JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J. - Appellant Guru Prasad Kushwaha has preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated January 24, 1975 by Sri R.K. Garg, VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur allowing Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1974 and setting aside the judgment and decree and dated November 22, 1973 passed by Sri G.P. Srivastava, III Additional Munsif, Kanpur decreeing the Suit No. 1385 of 1972 arising between Guru Prasad Kushwaha and State of U.P. 2. The controversy in a narrow compass is that the plaintiff was appointed a Peon on May 13, 1970 in the office of the Special Employment Ex-change, for the physically handicapped at Regional Employment Exchange, Kanpur. It is alleged by the respondent that his services were temporary liable to be termination by one month's notice. The services of the plaintiff were terminated w.e.f February 11, 1972. Feeling aggrieved against the such termination of his services in an arbitrary, illegal, and malafide manner, the appellant filed a suit in the court of Munsif City, Kanpur which was transferred to the Court of III Additional Munsif, Kanpur (Suit No. 1385 of 1972 Guru Prasad Kushwaha v. State of U.P.). While working in the said office, plaintiff was served with a letter dated August 20, 1971 issued by Sri K.K. Mehrotra, Deputy Regional Employment Officer to which the appellant submitted reply on August 23, 1971. Again the appellant was issued a letter dated September 8, 1971. The appellant alongwith one Sri Shyam Lal, Sweeper-cum-Chaukidar submitted a joint application on September 14, 1971 to the Regional Employment Officer containing serious allegations against Sri K.K. Mehrotra and the head Clerk for taking private work and monthly illegal gratification from them. An enquiry for the redressal of their grievances was requested. It was also alleged by the appellant that he used to milch the cow of Sri K.K. Mehrotra but after the death of the calf on September 5, 1971, an artificial calf was provided which appellant declined to touch being the hid of the dead animal on account of certain caste restrictions. An application dated September 16, 1971 was submitted accordingly. The appellant against submitted another complaint on September 23, 1971. The appellant further submitted another complaint on October 7, 1971 that he was being harassed by Sri K.K. Mehrotra. An application dated September 16, 1971 was submitted accordingly. The appellant against submitted another complaint on September 23, 1971. The appellant further submitted another complaint on October 7, 1971 that he was being harassed by Sri K.K. Mehrotra. Within a lapse of three days on October 10, 1971, another complaint was made by the appellant against Sri K.K. Mehrotra. The appellant, however, was directed to remain in office on December 29, 1971 for the whole of the day with a direction not to go for distribution of date on that day. On January 7, 1972 the appellant obtained station leave permission availing two days casual leaves i.e., for January 8, 1972 and January 9, 1972. We went to his home at Unnao where was suddenly taken ill and could not resume his duty on January 10, 1972. An application dated January 12, 1972 was sent by the plaintiff for leave. On January 12, 1972 and January 28, 1972, two letters sent by Sri K.K. Mehrotra were served on the plaintiff at Unnao. When the applicant after recovering from illness reported for duty on February 5, 1972 along with medical and fitness certificates, he was not allowed to job his duty and was informed that his services have been terminated, and that the termination order had been sent to his home address. This was received by the appellant on February 11, 1972 at Uanao. The main contention of the plaintiff was that the termination order was illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires. The respondent contested the suit on various grounds denying the allegations of the plaint. The main contention of the respondent was that the plaintiff was appointed purely on a temporary basis and his services were liable to termination by one month's notice. It was also averred that Article 311(2) of the constitution was not applicable to the appellant. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: Whether the termination of the plaintiffs serviced vide order dated February 11, 1972 is illegal and ultra vires on the ground contained in paragraph 26 of the plaint ? Whether the plaintiff s notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is illegal ? To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 3. Necessary evidence on behalf of the parties was adduced. Whether the plaintiff s notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is illegal ? To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 3. Necessary evidence on behalf of the parties was adduced. While deciding issue No. 1, the trial Court held that the impugned termination notice is illegal and ultra vires. As regards issue No. 2 regarding the legality of the notice under Section 80, C.P.C., the trial Court found that the notice is wholly legal. The plaintiffs suit for declaration that the termination order dated February 11,1972 being illegal and ultra vires was decreed and it was declared that the plaintiff is continuing in service with full benefit on the date of the suit. 4. Aggrieved against the judgment and order dated November 29,1973 decreeing the suit, the respondent State of UJP. preferred an appeal to the Court of District Judge (Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1974) which was transferred to the VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur. The lower appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court. The appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court were set aside and dismissing the suit of the appellant with cost of both the courts. 5. Hence the second appeal. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. The learned Counsel for the appellant Sri. A.K. Sharma has very strenuously submitted that the impugned order of termination is mala fide and is a colourable exercise of power. It has been submitted that Shri K.K. Mehrotra, Deputy Regional Employment Officer used to take work privately at his residence from the appellant. Complaints to this effects were made by the appellant against Shri K.K. Mehrotra to the higher authorities and even to the then Finance Minister Sri N.D. Tiwari. The appellant in support of his case besides himself examined three other witnesses who also substantiated the allegations of the plaintiff. Sri K.K. Mehrotra himself appeared as D. W. 1 on behalf of the respondent. No doubt, he denied that any private work was taken from the appellant. D.W. 1 Sri K.K. Mehrotra admitted that some complaints were received from S.P., Unnao. There is no mention of such a complaint by S.P., Unnao to Sri K.K. Mehrotra in the written statement nor such complaint or letter from S.P., Unnao has been filed, 6. No doubt, he denied that any private work was taken from the appellant. D.W. 1 Sri K.K. Mehrotra admitted that some complaints were received from S.P., Unnao. There is no mention of such a complaint by S.P., Unnao to Sri K.K. Mehrotra in the written statement nor such complaint or letter from S.P., Unnao has been filed, 6. However, the fact remains that there was some animus lurking in the mind of Sri K.K. Mehrotra against whom complaints were made by the appellant. The learned Counsel for the respondent has alleged that the termination is not stigmatic but is a termination simpliciter. I am unable to subscribed to the view as advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondent. It has been held time and again that the court has got powers to go behind the notice for passing the termination order which may appear to be simpliciter in nature or innocuous but in otherwise punitive. The surrounding circumstances of the case clearly reveal that Sri K.K. Mehrotra was Unhappy with the appellant and the impugned order of termination is resultant to such annoyance. How-so-ever simpliciter or innocuous the termination order may appear to be the fact remains that Sri K.K. Mehrotra acted with all the promptitude in terminating the services of the appellant. If the appellant was taken ill and came to join duties alongwith a medical certificate of illness and a fitness certificate, there was hardly any occasion for Sri Mehrotra to have passed the impugned order of termination. The haste with which action was taken against the appellant clearly smacks of some prejudice luking in the mind of Sri Mehrotra who in a revengeful or in a fit of annoyance passed the impugned order. It is settled law that the courts have ample power to go behind the motive for passing the termination order which may appear simpliciter in nature but in otherwise punitive with its intent. 7. In the case of Jamail Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1626, it was held that the ad hoc services of the petitioners have been arbitrarily terminated as no longer required while the authorities have retained other surveyors who are Juniors to the petitioners. The court held that the termination of the services of the petitioners is illegal and bad being in contravention of the Fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4 and 15 of the Constitution. 8. The court held that the termination of the services of the petitioners is illegal and bad being in contravention of the Fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4 and 15 of the Constitution. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and another, A.I.R. 1984 S. C. 639, in which it was held: "In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract of the service rules, then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service Is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with." 9. In the case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1974 S. C. 2192. It was held that the form of order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311(2). In such a case the simpliciter in the form of order will not give any sanctity. The order was thus found to be illegal and was set aside. It is thus, well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camou-flage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. Two circumstances are indicative of the fact that the termination of the appellant is not as innocuous or simpliciter as is alleged, firstly, he had made complaints against Sri. K.K. Mehrotra and secondly, some report from S.P., Unnao had been received by Sri K.K. Mehrotra against the appellant. Two circumstances are indicative of the fact that the termination of the appellant is not as innocuous or simpliciter as is alleged, firstly, he had made complaints against Sri. K.K. Mehrotra and secondly, some report from S.P., Unnao had been received by Sri K.K. Mehrotra against the appellant. Case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab was followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 639. The learned Counsel for the appellant has further submitted to fortify his submission that the termination of the appellant is punitive in character and intent Reliance has been placed in the case of Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 1985 (50) F.L.R. 77 and KC. Joshi v. Union of India, 1985 (51) F.L.R. 145. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant Sri A.K. Sharma has strenuously submitted that the right to livelihood which in the case means employment of the petitioner, is also protected by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to livelihood have been recognised as a fundamental rights protected by Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the case of Olga Telis v. Bombay Municipal Board, 1985 (III) S.C.C. 545 , in respect of employees, like the petitioner the right of employment would be protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as his livelihood depends on his continued employment. Such a view has taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Surendra Kumar Shukla v. Union of India, 1985 U.P. Local Bodies and Education cases 789. 11. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to succeed and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellant Court allowing the appeal is hereby set aside and the judgment and the decree of the trial court dated November 29, 1973 decreeing the suit, is hereby affirmed. The respondent is directed to treat the petitioner as continuous in service with full benefits till date. The respondent is further directed to pay the entire amount which has become due to the petitioner within two months from today along with the benefits which have accrued to him.