JUDGMENT - H. SURESH, J.:---Two questions arise in this petition: (a) Whether the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Customs, Narcotics Control Bureau of the Central Excise, are police officers while investigating offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985? (b) Whether the statements made before them are inadmissible in evidence under section 25 of the Evidence Act or under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 2. The facts leading to the present petition, are briefly as follows: On 4th September, 1987 on the basis of a secret information, the Officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (D.R.I.), Bombay, assisted by the Officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau, Bombay, intercepted a Taxi bearing Registration No. MRO 6230, near Hotel Fariyas at Colaba, Bombay. Respondent No. 1 was the sole occupant as driver of the said taxi. The Officers saw a zipper bag at the feet of respondent No. 1. The Officers took the Taxi to their Office Building at Colaba. Two panchas were called and under the panchanama, the Officers recovered five cloth bags, each containing one kilogram of brown powder. On a testing it was found that the brown powder was heroin, a narcotic drug and valued approximately at Rs. 10 lakhs. Statement of respondent No. 1 was recorded, wherein he made certain admissions. On the basis of the information gathered from respondent No. 1, the second accused by name Mohammed Quasim Anwari alias Javed, an Afgan National was apprehended. Statement of the said Mohammed Quasim Anwari alias Javed was also recorded. Both of them were arrested and produced before the learned Magistrate and they were remanded to custody from time to time. On 4th November, 1987, the appellant herein filed a complaint before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay, against the said two persons. After issue of the process, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, committed the case to the Court of Sessions at Greater Bombay. 3. The said Sessions Case came up before the learned Judge for final hearing. But in between, it appears that the said Mohammed Quasim Anwari alias Javed, who was granted bail, absconded. The case ultimately commenced only against respondent No. 1. 3. The said Sessions Case came up before the learned Judge for final hearing. But in between, it appears that the said Mohammed Quasim Anwari alias Javed, who was granted bail, absconded. The case ultimately commenced only against respondent No. 1. The prosecution started its evidence with the first witness Shri S.K. Pradhan, Senior Intelligence Officer of the D.R.I. After deposing to the interception and recovery of the brown powder from the five cloth bags, the said witness was asked about questioning of respondent No. 1 in the presence of panchas about the recovery of the zipper bag and the brown powder found in the cloth bags and replies given by respondent No. 1. The said question was objected to by the defence on the ground that the statement of the respondent is not admissible as the D.R.I. Officers before whom the statement was made are Police Officers while investigating offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the N.D.P.S. Act"). After hearing submission on either side, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, by an elaborate order dated 25th October, 1988 upheld the contentions of the defence and held that the statements are not inadmissible, being hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and also under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is against this order, the present petition has been filed. 4. Mr. Desai submits that there are number of such cases which are pending in the lower Courts wherein such questions have arisen and it is necessary to lay down the law and clarify the legal position. 5. It is better that we have a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psyschotropic Substances Act, 1985. The preamble to the said Act says that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs "to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for matters connected therewith." Section 4 of the said Act directs the Central Government to take such measures as it deems necessary or expedient "for the purpose of preventing and combating abuse of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the illicit traffic therein". Under section 37 of the said Act, every offence punishable under this Act has been made cognizable offence. Under section 37 of the said Act, every offence punishable under this Act has been made cognizable offence. In the result, even an ordinary police officer can take cognizance of the offence under this Act. 5-A. We now come to Chapter V of the said Act, which refers to procedure as to search, seizure, arrest, recording of information and prosecution. Section 41 empowers a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class or any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, to issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act, or for the search, whether by day or by night, of any building, conveyance or place in which he has reason to believe any Narcotic or Psychotropic Substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed. Under sub-section (2) of section 41, any such officer of gazetted rank of the departments of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any other department of the Central Government or of the Border Security Force as is empowered in this behalf by the State Government, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing that any person has committed an offence punishable under this Act may authorise any officer subordinate to him put superior in rank to a peon, sepoy, or a constable, to arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place whether by day or by night or himself arrest a person or search a building conveyance or place. Under section 42, any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any other department of the Central Government or of the Border Security Force as is empowered in this behalf by the Central Government, or any such officer of the Revenue, Drugs Control, Excise, Police or any other Department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by the State Government, has a power between sunrise and sunset, to enter into and search any building, conveyance or place in case of resistance, break open any door and remove and obstacle to such entry; to seize any drug or substance and materials used in the manufacture thereof or any article, animal or conveyance which has reason to believe to be employed to be liable to confiscation under the Act; to detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act. In case of emergency, such officers have powers to enter into any enclosed place or conveyance at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief. Under sub-section (2) of section 42, where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. Section 43 provides for arrest and seizure in public places. Section 50, when any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of section 41, section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate. The Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer concerned, before whom, any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that such search be made. The Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer concerned, before whom, any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that such search be made. Section 51 is a general provision which says that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply, "in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, to all warrants issued and arrests, searches and seizures made under this Act." Under section 52, sub-section (2), every person arrested and article seized under warrant issued under sub-section (1) of section 41 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the Magistrate by whom the warrant was issued. Under sub-section (3) of section 52, every person arrested and article seized under sub-section (2) of section 41, section 42 or section 44 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to (a) the officer in charge of the nearest police station, or (b) the officer empowered under section 53 of the Act. Section 53 is material, and it is as follows: "53(1) The Central Government, after consultation with the State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, invest any offer of the department of central excise Narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or Border Security Force or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of the offences under this Act. (2) The State Government may, be notification published in the Official Gazette, invest any officer of the department of drugs control, revenue or excise or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act." The only other relevant provision is section 67 which is as follows:--- "67. Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the Central Government a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act:--- (a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; (b) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry; (c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case." 6. In the present case, notifications have been produced to indicate that the Officer concerned has been invested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station. The learned Sessions Judge, after taking into account all the provisions and after comparing the powers so invested or conferred upon the officer with the police officer who is entitled to investigate a cognizable offence under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, came to the conclusion that the powers are similar and analogous to each other and it is on that basis he held that the confessions made to such an officer are inadmissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act and the statement made to such an officer is hit by the provisions of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. Before the learned judge, the prosecution cited number of cases. In particular, the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and also that of the Delhi High Court, wherein it has been held that the statements made to such an officer under the Act are not hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and that such statements are admissible. The learned Judge did not accept these authorities as, in his opinion, on a comparison of the various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with that of Act, he found that there was no difference between a Police Officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and an officer invested with the power of an officer-in-charge of a police station as provided under section 53 of the Act. 8. Questions similar to the ones that have arisen before me have been decided by the Supreme Court, though not in respect of the provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act. 8. Questions similar to the ones that have arisen before me have been decided by the Supreme Court, though not in respect of the provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act. Such questions have been decided mainly in relation to Bihar and Orissa Excise Act or in relation to central Excise and Salt Act. Mr. Desai, therefore, rightly started with the analysis of the case by referring to those judgments, Firstly, he referred to the case of (Raja Ram v. State of Bihar)1, reported in 1964 (1) Criminal Law Journal Page 705 : A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court Page 828. In this case, the question which fell for consideration by the Supreme Court was whether an Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 shall, for the purpose of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a police station and whether a statement made to such an officer is hit by the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act. We do not have the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act. But from the Judgment, we can make out that under the said Act, the officer was entitled to investigate any offence under the Excise Act within that area without the order of the Magistrate and writing made by the Customs Officer or other officer of the Customs not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Customs authorised in this behalf by the Chief Customs Officer. The Court observed that while an officer has to perform wide range of duties, the mere fact that some of the powers are identical with those of a police officer, would not make him a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The test is as follows:- "In our judgment what is pertinent to bear in mind for the purpose of determining as to who can be regarded a police officer for the purpose of this provision is not the totality of the powers which an officer enjoys but the kind of powers which the law enable him to exercise. The test is as follows:- "In our judgment what is pertinent to bear in mind for the purpose of determining as to who can be regarded a police officer for the purpose of this provision is not the totality of the powers which an officer enjoys but the kind of powers which the law enable him to exercise. The test for determining whether such a person is a 'police officer' for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act would, in our judgment, be whether the powers of a police officer which are conferred on him or which are exercisable by him because he is deemed to be an officer in charge of police station establish a direct or substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by section 25, that is, the recording of a confession. In other words, the test would be whether the powers are such as would tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect or a delinquent. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys. These question may perhaps be relevant for consideration where the powers of a police officer conferred upon him are of a very limited character and are not by themselves sufficient to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession." Thereafter the Supreme Court for the purpose of analysing the position of an officer with powers of a limited character as compared with the powers to investigate as provided under section 156, Cri.P.C., in that context, referred to the Sea Customs Act itself. Under the Sea Customs Act there are provisions enabling a Customs Officer to search on reasonable suspicion any vessel in any port in lndia or any person who has landed from any vessel. But the Supreme Court took note of the fact that the power was subject to the right given by section 170 of that Act to that person to require the Customs Officer to take him before his search to a Magistrate or to a Customs Collector, Thereafter whether he should be searched or not would depend upon the Magistrate or the Customs Collector being satisfied about the existence of reasonable grounds for the search. There are no such restrictions imposed upon a police officer making a search under section 102, sub-section (3) of the Code. Similarly, a Customs Officer cannot search any place on land without obtaining a search warrant from a Magistrate. Again, under section 173 of the Act a Customs Officer has the power to arrest a person against whom reasonable suspicion exists that he has been guilty of an offence under the Act. But he is required to produce that person forthwith before the nearest Magistrate and it will be for the Magistrate either to commit that person to jail custody or release him on bail at his discretion. Inparticular, the Supreme Court took note of the fact that a police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure has powers to release and arrest a person on his furnishing a bail and is not required for that purpose to obtain an order of a Magistrate. The existence of such a power to grant bail in an officer-in-charge of Police Station itself enables him to exercise authority over the arrested person and influence his conduct if he so wishes. This is an important circumstance which will go to determine how a distinction could be made between a police officer-in-charge of a police station and an officer who has been vested with the powers as provided under the Customs Act. In other words, it all depends upon the powers which are conferred on the officers, and whether the powers are such as to enable them to exercise a kind of authority over the persons arrested to compel them to make statements which may be incriminating to the persons making them. The Supreme Court observed as follows:- "The law allows the police officer to obtain such statements with a view to facilitate the investigation of the offences. But it renders them in admissible in evidence for the obvious reason that a suspicion about voluntariness would attach to them. It is the power of investigation which establishes a direct relationship with the prohibition enacted in section 25. But it renders them in admissible in evidence for the obvious reason that a suspicion about voluntariness would attach to them. It is the power of investigation which establishes a direct relationship with the prohibition enacted in section 25. Therefore, where such a power is conferred upon an officer, the mere fact that he possesses some other powers under another law would not make him any the less a police officer for the purposes of section 25." Thereafter the Supreme Court held that as far as an Excise Officer under the said Bihar and Orissa Excise Act is concerned, he has the same position as an Officer-in-charge of a police station making investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Desai submitted that under the N.D.P.S. Act there are number of provisions which can be compared with the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and on the same basis as the Supreme Court has done, if one analyses these provisions, it cannot be said that the Officers who are invested wtih the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station under section 53 of the Act cannot be said to be police officers so as to attract the embargo provided under section 25 of the Evidence Act. 9. Mr. Desai then drew my attention to the case of (Badaku Joti v. State of Mysore)2, reported in A.I.R 1966 Supreme Court page 1746 wherein the Supreme Court was concerned with the provision of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the statement made by an accused to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise would not be hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and would be admissible in evidence. In that context, the Supreme Court made the following observations (at page 1749-1750); "It has been urged before us that if we consider section 21 in the setting of section 14 of the Act, it would become clear that the enquiry contemplated under section 21(1) is in substance different from investigation pure and simple into an offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not necessary to decide whether the enquiry under section 14 must also include enquiry mentioned in section 21 of the Act. It is not necessary to decide whether the enquiry under section 14 must also include enquiry mentioned in section 21 of the Act. Apart from this argument we are of the opinion that more conferment of powers of investigation into criminal offences under section 9 of the Act does not make the Central Excise Officer a police officer even in the broader view mentioned above. Otherwise any person entrusted with investigation under section 202 of the Cri. P.C. would become a police officer." Again at page 1750: "All that section 21 does is to give him certain powers to aid him in his enquiry. In those circumstances we are of opinion that even though the Central Excise Officer may have when making enquiries for purposes of the Act powers which an officer-in-charge of a police station has when investigation a cognizable offence, he does not thereby become a police officer even if we give the broader meaning to those words in section 25 of the Evidence Act. The scheme of the Act, 1915, the appellant cannot take advantage of the decision of this Court in Raja Ram Jaiswal's case, (1964)2 S.C.R. 752 : A.I.R 1964 S.C. 828, taking even the broader view of the words "police officer" in section 25 of the Evidence Act. We are of opinion that the present case is more in accord with the case of Barkat Ram, (1962)3 S.C.R. 338 : A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 276." 10. Mr. Desai also relied on the case of (Balkishan v. State Maharashtra)3, reported in A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 379, wherein the question related to the position of an officer of the Railway Protection Force making enquiry under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. Mr. Desai also relied on the case of (Balkishan v. State Maharashtra)3, reported in A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 379, wherein the question related to the position of an officer of the Railway Protection Force making enquiry under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. The Supreme Court in that case, after taking into account the fact that the character of the "enquiry" is different from that of "investigation" under the Code and after taking into account the fact that the officer has no power to initiate prosecution by submitting a chargesheet as provided under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, summarised the legal position as follows (at page 393) : "In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that an officer of the R.P.F., conducting an enquiry under section 8(1) of the 1966 Act has not been invested with all the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station making an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code. Particularly, he has no power to initiate prosecution by filing a chargesheet before the Magistrate concerned under section 173 of the Code, which has been held to be the clinching attribute of an investigating "Police Officer". Thus, judged by the test laid down in Badku Jyoti Savant's case, which has been consistently adopted in the subsequent decisions noticed above, inspector Kakade of the R.P.F. could not be deemed to be a 'Police Officer' within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and therefore, any confessional or incrimnating statement recorded by him in the course of an enquiry under section 8(1) of the 1966 Act, cannot be excluded from evidence under the said section." 11. We have certain direct authorities under this very Act from the Delhi High Court as also from the Gujarat High Court and the Allahabad High Court. In the case of (Kirpal Mohan Virmani v. B.D. Mishra, intelligence Officer)4, (Cri. Misc. (M) 1451 of 1987 along with Cri.Rev. 170/87 Cri. Misc (M) 1258/87), decided on 7th December, 1988, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (Coram : R.N. Pyne, C.J. and G.C. Jain. J.,) directly held that the officers are not Police Officers within the meaning of the term used in section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Allahabad High Court in the case of (Teer Singh Harbux Singh v. The State)5, Criminal Misc. J.,) directly held that the officers are not Police Officers within the meaning of the term used in section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Allahabad High Court in the case of (Teer Singh Harbux Singh v. The State)5, Criminal Misc. Case No. 2085(B) of 1986 also held that the officer under the Act cannot be deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a police station. Similarly, in an earlier case of (Jagatsingh Sardulsingh Sodha v. Collector of Customs)6, Misc. Criminal Application No. 787 of 1987 the Gujarat High Court held that the officers appointed under the Act cannot be said to be the police officers within the contemplation of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11-A. Mr. Siwani pointed out that N.D.P.S. Act is essentially a criminal law unlike the Customs Act or the Excise Act where the main object of those Acts is to collect excise or duties or to collect the revenue. He, therefore, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge was right when he came to the conclusion that the officer could extract confession just as any other police officer would do under the Code and that such confessions are per se inadmissible. 12. Mr. Siwani also pointed out that under the Customs Act, the offences are not cognizable offences, whereas under the N.D.P.S. Act, every offence is cognizable. He, therefore, submitted that a person can be arrested under the N.D.P.S. Act and his statement is recorded thereafter. Such statements by an accused person must necessarily be deemed to have been recorded by a police officer. On the other hand, under the Customs Act, till the complaint is filed, the detained person cannot be considered as an accused person. He also pointed out that under the Customs Act, powers are given to the Customs Officer in connection with granting of bail (section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962) whereas under section 53 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the officer concerned is given the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station by virtue of notifications. He also pointed out that under the Customs Act, powers are given to the Customs Officer in connection with granting of bail (section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962) whereas under section 53 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the officer concerned is given the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station by virtue of notifications. He also pointed out that under section 108 of the Customs Act, the officer who records the statement is given the status of a judicial officer as if it is a judicial confession which can be recorded by a Magistrate, whereas under section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act, it cannot be said that such officers are judicial officers or such proceedings can be said to be a judicial enquiry. 13. Mr. Siwani, also took me at length through the judgment given by the learned Sessions Judge wherein the learned Sessions Judge has compared the various provisions under the N.D.P.S. Act with the provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After comparisons, the learned Judge summarised the position, as he understood, in this manner:- "Thus, in view of the above discussion and by simple comparison of the powers invested or conferred upon the officers of various departments other than Police department including Customs and Revenue Intelligence for the purpose of investigating offences under the Act by virtue of various provisions of the Act are found to be similar and analogous to the powers of Police Officer investigating a cognizable offence under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is also to be noted that under section 53 of the Act and by virtue of the notification, the officers mentioned in the notification are invested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station. Further, under section 55 of the Act, the functions and obligations of such officers are invested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station which are again similar and analogous to the powers with which an officer-in-charge of the police station is invested under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." 14. With respect of the learned Judge, he has missed the whole point. What is important is not so much the comparison of the provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure with the provisions under the N.D.P.S. Act, but comparison of the powers as would tend to facilitate extraction or confessions from an accused. With respect of the learned Judge, he has missed the whole point. What is important is not so much the comparison of the provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure with the provisions under the N.D.P.S. Act, but comparison of the powers as would tend to facilitate extraction or confessions from an accused. Can it be said that under the Act, the provisions are such that the officers would be able to extract confession from an accused person? It is here, the Supreme Court has given us the necessary guidelines, as indicated above. Essentially, the officer is not a police officer as understood under the Criminal Procedure Code. He is an officer on whom the powers of an officer-in-charge of police station, for a limited purpose, are conferred. He has no power to grant bail. He has no police lockup. If an accused is arrested within no time he must forward the accused before the magistrate. It is for the learned Magistrate to grant him bail or not. Significantly there is no provision whereby the learned Magistrate could remand the accused to the custody of the police officer. The accused must necessarily go to the judicial custody. Again, the officer has no powers to prefer a chargehseet as is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the enquiry, if the officer thinks that there is a case against the accused, he must file a complaint, on which, again, it is for the learned Magistrate to issue or not to issue, a process. Thereafter the case proceeds as if it is a private complaint. Therefore, if one looks at the matter from this angle, it becomes clear that when the officers records statement under section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act, it is essentially in the form of an enquiry. It could be before the accused is arrested. It could be even after the accused is arrested. After ascertaining and collecting such information, as is necessary to prefer a charge that the accused has committed an offence within the meaning of the Act, it is for him to file a complaint before the learned Magistrate. In my view, such an enquiry cannot be equated with the investigation by an officer-in- charge of a police station as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In my view, such an enquiry cannot be equated with the investigation by an officer-in- charge of a police station as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that is so, the officers who have been given the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station within the meaning of section 53 of the Act, cannot be said to be police officers within the meaning of section 52 of the Evidence Act. The statements recorded by the officers under this Act thus become admissible in law. 15. Similarly, it cannot be said that the statements so recorded are like the statements recorded under section 161 of the Code nor can it be said that statements are hit by the restrictions provided under section 162. It is a private complaint. The statements made to a complainant by a witness or an accused are admissible in law. The only difference between an ordinary complainant and a complainant under this Act is that the latter has powers under a statute to call for information from any person. But that does not mean that such a power necessarily becomes an instrument for coercive extraction of information and statements. With the result in my view, the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in his conclusion that the statement are hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and also by the provisions of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. I, therefore, pass the following order : ORDER The order dated 25th October, 1988 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, in Sessions Case No. 1110 of 1987, is quashed and set aside. I hold that the Directorate Revenue Intelligence Officers are not the Police Officers for the purpose of offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances act, 1985 and the statements made before them are admissible under the law. Rule made absolute accordingly. Rule made absolute. -----