JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has been convicted for the offence under Section 3/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (here in after referred to as 'the Act') by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur and sentenced to six months simple imprisonment and a fine of L 1,000 and in default of payment of fine he has to further undergo three months simple imprisonment. This decision was confirmed in appeal No. 221/79 by the Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur by order dated 2nd July, 1985. Against this the present revision petition has been filed. 2. Some dates relevant for our purpose may be mentioned. 450 Grams of Ajwayan was purchased by Shri Kalyanmal Sharma on 26th August, 1976. The accused petitioner is a shop keeper. The sample collected was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis and on 30th September, 1976, the Public Analyst prepared his report and found that there were live insects in large quantity in the sample. This report was sent to the Food Inspector for obtaining sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner and this sanction was given on 3rd November, 1976. The complaint was filed on 26-11-1976 and for the first time the accused appeared before the court on 3-9-1977. 3. A number of grounds have been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the conviction cannot be maintained and they are as under: (1) That the petitioner at the time of purchase of Ajwayan by the Food Inspector Kalyan Mal Sharma disclosed that the Ajwayan was not meant for human consumption but was for cattle; (2) That there was no outer cover on the samples which were sealed and there was no distinguishable proof on the outer cover. In this contest, it is contended that the samples and seal are to be sent separately by registered post and this was not complied with as the Food Inspector stated that the seal was sent by hand; (3) That the Rule 9(j) of the Act is said to have been not complied with because, the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to the petitioner. For this, PW 1, Kalyan Mal Sharma has stated that after the receipt of the report from the Public Analyst, he had submitted the papers before the Chief Medical and Health Officer and he must have sent the report to the petitioner; (4) That the sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner is in a general proforma, which goes to show that the authority did not apply its mind end as such, it is cot a proper sanction. I propose to deal with the first and third arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. As far as the contention that the Ajwayan was not meant for human consumption, is concerned, there was nothing on record to show the petitioner had stated this at the time the Ajwayan was purchased by the Food Inspector. The Inspector has not been asked any question in cross-examination as to whether the petitioner had stated this fact to him. More over, it has come in the evidence that the total Ajwayan in the petitioner's stock Grams and this small quantity cannot be said to be kept by the petitioner at the shop for the use of animals. In his statement, the accused has stated that the rate of the good Ajwayan was about L 12/-per Kg. and the Ajwayan sold to the Food Inspector was that which was sold at rate of L 6/- per Kg. therefore, it could not have been meant for human consumption. This contention of the petitioner does not deserve to be accepted as it can be said that this is on after though and at the same time it can be said that if two qualities are available in a particular commodity, it cannot be said that the inferior quality should be infested with insects, or it should be presumed that it was not meant for human consumption. A particular commodity may be sold in different qualities on different rates but it would not give a licence to a dealer to sell an inferior quality after adulterine it. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Ajwayan was not meant for human consumption is not accepted. 4. A particular commodity may be sold in different qualities on different rates but it would not give a licence to a dealer to sell an inferior quality after adulterine it. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Ajwayan was not meant for human consumption is not accepted. 4. Rule 9(j) of the Rules, provides that after receipt of the report of the Public Analyst in Form 3, the Food Inspector is to send a copy of the same to the person from whom, the sample was purchased. This rule falls within the rules which lay down the duties of the Food Inspector. In the present case, the Food Inspector did not send the report to the person from whom the sample was purchased He only believes that the report of the Public Analyst was brought to the knowledge of this petitioner by the Chief Medical and Health Officer. For this, there is no proof on record. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that Rule 9(j) is mandatory and non compliance of the same vitiates the conviction, He has placed reliance on Velji v. State of Rajasthan 1982 WLN (UC) 588 . and Labh Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 1979(1) 5) and on Bhole Nath Nayak v. State and Anr. 1977 Cr. LJ 154 in support of his contention. 6. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor has relied upon a DB case of Nanak Ram and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan 1983 RLR 89 and a Supreme Court decision in Dal Chand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal [ AIR 1983 SC 303 ] . 7. On basis of these decisions it is contended that Rule 9(j) of the Rules is directory and not mandatory It may be stated that in the cases of Dal Chand and Ors. and Nanak Ram (supra), the position was different in as much as the non-compliance of Rule 9( j) was to this extent that the report was not sent to the person from whom the sample was purchased, within the prescribed period of ten days. But in the present case, the report had not been sent at all. and Nanak Ram (supra), the position was different in as much as the non-compliance of Rule 9( j) was to this extent that the report was not sent to the person from whom the sample was purchased, within the prescribed period of ten days. But in the present case, the report had not been sent at all. In Dal Chand's case (supra), the Supreme Court has observed: "The period of ten days was prescribed with a view to expedition end with the object of giving sufficient time to the person from whom the sample was taken to make such arrangements as he might like to challenge the report of the Public Analyst, for example, by making a request to the Magistrate to send the other sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. Where the effect of non-compliance with the rule was such as to wholly deprive the right of the person to challenge the Public Analyst's report by obtaining the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, there might be just cause for complaint, as prejudice would then be writ large. Where no prejudice was caused there could be no cause for complaint. I am clearly of the view that Rule 9(j) of the Rules was directory and mandatory. The present case is one where in no report has been sent to the petitioner and it can be said that be has been deprived of his valuable right of getting the sample analysed by the Central Food laboratory. The object of Rule 9(j) is to afford opportunity to an accused to exercise his right under Section 13(2) of the Act and this right cannot be negatived by not supplying the report. Rule 9(j) can be said to be directory in the sense that if the report of the Public Analyst is not sent to the person from whom the sample was purchased within the prescribed period of ten days, then it could not result in prejudice to the accused but if it is not supplied at all then it cannot be said that instead of substantial compliance, there is partial compliance of the rule and no prejudice has been caused. In view of the fact that the report of the Public Analyst has not been sent to the petitioner at all, his conviction cannot be sustained. 8. In view of the fact that the report of the Public Analyst has not been sent to the petitioner at all, his conviction cannot be sustained. 8. The other points raised by the petitioner need not be decided in this petition. 9. In view of the above reasons, the revision petition of the petitioner is accepted and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner is set aside.Revision accepted. *******