JUDGMENT G. B. PATNAIK, J. - Petitioner No. 1 is the company and petitioner No. 2 is its principal officer. Petitioner No. 1 is an assessee both under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 as well as under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. For the assessment year 1971-72, the petitioner was assessed by the Sales Tax Officer, Cuttack-II (opposite party No. 3) by his order dated 31st March, 1975, which has been annexed as annexure-1. Under the said assessment order, the total demand was Rs. 17,53,282.43. But as the petitioner had paid the admitted tax to the tune of Rs. 7,79,481.62 and also availed of some rebate, the petitioner was directed to pay the balance tax of Rs. 9,70,329.42. This order was ultimately challenged before the Tribunal in second appeal and the Sales Tax Tribunal in Second Appeal No. 73(C) of 1979-80 disposed of on 6th January, 1980 allowed the appeal, set aside the order disallowing concessional rate of tax as claimed and remitted the case back on remand to the assessing officer with a direction to allow the concessional rate of tax as claimed if the declarations in form-9 are otherwise found to be in order. Subsequent to this order of the Tribunal, the petitioner filed an application for refund on 5th February, 1980 on the ground that there being no legality in the demand in question and the order of assessment having been set aside, the petitioner is entitled to the refund in question. The Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 3) rejected the petitioner's application for refund by his order dated 30th June, 1980, annexed as annexure-4. It has been held by the Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 3) that as reassessment is a continuation of the proceeding already started for assessment of the case, no refund is due at this stage and hence the refund application is rejected so far as it relates to the year 1971-72 with a direction to apply for refund if payable only after completion of the reassessment on the basis of the direction of the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal. It is this order of rejection of the petitioner's application for refund which is being assailed in the present writ application. 2. Mr. It is this order of rejection of the petitioner's application for refund which is being assailed in the present writ application. 2. Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that on setting aside of the earlier order of assessment, there is no legal demand against the petitioner and, therefore, the assessee-petitioner is entitled to the refund in question. In support of this aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on the two Bench decisions of this Court in Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur-III Circle, Jharsuguda [1982] 50 STC 211 and Orissa Road Transport Company Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam-I Circle, Berhampur [1983] 54 STC 22. Both these decisions fully support the contention of Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the two Bench decisions of this Court, there is no escape from the conclusion that opposite party No. 3 committed a gross error of law in rejecting the petitioner's application for refund. 3. Though no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Revenue in this case, yet the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the department, raises two contentions in support of the order of refusal passed by opposite party No. 3, namely, - (i) in view of section 14-D of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, the order of the Sales Tax Officer must be construed to be one in exercise of that power; and (ii) in view of insertion of the proviso to section 14, the said proviso should apply. The proviso relates to procedural matters and will govern all pending cases. We are not, however, impressed with any of the submissions made by the learned Standing Counsel. Section 14-D is the power of the Commissioner of Sales Tax to withheld refund in certain contingencies. That power, in our view, can be exercised only by the Commissioner alone and not by the officers subordinate to him. Admittedly, the Commissioner has not exercised that power in the present case. In that view of the matter, it is difficult for us to construe that the order of refusal is one in the purported exercise of power under section 14-D of the Act. The said contention of the learned Standing Counsel must be rejected. 4. Admittedly, the Commissioner has not exercised that power in the present case. In that view of the matter, it is difficult for us to construe that the order of refusal is one in the purported exercise of power under section 14-D of the Act. The said contention of the learned Standing Counsel must be rejected. 4. So far as the second contention is concerned, admittedly, the proviso had not been there on the statute book on 30th June, 1980 when the impugned order was passed by the Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 3). Consequently, he had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The further question which now arises for our reconsideration is whether there has been already a reassessment pursuant to the order of the Tribunal and if so, whether the petitioner is entitled to any refund subsequent to the said reassessment. There is no material before us, nor any such material is produced either by the petitioner or by the learned Standing Counsel to come to a conclusion whether there has been any reassessment pursuant to the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal. But since more than eight years have elapsed, we think that reassessment must have been done in the meantime. In that view of the matter, we do not find any force in the petitioner's contention that a direction be given to the opposite parties to refund the amount which the petitioner had during the subsistence of petitioner's appeal before the lower authorities. In the circumstances, as stated above, we would direct that the petitioner may make an application for refund if after the reassessment made by the assessing officer pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner is still entitled to some amount to be refunded to him. This writ application is disposed of with the aforesaid observations. There will be no order as to costs. A. K. PADHI, J. - I agree. Writ application disposed of accordingly.