NAVIN CHANDRA SHARMA, J.—This is first appeal by Kewalchand and Hastimal against the decree of the Additional District Judge, Nagaur dated February 22, 1988 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 12,000/- and ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises and also awarding to the plaintiff damages for use and occupation of the premises at the rate of Rs. 600/-per month. 2. Facts leading to the filing of this first appeal are that on. September 28, 1983 plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Satyanarain instituted Civil Original Suit No. 19 of 1983 against partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries Nagaur and impleaded Kewalchand and Hastimal appellants as defendants in their capacity as partner of the said firm. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the suit premises were situated on the west of Railway Station, Nagaur and were bounded as described at the foot of para 1 of the plaint. It was alleged that the defendants took these premises on rent with the stipulation that they would pay rent at the monthly rate of Rs 600/-. The rental amount of one year would be paid in advance and thereafter month by month. The defendants executed a registered Kabuliyat in this respect in favour of the plaintiff. The tenancy commenced from October 23, 1979. There were two godowns in the premises and rest of the land was vacant. It was agreed that the defen-dants would be entitled to make constructions on the open land and the constructions would be also handed over to the plaintiff when the premises were vacated. It was mentioned that the business of firm oswal Metal Industries, Nagaur was closed in the year 1981. The defendant removed some girders from the godown and also dug pits 4 or 5 deep while removing the poles. Rent was not paid after January 22, 1982 and more than six months rent had fallen in arrears upto the date the suit was filed. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants had closed their industry and had sub-let the premises to M/s Mahendra Metal Industries. The plaintiff claimed for a decree of arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation and for ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises. 3. Summons of the suit were served on Kewal Chand and Hastimal on October 6, 1983 for appearance in Court on October 28,1983. The plaintiff claimed for a decree of arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation and for ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises. 3. Summons of the suit were served on Kewal Chand and Hastimal on October 6, 1983 for appearance in Court on October 28,1983. In the summons both Kewalchand and Hastimal were described as Partners of partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries, Nagaur. On behalf of both these appellants, Vakalatnama was filed by Shri Navaratan Raj Mehta on October 28, 1983 and appearance was to put by the said Advocate on behalf of the appellants. On that date the Additional District Judge was out from headquarters and the case was adjourned to November 19, 1983 for filing of the written statement. On November 19, 1983 the Additional District Judge was on leave and the case was adjourned to December 13, 1983 for filing of the written statement. On this date an application under O. 6 r. 5. C.P.C. was filed on behalf of the appellants stating therein that it was not clear from the plaint whether the partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries had been impleaded as defendant or not. It was also mentioned that at various places in the plaint the word "defendant" in singular had been used. Clarification was also sought about the date of closure of the business by firm Oswal Metal Industries. Lastly, it was mentioned that Kewalchand appellant No. 1 had retired from partnership on August 24, 1981 and Hastimal appellant No. 2 had retired from the partnership firm on November 25, 1980 and the plaintiff had full knowledge of the same. That made the asking for further and better particulars more essential. It was prayed that the plaintiff be directed to submit further and better particulars. The plaintiff filed reply to this application on January 4, 1984 wherein he mentioned that the partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries has been impleaded as a defendant. It was also mentioned that wherever the word "defendant" has been used in the plaint, it refers to the appellants. It was also stated that the appellants bad given no information to the plaintiff about their retirement from the partnership firm. 4. It was also mentioned that wherever the word "defendant" has been used in the plaint, it refers to the appellants. It was also stated that the appellants bad given no information to the plaintiff about their retirement from the partnership firm. 4. On March 19, 1984 an application was filed on behalf of the appellants stating that despite the fact that partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries had been impleaded as a defendant, the plaintiff had not submitted any summons to be served on the firm. It was alleged that out of the three defendants, one defendant, namely, M/s Oswal Metal Industries still remained to be served. One more application was filed that the plaintiff had only submitted a reply to the application under O.6 r. 5 and had not submitted further and better particulars. These applications were heard by the Additional District judge and decided on May 27, 1984. It may be mentioned that on March 19, 1984, the defendants had also filed written statement. The Additional District Judge held that the plaintiff had made clear on February 16, 1984 that he had already given the better particulars. In any event, the Additional District Judge said that the defendants appellants had already filed a written statement and there remains no necessity for any other better particulars. As regards service of summons on the partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries Nagaur,. if was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that a partnership firm is served through its partners and since summons had been served on the partners it amounted to service on the partnership firm as well. The Additional District Judge in this regard ordered that if from technical point of view, the plaintiff desired to serve separately on the firm he can do so otherwise, proper inference would be drawn at the appropriate time. The case was fixed for filing of documents and framing of issues. 5. The Additional District Judge framed seven issues in the suit. It held that the defendants had defaulted in the payment or tender of rent after January 22, 1982. Issue No. 2 which related to sub-letting was not pressed on behalf of the plaintiff. Issues No. 3 and 4 which related to causing of damage to the premises and nuisance was decided against the plaintiff. It held that the defendants had defaulted in the payment or tender of rent after January 22, 1982. Issue No. 2 which related to sub-letting was not pressed on behalf of the plaintiff. Issues No. 3 and 4 which related to causing of damage to the premises and nuisance was decided against the plaintiff. Issue No. 5 related to the question of retirement of both the appellants from the partnership firm as alleged by them. The trial court did not believe the evidence adduced by the appellants that the plaintiff had been informed of their retirement at the time when farewell was given to the retiring partners by the firm. It was held that while retiring, the appellants did not arrange for an agreement between the plaintiff and the remaining partners regarding the rented out premises audits rent and. they also did not give any notice to the plaintiff about their retirement. Issue no. 5 was decided against the defendants. On the basis of the above findings, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff as aforesaid. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants urged that the partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries, which was impleaded as a defendant in the suit, was not served by any summons on the partners of the said firm as on the date of the suit. It was contended that both the appellants, who had been impleaded as partners of the firm by the plaintiff, had retired much before the institution of the suit and, therefore, service of summons on them was in-effective qua the partnership firm. The learned counsel for the appellants next contended that even if no public notice in the manner provided in section 72 of the Partnership Act was served regarding the retirement of the appellants from the partnership firm. It is clear that at least on the date on which the appellants filed application under 0.6 r. 5 C.P.C. for further and better particulars .on December .13, 1983 the plaintiff had been intimated that Kewalchand appellant had retired from the partnership firm on August 24, 1981 and Hastinial appellant on November 25, 1980. On this basis it was argued that the appellants were not liable to pay any rent to the plaintiff with effect from December 13, 1983 when they filed the application under O. 6 r. 5. On this basis it was argued that the appellants were not liable to pay any rent to the plaintiff with effect from December 13, 1983 when they filed the application under O. 6 r. 5. C.P.C. as to the liability for ejectment it was urged that the appellants in their written statement had already stated in para 13 that so far as the appellants were concerned, there was no dispute regarding possession and in case the plaintiff had not already obtained possession of the suit premises, a decree can immediately be passed in his favour for possession of the suit premises. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to the decision in International Continental Caoutchouc Compagnie Vs. Mehta & Co.. (1) and contended that when the appellants had been served as partners of the firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries Nagaur under O. 30 r.3 C.P.C. they had appeared under protest stating that they had retired and as such the service on them as service on the partnership firm was a nullity. In the above decision appearance has been put by an attorney on behalf of the defendant Bhagat Ram Vadra. That appearance was made under protest as the defendant denied that he was a partner of the firm. On 12th April a written statement was tiled on behalf of Bhagat Ram Vadra in which he only said that he had no knowledge of the allegations in the plaint and he denied that he was a partner. Referring to O. 30 r.6 C.P.C, his Lordship Buckland J., stated that the provisions contained in r. 6 of O. 30 C.P.C. meant that though such persons may file different written statements, they may not do so on their own behalf but must file them on behalf of the firm. Should they file different written statement on behalf of the firm, the plaintiff will be obliged to show that not one of the defence prevents a decree being made against the firm. The learned Judge then referred to G. 30 r. 3 (a) of the old Code which was not identical with the corresponding provisions contained in O. 30 r 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure of present Code. The learned Judge then referred to G. 30 r. 3 (a) of the old Code which was not identical with the corresponding provisions contained in O. 30 r 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure of present Code. Examining the provisions of O. 30 r. 3(a) of the old Code, the learned Judge said that the effect of that rule was that where a person who had been served as a partner under Rule 3 appeared under protest, the service on him as such on the firm was a nullity and the plaintiff should therefore begin again and effect service-upon the firm in accordance with Rule 3 unless the firm had already been otherwise served through some other person as a partner who had not appeared under protest The learned Judge then examined the question as to what should happen of the defend-ant who had entered appearance under protest denying that he was a partner of the firm. He referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Charry Vs. Pohoomai (2). In the Bombay case, the learned Chief Justice had said that in such event after the plaintiff had obtained the judgment, he may apply under O. 21 r. 50 for leave to issue execution against the person who had appeared under protest when if the liability is still disputed, the court may order the liability is still disputed, the court may order the liability of such person to be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried or determined. The other alternative was also referred in that case by stating that the plaintiff may wish to challenge at once the denial of the persons served as a partner that he was a partner. If so, he should take out a summons to strike out the appearance entered on the ground that the party appearing was a partner in the firm or was a partner at the time the cause of action accrued or in the alternative to strike out of such appearance the denial of partnership. An order may then be made directing an issue to be tried to determine the question of partnership. In another case of Vithal-das Vs. An order may then be made directing an issue to be tried to determine the question of partnership. In another case of Vithal-das Vs. Hensraj (3), the same Chief Justice suggested a third alternative, namely, that the person who had entered appearance under protest had a right to ask the court to have the question decided whether or not he is a partner in the defendant firm and get the matter decided. On the facts of the case before the Calcutta High Court, it was laid down that no such question had yet arisen in that case because no summons had been taken out by the party who desired to have the question determined. It was, therefore, observed that it was not necessary until the point came before the court in a concrete form to express any definite opinion as to whether or not the law and practice admit of either of these courses being followed. None of the above procedures were mentioned in the provisions contained in O. 30 of the old Code. Shri Buckland J. said that O. 21 r.50 of the Code provided a definite procedure whereby the issue can be determined before any execution could go against the person who had entered appearance under protest. The learned Judge referred to the observations of Atkin L.J. In Weir & Co. Vs. Mc. Vichar & Co., (4) and observed that Atkin L. J. seemed to have taken the view that the question could only be determined after judgment. The matter was left open by the learned Judge for a proper occasion in case such a question arose before him. For the purpose of disposal of the matter before him, the learned Judge said that a person who had been served as a partner under O. 30 r.3 of the old Code and entered appearance under protest was not entitled to file a written statement on his own behalf denying that he was a partner. That was precisely the law laid down in the above Calcutta case, on the basis of the provisions contained in O. 30 of the old Code. The written statement filed by Bhagat Ram Vadra was ordered to be taken off the file which amounted to this that there was no written statement in the suit and which consequently was undefended. 8. The written statement filed by Bhagat Ram Vadra was ordered to be taken off the file which amounted to this that there was no written statement in the suit and which consequently was undefended. 8. I may refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gajendra Narain Singh vs. Jobarimal Prahlad Rai (5). In that case M/s Johri mal Prahlad Rai had filed a suit against a partnership firm M/s Tirhut Umbrella Works for recovery of some money. Summons of the suit was served upon Gajendra Narain Singh as a partner of the defendant firm. Mr. D. B. Tilak, an Advocate, who was angaged by Singh, filed a Vakalatnama in Court authorising Mr. Tilak to act, appear and plead in the suit. A chamber summons was served on Singh On September 9, 1953 Mr. Tilak as Advocate for Singh addressed a letter to the attorney of the plaintiffs requesting them to consent to an adjournment of the suit to enable Singh to file his written statement. By consent of the Advocate, the Chamber summons for directions stood adjourned for a fortnight. When the Chamber summons for direction was taken up for hearing on September 24, 1953 Mr. Tilak informed the Court that Singh claimed that he. was not a partner of the defendant firm and orally prayed for an order permitting withdrawal of the appearance filed in Court. The Court rejected the application for leave to withdraw. Mr. Tilak withdrew from the suit and the suit was heard exparte. The court decreed the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. The decree was sent for execution. The plaintiffs applied for leave to execute the decree against Singh under O. 21 r. 50 (2) C.P.C. Singh contended that he was not a partner of defendant firm and that he was not liable to satisfy the debts of that firm and that he had appeared in the suit not as a partner but in his individual capacity and further that he had informed the court that he was not a partner of the defendant firm. The District Judge upheld the contention of Singh. However, the Patna High Court reversed the findings of the District Judge. The matter came before the Supreme Court. His Lordship Shah, J., as he then was dealt with the provisions of O. 30 of the old Code. The District Judge upheld the contention of Singh. However, the Patna High Court reversed the findings of the District Judge. The matter came before the Supreme Court. His Lordship Shah, J., as he then was dealt with the provisions of O. 30 of the old Code. His Lordships referred to the provisions contained in Rules 1,3 5,6 and 8 of order 30 as then stood and observed that r. 8 of order 30 enabled the persons served as a partner to appear under protest, and to deny that he was a partner of the firm which issued. Appearance under protest by the persons sued render the service of summons as regards the defendant firm inveffective. The plaintiff may obtain a fresh summons against the firm and serve it in the manner prescribed by O.30 r. 3 C.P.C. •against another persons who is alleged to be a partner by the plaintiff. A decree against the defendant firm so obtained may with leave under O.20 r. 50(2) be executed against the firm and also against the person who had been initially served as a partner and who had appeared under protest denying that he was a partner. The plaintiff, however, is not obliged to obtain a fresh summons; he may request the Court to adjudicate upon the plea of denial raised by the person served and appearing under protest. The Court will then proceed to determine the issue rai-sed by that plea., if the Court finds on evidence that the persons served was not a partner at the material time, the suit cannot proceed unless summons is served afresh under Rule 3, It the Court holds that he was a partner, service on him will be regarded as a good service on the firm and the suit will proceed against the firm. It thus appears that their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved of the first two alternatives referred to by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court in Charry vs. Pohoomal (supra) referred to in the decision of the Calcutta High Court dealt with above. On marits of the case, his Lordship Shah J., observed that Gajendra Narain Singh did not enter appearance under protest. He filed an appearance in his individual name in the suit and obtained an adjournment from the Court to enable him to file his written statement. On marits of the case, his Lordship Shah J., observed that Gajendra Narain Singh did not enter appearance under protest. He filed an appearance in his individual name in the suit and obtained an adjournment from the Court to enable him to file his written statement. The appearance so filed was deemed to be on behalf of the firm. At the hearing,of the summons for directions he contended that he was not a partner of the defendant firm and applied for leave to withdraw his appearance which was filed without protest. It was held that unless the Court permitted Singh to withdraw the apearance initially filed it continued to be an appearance under Rule.6 of Order 30 on behalf of the firm. As the matter was at the stage of execution, their Lordships were not concerned, in that case to decide whether the application of Singh for leave to withdraw his appearance was properly rejected. For that it was stated that the question could only be raised in a proceeding adopted by Singh in the proper court challenging the decision of the Civil Court and not in the proceeding for execution of the decree. Thereafter their Lordships referred to the provisions contained under O. 21 r. 50 of the Code and held that by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-rule (I) of cl. (b) of r. 50 of O. 21 C.P.C. the decree was liable to be executed against Singh. 9. The whole of Order 30 in the Code of Civil Procedure has been newly incorporated in the Code. In the old Code on account of the provisions contained in section 45 of the Contract Act, in suits by or against firms, all the members composing the firm were necessary parties. Order 30 was introduced in the present Code so as to provide exception to the provisions contained in section 145 of the Contract Act and thus if the promisees are partner it enable one to sue alone, but only if he sued in the name of the partnership. A firm as such had no existence in law. It is not a legal entity like a corporation. It is a mere abrevated name for the partner of which it consists. The effect of the using the name of the firm is simply to bring all the partners before the Court. A firm as such had no existence in law. It is not a legal entity like a corporation. It is a mere abrevated name for the partner of which it consists. The effect of the using the name of the firm is simply to bring all the partners before the Court. A decree against a firm in the name of the firm has the effect as a decree against all partners. Appendix A to the Code dealing with the description of parties in particular cases shows that in suits by or against a firm, the description of the plaintiff or the defendant should be "AB", a firm carrying on business in partnership. The plaint should therefore name only the firm as the plaintiff or the defendant. The words "two or more persons" in Rule 1 of Order 30 are merely descriptive of a partnership as introductory to the enacting part of the Rule that they are entitled to sue in. the firm name. Therefore, it is not necessary that two partners of the firm should be named in the cause title. One partner can institute a suit in the name of the firm. Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code inter alia provides that two or more persons being liable as partners may be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partner., at the, time of the acceding of the cause of action. The pleadings or other documents can be signed, verified or certified by any of the persons liable as partner. Rule 3 of Order 40 of the Code deals with service of summons on the firm. Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons should be served either upon any one or more of the partners or at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of partnership business there, as the Court may direct and such service shall be deemed to be good service upon the firm so sued. If the service of summons is affected upon any one or more of the partners, it is good service upon the firm as well as upon that partner personally, but it is no service upon any other member of the firm so as to make such a member a person who has been individually served as a partner. There is a proviso to Rule 3 saying that in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon other person within India whom it is sought to make liable. This proviso applies when the dissolution of the firm was in the knowledge of the plaintiff, Order 6 of Rule 30 deals with appearance of partners. Though all proceedings in a suit against a firm In the firm name must be conducted in the firm name,, the partners should, so far as appearance is concerned, appear individually in their own names. The only persons entitled to appear in a suit against a firm are (i) the persons who alleged that they were partner of the firm sued or were partners at the time the cause of action arose; and (ii) persons who are served as partners but deny that they are partners of the firm sued or were partners of the firm at the time the cause of action accrued. The latter category of persons may appear under protest. This is made clear by Order 30 Rule 8 of the Code which inter alia provides that where a person served with summons as a partner denies that he is a partner, he may enter appearance under protest under this Rule. Both in the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 758 and in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 581(supra) it has been laid down that where a person who has been served as a partner appears under protest, the service on the firm is ineffective. Ruckland J., observed as follows: — "The effect of that Rule, as affecting the proceedings against the firm, is that where a person who has been served as a partner under Rule 3, appears under protest, the service on him as service on the firm is a nullity. Ruckland J., observed as follows: — "The effect of that Rule, as affecting the proceedings against the firm, is that where a person who has been served as a partner under Rule 3, appears under protest, the service on him as service on the firm is a nullity. The plaintiff should, therefore, begin again and effect service upon the firm in accordance with Rule 3." Shah J in Gajendra Narains case (supra) observed regarding Order 30 of Rule 8 as follows: — "The Rule enable the persons served as a partner to appear under protest and to deny that he is a partner of the firm which is sued. Appearance under protest by the persons sued renders the service of summons as regards the defendant firm ineffective. The plaintiff may obtain a fresh summons against the firm and serve it in the manner prescribed by O. 30 r. 3 against another person who is alleged to be a partner by the plaintiff, the • plaintiff, however, is not obliged to obtain a fresh summons. He may request the Court to adjudicate upon the plea of denial raised by the persons served and appearing under protest:" Rule 8 of the Order 30 has since been amended by a new provision and now it has been incorporated that when any person served with a summons in the name provided by r. 3 enters appearance under protest, denying that he was a partner at any material time, either the plaintiff or the person entering the. appearance may, at any time before the date fixed for hearing any final disposal of the suit, apply to the court for determining whether that person was a partner of the firm and liable as such. If the court holds that such person was not a partner of the firm or was not liable as such, that shall not press the plaintiff from otherwise serving a summons on the firm and proceeding with the suit, but in that event, the plain-tiff shall be precluded from alleging the liability of that person as a partner of the firm in execution of any decree that may be passed against the firm. Then there is order 21 r. 50 in the Code according to which the decree against a firm may be executed (a) against any property of the partnership (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under Rule 6 or 7 of order 30 or who has admitted in the pleadings that he is or who has been adjuged to be a partner; and (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner- with a summons and has failed to appear. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 50 of Order 21 provides that where the decree holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in clauses (b) and (c) above as being partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed such court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. As already stated, where a firm is dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the plaintiff is bound to serve the summons upon other person within India whom it is sought to be made liable as provided in proviso to rule 3 of Order 30. No order can be made under sub rule (2) of Rule 50 of Order 21 against a former partner who has, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, left the firm before the institution of the suit. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 50 of Order 21 applies only when there has been no dissolution or none to the knowledge of the plaintiff. When there has been a dissolution to the knowledge of the plaintiff an outgoing partner cannot be made liable unless he has been served with the summons in accordance with the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 30 C.P.C. This is the scheme of a law relating to suit against firm and execution of decree obtained against a firm. 10. When there has been a dissolution to the knowledge of the plaintiff an outgoing partner cannot be made liable unless he has been served with the summons in accordance with the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 30 C.P.C. This is the scheme of a law relating to suit against firm and execution of decree obtained against a firm. 10. It is important to note that Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C, provides that any two or more persons liable as partners may be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. The words "accruing of the cause of action" are important. Similarly ,in 0 30 r.8 C.P.C. there are words "denying that he was a partner at any material time" which in the context means at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. On the facts of the present case it has already been stated that the plaintiff had sued the partnership firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries Nagaur and in the plaint both the appellants were shown as partners. The summons of the suit were also served on the appellants mentioning them as partners of the firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries. It is clear that on December !?, 1983.,. an application was filed on behalf of the appellants under Order .6 Rule 5 C.P.C. seeking certain clarifications regarding the plaint alle-gations and in this application it was also mentioned that Kewalchand had retired from the partnership firm on August 24, 1981 and Hastimal appellant had retired on November 25, 1980. Thereafter on March 18,1984 another application was filed on behalf of the appellants that the firm Oswal Metal Industries had not been served and no progress in the suit can be made till the firm was served. 11. No particular form of appearance under protest is prescribed under 0 30 r. 8 C.P.C. It is clear that on December 13, 1983 the appellants made is clear to the Additional District Judge Nagaur that Kewalchand had retired from partnership firm on August 24, 1981 and Hastimal had retired from it on November 25,1980. Thus it was made clear that both the appellants were not partners of the firm. By Another application dated March 19, 1984, it was stated by the appellants that the firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries has not been served. Thus it was made clear that both the appellants were not partners of the firm. By Another application dated March 19, 1984, it was stated by the appellants that the firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries has not been served. The Additional District Judge by his order dated April 27, 1984 contended himself by stating that if from technical point of view, the plaintiff desired to serve the partnership firm, he is free to do so. He mentioned that otherwise, necessary inference would be drawn at appropriate stage on the contention of the plaintiff that the partnership firm has been served through its partners. He adjourned the case for production of documents and framing of issues. 12. Here I may notice the provisions contained in Chapter V of the partnership Act which deals with incoming and outgoing partners. Section 31 deals with introduction of a person as partner into a firm. When a partner is introduced in a firm, he becomes liable for any act of the firm done after he became a partner Then section 32 deals with retirement of a partner. A partner can retire with the consent of all the partners or in accordance with an express agreement by the partners. Sub-section (2) of section 32 provides that a retiring partner may be discharged from any liability to any third party for acts of the firm done before his retirement by an agreement made by him with such third party and the partners of the reconstituted firm and such agreement may be implied by course of dealings. Then there is sub section*(3) to section. 32 which provides that notwithstanding the retirement of a partner from a firm, he and the partners continued to be liable as partners to third party for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the retirement until public notice is given of the retirement. Notice under sub section (3) can be given by a retired partner or by any partner of the reconstituted firm. Provision relating to mode of giving the public notice is provided in section 12 of the Partnership Act. Notice under sub section (3) can be given by a retired partner or by any partner of the reconstituted firm. Provision relating to mode of giving the public notice is provided in section 12 of the Partnership Act. A public notice under the Act is given when it relates to the retirement of a partner by publication in the official Gazette and in at least one vernacular newspaper having circulation in the District where the firm to which it relates has its place or principal place of business. In the case of registered firm, notice has also to be given to the Registrar of firm. Section 36 provides that an outgoing partner may carry on a business competing with that of the firm and he may advertise such business but subject to a contract to the contrary he may not use the firm name or represent himself as carrying on the business of the firm and will not solicit the customers of persons who were dealing with the firm before he ceased to be a partner. Looking to the scheme of Chapter V of the Partnership Act, in my opinion, a distinction has to be drawn between the partners of the firm who continued to be partners and the retired partner. A retired partner ceases to be a partner of the firm It is a different thing that he continues to be liable as partner to third parties for any act done by any of the partners of the firm which would have been an act of the firm if done before the retirement until public notice is given of the retirement. The liability of a retired partner arises on account of the fact that the third parties may deal with the firm without knowledge of the retirement of the partner under a belief that he continues to be a partner. This is based on the rule of estoppel. For the purpose of the partnership firm, a retired partner ceases to be a partner of the firm from the date of his retirement. The question of his liability to third parties is based on a different rule of law and is not based on the assumption that he still continues as a fact to be a partner of the firm. The question of his liability to third parties is based on a different rule of law and is not based on the assumption that he still continues as a fact to be a partner of the firm. He can be made a party to the suit to make him liable on the ground that no public notice had been given by the retiring partner as required by section 32 (3) read with section 72 of the Partnership Act. However, for the purpose of service of summons on the firm, the service on a retired partner will not serve the purpose until and unless it is shown that he was a partner at the time of the accruing of the cause of action which is the material time also for purposes of Rule 8 of Order 30 of the Code. Since in the light of the facts, as I have stated above, both the appellants had appeared under protest before the Additional District Judge stating that they had retired from the partnership firm on November 25, 1980 and August 24, 1981 service on the firm could not be said to have been made under Rule 3 of Order 30 C.P.C. unless on an application made by either party, the Additional District Judge determined under Order 30 r. 8 (2) of the Code that the appellants were partners of the firm at the material time. This inquiry was not made by the Additional District Judge probably because neither side made an application to that Court for determining this question. 13. It may be next mentioned that the appellants has also filed a written statement on March 1984. The appellants could not file the written statement if they had appeared in their own names, because according to order 30 r. 6 of the Code further proceedings in the suit could continue only in the name of the firm. Consequently, it will have to be ordered on the line mentioned in the decision reported in (International Continental Caoutchous Compagines case (supra) that the written statement filed by the appellant on March 19, 1984 shall be taken off the file and the result would be that it will be treated that there is no written statement in the suit on behalf of the defendants. Any proceedings taken as between the plaintiff and the appellants after the filing of the written statement shall also be treated as a nullity. 14. I may not be understood as saying that that plaintiff cannot implead the appellant as defendant in this suit, if they so want to do, in order to make them liable for any decree by taking resort to section 32(3) of the Partnership Act read with section 72 of the said Act. The plaintiff will be at liberty to implead the appellants as independent defendants apart from as partners of the firm M/s Oswal Metal Industries Nagaur and amend their plaint to make them liable under sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Partnership Act. This order will also not affect the right of the plaintiff to apply under order 30 rule 8(2) C.P.C. to the Additional District Judge for determining whether the appellants were partners of the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and to pass appropriate orders under the said provisions. It would depend on determination of the Additional District Judge under O. 30 r. 8 C.P.C. as to whether the appellants were partners of the firm at any material time or not for the purpose of further determining whether the partnership firm has been duly served or needs fresh service in accordance with Order 30 r. 3 of the Code. 15. All that I have decided by this judgment is that the appellants had appeared in protest denying that they were partners at any material time. It is now for either of the parties to take steps in accordance with law. In the light of the view taken by me, I have ordered that the written statement filed by the appellants must be taken off the file with the result that the suit remained unde-fended by them as partners of the firm. Further I have quashed the further proceedings is between the plaintiff and the appellants taken in the suit on account of the same being a nullity. 16. I allow this first appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge Nagaur dated February 22, 1988 with the above order already mentioned.