JUDGMENT M.P.Singh, J. 1. The petitioner is a tenant of shop no. 91 situate in Sarai Karori, Khurja, District Bulandshahr. He has been in occupation of the shop since 1947 and has been carrying on the profession of Vaidyagi. 2. In December, 1982 a partition took place between the respondent no. 3 Om Prakash and his father Gopi Lal. As a result of that partition, the house in dispute fell to the share of respondent no. 3. This partition was recognised by means of a decree passed on 26th September, 1983 and signed on 10-10-1983 in suit no. 107/1983. After the decree was passed in favour of respondent no. 3, he filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of the shop on the ground that he had no other shop and he wants to set up his own independent business in the said shop. It was also asserted that his need was bonafide. 3. The said application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the partition decree was a collusive one and has been purposely obtained in order to file the present application. According to the petitioner the release application was not bonafide. 4. The Prescribed Authority by means of the order dated 27-4-1984 allowed the release application holding that the compromise between the respondent no. 3 and his father was not collusive and the need of the landlord was bonafide and genuine. On the question of comperative hardship, a finding was recorded that in case the shop was not released in favour of the landlord, greater hardship will be caused to him. Aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal. The Appellate Authority after considering the evidence, particularly the affidavit of Gopi Lal and the affidavit of the petitioner, recorded its own independent finding that the partition between the respondent no. 3 and his father was not a collusive one and found it to be genuine. On the question of bonafide need the appellate authority affirmed the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the landlord was living separately from his father in another tenanted house. He had no shop where he could start his own independent business. 3 and his father was not a collusive one and found it to be genuine. On the question of bonafide need the appellate authority affirmed the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the landlord was living separately from his father in another tenanted house. He had no shop where he could start his own independent business. On the basis of these findings the appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 27-11-1984 against which the present writ petition has been filed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the partition decree is a collusive one and it should have been ignored by the authorities below. THEy have committed a mistake in relying upon the same. His case further was that this compromise was arrived at between the landlord- respondent no. 3 and his father in order to evict the petitioner from the shop in dispute. The contention is misconceived inasmuch as so long the decree passed by the Civil Court in suit no. 107 of 1983 is not set aside, the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to record a finding that the compromise decree was collusive. The validity of the decree cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings. In order to support his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon B. N. Tiwari v. Additional District Judge, 1982 AWC 401 . The question for consideration in that case was whether there was an oral partition amongst the parties or not. The decision on that question was within the power of the Prescribed Authority and after considering the evidence a finding has been recorded that the oral partition was a collusive one. This case has no application to the facts of the present case because in the instant case there is already a decree of Civil Court which has not been set aside as yet. It was not open to the Prescribed Authority to record a finding otherwise. The authority cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no relevance so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. 7. On the basis of the discussion above there is no difficulty in my way in holding, that the finding recorded by the appellate authority aswell as by the Prescribed Authority that the partition decree was a valid one, is correct- 8. 7. On the basis of the discussion above there is no difficulty in my way in holding, that the finding recorded by the appellate authority aswell as by the Prescribed Authority that the partition decree was a valid one, is correct- 8. Now I come to the next question whether the need of the landlord was bonafide or not. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the finding of the authorities below on the ground that Gopi Lal, father of the respondent no. 3, has admitted that the respondent no. 3 was doing business along with him. The entire affidavit of Gopi Lal has been placed before me. In none of the paragraphs of the said affidavit it has been said that respondent no. 3 Om Prakash was still doing the business with Gopi Lal. What has been said by the father of the respondent no. 3 is that before the partition his son was living and also doing the business along with him. It has been further stated that after the partition, his son is living separately and is not doing any business for want of the accommodation. Thus, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also devoid of merit. In this case we are concerned with the expression 'bonafide required' appearing in section 21 (I) (a) of the Act. This expression has received a judicial interpretation in various pronouncements. The assessment has to be objective depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Relying upon the decision of - the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan (deceased) through L. Rs., 1979 (1) SCC 275, this Court in the case N. S. Datta v. VII Addl. District Judge, 1984 (1) ARC 113 held that the word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must prove that he genuinely required the accommodation. The authorities below while considering this aspect of the matter have recorded a finding that the need of the landlord was bonafide and on comparison of relevant hardship, the finding has also been recorded in favour of the respondent no. 3. 9. The authorities below while considering this aspect of the matter have recorded a finding that the need of the landlord was bonafide and on comparison of relevant hardship, the finding has also been recorded in favour of the respondent no. 3. 9. It has been held in numerous cases of this Court that findings on these questions are pure questions of fact and cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court. The Court has only to look into whether there is any error apparent on the face of the record or not. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Manohar Lal v. District Judge Saharanpur, 1982 UPRCC 496 for the proposition that the accommodation in occupation of the father of the respondent no. 3 could be considered as available to his son. It is not the question of title which is decisive but the factum of availability of the accommodation is to be taken into consideration. Here no evidence has been led by the petitioner to show that any other shop is available to the respondent no. 3. On facts this case is of no assistance to the petitioner. It appears that the authorities below while allowing the application for release of the shop, has lost sight of the fact that two years rent has to be awarded as compensation to the sitting tenant. That has not been done in this case. On this ground the orders cannot be set aside. This Court has got power to award compensation to the petitioner even at this stage. 11. For the reasons given above, the writ petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. However, the respondent no. 3 is directed to pay two year's rent as compensation to the petitioner within a period of three months from today. Petition dismissed.