tions are only for the acquisition of the land for co-operative society. The submission of Mr. Desai that the same principle should be applied cannot be accepted. Apart from that we have considered the question with regard to the suitability and availability of such Government fallow lands. ( 20 ) EVEN though the petitioners did no contend in the petition Mr. G. N. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted before us that large area of land of Kavas and Limla villages is acquired and therefore it was obligatory on the Government to consider the environ- mental aspect i. e. the effect of such project on the environment which is necessary for the purpose of ecological balance. In the submission of Mr. Desai Government has not considered this aspect. In the submission of Mr. Desai Government has not considered this aspect. As no contention is raised in the petition the respondents could not get oppor- tunity to place before the Court the consideration of the Government so far as the environmental aspect and the ecological balance is concerned. Even according to the petitioners the members of the Pollution Board had visited the places and only after that clearance was given for the acquisition of the lands. The bare submission at the time of arguments that the environmental aspect and the ecological balance were not considered cannot be accepted. . ( 21 ) MR. G. N. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners during the course of elaborate argu- ments did not urge the validity of the acquisition on the ground of urgency clause under Section 17 Land Acquisition Act but after the argument so learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr. P. G. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the acquisition is invalid as the urgency clause under Section 17 Land Acquisition Act was made applicable along with the notification under Section 6 of the Act and the urgency clause can be made applicable only after notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquision Act is issued. In submission of Mr. Desai invocation of Section 17 can be only after issuance of notice under sub-section (1) of Sec- tion 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. He also submitted that the very exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 17 Land Acquisition Act is the illustration of non-appli- cation of mind and colourable exercise of power. The petitioners stated in the petition that in response to the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the land Acquisition Act they had filed objection and thereafter they are called for hearing. The petitioners have also stated that thereafter it appears that the report was also made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the State Government and the State Government appears to have issued Notification in the Gov- ernment of Gujarat Gazette dated 20/09/1983 being Notification dated 19/09/1983 purporting to be under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners have also stated that thereafter it appears that the report was also made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the State Government and the State Government appears to have issued Notification in the Gov- ernment of Gujarat Gazette dated 20/09/1983 being Notification dated 19/09/1983 purporting to be under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is also stated that it also appeared that the State Government had purported to apply urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act and by Notice dated 28/09/1983 the Government declared that since urgency clause was applied possession of the lands should be taken on 18/10/1983 It is also categorically stated that the Land Acquisition Officer had also purported to issue notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act purporting to fix the hearing of the matter on 25/10/1983 It is further stated that in any view of the matter this was not a case in which urgency clause should be applied under Section 17 of the Act. It is submitted that large area of the land is already in possession of the KRIBHCO and therefore application of ur- gency clause shows non-application of mind and mala fide action on the part of the Government. They also stated that the State Government or the Special Land Acquisition Officer were not entitled to dispossess the petitioners of their lands purporting to act under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. According to the petitioners Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act is arbitrary illegal and unjust. What is challenged in the petition is the application of urgency clause and that too alongwith Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 22 ) SO far as the requirement of application of urgency clause under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is concerned Mr. K. Dhar in his Sur-rejoinder has stated that considering the importance of the project it was though absolutely necessary to apply urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. The lands in fact were most urgently required for constructing the houses of the employees. I is apparent from the deposition of Mr. Dhar that the land were urgency required and therefore the Government applied the urgency clause. The lands in fact were most urgently required for constructing the houses of the employees. I is apparent from the deposition of Mr. Dhar that the land were urgency required and therefore the Government applied the urgency clause. As such it cannot be accepted that no circumstances existed or there was no necessity to apply the urgency clause. Apart from that the purpose is not served as the possession of the lands is not taken even by resorting to the urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 Land Acqi- sition Act as the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 for handling over the possession within 15 days from 28/09/1983 was served to the petitioners but in the meanwhile the petition- ers filed this petition and this Court by interim order dated 11/10/1983 restrained the respondent from taking possession of the lands and since then except the petitioners who have withdrawn from the petition and settled with the KRIBHCO they continue to hold possession of the lands. ( 23 ) THE submission of Mr. P. G. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied a the time of notification under Section 6 or the Land Acquisition Act but can be applied only after 15 days after the notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. That contention is not specifically raised in the petition. However it being point of law is required to be consid- ered. The Notification under Section 6 of the Act is not produced but notice dated 28/09/1983 (Annex. F) under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act is produced. In that notice it is stated that the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and after that the notification dated 19/03/1983 under Section 6 of the Act is issued and the urgency clause under Section 17 of the land Acquisition Act is applied. By Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9. In that notice it is stated that the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and after that the notification dated 19/03/1983 under Section 6 of the Act is issued and the urgency clause under Section 17 of the land Acquisition Act is applied. By Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9. the petitioners wore called upon to hand over the possession after 15 days after the publication of that notice and for that purpose the Land Acquisition officer would go to the Panchayat Officer on 28/10/1983 As discussed above the procedures under Section 5-A and under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are followed and the Notice under Section 9 of the Act for getting the possession of the lands after 15 days of the publication of the notice was served. SECTION 17 of the Land Acquisition Act before the amendment by Act No. 68 of 1984 duly amended by I and Acquisition (Gujarat Unification and Amendment) Act 1905 pro- vided that in cases of urgency whenever the appropriate Government so directed the Collec- tor though no such Award had been made on the expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 may take possession of any land for public purpose or for the company all thereafter such land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (4)of Section 7 enables the appropriate Government to direct that the provisions of Sections-A shall not apply in case of any land to which in the opinion of the Government the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable and in case the Government exercise the power under subsection (4) of Section 17 declaration can be made under Section 6 in respect to any land at any time after publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4. In case the power is exercised by the Government under sub- section (4) of Section 17 the procedure under Section 5-A is not required to be followed but in the instant case that question does not arise as the notification under Section 6 was issued only after following the procedure under Section 5a of the Land Acquisition Act. Not only that but the possession was demanded after 15 days after the publication of the notice under sub- section (1) of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. Not only that but the possession was demanded after 15 days after the publication of the notice under sub- section (1) of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. The effect of application of urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 is that without declaring the Award the possession can be taken after 15 days after the notice under Section 9 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 does not contemplate the application of that urgency clause after the notice under Section 9 of the Act. It only provides that possession can be taken after 15 days after the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act The purpose of holding the inquiry under Section 11 and passing the Award by the Collector is to provide for the adequate compensation to the person whose property is acquired. It is clear that the urgency clause was made applicable along with the notification under Section 60 of the Land Acquisition Act As such there is no bar in applying the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act alongwith or just after the notification under section 6 of the Act It is not necessary that urgency clause under sub-section (i) of Section 17 can be applied only after notice under subsection (1) of Section 9 is published. What is contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section 17 is that on the Government deciding to apply the urgency clause the possession of the land can be taken after the expiry of 15 days after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-seeion (1) of Section 9 even though the Award under Section 11 of the Act is not passed and on taking possession the land shall vest absolutely in the Government. It does not contemplate that the urgency clause can be made applicable only after the notice under sub-sec. section (1) of Section 9 is issued. The submission of Mr. Desai therefore deserves to be repelled. ( 24 ) MR. P. G. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission re- ferred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Natwarlal Jerambhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 12 GLR 146. The submission of Mr. Desai therefore deserves to be repelled. ( 24 ) MR. P. G. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission re- ferred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Natwarlal Jerambhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 12 GLR 146. It was a case in which the provisions of sub-sec- tions (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act were resorted to for taking possession of the lands urgency by dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. In that matter the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act and the urgent requirement were under consideration of the Court and it was observed that the urgency must be such that the period required for inquiry under Section 5a of the Act would cause more prejudice and inconvenience so as defeat the very purpose of acquisition and the purpose of acquisition cannot be fulfilled. The Division Bench also observed that the provisions of sub-section (1) and (q) of Section 17 of the Act provide that the Government has to be satisfied that the lands. are urgently needed and the opinion of the Government is not justifiable but the opinion of the Government must be based on the objective facts and the condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 5-A of the Act must be fulfilled. In the instant case the inquiry under Section 5-A was held and only after declaration of notification under Section 6 of the Act ur- gency clause was applied. ( 25 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad and Ors. v. U P. Government and Ors. AIR 1964 S. C. 1217 relied upon by Mr. P. G. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners points out the different circumstances in which the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4)of Section 17 of the Act can be applied and that even though sub-section (1) of Section 17 is resorted to it is always not necessary that the direction under sub-section (4) of Section 17 should also be issued. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 empowers the Government to direct the Collector though no award has been made under Section 11 to take possession of any land needed for public purpose and such land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. If action is taken under sub-section (1) of Section 17 taking possession and vesting which are provided in Section 16 after the award under Section 11 are accelerated. If the Government makes a direction only under Section 17 (1) the proce- dure under Section 5-A will still have to be followed before a notification under Section 6 is issued though after that procedure has been followed and a notification under Section 6 is issued and Collector gels the power to take possession of the land after the notice under Section 9 without wailing for the award and on such taking possession the land shall vest absolutely in Government free from all encumbrances. It is only when the Governmental so makes a declaration under sub-section (4) of Section 17 that it becomes unnecessary to take action under Section 5-A and make a report thereunder. The judgment does not lay down any law as sought to be interpreted by Mr. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners. On the contrary it supports the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that the urgency clause under sub-section (1)of Section 17 can be applied along with or immediately after the declaration under Section 6 is made. ( 26 ) MR. Desai referred the decision of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Hakim Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1970 Allahabad 151 not approv- ing the view taken by the Division Bench of the same High Court in the case of Sheikh Ghulam Maula v. State of U. P. AIR 1964 All 353 wherein the Full Bench was considering the point as to whether a Notification under subsection (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition can be issued if the notification under sub section (1) of Section 17 of the Act has not already been issued. It was not the point for consideration before the Full Bench as to whether the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 17 can be issued only after the Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act is published. It was not the point for consideration before the Full Bench as to whether the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 17 can be issued only after the Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act is published. While considering the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act the Full Bench observed that an analysis of Section 17 of the Act as it then stood revealed that under sub-section (4) the Collector may take possession of any land fifteen days after the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 of the Act in other words the action under that sub-section can be taken only after notifi- cation under Sections 4 and 6 and the notice under Section 9 (1) of the Act have issued and objections if any under Section 5-A of the Act have been disposed of. The Full Bench pro- ceeded on to consider the judgment of the Division Bench of that Court in Sheikh Ghulams case (supra) in which the Division Bench had expressed the view that only after the direction is given by the Government it can be said that the power mentioned under sub-section (1) can be exercised in regard to the land and that the Government must bring the land actually within the application of sub-section (1) by directing the Collector on account of urgency to take posses- sion of it on the expiry of 15 days from the publication of a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 even though no award has been made. The Full Bench disagreeing with the Division Bench observed:. . . . Under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act the appropriate Government can give a direction to the Collector for taking action only after fifteen days have expired from the data of the publication of the notice mentioned in subsection (1)of S. 90 of the Act. If action under sub- section (4) of S. 17 is to be taken the stage for it will be much earlier in time than the stage for action contemplated by sub-section (1) of S. 17 of the Act. . . If action under sub- section (4) of S. 17 is to be taken the stage for it will be much earlier in time than the stage for action contemplated by sub-section (1) of S. 17 of the Act. . . Even the Full Bench expressed the view that the action under sub-section (1) can be taken only after the expiry of 15 days after the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act By using the word action the Full Bench clearly meant the action of taking possession as that is the only action which is contemplated to be taken by Collector under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act. Apart from the fact that the point of considera- tion before the Full Bench was as stated above the Full Bench has not laid down any proposi- tion of law as sought to be canvassed by Mr. Desai learned Counsel for the petitioners. ( 27 ) IN Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma 1970 149 composit notification under Section. 6and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh declaring that the land was urgently needed for public purpose and that the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was dispensed with and that the pos- session will be taken under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act after the expiry of 15 days after the publication of the notice under subsection (1) of Section 9 of the Act In that case the possession was already taken away by the Government even before the notification was issued The Supreme Court expressed the view that when the notification under Section 17 (1) is issued on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-sec- tion (1) of Section 9 the possession previously obtained will be doomed to be the possession of the Government under Secti on 17 of the Act and the land will vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. Even though it was no for consideration of the Supreme Court as to whether the composit notification under Sections 6 and 17 can be validly issued it transpires from the observations that such composit notification can be issued and merely because such composit notification is issued it does not invalidate the notification or the acquisition ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jetmull Bhojraj v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 1363 observed that ordinarily possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the Collector has made an Award under Section 11 and not before it but an exception is provided under Section 17 (1) of the Act In ease of urgency if the Government so directs the Col- lector may though no Award has been made under Section 11 on the expiration of the 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act take possession of any land and the land shall thereupon vest absolutely with the Govern- ment free from all encumbrances The Supreme Court also expressed the view that the expres- sionwhenever the appropriate Government so direct in sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act refers to the taking over possession and not to the declaration of urgency In our view the absolute vasting of the land in the Government is therefore from the date of taking possession after 15 days after the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act It can never be accepted that the urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 can be ap- plied only after notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act is issued If that is accepted it would frustrate the very purpose of applying the urgency clause under sub- section (1) of Sec- tion 17 of the Act. ( 29 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the respondents referred the decision of this Court in the case of Jagjivanbhai Motirai v. The State of Gujarat and Ors. ( 29 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the respondents referred the decision of this Court in the case of Jagjivanbhai Motirai v. The State of Gujarat and Ors. 1989 (1) GLH 190 The judgment of the Allahabad High Court was referred before the Division Bench in which one of us (the Chief Justice) was a party but the Division Bench observed: therefore it is clear that Section 17 (1) applies as soon as the Government is satisfied that the land is needed for public purpose and is needed urgently Ordinarily such satisfaction is part of the same process of satisfaction and there cannot be any objection for recording such. satisfaction by one notification. In the present case Section 6 Notification notifies that the Government has come to the conclusion that the land is needed for public purpose and then also recorded that it is urgently needed. The further direction which has been given is clearly consistent and in accordance with Section 17 (1) of the Act. Thus the direction does not enable the Land Acquisition officer to lake the possession immediately but he is directed to take pos- session only after issuance of notice under Section 9 (1) of the Act. There is no infirmity in such direction. The judgment of Allahabad High Court does not lay down any law on this point. We are fully satisfied that Sections 6 and 17 (1) notification which has been issued as one notification is legal and valid and there is no infirmity in in the same. In view of the above discussion the submission of Mr. Desai deserves to be rejected. ( 30 ) AS the possession of the acquired lands of the contesting petitioners could not be taken because of the interim order of this Court the petitioners are not prejudiced by the issuance of the urgency provisions. ( 31 ) NO other point is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged. Interim relief vacated. ( 32 ) MR. G. N. Desai the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners wants stay of this order since according to Mr. G. N. Desai his clients are in possession of the land. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged. Interim relief vacated. ( 32 ) MR. G. N. Desai the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners wants stay of this order since according to Mr. G. N. Desai his clients are in possession of the land. He wants to move the Supreme Court and according to him the Supreme court will have summer recess during the months of May and June and it reopens only by 10/07/1989 He prays that stay of the operation of this order may be granted at least upto 17/07/1989. Considering the request there will be stay of taking possession of the disputed land from the petitioners herein until 17/07/1989. .