JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---This writ petition arises out of suit filed by the present petitioner who is the landlady in respect of the suit premises, for recovery of possession of the suit premises from the respondent defendant, a helpless lady whose husband has deserted her, on the ground of the landlady's bona fide requirement. 2. Admittedly, the suit premises are on the ground floor of the building to the petitioner-plaintiff. It was purchased by her in the year 1959. The respondent was already in occupation of the ground floor of the building as tenant of the erstwhile landlord. After the purchase of the building by the present petitioner, she become the respondent's landlady. There is no dispute that right from the beginning when the petitioner became the owner of the building in question, quarrels and disputes have been going on between the parties. Earlier a suit was filed for recovery of possession of the suit premises from the respondent on the ground of unlawful sub letting. As stated by the lower appellate Bench, there existed even criminal litigations between the parties. It was only after the earlier suit, filed on the ground of unlawful sub-letting was dismissed by the Court that the present suit was filed for recovery of possession of 3/4th portion of the suit premises on the ground of the petitioner-landlady's bona fide requirement. 3. During the trial, the landlady herself did not step into the witness box to depose to the nature of her bona fide requirement. On her behalf her husband give evidence. The trial Court had decreed the suit to the extent of about 1/2 portion of the suit premises by demarcating the portion which was to be handed over by the respondent into the possession of the present petitioner. 4. No appeal was filed by the landlady. In the appeal filed by defendant, the appellant Court has taken the view that there were 13 persons staying in the suit premises as members of the defendant's family. The Court also held that the requirement of the petitioner did not appear to be bona fide. In this connection, noticing that the petitioner/landlady had not stopped into the witness box to depose to her bona fides the appellant Court has come to the conclusion that the principle laid down by this Court in (Nanalal Goverdhandas Co. v. Smt. Samratbai Lilachand Shah)1, 1981 Bom. In this connection, noticing that the petitioner/landlady had not stopped into the witness box to depose to her bona fides the appellant Court has come to the conclusion that the principle laid down by this Court in (Nanalal Goverdhandas Co. v. Smt. Samratbai Lilachand Shah)1, 1981 Bom. C.R. 334 squarely applies. The appeal has, therefore, been allowed by the Bench and the petitioner's suit for possession has been dismissed. I may mention here, and on this point there is no dispute before me, that the above judgment of the learned Single Judge in Nanalal's case is no longer good law in view of the subsequent Division Bench judgment of this Court, reported in (N.G. Khandelwal v. Nandubai Bansidbar Khandelwal)2, 1984 Mh.L.J. page 253. (following another Division Bench judgment of this Court (unreported) in (L.P.A. 24 of 1979 dated 21st September 1981)3. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge has held that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession to any portion of the suit premises in possession of the defendant at all. Present writ petition has been filed by the original plaintiff whose entire suit has been dismissed by the appeal Court. 5. After the filing of this petition, Affidavits have been filed by the parties to bring on record certain subsequent events. Original plaintiff's attempt is to prove that the number of members in the defendant's family has now reduced from 13 to 7 because Ahmed Ansari, the only brother of the respondent, has left the premises along with his wife and four children. Plea therefore, is that in view of the changed circumstances of which this Court should take note, the decree passed by the trial Court should be restored. 6. Mr. Sayed tried to rely upon above-mentioned judgment of the learned Single Judge in Nanalal's case in support of his contention that the landlady's bona fides were not proved. But, in view of the above mentioned Division Bench judgment reported in 1984 Mh.L.J.P. 253 (which specifically over-rules the judgment of the learned Single Judge), he did not pursue that point any further. 7. No other point was urged in support of the plea that the bona-fides of the plaintiff were in any way suspect. It follows that the lower Court was wrong in holding that the bona fides of the plaintiff were not established. 7. No other point was urged in support of the plea that the bona-fides of the plaintiff were in any way suspect. It follows that the lower Court was wrong in holding that the bona fides of the plaintiff were not established. All the same, I cannot but think that this is a case where substantial justice has been done between the parties. This is so because of the subsequent events. An affidavit has been filed by the respondent showing that the plaintiff has acquired possession of one bed-room on the first floor which was in the occupation of Jenabai. That is about 125 sq. ft. of area. In addition to this, the respondent's Affidavit states that one of the galleries has been enclosed by the plaintiff so that virtually one more room is made available for the plaintiff. The affidavits filed by the parties do bear out the correctness of this factual position. It is in the context of this fact that I must appreciate the submission made by Mr. Sayed appearing for the respondent. He pointed out that the final order passed by the trial Court leaves no rood for doubt that all that was given by the trial Court to be plaintiff from out of the premises in occupation of the defendant was a portion of the hall on the ground floor and nothing more. I repeatedly asked Mr. Desai as to what is the area which was given by the trial Court to the plaintiff from out of the premises held by the defendant and he stated that it was 140 sq. ft. area which was to be received by the plaintiff as per the decree passed by the trial Court and that this was done by apportioning the hall into two parts. After taking instruction from his client he stated that the portion of the hall which was to be given into the possession of the plaintiff as per this decree ad measures about 140 sq. ft. It was in this context that Mr. Sayed argued, with quite some force, that, if, as per the trial Court's decree, the plaintiff was to get only 140 sq. ft. of area from out of the premises of the tenant, then almost that much area is already received by the plaintiff after the passing of the trial Court's decree. ft. It was in this context that Mr. Sayed argued, with quite some force, that, if, as per the trial Court's decree, the plaintiff was to get only 140 sq. ft. of area from out of the premises of the tenant, then almost that much area is already received by the plaintiff after the passing of the trial Court's decree. The room of which the possession was received by the plaintiff from Janabai admeasures about 125 sq.ft. Before getting that possession, the trial Court had granted the decree for about 140 sq. ft. Against that part of the decree, no appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. Mr. Sayed argued that this would show that the plaintiff was satisfied if about 140 sq. ft. of area was received by the plaintiff in addition to whether area she had already got at the time of the decree of the trial Court. Plea is that as against this requirement, the plaintiff has got possession of the room admeasuring 125 sq. ft. from Janabai. Mr. Sayed contends that the plaintiff's requirement is substantially satisfied and, hence, no decree against the defendant needs to be passed. I find no answer to this plea. 8. The position would have been , perhaps, different if the plaintiff had filed an appeal against the decree passed by the trial Court. Further, as a matter of fact, in the plaint itself, the affirmation made by the plaintiff relates to possession of 3/4th area and not the entirely of the suit premises. In the plaint, it is specifically stated that no hardship would be caused to the defendants if possession of the 3/4 area was given to the plaintiff. The trial Court, by its decree, gave much lesser area to the plaintiff admeasuring about 150 sq. ft. No appeal was filed by the plaintiff against that decree. This clearly means that the plaintiff was satisfied with the additional 140 sq. ft. of area. Now, out of that area, 125 sq. ft. area is received by the plaintiff by taking possession of the room in possession of Jenabai. I, therefore, see no reason why I should interfere with the order passed by the lower Court. 9. This is particularly so, because, after going through the evidence as also through the judgment of the lower appellate Court, I can see that the defendant is an old woman deserted by her husband. I, therefore, see no reason why I should interfere with the order passed by the lower Court. 9. This is particularly so, because, after going through the evidence as also through the judgment of the lower appellate Court, I can see that the defendant is an old woman deserted by her husband. She has been eking out some living somehow or the other, but by honest means. That is the reason why her sister and her sister's husband stayed with her as members of her family and, in return, virtually maintained her. In a sense the area which is with her gives her not only a shelter but also livelihood. I would not be justified in depriving the old woman, in the evening time of her life, of this solace. In my opinion, substantial justice has been done even assuming that some portion of the lower Court's judgment is not quite happy. 10. The petition, therefore, fails. The Rule earlier issued is discharged. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----