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1989 DIGILAW 663 (ALL)

Hardei v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad

1989-08-30

D.S.BAJPAI

body1989
JUDGMENT D.S.Bajpai, J. 1. Smt. Hardei has preferred Writ Petition no. 701 of 1980 praying for quashing the judgment and order dated 25-5-1974 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Akbarpur, District Faizabad (Annexure 2) and the judgment and order dated 11-3-1980 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). 2. Petitioner of Writ Petition no. 2234 of 1980 Ram Asrey, on the other hand has prayed for quashing of judgment and order dated 18-3-1974 passed by the Consolidation Officer (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) and the judgment and order dated 11-3-1980 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). Dispute relates to the same khata in both the writ petitions and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 11-3-1980 is the same in both the cases. 3. Briefly stating the dispute pertained to khata no 1 situate in village Keonda, Pargana and Tasil Akbarpur, District Faizabad which was recorded in the basic year in the name of Udai Raj Singh opposite party no. 3 in both the writ petitions as Bhumidhar. Ram Asrey petitioner in writ petition no. 2234 of 1980 who claimed to be the son of Smt. Hardei petitioner in Writ Petition no. 701 of 1980 filed a joint objection claiming co-tenancy rights in the khata in dispute on the ground that the land in dispute was joint acquisition with Dhangoo and Adhin, father of Smt. Hardei's husband Sarju and that they were co-tenants to the extent of 1/2 share. The petitioners also claimed possession. Dhangoo was the elder brother of Adhin. Dhangoo and Adhin being two sons of Badli, Sarju was the only son of Adhin and Gambhir was the only son of Dhangoo. The case set up was that Dhangoo held the land in a representative capacity for the joint family and after him the name of Gambhir, his son was recorded on the khata in dispute. Dhangoo, it is stated, taking undue advantage of the entry in his name transferred the khata in favour of opposite party no. 3 Udai Raj by a registered sale-deed dated 23rd July, 1958. Smt. Hardei filed a civil suit being Regular Suit no. 444 of 1958 in the Court of Munsif which was withdrawn by her on 7-12-1960. Thereafter Regular Suit no. 3 Udai Raj by a registered sale-deed dated 23rd July, 1958. Smt. Hardei filed a civil suit being Regular Suit no. 444 of 1958 in the Court of Munsif which was withdrawn by her on 7-12-1960. Thereafter Regular Suit no. 8/123/138/14 was again filed by her before the Sub-Divisional-Officer under section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which stood abated on account of start of consolidation operations. A second objection was filed on behalf of Gambhir challenging the validity of the sale-deed on the ground of fraud. His assertion was that he had agreed to transfer only plot nos. 61 and 414 and not all the plots mentioned in the sale-deed. Various other objections were raised, some of which, it is averred, support Smt. Hardei's contention. These objections were contested on the ground that firstly Ram Asrey was not the son of Sarju and secondly that the land in dispute was not ancestral and as such Smt. Hardei and Ram Asrey the two petitioners in the writ petitions filed by them held no share therein After appraising oral as well as documentary evidence the Consolidation Officer allowed the co-tenancy claim of Smt. Hardei to the extent of 1/2 share. He, however, held that Ram Asrey petitioner in the subsequent writ petition was not the son of Smt. Hardei from Sarju Feeling aggrieved Ram Asrey as also Gambhir and Udai Raj preferred these separate appeals before the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation who by his judgment and order (Annexure-2) upheld the finding of the Consolidation Officer in regard to the joint acquisition of land in dispute and allowed the claim of Ram Asrey holding him to be the son of Sarju, upheld this co-tenancy claim but rejected the claim of Smt. Hardei. Smt. Hardei, Udai Raj and Gambhir thereupon preferred three separate revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation who by his judgment and order dated 11-3-1980 (Annexure-3) allowed the revision of Udai Raj and dismissed the revision of Smt. Hardei and Gambhir holding that the land in dispute was not ancestral property and the petitioner or her son Ram Ashrey had no share in the same. It is against this order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that Smt. Hardei and Ram Asrey have preferred the two writ petitions which are being heard and decided by a common judgment. 4. It is against this order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that Smt. Hardei and Ram Asrey have preferred the two writ petitions which are being heard and decided by a common judgment. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as also the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3 in both the writ petitions and gone through the affidavits exchanged between the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that since there was ample evidence to indicate that Dhangoo held the khata in dispute in a representative capacity, the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in holding that the disputed khata was the joint Hindu family property. This submission of the learned counsel was based on the fact as stressed by him that there is a presumption of jointness of the Hindu family and that the burden as such was on Gambhir or for that matter on Udai Raj to whom they had transferred the land by a registered sale-deed to prove otherwise, that is to prove that the family had separated and the land in dispute was not the joint family property. Coupled with this the further submission was that the khata had been coming down in identical form and that the two petitioners in the writ petition had actually held in their possession about half the share to which they were entitled and had been paying land revenue to that extent. All these questions have been considered in detail by the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation in his detailed judgment dated 11-3-1980 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). On an examination of the entries in the revenue records of 1329 Fasli he has held that khata no 12 was entered at that time in the name of Adhin son of Badli; khata no. 19 was entered in the name of Badli. Khata no. 29 was also entered in the name of Badli while khata no. 20A was entered in the name of Dhangoo son of Badli. On this basis the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation came to the conclusion that since the two khatas 19 and 29 stood in the name of Badli who was father of Dhangoo and Adhin while khata no. 29 was also entered in the name of Badli while khata no. 20A was entered in the name of Dhangoo son of Badli. On this basis the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation came to the conclusion that since the two khatas 19 and 29 stood in the name of Badli who was father of Dhangoo and Adhin while khata no. 28 stood in the name of his elder son Dhangoo, there had been a separation in the family otherwise there was absolutely no question of two khatas standing in the name of father and the remaining two khatas standing in the name of Adhin and Dhangoo (one each). On this evidence the burden shifted on the petitioners in the two writ petitions to establish that the disputed khata continued to stand in the name of Dhangoo in a representative capacity. It is also not disputed that the khata in dispute comprised to eighteen plots in 1301 Fasli which was entered in the name of Badli with an area of 7 bighas, 17 biswas and 10 biswansis; its rent being Rs. 32/-. In 1314 Fasli name of Dhangoo was entered on the khata comprising 14 plots with an area of eight bighas, three biswas with the addition of four new plots. It thus cannot be disputed that the khata did not come down in identical form from Badli to Dhangoo. Even otherwise the tenancy was not heritable under the provisions of section 48 of the Oudh Rent Act. Section 48 read with section 18 of the said Act leave no doubt that on the death of a tenure holder the heir would continue to be a tenant for the period of five years whereafter he would have no right unless a fresh patta is executed in his favour or it continued to be in possession for a period of three years on the expiration of statutory period of five years. For this there is no evidence adduced by the petitioners in the two writ petitions. In 1329 Fasli also the disputed khata has not come down in identical form. The Deputy Director of Consolidation as such, in my opinion, did not commit any error of law in holding that the khata in dispute was not joint family property and did not come down in indentical form. 5. In 1329 Fasli also the disputed khata has not come down in identical form. The Deputy Director of Consolidation as such, in my opinion, did not commit any error of law in holding that the khata in dispute was not joint family property and did not come down in indentical form. 5. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed an error of law in rejecting the khasra entries. These khasra entries pertain to years 1365 Fasli to 1368 Fasli. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has stated that these entries were not made in consonance with the provisions of Land Records Manual and as such could not be relied upon. [ hold that the Deputy Director of Consolidation could very well reject and disbelieve entries which were not in consonance with the provisions of the Land Record Manual. There is, therefore, no illegality committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in rejecting these entries. Even otherwise the, entries do not depict, in any way, that the holding was the same as was alleged to be coming down from Dhangoo who was there in a representative capacity. It is also pertinent to point out that these entries are not in the name of either of the two petitioners. They are said to be in possession through somebody and this does not got indicate that either of the two petitioners were themselves in possession of the khata in dispute. 6. The third contention of the learned counsel was that the rent receipts had not been considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation which indicated that the two petitioners were in possession. THEse rent receipts have been considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and he has given ample reasons for discarding them. Learned counsel also submitted that in any case reliance placed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the entry in the revenue records of 1329 Fasli being in respect of another village the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in holding that the family had separated. There is no error inasfar as the conclusion is concerned, since the state of jointness of the family is dispelled from these khatauni entries. It cannot be said that the position apparent from these entries would lead to an inevitable conclusion that the family had in fact not separated. 7. There is no error inasfar as the conclusion is concerned, since the state of jointness of the family is dispelled from these khatauni entries. It cannot be said that the position apparent from these entries would lead to an inevitable conclusion that the family had in fact not separated. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon decision of this Court in Sanehi v. D. D. C. Faizabad, 1985 LCD 330 wherein it has been held that minor changes would not lead to the conclusion that the holding was not coming in an identical form. In view of the facts of this case as apparent from the judgment of the Court of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, it cannot be held that there has been minor changes in the holding coming down from Badli or Dhangoo. This case, therefore, does not support the petitioners. Similarly the case of Bala Charan v. State of U. P., 1978 RD 51 does not further the cause of the petitioners in holding that the holding was joint and held by Dhangoo in a representative capacity. 8. This view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on different aspects of the matter is strengthened by undernoted decisions of this court: Budhlal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 RD 324, Jagdamba Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1984 RD 388, Smt. Kilhati v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1975 RD 280, Basudeo v. Board of Revenue, 1974 PD 188, Ram Bhajan v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1983 LCD 160, Bhikhoo v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1983 LCD 372. In view of the discussions above the petitioners in the two writ petitions have failed to prove any case of co-tenancy and their claim could not succeed as ultimately held by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his impugned order dated 11-3-1980 filed as Annexure-3 to both the writ petitions. In asfar as the impugned order contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition no. 701 of 1980 dated 25-5-1974 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation and order dated 18-3-74 passed by the Consolidation Officer (Annexure-1 to writ petition no. In asfar as the impugned order contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition no. 701 of 1980 dated 25-5-1974 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation and order dated 18-3-74 passed by the Consolidation Officer (Annexure-1 to writ petition no. 2234 of 1980) are concerned, they cannot be sustained since the holding has not been found to be joint and as such claim of Ram Asrey petitioner could not be upheld and Smt Hardei was not entitled to any share in view of the fact that the holding was not held in a representative capacity by Gambhir. In this view of the matter Smt. Hardei, as also Ram Asrey petitioners in both the writ petitions were not entitled to any right in the holding in dispute. The finding in regard to Ram Asrey, even if he is held to be son of Sarju, cannot confer on him any co-tenancy rights since the holding itself has not been found to be a joint Hindu Family property. It is, as such, not necessary to record any finding on this aspect. 9. In the result, the two writ petitions fail and are dismissed. However, parties shall bear their own costs.