JUDGMENT B.L. Loomba, J. - In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, controversy relates to a portion of house No. 970/971/972 situate in mohalla Sadar Bazar, Lucknow. This property has been the subject matter of long drawn litigation between the parties. 2. Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum (respondent No. 3 in this writ petition) along with another, filed Suit No. 23 of 53 in the Court of Civil Judge, Lucknow, under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The case set up by her was that the disputed part of the house came in her share and possession after the death of her husband in partition amongst the coowners and she had let it out to one Prem Kant Srivastava. The tenant indicated his intention to vacate the house but before he could actually vacate and deliver possession to her the defendants broke open the room and took unauthorised possession of this property on 26856. The defendants in the suit, including the present petitioner Shafiqur Rehman Khan (defendant No. 9 in the suit) pleaded, through their joint written statement, that they were in fact in possession of this property and had been paying house and water tax in respect thereof. They denied the alleged partition and the exclusive possession of the plaintiffs and according to them, Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum married one Ahmad Mirza alias Majjan in march, 1965 and her rights were lost on account of remarriage. The said suit was decreed by the Civil Judge by his judgment and order dated 18562 (copy of the judgment has been provided by learned counsel for the respondent). In proof of the claim of partition, a map was put by the plaintiffs which contained the signatures of respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum and defendant No. 1 in the suit Smt. Zohra Khatoon. It also contained the signatures of one Mohd. Akram Husain, Advocate and Shri Zahurul Hasan, the then Revenue Secretary in the U. P. Government. The map wai said to have been prepared and also signed by one Abdul Razzaq, Amin, who had by then died. Shri Mohd. Akram Husain, Advocate appeared as witness to testify the factum of partition and the signatures of the parties and the witnesses in proof thereof including the marking of the disputed property by the red colour in the map. Shri Mohd. Akram Husain, Advocate appeared as witness to testify the factum of partition and the signatures of the parties and the witnesses in proof thereof including the marking of the disputed property by the red colour in the map. According to him, the partition was done by metes and bounds through the intervention of Shri Fazular Rahman Khan and Zahurul Hasan and partition walls were put up to separate the portion in suit and she was put in actual possession thereof. It was also testified that the plaintiff remained in actual possession of this property. Prem Kant Srivastava also appeared in the witness box to testify that he remained in occupation of this property from August 1955 to 26856 as tenant of plaintiff Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum. One Kailash Nath Kapoor, Advocate also appeared as a witness for the plaintiff. From the side of the defendants there was the sole testimony of Smt. Zubeda Khatoon, defendant No. 2, daughter of defendant No. 1, Smt. Zohra Khatoon. She did not deny the occupation of Prem Kant Srivastava but according to her the portion was not separated by any partition wall. Upon the evaluation of the evidence, the learned Civil Judge accepted the plaintiff's case as to the partition and her exclusive possession and also the fact that she was dispossessed by the defendants within six months of their filing of the suit. The suit was, accordingly, decreed and the defendants were required to deliver back possession of the disputed property forthwith. 3. Against the judgment of Civil Judge, Lucknow dated 18562, a revision was filed before this court which was dismissed on 17164. Difficulties arose in the execution of the decree. Objections were raised as to the identity of the disputed property. The Civil Judge rejected the objections and held that the decree could be executed and possession delivered on the basis of partition map treating it as part of the decree. Revision No. 149 of 74 was allowed by the Additional District Judge on 19479 with the observation that the partition walls having already been demolished the property could not reasonably be identified on the basis of boundaries. The matter reached High Court Through W.P. N0. 33 of 1980 which was decided on 30680. The High Court agreed with the Civil Judge and held that the decree could be executed with the help of map Ext. 3. The matter reached High Court Through W.P. N0. 33 of 1980 which was decided on 30680. The High Court agreed with the Civil Judge and held that the decree could be executed with the help of map Ext. 3. However, it was directed that the executing court could satisfy that Ext. 3 was actually the map which was filed before the court through which the property was subjected to partition 4. The matter was eventually taken by defendants judgmentdebtors before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1649 of 1980. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the judgment of Additional District Judge subject to the following modifications : (1) with the help of Ext. 3 and such other evidence as the parties may adduce, the court would determine whether decreeholder had established satisfactorily the identity of the property in regard to which they had obtained decree under execution. (2) if the identity of the property was established but not otherwise, the decree would be executed and the decree holder would be put in possession of the property. The Judgmentdebtor, of course, had the liberty of showing that the decree was not executable. After the decision by the Supreme Court the matter came up for consideration and disposal before the then District Judge, Lucknow in Misc. Case No. 62C of 1973 arising out of Execution Case No. 12 of 1964. This misc. case was decided by the then District Judge, Shri Kamleshwar Nath, by order dated 29482, (Annexure1) to the counteraffidavit dated 4589 of the respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum, in this writ petition (factual position about the litigation after the judgment of the civil Judge dated 18562 has been stated above on the basis of what is contained in the judgment of District Judge, Lucknow dated 29482). 5. The District Judge, Lucknow went into all the necessary details about the boundaries and structural details of the house in the context of the partition map, Ext. 2, and the material which was brought before the court by evidence of the parties. It appears, report of the Advocate Commissioner had also been obtained in the matter. A categorical finding was recorded that the map Ext. 2, and the material which was brought before the court by evidence of the parties. It appears, report of the Advocate Commissioner had also been obtained in the matter. A categorical finding was recorded that the map Ext. 3 correctly indicated the property in respect of which the suit was filed and the plaintiff decree holder was entitled to be put in possession The objection under section 47 CPC was, accordingly, dismissed and Shri Syed Mohd. Ibne Ali, Advocate, was appointed to deliver possession of the property to the decree holder. Long last, this respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum was put in possession of this property on 23383. 6. The matter took another turn. One Umesh Agarwal applied for allotment of this property. He did so allegedly in collusion with the present petitioner Shafiqur Rehman (para 10 of the counteraffidavit dated 4589) The property was allotted to Umesh Agarwal on 29783 and he got possession of the house. Respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum filed review petition under section 16(5) of U.P. Act XIII of 72. This review petition was allowed by Additional District Magistrate (Rent Control) by his order dated 211285 (Annexure1 to this writ petition). The allotment order was set aside. Umesh Agarwal, it appears, had raised a submission that possession of the house at the time of allotment was not with the respondent but it was with Shafiqur Rehnaan. While cancelling the order of allotment it was observed that the question of delivery of possession to Smt. Mohd, Jehan Begum would be considered on merits. 7. Respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum and Smt. Nascem Khan, respondent No. 4 filed revision before the District Judge under section 18 of the said Act, to urge that the allotment order having been cancelled, an express order that the landlady be put in possesssion requires to be passed. This revision, it appears, was against Umesh Agarwal, who was a party to the proceeding. This revision was allowed by judgment and order dated 30988 by Additional District Judge, vide Annexure2 to the writ petition. It was held that the review application having been allowed by the Rent Control Officer, a legal obligation was cast on him to direct delivery of possession in favour of landlady under section 16 (5) (b) of the Act. The revision was accordingly allowed with the direction for delivery of possession to the landladyrevisionist immediately. 8. It was held that the review application having been allowed by the Rent Control Officer, a legal obligation was cast on him to direct delivery of possession in favour of landlady under section 16 (5) (b) of the Act. The revision was accordingly allowed with the direction for delivery of possession to the landladyrevisionist immediately. 8. Another fact requiring mention is that against the order of the Rent Control Officer in review dated 211285, Umesh Agarwal, allottee, also filed revision being Revision No. 6 of 86. However, Umesh Agarwal got his revision dismissed on 30988. After the judgment of the Additional District Judge dated 30988 the Rent Control Officer proceeded to take steps for delivery of possession to the landlady. Present petitioner Shafiqur Rehman, it appears, entered in possession of the property and filed a release application under section 16 of the Act on 291188 (copy Annexure3 to the writ petition). In this application, vide para 8, it was stated that Umesh Agarwal vacated the house in the first week of September, 1988 and since then the petitioner is in possession of this portion of the house. It was, however, notdisclosed as to how the petitioner came in possession, whether through Umesh Agarwal or of his own. That is how Shafiqur Rehman came forth to object to the delivery of possession in favour of the landlady and for an order of release of the property in his favour. The Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) decided the matter by his judgment and order dated 12489. According to this decision Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum was treated and shown as the landlady at the time when allotment was made in favour of Umesh Agarwal and possession was delivered in his favour and as per the legal position it is she to whom the possession of the property has to be delivered back when the order of allotment was cancelled. As to the claim of Shafiqur Rehman Khan, it was observed that even assuming that he is coowner he has no right to object to the delivery of possession in favour of Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum who was in fact the landlady and who was entitled to be put in possession in that capacity and even as a coowner. It was, accordingly, directed that she be put back in possession within one week. Objection of Shafiqur Rehman was dismissed. 9. Jehan Begum who was in fact the landlady and who was entitled to be put in possession in that capacity and even as a coowner. It was, accordingly, directed that she be put back in possession within one week. Objection of Shafiqur Rehman was dismissed. 9. Aggrieved by this order dated 12489, the present writ petition was filed by Shafiqur Rehman Khan on 3589. 10. Before proceeding to consider the matter further, it may be stated that W.P. No. 6890 of 1985 was filed by respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum for a mandamus for delivery of possession. Umesh Agarwal allottee moved an application for impleadment. This writ petition, however, was dismissed as not pressed on 29.11.88. Present petitioner took possession, it appears, earlier and filed release application on 291188. 11. The grounds of challenge to the validity of the impugned order of the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) dated 12489, broadly, are as under: (1) Section 16(5)(b) of the Act does not confer any inherent power on the Prescribed Authority to dispossess any person other than the allottee when his order of allotmen1 is cancelled. (2) Even assuming that the petitioner is a trespasser he cannot be evicted in proceedings under the provisions of the said Act and the remedy of the respondent socalled landlady for possession against the petitioner lies elsewhere. 12. On careful consideration, I am of the view that none of the grounds raised to assail the validity of the impugned order has any merit. In para 10 of the writ petition it has been stated that ......allotee Shri Urnesh Agarwal who vacated the premises on account of which the petitioner had taken the possession pursant to his right of ownership over the house in question. (Emphasis supplied). The petitioner's case in substance clearly, thus, is that when allottee Shri Umesh Agarwal did not press his revision and vacated the house the petitioner took possession thereof claiming that he is a coowner of the property. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to refer any provision of the Act (U. P. No. XIII of 72) whereunder a person claiming coownership right, has been permitted to take possession when the premises under allotment are vacated by the allottee as a result of the cancellation of order of allotment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to refer any provision of the Act (U. P. No. XIII of 72) whereunder a person claiming coownership right, has been permitted to take possession when the premises under allotment are vacated by the allottee as a result of the cancellation of order of allotment. The only contention which has been convassed is that as a coowner it is his inherent right, under the general law, to take over the possession. I am afraid, this submisson is wholly, untenable and misconceived. It has to be accepted as fact that respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum was, and is, the landlady for purposes of enforcement of the Act. She was in exclusive possession of this property when it was allotted to Umesh Agarwal. The order of allotment was directed against her and it is she, who according to law, would be taken to have allowed the allottee to occupy the same. When the allottee ceases to occupy and vacates the premises without informing the allotting authority and without passing on the possession thereof to the landlady, the possession of the building in the eye of law would be resting with the landlady; there would not be vaccum in this regard. In the instant case there is nothingon record to show that Umesh Agarwal handed over the possession to the landlady. According to the respondent, Umesh Agarwal was in collusion with the petitioner and that is how the petitioner cleverly and fraudulentlygot in unauthorised occupation of the house. This appears to be so, as otherwise Umesh Agarwal would have handed back the possession to his landlady. 13. Section 13 of the Act contains prohibitive and restrictive provision in this regard. This section is reproduced below: 13 Restrictions on occupation of building without allotment or release where a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building or part thereof, no person shall occupy it in any capacity on his behalf, or otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under section 16, and if a person so purports to occupy it, he shall, without prejudice to the provisions of section 31, be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part. So long as the building is within the restrictive and regulatory provisions of the Act, the enforcing authority has to ensure compliance of the provisions. So long as the building is within the restrictive and regulatory provisions of the Act, the enforcing authority has to ensure compliance of the provisions. It is not open to anyone claiming rights as coowner or transferee or on any other basis to take law in his hand and occupy the building, holding out that he has done so as he is entitled to be in possession in his own rights. This act cannot be rightfully and effectively enforced if the position canvassed on behalf of the petitioner is accepted. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner initially argued that section 13 of the Act is inapplicable because the building was not vacated in the present case by a tenant. Umesh Agarwal came in possession of the premises as allottee from the District Magistrate. Respondent landlady Smt. Mohd. jehan Begum was directed under the order of allotment to let out the building in favour of the allottee. True, that the landlady did not accept Umesh Agarwal as tenant inasmuch as no advance rent was received as is contemplated in subsection (9) of section 16 of the Act. As is provided in subsection (8) of section 16 the allottee shall be deemed to become tenant of the building from the date of allotment. This provision is, however, subject to subsections (5) and (9) and also section 18. This means that the allottee shall not be deemed to have become tenant when on review the allotment order is cancelled under subsection (5) or under subsection (9) (b) of section 16 or when the order of allotment is cancelled under section 18. From the view point it can be convassed that Umesh Agarwal could not be deemed to be a tenant for purposes of section 13 of the Act. 15. Section 11 prohibits a landlord from letting out an accommodation, except in pursuance of an order of allotment under section 16. Section 12 covers the cases where the landlord or tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. Section 13 then provides that where a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building no person shall occupy the same in any capacity on behalf of the landlord or tenant except under an order of allotment or release. The ambit of section 13 came up for consideration in Geep Industrial Syndicate Vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad (1982 ARC (1) 585). The ambit of section 13 came up for consideration in Geep Industrial Syndicate Vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad (1982 ARC (1) 585). Thecontention raised was that since words ceased to occupy have been used in subsection (4) of section 12, the applicability of section 13 is restricted to cases covered by section 12. This contention was repelled and it was held that section 13 serves dual purpose. It may apply to cases covered by section 12 but it has to be read along with section 11 as well and that section 13 is common to both the provisions and as such section 13 cannot be restricted to cases covered by section 12. 16. In the present case the petitioner claims that he got in possession of the property as coowner. This means that he was claiming himself to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act. According to the definition of the term 'landlord' a parson to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable is the landlord. The petitioner claims that he is a coowner and as such he would be claiming rent if the property is let out. It has to be noted that the petitioner treating himself as landlord applied for release of the accommodation in his favour and it is in proceedings relating to his release application, (copy of the release application is Annexure3), wherein he claimed that he is owner of the house and entitled to seek release. His claim for possession, according to his own case cannot be other than as a landlord. He cannot claim better rights than the respondent who was admittedly the landlady of the house in question. Section 13 would, as such, apply to the petitioner and he could not enter upon the possession of the property and his possession would be deemed to be unauthorised and he would be liable for eviction under the provisions of the Act, 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has produced a copy of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.S. Barrow Vs. District Magistrate & others in Civil Appeal 1988 of 1989 (1989 I SVIR (C) 478) in support of the contention that even a coowner may be entitled to take possession over an accommodation subject to U.P. Act XIII of 72. The facts of that case appear to be entirely different. District Magistrate & others in Civil Appeal 1988 of 1989 (1989 I SVIR (C) 478) in support of the contention that even a coowner may be entitled to take possession over an accommodation subject to U.P. Act XIII of 72. The facts of that case appear to be entirely different. The original owner landlord had died and the person who had occupied the premises claimed that the property had come to his share and in any case he was a coowner of that property. In the present case the admitted position is that the respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum was admittedly landlady of Umesh Agarwal who was allottee and who vacated the premises. Moreover, this point was not directly considered and decided in the said judgment. 18. Another decision relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel is of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Gopal Vs. Additional District Judge (1988 All Civil Journal 624). The only point decided in that decision was that a landlord even though not in possession can ask for review of the order of allotment. This decision is also inapplicable to the matter under consideration. 19. Even assuming that section 13 is inapplicable, in the facts of the case the petitioner had no right 10 take possession of the property. As has been mentioned above, the respondent was put in physical possession of the property on 23383. Umesh Agarwal sought allotment of this property describing the respondent to be its landlady. The order of allotment was directed against the respondent. It is the respondent who challenged the order of allotment and succeeded in obtaining an order under section 16(5) of the Act for cancellation of the order. For purposes of Act she was the landlady and, as such, possession was taken from her when Umesh Agarwal occupied the building under the order of allotment. Umesh Agarwal was liable to hand over the possession of the property to the respondent when he decided to vacate the same after getting his revision dismissed. On his vacation it is the respondent who would be deemed to be in legal possession of the property. The District Magistrate was clearly under a statutory obligation to put the respondent landlady in possession of property when the order of allotment was cancelled under section 16(5) of the Act. On his vacation it is the respondent who would be deemed to be in legal possession of the property. The District Magistrate was clearly under a statutory obligation to put the respondent landlady in possession of property when the order of allotment was cancelled under section 16(5) of the Act. In the absence of any provision which could enable the petitioner to get in possession of the property his act in entering upon the possession would be unauthorised and illegal. If the petitioner claims any legal rights in respect of the property he may seek appropriate remedy in a competent court of law and claim possession as against respondentlandlady whose claim of exclusive ownership was prima facie upheld in proceedings under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act as already discussed. She was found to be in exclusive possession of the property and the present petitioner along with others were held to have unlawfully dispossessed her. She was put back in exclusive possession and she has a right to continue in possession until the petitioner, or for that purpose any one, is able to successfully claim his rights in a court of competent jurisdiction. For purposes of U.P. Act XIII of 72 the petitioner being not a landlord he had no right to claim possession when Umesh Agarwal ceased to occupy the same. The District Magistrate in pursuance of his statutory obligation rightly decided that it is the respondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum who is to be put back in possession after the allotment was cancelled. 20. Subsection (4) of section 16 provides that where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain possession of the building allotted to him or as the case may be, released in his favour, the District Magistrate on an application by allottee or landlord, as the case may be, evict any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in possession and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary to put the allottee or the landlord in possession (emphasis supplied). The landlord has likewise to be put in possession of the premises when the order of allotment is set aside under section 16(5) and in enforcing this order any person against whom the order of eviction is directed or who may be found in occupation, has to be evicted. 21. It would be clear in this way that the petitioner was not vested with any legal right to take possession over the premises in question when Umesh Agarwal vacated the same. His occupation appears in contravention to section 13 of the Act and in very view of the matter he would be taken to be an unauthorised occupant thereof liable for eviction under section 16 (5) (b) of the Act. 22. It would be relevant to notice that the petitioner even on an earlier occasion occupied the building in a similar manner, as the judgment of Civil Judge, Lucknow dated 18582 in Civil Suit No. 23 of 59 between the parties under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act reveals. As already discussed in detail, the case of the plaintiffrespondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum was accepted that on vacation of the house by her tenant Prem Kant Srivastava on 26856 the petitioner unlawfully occupied the house. The petitioner and other persons had set up the claim of coownership but the findings recorded were clearly in favour of the plaintiffrespondent and it was held that the disputed portion of the house, as per the partition effected between the parties, fell in the exclusive share and possession of the plaintiffrespondent. The suit for eviction of the defendants including the present petitioners, and for putting back the plaintiffrespondent Smt. Mohd. Jehan Begum in possession was decreed with costs. That decree on account of revisions and appeals and lastly because of the objections raised in the execution proceedings was executed finally on 23383, after about 21 years from the date of decree. The petitioner acted the same way again when the allottee Shri Umesh Agarwal vacated the premises. His conduct, on the face of it, cannot be said to be bonafide and upright. For this reason also, he is not entitled to be granted any relief by this court in exercise of its extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. The writ petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed with costs. Stay order shall stand discharged. For this reason also, he is not entitled to be granted any relief by this court in exercise of its extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. The writ petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed with costs. Stay order shall stand discharged. (Copy of this judgment be made available to the parties on payment of usual charges within one week).