Judgment :- Balakrishna Menon, J. Both these revision petitions are by the Kerala State Electricity Board against the orders of the District Court passed under S.16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 The District Judge by these impugned orders determined the compensation payable to the respective claimants on applications made by them under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act read with S.51 of the Electricity Act, 1910. In both the cases compensation was claimed for the trees cut as well as for diminution in value of the land for the reason of the drawal of overhead power lines across the land. The learned District Judge has allowed compensation under both the heads based on the revised valuation statements submitted by the respective claimants. 2. The learned single judge before whom these cases came up for hearing had some doubt as to whether compensation for injurious affection can also be awarded in addition to compensation for the trees cut determined on the basis of capitalisation of income. These cases were accordingly referred for decision by a Division Bench. 3. A preliminary objection is raised by counsel for the respondents about the maintainability of the revision petitions in view of the decision of a learned single judge in Kerala State Electricity Board. Thampi (1988(2) KLT 941). The learned judge, following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Aundal Animal v. Sadasivan Filial (1987 (1) KLT 53 - AIR 1987 SC 203) and South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Samp Singh (AIR 1965 SC 1442) has held that no revision lies against the determination of compensation by the District Judge under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act. The learned judge felt that an earlier decision of this Court by Viswanatha Iyer J. in K.S.E. Board v. C.G. Narayanan (1973 KLT 968) does not cover the point regarding the maintainability of the revision and as the point, according to the learned judge, is res integra, it was open to him to consider the question in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. 4. The decision in South Asia Industries' case related to the question whether an appeal is maintainable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a single judge of the High Court in appeal under S.39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. 4. The decision in South Asia Industries' case related to the question whether an appeal is maintainable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a single judge of the High Court in appeal under S.39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. As per S.39(1) an appeal lies 10 the High Court from an order of the Rent Control Tribunal established under the Act. S.43, however, enacted that every order made by the Controller or an order passed on an appeal under the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. As per clause 37 of the Letters Patent a right of appeal under clause 10 would be taken away by a law made by the appropriate legislature. Construing S.43 the Supreme Court stated at page 1447: "(17) The expression "final" prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in S.43 of the Act, in our view, does not restrict the scope of the said expression; indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar. The expression "final" in the first part of S.43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words "shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding" bar collateral proceedings. The section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the expression "final" may have a restrictive meaning in other contexts, but in S.43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning cannot be given, for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a hierarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising thereunder. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeals arising under the Act. The opening words S.43 of the Act "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act" emphazise the fact that the finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeals arising under the Act. The opening words S.43 of the Act "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act" emphazise the fact that the finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to. something outside the Act." It was for the above reason that the Supreme Court held that no further appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would lie against the decision of a single judge under S.39(1) of the Act. The last part of the above quotation would indicate the exclusion of farther remedies under the ordinary law of procedure for the reason that the Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the legislature was to provide for an exhaustive code for disposing of cases arising under the Act. The decision of the Privy Council in Mating Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin (61 Ind App 158: AIR 1934 PC 81) is referred to and distinguished. In that case the Judicial Committee had to consider whether an appeal lay to the Privy Council against the order of the High Court under S.75(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. That Act by S.4(2) provided that subject to the provisions of the Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the decision of the District Court under the Act was final. But under S.75(2), however, there was a right of-appeal to the High Court from the decision of the District Court. The Judicial Committee held that in a case where the Act gave a right of appeal to the High Court, an appeal from the decision of the High Court would lie to the Privy Council under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Privy Council reiterated the principle that when the appellate court is one of the ordinary courts of the country, the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure applied. The Supreme Court distinguished this decision for the following reason stated at page 1447: "It will be noticed at once that the order of the District Court was final subject to the provisions of the said Act and under the said Act a right of appeal was given to the High Court. The order of the High Court in the appeal was not made final. The order of the High Court in the appeal was not made final. Therefore, the Judicial Committee held that an appeal lay to the Privy Council against the order of the High Court." The Supreme Court refers also to Kydd v. Liverpool Watch Committee (1908 AC 327) where the facts were that under S.11 of the Police Act, 1890, .there was an appeal to quarter sessions as to the amount of a constable's pension. The duty of the quarter sessions was stated thus: "that Court, after inquiry into the case, may make such order in the matter as appears to the Court just, which order shall be final." Lord Loreburn L.C. construed the section thus: "Where it says, speaking of such an order, that it is to be final, I think it means there is to be an end of the business at quarter sessions . . . " The question about the maintainability of a revision under S.115 C.P.C. against the decision of a Court subordinate to the High Court did not, however, arise in South Asia Industries' case. 5. Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987 (1) KLT 53 -AIR 1987 SC 203) is a case which arose out of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. S.18(5) of the said Act enacts: 'The decision of the appellate authority, and subject, to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in S.20." S.20 provides for a revision against the order of the appellate authority and the revisional authority is the District Court where the appellate authority is a Subordinate Judge, and the High Court in all other cases. The Act provides for a tier of courts viz. the rent control court, the appellate court and the court of revision. Considering the scheme of the Act the Supreme Court held that the observations of Lord Loreburn L.C. in Kydd v. Liverpool Watch Committee would apply to the finality provided for in S.18(5) of the Act. Overruling the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT 583) the Supreme Court observed at page 208: "In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of sub-s.(51 of S.18 of the Act. Overruling the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT 583) the Supreme Court observed at page 208: "In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of sub-s.(51 of S.18 of the Act. Sub-s.(5) of S.18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in S.18 of the Act shall not-be liable to be questioned except in the manner under S.20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under S.20 of the Act in question. When S.18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law" except in the manner provided under S.20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a Court of law and which is a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order after revision under S.20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of S.18(5) read with S.20 inhibits further revision. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of S.18(5) read with S.20 inhibits further revision. The Courts must so construe." It was, therefore, with reference to the scheme of the Act and the language of S.18(5) that the Supreme Court held that no second revision lies to the High Court under S.115 C.P.C. The Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (AIR 1980 SC 892) where the court was concerned with the question of the maintainability of a second revision before the High Court against the revisional orders of the District Court under S.115 C.P.C. as amended in U. P. as well as under S.25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as amended in its application to the State of U.P. Construing these amended provisions the Supreme Court held that no second revision lay to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court under S.115 C.P.C. for the reason that the legislative intent was clearly to bifurcate the revisional jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court and a second revision under S.115 C.PC. was not maintainable. In regard to a second revision against a revisional order under S.25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the Supreme Court was of the view that a revisional order of the District Court under S.25 was not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It was further observed that an examination of the provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicated that it was a self-contained code so far as the enquiry covered by the Act was concerned and accordingly it was held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 C.P.C. was excluded. 6. The decision in Vishesh Kumar's case rested on the scheme of the Act and the legislative intent. The decision in Aundal Animal's case is based on the language of S.18(5) and also on the scheme of the Act providing for a hierarchy of courts including a court of revision. 7. 6. The decision in Vishesh Kumar's case rested on the scheme of the Act and the legislative intent. The decision in Aundal Animal's case is based on the language of S.18(5) and also on the scheme of the Act providing for a hierarchy of courts including a court of revision. 7. A later decision of the Supreme Court in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat and others (1987 (2) KLT 977-AIR 1987 SC 2323) was concerned with a similar provision under the Karnataka Rent Control Act of 1961. S.48(6) of the Karnataka Act contained a provision similar to S.18(5) of the Kerala Act. The Karnataka Act before its amendment in 1975 provided for an appeal to the District Court against an order of the Rent Controller or court passed under Ss.14,16,17 or 21 of the Act- Thereafter a revision lay to the High Court under S.50 of the Act. Sub -s.(6) of S.48 provided that the decision of the District Judge shall, subject to the decision of the High Court under S.50, be final and the order of the court or the controller shall, subject to the decision of the relevant appellate authority or of the High Court under S.50, be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision. One of the changes effected by the Amending Act of 1975 was to confer jurisdiction on the Civil Judges in the place of District Munsiffs in respect of house rent control cases arising in the city of Bangalore. Another change effected was to take away the right of appeal to the District Judge against the decision of a Rent Control Court by deleting sub-s.(1) of S.48. There was a further change to restrict the High Court's power of revision under S.50 to those cases decided by the City Civil Judges and to confer revisional powers on District Judges in respect of cases decided by Munsiffs exercising jurisdiction in areas outside the city of Bangalore. The legislature had thus done away with the remedy of an appeal and the Act provided only for a revision to the District Court in respect of cases arising from areas out side the city of Bangalore and a revision to the High Court with respect to cases arising in the city of Bangalore. 8. The legislature had thus done away with the remedy of an appeal and the Act provided only for a revision to the District Court in respect of cases arising from areas out side the city of Bangalore and a revision to the High Court with respect to cases arising in the city of Bangalore. 8. The question for consideration in Shyamaraju's case before the Supreme Court was as to whether S.48(6) of the Karnataka Act excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a revision under S.115 C.P.C. against the revisional order of the District Court under the Act. The Supreme Court approved the Full Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavelekar (ILR (1978) 2 Kant 1585) and overruled a later Full Bench decision in Yaragatti v. Vasant (AIR 1987 Kant 186). The earlier Full Bench in Krishnaji's case had held that a revisional order of the District Court is subject to a further revision by the High Court under S.115 CPC. It was following Vishesh Kumar's case and Aundal ammal's case that the later Full Bench in Yaragatti's case held that a revision under S.115 CPC is barred under S. 48(6) of the Karnataka Act. The Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in Chhagan Lalv. The Municipal Corporation, Indore (AIR 1977 SC 1555) and an unreported decision in Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty in Special Leave Petition No. 913/1978. The decision in Krishnadas Bhatija"s case quoted at page 2324 reads: "The petitioner contends that the order of the High Court is without jurisdiction because under S.50 Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a revision does not lie to the High Court. We do not agree. S.115, CPC gives powers to the High Court to revise any order from the district court, subject of course to the limitations set out therein. The narrow point then is as to whether the District Judge can be equated with a district court. The High Court, following its own earlier decisions has held so. We agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act, the District Judge and the District Court are interchangeable expressions and nothing turns on the mere fact that the section uses the expression 'District Judge'. S.115. The High Court, following its own earlier decisions has held so. We agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act, the District Judge and the District Court are interchangeable expressions and nothing turns on the mere fact that the section uses the expression 'District Judge'. S.115. CPC therefore applies and the revisional jurisdiction is vested in the High Court." The decisions in Vishesh Kumar's case and Aundal ammal's case were considered by the Supreme Court and the ratio of those decisions, it was held, does not apply to the case arising under the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The following observation in Chhagan Lai's case (AIR 1977 SC 1555) is quoted at page 2326: "The second contention is based on S.149, Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act. 1956. It provides that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court, when any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment. Sub-s.(1) of S.149 provides that the decision of the District Court shall be final. It was submitted that the decision of the District Court was therefore final and that the High Court was in error in entertaining, a revision petition. This plea cannot be accepted for, under S.115, C.P.C., the High Court has got a power to revise the order passed by courts subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the District Court is a subordinate court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court " It was accordingly held that in spite of the language of S.48(6) of the Karnataka Act a revision lies to the High Court under S.115 CPC against the revisional order of the District Court passed under the Karnataka Rent Control Act. 9. A recent decision of the Supreme Court by a three-Judges Bench in Ms. Jetha bai & sons v. Ms. Sunderdcs Rathenai (1988(1) KLT386 -AIR 1988 SC 812) arising out of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 2 of 1965, has considered the decisions in Vishesh Kumar's case Aunda'1 Animal's case and Shyamaraju's case and has re-affirmed the correctness of those decisions with reference to the particular enactments concerned. Jetha bai & sons v. Ms. Sunderdcs Rathenai (1988(1) KLT386 -AIR 1988 SC 812) arising out of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 2 of 1965, has considered the decisions in Vishesh Kumar's case Aunda'1 Animal's case and Shyamaraju's case and has re-affirmed the correctness of those decisions with reference to the particular enactments concerned. Referring to Vishesh Kumar's case the Supreme Court observed at page 821: "As was noticed in Vishesh Kumar's case (AIR 1980 SC 892) the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court and for determining the legislative intent, the Court must as far as possible construe a statute in such a manner as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it." Referring to the relevant provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it is observed at page 820: "Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his ease before the Rent Control Court and then before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be before the Court of Revision viz. the District Court if the Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before three Courts, viz. the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court, there was no need to make the revisional order of the District Court subject to further scrutiny by the High Court by means of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code. It has been pointed out in Aundal ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203) (supra) that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms of S.20 read with S.18(5) in their proper perspective and this failing had affected its conclusion." It is further observed at page 821: "The Full Bench failed to notice certain crucial factors. In the first place, S.20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge as well as by the High Court. In the first place, S.20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge as well as by the High Court. Such being the case if it is to be taken that an order passed by a District Court under S.20 will not have finality because the Section does not specifically say so, then it will follow that a revisional order passed by the High Court under S.20(1) also will not have finality. Surely it cannot be contended by anyone that an order passed by a High Court in exercise of its powers of revision under S.20(1) can be subjected to further revision because S.20(1) has not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under that Section. Secondly, the terms of S.20(1) have to be read in conjunction with S.18(5). S.18(5), as already seen, declares that an order of a Rent Control Court shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority and an order of an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided for in S.20. When the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final at their respective stages unless the order is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revision as Authority as the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under S.20(1) by the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of finality. The third aspect is that the Legislature has not merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to called in question in any Court of law except as provided for in S.20. These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under S.115 C.P.C. to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court under S.20 of the Act. This position has been succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal ammal's case." Referring to Shyamaraju's case it is observed at page 821: "18. This position has been succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal ammal's case." Referring to Shyamaraju's case it is observed at page 821: "18. Having said so much it is really not necessary for us to dwell at length about the decision in Shyamaraju's case (AIR 1987 SC 2323) restoring the ratio in Krishnaji's case (ILR (1978) Kant 1585) (FB) and disapproving the decision in Yaragatti's case (AIR 1987 Kant 186) (FB). Even so we cannot but refer to the fact that in the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has been completely taken away and the entire proceedings are sought to be limited to a two tier system viz., the Rent Control Court and the Revisional Court, whereas under the Kerala Act there is a three tier system viz., the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court. Though S.48(6) of the Karnataka Act (as amended) also speaks of the finality of the order of the Rent Control Court, subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under S.50 in more or less the same terms as in S.18(5) of the Kerala Act, the force underlying the words "shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question" etc. has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions present distinctly different perspectives. It is in that situation it was found in Shyamsraju's case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in Chhaganlal's case (AIR 1977 SC 1555) and Krishnadas Bhatija's case rather than the ratio in Vishesh Kumar's case (AIR 1980 SC 892) and Aundal ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203). It is in that situation it was found in Shyamsraju's case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in Chhaganlal's case (AIR 1977 SC 1555) and Krishnadas Bhatija's case rather than the ratio in Vishesh Kumar's case (AIR 1980 SC 892) and Aundal ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203). In fact, it is worthy of notice that Venkataramiah, J. who spoke for the Full Bench in Krishnaji's case (ILR (1978) Kant 1585) was a party to the judgment in Aundal Animal's case and the learned judge, while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukhar i, J., who spoke for the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case." It was accordingly held that there is no conflict between the decisions in Aundal ammal's case and Shyamaraju's case and there was no need for any fresh thinking on the scope of S.20 read with S.18(5) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The decisions in Vishesh Kumar's case and Aundal ammal's case are based on the language of the statute that the Supreme Court was called upon to consider and in spite of similar words of restriction the Supreme Court in Shyamaraju's case has held the revision maintainable against the revisional order of the District Court under the Karnataka Rent Control Act. 10. Sub-s.(5) of S.16 of the Telegraph Act enacts that the determination of dispute by the District Judge under sub-sections (3) or (4) shall be final subject to the proviso preserving the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of the compensation paid by the Telegraph authority to any other person. The finality enacted under sub-s.(5) cannot therefore be said to be absolute. It is only a qualified finality subject to the results of the suit referred to in the proviso relating to matters falling thereunder. There is no provision barring a revision to the High Court under S.115 CPC. There cannot be any doubt that the District Judge referred to in S.18(3) is the District Court as is clear from the decisions in Shyamaraju's case (1987(2) KLT 977- AIR 1987 S. C. 2323) and Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K. (1976 KLT 810 S.C. ). There is no provision barring a revision to the High Court under S.115 CPC. There cannot be any doubt that the District Judge referred to in S.18(3) is the District Court as is clear from the decisions in Shyamaraju's case (1987(2) KLT 977- AIR 1987 S. C. 2323) and Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K. (1976 KLT 810 S.C. ). Viswanatha Iyer J. in Kerala State Electricity Board v. C.G. Narayanan (1973 KLT 968 -AIR 1973 Ker.144) considered the question of maintainability of a revision against the decision of the District Judge under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act and held the District Judge acts not as a persona designata, but as a court subordinate to the High Court, and but for the finality referred to in S.16(5) the ordinary right of appeal and a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure would have been available, to the aggrieved party. It was accordingly held that a revision lies to the High Court against the decision of the District Judge under sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.16 of the Telegraph Act. The learned judge stated at page 145: "So, according to me, the District Judge functions in these matters in his judicial capacity as a District Court and that Court being subordinate to this Court, a revision under S.115, Civil P.C. will lie. I am supported in this conclusion by a decision reported in Abdul Aziz v. Punjab Government, (AIR 1942 Lah. 186) where on a similar question being raised, their Lordships of the Lahore High Court took the view that the District Judge is to act in his judicial capacity and not as a persona designata in these matters. I respectfully agree with the reasoning in that case and hold that the revision petition is maintainable under S.15, Civil P.C. before this Court." In the light of the above decision of Viswanatha Iyer J., the learned judge who decided Thampi's case (1988(2) KLT 941) was wrong in his observation that the question raised before him relating to the maintainability of the revision is res integra and is not covered by the earlier decision. 11. 11. As held by Viswanatha Iyer J. an aggrieved party would have been entitled to an appeal against the decision of the District Court under subsection (3) and (4) of S.18 of the Telegraph Act, but for the finality of the decision of the District Court provided for in sub-section (5). In Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR 1948 PC 12) Lord Simonds on behalf of the Board observed at page 14: "The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal : see 43 I.A. 192 and 63 LA. 180." 12. Referring to Kyddv. Watch Committee of City of Liverpool ((1908) AC 327) and the subsequent case of Piper v. St. Marylebone Licensing Justices ( (1928) 2 K.B. 221) Lord Denning M. R. observed in Tehran v. Rostron (1971 (3) WLR 612) at p. 615: "But I must say at once that I do not think we should accede to this preliminary objection. Much has happened since those cases were decided. The courts have given more thought to the meaning of the legislature when it says that a decision of this or that tribunal is to be "final". The modern cases establish this principle: when Parliament says that a decision of an inferior tribunal is to be "final", it does so on the assumption that the tribunal will observe the law. Parliament only gives the impress of "finality" to the decision on the condition that it is reached in accordance with law: and the Queen's courts will see to it that this condition is fulfilled. Accordingly if a tribunal goes wrong in law and "the error appears on the face of the record, the High Court will interfere by certiorari to quash the decision. It is not to be detarred by the enactment that the decision is "final." The decision maybe final on the facts, but it is not final on the law. This was settled by Reg. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Gilmore (1957) 1 Q.B. 574, where all the cases are collected. It is not to be detarred by the enactment that the decision is "final." The decision maybe final on the facts, but it is not final on the law. This was settled by Reg. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Gilmore (1957) 1 Q.B. 574, where all the cases are collected. Likewise if a board or a Minister is entrusted with a decision affecting private rights, then even though it is said to be "final", the High Court can ensure that it is correct in point of law. It can do so by making a declaration as to the law by which the authority must abide. That was settled by Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1960) AC. 260, and particularly by the speech of Lord Simonds, at pp. 286-287." 13. In the light of the decisions in Chhagan Lai's case (AIR 1977 SC 1555), Shyamaraju's case (1987(2) KLT 977-AIR. 1987 S.C. 2323) and Krishnadas Bhatija's case referred to therein, we are clearly of the view that a revision under S. HSCPCis maintainable against the decision of the District Judge under sub-s.(3) or sub-s.(4) of S.16 of the Telegraph Act. The learned judge who decided Thampi's case (supra) has, in Neelandan v. K.S.E. Board (1988 (-2) KLT 656), on the same view held that: "The proviso providing the alternative remedy, in my judgment, inhibits a revision under S.115 C.P.C. against the order of the District Judge under sub-s.4 of S.16. lam fortified in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal y. Sadasivan Filial (1987.(1) KLT 53 (SC) ). The revision therefore is disposed of as not maintainable." In the light of the principle discussed above we are clearly of the view that Thampi's case 1988(2) KLT 941 and Neelandan's case 1988(2) KLT 656 are not correctly decided. 14. The question referred to the Division Bench for decision does not present any difficulty in view of the earlier decisions of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Varghese Thomas (1961 KLT238) and K.S.E. Board v. Marthoma Rubber Co. Ltd. (1981 KLT 646 (F.B.)). S.10 of the Telegraph Act empowers the telegraph authority from time to time to "place and maintain a telegraph line under, over, along or across, and posts in or upon, any immovable property" and in so doing it shall do as little damage as possible. Ltd. (1981 KLT 646 (F.B.)). S.10 of the Telegraph Act empowers the telegraph authority from time to time to "place and maintain a telegraph line under, over, along or across, and posts in or upon, any immovable property" and in so doing it shall do as little damage as possible. When it exercises those powers in respect of any property, the telegraph authority is required to pay full compensation to all persons interested for any damage sustained by them by reason of the exercise of those powers. The compensation payable is the "just equivalent of what the owner has been' deprived of", as stated by the Supreme Court in a different context in State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella Banerjee (AIR 1954 SC 170 at page 172). 15. Geevarghese Kathanar's case (1980 KLT. 880) referred to in the reference order relates to the determination of market value for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In that case it is held at page 882: "But when once capitalised value of the income is adopted as the basis for determining land value, there is no scope for awarding any additional value for the land separately. That is because in determining the market value on the basis of income, what the court really does is to find out what any person would be willing to pay for a property such as the one acquired if it would yield the income that is determined by the court as that from the property acquired." Value based on capitalised income is an accepted method for determining the market value of land with improvements yielding an annual income. The market value thus determined is of the land with the improvements, and there is no question of a separate value for the land apart from the improvements yielding the income. Compensation for the trees cut by the telegraph authority in exercise of its powers under S.10 of the Telegraph Act should be the just equivalent of what the owner of the land has been deprived of. Compensation for the trees cut by the telegraph authority in exercise of its powers under S.10 of the Telegraph Act should be the just equivalent of what the owner of the land has been deprived of. A Division Bench of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Varghese Thomas (1961 KLT 238), in considering the question of compensation for damage done by cutting of trees, referred to the following passage occurring in 61 Harward Law Review p. 161, laying down the correct principle for determination of compensation: "The possibility of diverse results from the use of the diminution or cost-of-repair test for determining damages becomes pronounced in cases of injury to improvements to land. Where, as is often the situation, demand for land is not related to the existence of the improvements, injury to them may cause no decrease in the over-all value. Few Courts would be likely to deny any right of recovery; instead of applying a test of over-all diminution. Courts generally will evaluate separately the damage to improvements. While refusing to. value improvements separately might tend to cause the land to be used for those purposes for which it is economically best suited -since such purposes determine the market price, and "hereby the amount of diminution-such refusal would be inconsistent with our individualistic ideas of property rights probably the best over-all results are reached by hose Courts using a flexible approach by which in any particular case the measure which most fairly compensates plaintiff for his loss is used." The Division Bench at page 245 laid down the principle thus: "We therefore think, that apart from other damage which may have been caused, it is a safe rule to lay down, that compensation payable on the destruction of a bearing tree, is the present value of an annuity which gives a return at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. Apart from the lack of practice and familiarity, we do not conceive any serious difficulty in applying the rule as stated above, to fruit bearing trees such as cocoanut, arecanut, jack trees etc. Apart from the lack of practice and familiarity, we do not conceive any serious difficulty in applying the rule as stated above, to fruit bearing trees such as cocoanut, arecanut, jack trees etc. With respect to rubber trees and pepper vines, though for ascertaining the value of improvement and for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act, a different rule of capitalisation is in vogue, none of the counsel pointed out any fallacy in applying the rule of present worth at 5 per cent per annum. The duration of productive life being smaller, in their case, the multiple for capitalisation will be proportionately lower. We therefore think, that the same rule may apply to rubber trees and pepper vines." A Full Bench of this Court in K.S.E. Board v.' Marthoma Rubber Co. Ltd. (1981 KLT 646) accepted the above method as embodying the correct principle for determining compensation for the trees cut. The Full Bench, however, stated that an annuity, assuring a five percent return of income cannot be applied for all times and the present value of annuity should be determined with reference to the rate of interest available on deposits in nationalised banks. The Full Bench observed: "6. We are in respectful agreement with the principle enunciated by the Division Bench in the Electricity Board's case. If we capitalise the income for the number of years during which the tree is expected to yield in future at the prevalent rate of interest the capitalised value will represent not only the return for these years, but in addition the capital That would remain in tact at the end of the period. To put the same idea in a different way, it would represent such recurring return for all time and not for the limited period during which alone the tree would have continued to yield income. Therefore that would not be just equivalent of the compensation. To put the same idea in a different way, it would represent such recurring return for all time and not for the limited period during which alone the tree would have continued to yield income. Therefore that would not be just equivalent of the compensation. If 5% return would be a reasonable return and the trees would normally be expected to yield, say for 25 years more, what is paid as compensation must yield the annual return at 5% which would be equivalent of what the owner of the trees would have obtained had these trees continued to stand in the property for 25 years but since the trees would cease to yield income at the end of 25 years the amount paid as compensation must exhaust itself by the end of that period. In other words it will be as if the amount of income is received out for a period of 25 years. In that event the determination should be as if an annuity for 25 years is provided for. What amount invested today will yield annuity for a specified period will have to be computed. The present value of recurring payments for a specified number of years will have to be worked out. It will be easy to work it out on the basis of the valuation tables provided in the Appendix in "Parks on Valuations Land and Houses". The present value of Rs.1 per annum at specified rates of interest return for a specified number of years could be easily found from the table. That would serve as the basis for determining what such value will be applying the multiplier representing the specified number of years." It was accordingly held: "We think that it will be safe to adopt the return on a fixed deposit for the usual period of 63 months as reasonable anticipated return on a long term basis on a safe and prudent investment. We adopt the rates shown in the table as interest rates for the respective years, as reasonable rates. It is neither to be 5% as contended by respondents in these nor 10% in all cases as contended by the Board. The date when compensation becomes due will be the relevant date." The table referred Jo in this passage shows interest rate at 10% and 9% for the different periods referred to therein. It is neither to be 5% as contended by respondents in these nor 10% in all cases as contended by the Board. The date when compensation becomes due will be the relevant date." The table referred Jo in this passage shows interest rate at 10% and 9% for the different periods referred to therein. Compensation for the damage done by the cutting of trees in these cases is also to be determined in accordance with the principle stated above. 16. Since the compensation payable under S.10(d) of the Telegraph Act is the just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of, he is entitled also to any diminution in value of land for the reason of the drawal of overhead power-lines across the land. Beckett J. in Hussain Bakhsh v. Secy, of State and another (AIR 1935 Lahore 982) considering the relevant provisions of the Telegraph Act stated, thus: "In the third place, the learned Additional Judge considers that the depreciation in the value of property owing to the presence of an aerial line span is not such damage to property as is contemplated by the Act. The Act does not refer to damage to property. It refers to damage sustained by any person interested through the exercise of the special powers vested in the Department; and a depreciation in the value of land would be damage sustained by the owner. The damage is not confined, as the learned Additional judge has stated in his order, to actual damage to property by demolition of a building or damage to crops. The rendering of a site useless for building proposes may or may not be damage to the owner. This would depend on the circumstances existing at the time when the line was laid and can best be determined by considering whether there would have been any loss on the sale of the land from this cause if the land had been sold at that time." A Division Bench of this Court in Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. This would depend on the circumstances existing at the time when the line was laid and can best be determined by considering whether there would have been any loss on the sale of the land from this cause if the land had been sold at that time." A Division Bench of this Court in Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd- v. State of Kerala (1967 KLT 938) stated at p. 939: "But learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that by the erection of the transmission towers, and of electric posts and by the stringing of electric wires, there has been a diminution in the value of the lands, over which these have been done, the total area of the lands so affected being 10 acres 3 cents in CRP. 575 and 11/2 acres in CRP. 574. We are of the opinion that if there has a diminution in the market value of the land, in consequence, the petitioners have to be compensated." 17. We are clearly of the view that apart from the compensation for the damage done by the cutting of trees, the owner of the land is also entitled to compensation for any diminution in value of land that he has suffered for the reason of the drawal of overhead power lines across his land. The diminution in value is to be determined with reference to the market value of land without trees before and after the drawal of the lines. 18. In the present case the learned District Judge has merely accepted the revised valuation statements submitted by the respective claimants relating to compensation for the trees cut as well as for the diminution in value of the ] and- The court below has not considered the case on the basis of the evidence adduced before it. The correct principle of valuation is also not seen applied in determining the compensation payable to the respective claimants. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and remit the cases back to the court below for fresh disposal in the light of the directions and observations contained in this judgment. The civil revision petitions are allowed. The parties will suffer their respective costs. Krishnamoorthy, J. - I perused the judgment prepared by my learned brother Balakrishna Menon, J. and I agree with the order proposed by him. The civil revision petitions are allowed. The parties will suffer their respective costs. Krishnamoorthy, J. - I perused the judgment prepared by my learned brother Balakrishna Menon, J. and I agree with the order proposed by him. But I am giving my opinion also on the questions involved as they are important matters affecting many cases under the above statute and similar statutes containing similar provision making an order final and its effect on a further revision. There is already a decision by a learned Single Judge reported in K.S.E.B. v. Thampi (1988 (2) KLT 941) taking the view that a revision is not maintainable, the correctness of which is in challenge and which fact also prompted me to write a separate judgment. 2. These revisions arise out of an order under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act and the question to be determined is whether a revision under S.115 C.P.C. % will lie, in view of the fact that an order under S.16(3) is made final by virtue of the provision in S.16(5) of the Telegraph Act. The relevant provisions of the Telegraph Act are as follows: "(3) If any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency of the compensation to be paid under S.10, clause (d), it shall, on application for that purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him. (4) If any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation, or as to the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it, the telegraph authority may pay into the Court of the District Judge such amount as he deemssufficient or, where all the disputing parties have in writing admitted the amount tendered to be sufficient or the amount has been determined under sub-s.(3), that amount; and the District Judge, after giving notice to the parties and hearing such of them as desire to be heard, shall determine the persons entitled to receive the compensation or, as the case may be, the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it. (5) Every determination of a dispute by a District Judge under sub-s.(3), or sub-s. C4) shall be final: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of any compensation paid by the telegraph authority, from the person who has received the same." 3. At the outset it has to be noted that the order passed under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act by the District Judge in the context of the provisions of the Act is by the District Court. The District Court, while dealing with an application under S.16 of the Act, acts as a civil court. Construing the above provision, the Supreme Court of India in Kerala State Electricity Board v. TPK. (1976 KLT 810) observed as follows: "The provisions in the Telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of payment of compensation payable under S.10 of the Act indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a court. Where by statutes matters are referred for determination by a Court of Record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the court will determine the matters as a court. (See National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. The Postmaster General (1913 A.C. 546). In the present case the statute makes the reference to the District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court. In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge under this particular title while the intention is to refer to the Court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in S.16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District Judge is mentioned there as the Court of the District Judge. S.16(4) of the Telegraph Act requires payment into the court of the District Judge such amount as the telegraph authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation. Again, in S.34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of court fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. Again, in S.34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of court fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. S.3(15) of the General Clauses Act states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central Legislature means the judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context. In the Telegraph Act there is nothing in the context to suggest that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by the definition applicable thereto. The District judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a civil court in dealing with applications under S.16 of the Telegraph Act." 4. As the order made under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act being one by a District Court and it being a Court subordinate to the High Court, normally the order is liable to be revised by the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. The question to be decided is whether the above jurisdiction or power is ousted by the provision in S.16(5) of the Telegraph Act which makes the determination of a dispute by a District Judge under sub-s.(3) or sub-s.(4) of S.16 final. 5. The effect of an order being made final by a statute and under what circumstances an appeal or revision will lie against such an order had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in certain cases. 6. In S.A. Industries (P) v. Samp Singh (AIR 1965 SC 1442), their Lordships considered the question as to whether the right of appeal conferred under clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) has been taken away by the fact that an order made in appeal by the High Court under S.43 of the Rent Control Act is final. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, against the order of the Rent Controller an appeal is provided to the Rent Control Tribunal; from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal an appeal is provided to the High Court under S.39 of the Act on a substantial question of law. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, against the order of the Rent Controller an appeal is provided to the Rent Control Tribunal; from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal an appeal is provided to the High Court under S.39 of the Act on a substantial question of law. S.43 of the Act provides that the orders of the Controller or an order passed in appeal under the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. It will be relevant to quote the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act, namely, Ss.39 and 43, which read as follows:- "39. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-s.(2), an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by the Tribunal within sixty days from the date of such order xx xx xx xx (2) No appeal shall lie under sub-s.(1), unless the appeal involves some substantial question of law." "43. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding." Construing the above provisions and their impact on the right of appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, their Lordships held: "The expression "final" prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in S.43 of the Act, in our view, does not restrict the scope of the said expression; indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar. The expression "final" in the first part of S.43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words "shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding" bar collateral proceedings. The section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the expression "final" may have a restrictive meaning in other contexts, but in S.43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning cannot be given, for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a hierarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising thereunder. It is true that the expression "final" may have a restrictive meaning in other contexts, but in S.43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning cannot be given, for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a hierarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising thereunder. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeals arising under the Act. The opening words of S.43 of the Act "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act" emphasise the fact that the finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to something outside the Act." 7. In Chhagan Lai v. Indore Municipality (AIR 1977 SC 1555) the question arose as to whether a revision under S.115 C. P. C. is maintainable against an order of the District Court made under S.149 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act. S.149 of the said Act provides that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court and that the decision of the District Court shall be final. In construing the above provision and considering the question whether a revision will lie inspite of the fact that the order of the District Judge having been made final, their Lordships observed: "This plea cannot be accepted for, under S.115 of the C. P. C. the High Court has got a power to revise the order passed by courts subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the District Court is a subordinate court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." 8. The next decision of the Supreme Court which is relevant and on which the learned judge has placed considerable reliance in K. S. E. B v. Thampi (1988 (2) KLT 941) is the decision reported in Aundal ammal v, SadasivanPillai (AIR 1987 SC 203-1987 (1) KLT 53). As the learned judge has mainly relied on the above decision, it is necessary to consider that decision in detail. The case arose out of a proceeding under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Under the scheme of the above Act a landlord has to move the Rent Control Court in the first instance under S.11 of the Act for evicting a tenant from the premises. The case arose out of a proceeding under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Under the scheme of the above Act a landlord has to move the Rent Control Court in the first instance under S.11 of the Act for evicting a tenant from the premises. Under S.18, from the order of the Rent Control Court an appeal lies to an authority not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge to be notified by the Government by a general or special -order. The State Government has notified that the Subordinate Judge shall be the Appellate Authority for the purpose of the Rent Control Act. Under S.20 of the Act, a revision is provided to the District Court where the Appellate Authority is the Subordinate Judge and in other cases, to the High Court. As the Appellate Authority notified under the Act is the Subordinate Judge, a revision lies to the District Court under S.20 of the Act. The question arose before the Supreme Court as to whether a revision will lie under S.115 of the C. P. C. against the order of the District Judge passed in revision under S.20 of the above Act. Ss.18 and 20 read as follows:-