JUDGMENT S. Awasthy, J. -- 1. The appellant No. 1 Basant Kumar and appellant No. 2 Meena Kumari have been convicted under section 306 IPC and sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment while the appellant No. 2 Ladki Bai has been convicted under section 306, IPC and sentenced to ten years' simple imprisonment by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sehore, in Sessions Trial No. 10/82, decided on 23.11.1984. 2. The prosecution case is that Smt. Ushabai was married to Basant Kumar four years prior to the date of incident. They had a son. The appellant No.2, Ladki Bai is the maternal grandmother of Basant Kumar while the appellant No.3 Meena Kumari is the sister of Basant Kumar. Appellant No.1 Basant Kumar had written some letters to his father-in-law which are Exs.P.1 and P.2 in this case. On 7.10.80 in between 12.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. Ushabai sustained burn injuries in the house of the appellant Basant Kumar. She later on died in Hamidiya Hospital, Bhopal, the same day. Ushabai had gone to her parent's about a month or two prior to the date of incident and had shown the injuries on her person to her pare9ts. She was sent back to her husband's house about 15 days, prior to the incident. Om Prakash Gupta (PW-6), Said Khan Police Constable (PW-7) and Udaiveer Singh Head Constable (PW-11) saw the deceased Ushabai burning. At that time, appellants Ladki Bai and Meena Kumari were also witnessing Ushabai in fire. It is also suggested that some cloth to extinguish the fire was demanded by them, but they declined to give. She was rushed to the Hamidiya Hospital, Bhopal where she breathed her last. Appellant Basant, Kumar wrote Ex.P.2 a letter to his father-in-law Jagannath (PW-1). Dr. Heeresh Chand (PW-12) conducted the post-mortem (Ex.P.5) and opined that Ushabai did not die because of some accident, but the matter required investigation. First information report (Ex.P.11) dated 28.1.81 was recorded by B.S. Dube. 3. There is no direct evidence for holding that Ushabai committed suicide as the incident had taken place inside the, house of the appellants and no other person was present in the house. The defence of the appellants is that she caught fire while preparing tea on a kerosene stove. Dr. Ramesh Kumar Yadav (DW-1), Dr. 3. There is no direct evidence for holding that Ushabai committed suicide as the incident had taken place inside the, house of the appellants and no other person was present in the house. The defence of the appellants is that she caught fire while preparing tea on a kerosene stove. Dr. Ramesh Kumar Yadav (DW-1), Dr. A.K. Dube (DW-2) have been examined to prove that she caught fire because of an accident while preparing tea on the kerosene stove. No such stove has been produced in the Court to substantiate the said plea in defence. Dr. Ramesh Kumar Yadav (DW-1) merely proves that late Ushabai had stated to him that she caught fire from the stove and Dr. A.K. Dube (DW-2) also states the same fact. She was burnt 90% when she came before him. She was in a shock and not in a position to speak. Ex.D.3 was written by him on consultation of those who were attending on her in the hospital. Thus, it is clear that she did not give any dying declaration, as alleged by Dr. A.K. Dube (DW-2). It is rightly held that she was not in a position to give any statement to Dr. Dube (DW-2). The learned trial Judge has disbelieved the statement of Dr. Ramesh Kumar Yadav (DW-1) and discussed his evidence in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of his judgment. The learned trial Judge in paragraphs 20 and 21 of his judgment has held as to why the theory of accident propounded by the accused-appellants is unreliable. I do not repeat the reasoning, but suffice to say that the trial Judge has reached to the correct conclusion on the reasons given in those paragraphs. 4. The trial Court has relied the following circumstances for holding the appellants guilty: The appellants used to beat Ushabai and harass her as mentioned in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 of the judgment. Even on the date of incident Ushabai was assaulted by her husband, as per PW-9 she was seen burning by Om Prakash Gupta (PW-6) and Said Khan Police Constable (PW-7). A circumstance that a cloth was demanded from the appellants 2 and 3 which they declined to give is also believed to be a circumstance against the appellants relied by the trial Court. A circumstance that a cloth was demanded from the appellants 2 and 3 which they declined to give is also believed to be a circumstance against the appellants relied by the trial Court. No police report was made by them though the police station was only few paces away from the house and no first aid was taken from the local hospital, which too was nearby. No attempt was made to obtain her dying declaration immediately after the incident. The stove which was alleged to have caused the accident was not got seized by the appellants. The Rojnamcha Sanha dated 7.10.80, Ex.P.8, shows the said incident as accident which was contradicted by the statement of Kalabai (PW-8), real sister of the deceased. Thus, the finding of the trial Court that Ushabai did not catch fire because of the bursting of the stove is correct and based on evidence on record. Now, the question arises whether from the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs 25 and 41 of the judgment and on the basis of which presumption of abetment of the crime is drawn by the Court below could be held to be legal and justified. 5. The Act No. 46 of 1983 came into force from 25.12.1983 while the offence was committed on 7.10.80, hence presumption under section 113-A of the Evidence Act could not be raised. In the same manner, the amended section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code was inserted by Criminal Law (2nd Amendment) Act No. 46 of 1983. Hence, they cannot be pressed into service on the facts of the present case. 6. The evidence has come that the appellant No. 1 Basant Kumar did not like the clothes which were presented to him by his in-laws, as deposed to by Rampyari Bai (PW-9). The other circumstance that Ushabai used to complain of cruelty done to her by appellants 2 and 3. Hence, she did not want to go back to her Sasural and. further that she had shown a burn injury in her right hand and calf. Though Jagannath (PW-1) does not corroborate Rampyari Bai (PW-9), but Jagannath (PW-1) stated that Ushabai was not prepared to go to her in-laws. She was pursuaded to go by him shows that Ushabai was not happy with the behaviour of her in-laws when she went back to them on the last occasion. 7. Though Jagannath (PW-1) does not corroborate Rampyari Bai (PW-9), but Jagannath (PW-1) stated that Ushabai was not prepared to go to her in-laws. She was pursuaded to go by him shows that Ushabai was not happy with the behaviour of her in-laws when she went back to them on the last occasion. 7. The most important circumstance relied on by the trial Court is that about one or two hours prior to the incident, appellant Basant Kumar had assaulted Ushabai with stick and the other two appellants told: ^^;fn og [kkunkuh vkSjr gS rks tydj viuh tku ns ns**A 8. Om Prakash Gupta (PW-6) had stated that he had demanded cloth for extinguishing the fire on the person of Ushabai, but those ladies took time in bringing the cloth. These two appellants did not deny to bring the cloth as per Om Prakash Gupta (PW-6), but Said Khan (PW-7) states that they refused to bring the cloth. It, therefore, cannot be said as to who out of them is telling the truth. Thus, this circumstance as relied by the Court below cannot be held against the appellants 2 and 3. In the same manner, it has not been proved by the prosecution whether appellant No.1 Basant Kumar was present in the house. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the circumstances relied by the Court below are not sufficient to warrant a finding that there had been an abetment by appellants to Ushabai for committing suicide. He relied on the cases of Mahaveer Singh and others v. State of M.P. (1987 JLJ 635= 1987 MPLJ 403 ), Panchram and Samailal v. State of M.P. (1971 JLJ Note 80), Chanchal Kumari and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh ( AIR 1986 SC 752 ), Brij Lal and another v. State (Delhi Administration) [ 1984(2) Crimes 987 ] and Sharad v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). It is also argued that the assumption that such circumstances were created against Ushabai that she was compelled to commit suicide is unwarranted by facts and circumstances in the case. The alleged observation by appellants 2 and 3 ^^;fn og [kkunkuh vkSjr gS rks tydj viuh tku ns nsA** cannot be held to be an abetment to commit suicide. That was a sort of abuse out of anger only. The alleged observation by appellants 2 and 3 ^^;fn og [kkunkuh vkSjr gS rks tydj viuh tku ns nsA** cannot be held to be an abetment to commit suicide. That was a sort of abuse out of anger only. The learned Additional Sessions Judge himself was not sure if the incident was one of murder or suicide. Hence, benefit of doubt to the appellants. 10. In the case of Mahaveer Singh (supra), it has been held that "Even if two views are possible in a matter, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to the case of suicide by the deceased, the benefit has to go to the accused." It has further held in para 11 that there must be some instigation or provocation, persuation, urge forward, stimulation, impelling or encouraging in committing suicide for bringing home the guilt to the accused. There must be a dependable evidence for coming to such a conclusion. 11. In the case of Chanchal Kumari and others (supra), it was held that delay in lodging the first information report rendered the evidence undependable, in regard to actual abetment. The evidence that the incidents of cruelty were narrated to witnesses much prior to the date of incident may be a circumstance, but not conclusive in nature for holding the appellants guilty for abetment. 12. In the case of Panch ram and Samailal (supra), it has been held by this Court that the behaviour of the husband may be a cause for suicide of his wife, but that cannot be equated with abetment, which requires a positive step to be taken by a person to induce the commission of the offence. 13. In this case, even if it be held proved that the husband appellant No. 1 Basant Kumar beat his wife late Ushabai, prior to the incident on that day would merely prove that his behaviour may be a cause for her to commit suicide, but it cannot be held that he abated her for commission of suicide. In the same manner, the other two appellants might have ill-treated Ushabai by assaulting her, much prior to the date of incident, but in my view, those acts would not amount to abetment. They may be the cause for her committing suicide. 14. In the same manner, the other two appellants might have ill-treated Ushabai by assaulting her, much prior to the date of incident, but in my view, those acts would not amount to abetment. They may be the cause for her committing suicide. 14. In the case of Brij Lal and another (supra), it has been held that though such acts made the appellants morally responsible for what had happened, but their conduct or utterances do not constitute an act of abetment. 15. I agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and on the basis of the decisions cited above, I am of the view that the appellants are morally responsible for what had happened, but they cannot be held guilty for abetment of suicide committed by Ushabai. 16. I, therefore, allow the appeal and acquit the appellants of the offence punishable under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. They are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged.