ORDER D.S. Bajpai, J. - Defendant-applicants have preferred this civil revision under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against judgment and decree dated 28-5-1982 passed by the III Additional District Judge. Lucknow decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-opposite parties for ejectment. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the civil revision are that the opposite parties filed a suit for ejectment and realisation of Rs. 14,696.78 paisa as arrears of rent and damages and Rs. 2,772.80 as interest total Rs. 17,468.78 paise with pendente lite and future mesne profits Rs. 417.96 paise per month and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. The plaint allegations were that the opposite parties were owners of the building known as Halwasiya Court at Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Hazratganj, Lucknow and the defendants-applicants were tenants of the eastern portion of the first floor of the said building on a monthly rent of Rs. 24.37 paise. The rent was collected in the name of petitioner and Anari Devi. This rent became revisable under S. 7 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and a notice was sent and served on applicant No. 1 requiring him to increase the rent that the applicant No. 1 did not increase the rent and insisted on paying the rent at the lower rate where after at the instance of the opposite parties rent was determined by the District Magistrate, Luck now by his order dated 1-7-1976 and fixed at Rs. 387.00 per month plus 8 per cent water tax. The total sum of Rs. 417.96 paise per month. By a registered notice being sent by the opposite parties through their counsel on 13-5-1976 the opposite parties declared upon the applicant to pay the arrears of rent determined by the District Magistrate along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum and also determined the tenancy of the applicants who were required to vacate the disputed premises after expiry of the period of notice. Despite the notice being served on the applicants on 14-5-1979 the applicants paid only a sum of Rs. 4,835.70 paise but did not vacate the premises. This notice was followed by another notice by the opposite parties to the applicants under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 1st February, 1978 by registered post which was duly served on the applicants on 10-2-1978. 4,835.70 paise but did not vacate the premises. This notice was followed by another notice by the opposite parties to the applicants under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 1st February, 1978 by registered post which was duly served on the applicants on 10-2-1978. On the expiry of the period of notice the instant suit was filed and the opposite parties claimed ejectment of the applicants and arrears as aforementioned. An amendment was sought in the plaint allegations and para 2(a) was inserted by which a plea was raised that the building in the tenancy of the applicants was a public building as defined in Sections 2(a) and 3(o) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and in view of the amendments made to the Act with effect from 3rd July, 1976 the provisions of the said Act were not applicable in the case of the building sought to be vacated. The applicants contested the suit and filed a written statement. While admitting the ownership of the opposite parties they alleged that the opposite parties were collecting rent at the rate of Rs. 348.80 paisa per month; that the determination of the rent by the District Magistrate was without jurisdiction and the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim rent at that rate. Certain other pleas were raised including the plea that the notice dated 1-2-1978 under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was defective and vague and did not confer a right on the opposite parties to file the suit. On pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the under noted issues (points) : (1) Whether the defendants are liable to pay the rent @Rs. 348.80 paisa per month as alleged by them or the rent is payable @ Rs. 416.96 paisa per month as alleged by the plaintiffs. (2) Whether the premises in dispute is a public building and is exempted from the operation of the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 as alleged by the plaintiffs. (3) Whether the notices under S. 106 of Transfer of Property Act and S. 80, C.P.C. sent by the plaintiffs are illegal, vague and defective and suit based on these notices is not maintainable as alleged by the defendants. (4) Whether notice dated 1-2-1978 under S. 80, C.P.C. amounts to waiver of premises, (previous?), notice dated 14-9-76 sent by the plaintiffs. (4) Whether notice dated 1-2-1978 under S. 80, C.P.C. amounts to waiver of premises, (previous?), notice dated 14-9-76 sent by the plaintiffs. (5) Whether suit is barred by S. 69 of Indian Partnership Act as alleged by the defendants. (6) To what relief, if any, the plaintiffs are entitled. On appraisal of oral and documentary evidence the trial court returned a finding on point No. 1 holding that the rent payable by the applicants was at the rate of Rs. 348.80 paise per month as held in the court's order dated 1-7-1976. On point No. 2 a finding was returned that the building was a public building as defined in S. 2(a) and 3(o) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 as amended by U.P. Act 28 of 1976. On point No. 3 the learned trial Court held that the notice dated 1-2-1978 under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was legal and valid and the suit on the basis of this notice was maintainable and frame of the suit was not defective. On point No. 4 the learned trial Court was of the view that the notice dated 1-2-1978 under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not amount to waiver of the previous notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Point No. 5 was decided against the applicants. On point No. 6 it was held that in view of the findings recorded on issues 1 to 5 the opposite parties were entitled to a decree for ejectment against the applicants and a further decree for pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 348.80 paisa per month with effect from 1-3-1982 till the date of delivery of possession and as such claim of the opposite parties for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 17,468.78 paisa till the month of February, 1982 was dismissed since it was held that this amount had been paid by the applicants to the opposite parties. It is against this order that the present civil revision has been filed. Even though no civil revision lies against the impugned judgment and decree it being a judgment and decree in a S.C.C. Suit No. 26 of 1978 under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it has been treated as a revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. Even though no civil revision lies against the impugned judgment and decree it being a judgment and decree in a S.C.C. Suit No. 26 of 1978 under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it has been treated as a revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. During the pendency of the civil revision plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 Beni Prasad Halwasiya died and an application was filed by the applicants for substitution of heirs of Beni Prasad Halwasiya being Civil Misc. Application No. 268(M) of 1985. Another application was filed being Civil Misc. Application No. 165(M) of 1985 to the effect that the opposite parties by a registered gift- deed dated 10-1-1985 gifted first floor of the building known as Halwasiya Court, Lucknow, a portion of which was in the occupation of the applicants to a registered charitable trust "Halwasiya Foundation" and belonged to the said trust and as such leave be granted to the trust to contest the revision after substituting the name of the trust in place of the opposite parties. These applications were left to be decided at the time of hearing of the civil revision. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and in modification of the order dated 16-9-1985. I direct that the names of the applicants of C. M. Application No. 165(M) of 1985 be substituted in place of the names of the opposite parties 1 and 2 which are ordered to be scored out since undisputedly the heirs of opposite party No. 1 have admittedly no interest in the said premises as stated by the proposed heirs of deceased opposite party No. 1, Beni Prasad Halwasiya in their objection dated 26-8-1985 wherein they, inter alia, stated "that the applicants have no interest in the property in question and have no objection for the substitution of Halwasiya Foundation as party in the above revision in place of Sri B. P. Halwasiya." 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment of the learned trial court. The learned Standing Counsel contended that the Court below erred in law in holding that the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was legal and valid entitling the opposite parties to institute the suit before the learned trial court. The learned Standing Counsel contended that the Court below erred in law in holding that the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was legal and valid entitling the opposite parties to institute the suit before the learned trial court. The contention in a nut-shell is that since the said notice had been served in the name of Beni Prasad Anari Devi and the suit was filed in the name of Beni Prasad Halwasiya and Smt. Anari Devi Halwasiya as plaintiffs who have been arrayed as opposite parties in the revision the notice was not a legal and valid notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on the case of S.N. Dutt v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1449 , in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on consideration of the facts before the Court that the person giving the notice was not identifiable as plaintiff. In that case the facts were that S. N. Dutt was the sole proprietor of the business known as S. N. Dutt & Co. and carried on business under that name and style. The said business was dealing with supplies to the Railways. Before filing a suit against the Railways S. N. Dutt & Co. served two notices on the defendants in the suit under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A plea was taken that S. N. Dutt & Co. was not entitled to maintain the suit on the basis of these notices since they were defective and they had been issued by Messrs. S. N. Dutt & Co. and not on behalf of the plaintiff S. N. Dutt. The contention was upheld by the trial court. In appeal the High Court agreed with Subordinate Judge and held that the notice was defective. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered whether the notice complied with the provisions of S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. and not on behalf of the plaintiff S. N. Dutt. The contention was upheld by the trial court. In appeal the High Court agreed with Subordinate Judge and held that the notice was defective. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered whether the notice complied with the provisions of S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships held : "The defect in the present case is in regard to the name, it being not disputed that there is no other defect in the notice; and the question that arises is whether the defect in names makes the notices ineffective and therefore the suit becomes not maintainable in view of the bar of S. 80." On examination of notices the court held that since the notices were in the name of Messrs. S. N. Dutt & Co. while the suit was filed by S. N. Dutt claiming to be the sole proprietor of S. N. Dutt & Co. the person filing the suit was the same who had given the notice it did not reach to the conclusion that it was S. N. Dutt who was carrying on his business merely in the name and style of S. N. Dutt & Co. and as such the notice was held to be defective on the basis of which the suit could be filed. 4. In the case in hand the opposite parties filed copy of registration of the partnership firm M/s. Beni Prasad Anari Devi' as also particulars of the said firm which indicated that Beni Prasad Halwasiya and Anari Devi Halwasiya were partners of the aforesaid firm. These documents were not disputed and indicated that the firm was a registered partnership firm of which the opposite parties were the only two partners. Even otherwise it would appear that the rent was duly paid to this partnership firm of which the opposite parties were the only partners. On this basis the learned counsel for the opposite parties has contended that a suit could be filed either in the name of the firm or in the names of the partners of the firm and-the suit could not be held to have been improperly instituted if it is brought in the name of one of the partners of the registered firm. He placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Purushottam Umedbhai and Co. He placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Purushottam Umedbhai and Co. v. M/s. Manilal and Sons, AIR 1961 SC 325 , in which their Lordships have held while interpreting the provisions of 0. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure as under: "It is clear, therefore, that the provisions of O. XXX, R. I and R. 2 are enabling provisions to permit several persons who are doing business as partners to sue or be sued in the name of the firm. Rule 2 would not have been in the form it is if the suit instituted in the name of the firm was not regarded as, in fact, a suit by the partners of the firm. The provisions of these rules of O. XXX being enabling provisions, do not prevent the partners of a firm from suing or being sued in their individual names. These rules also do not prohibit the partners of a firm suing in India in their names individually although they may be doing business outside India." Learned counsel for opposite parties also placed reliance on a decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Kuver Bank Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 Cal 81 , in which it has been held : "A plaintiff bringing a suit against a firm may implead all the members of the firm as defendants in that suit and conversely, the members of a firm can sue jointly in their individual names. Such a suit will none the less be a suit against the firm or by the firm. As I have indicated already, the name of the firm is only a compendious description of the' partners in reference to the common interest which they possess in a certain concern and when the firm is arrayed as a defendant, all the partners should be deemed to be in that array of the defendants in their capacity as partners." A similar view has been taken by this Court in the under noted cases :- (1) M.S. Pearl Sound Engineer v. M/s. Pooran Chand, AIR 1975 All 207 ; (2) Yadav Ram v. Laxman Singh, AIR 1978 All 123 . On an examination of the cases aforementioned the irresistible conclusion is that the suit filed on the basis of the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 1-2-1978 was maintainable and there is no error of law much less error of jurisdiction in the judgment of the learned trial court on this point. 5. The second contention of the learned Standing Counsel was that the premises in dispute cannot be said to be a public premises under the provisions of Section 2(a) and Section 3(o) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The said Act defines 'public building' in Section 3(o) as under : "3(o) "Public building", means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation." Admittedly the building in dispute from which the applicants are sought to be evicted was a building taken on lease by the State Government for the office of the Registrar Co-operative Societies and as such would fall within the definition of `public building' under Section 3(o) of the Act. By provisions of Section 2(1) which is as under :- "2. Exemptions from operation of Act : - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to - (a) any public building;....." There is an exception in regard to the operation of the Act so far as public building is concerned. This provision has been added by Section 2 of U.P. Act 28 of 1976 to U.P. Act 13 of 1972 with effect from 5-7-1976 and the suit having been filed in the year 1978 cannot be disputed much less canvassed that the Court below erred in recording a finding that the building in dispute was a public building. 6. The learned Standing Counsel also emphatically urged that the notice dated 1-2-1978 under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure amounted to waiver of notice dated 14-9-1976. The object of a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is entirely different from a notice served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. The learned Standing Counsel also emphatically urged that the notice dated 1-2-1978 under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure amounted to waiver of notice dated 14-9-1976. The object of a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is entirely different from a notice served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only meant to give the concerned Government or public Officer an opportunity to consider the legal aspects of the matter and settle the claim outside the court without involving the State or the public Officer in litigation and it cannot be said that subsequent notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be tantamount to waiver of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. The learned Standing Counsel also tried to assail the decree of the learned trial court by which the applicants were to pay pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 348.80 paisa per month from 1-3-1982 till the date of delivery of possession on payment of requisite court fee. The scope of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is in the following terms :- "25. Revision of decrees and orders of Court of Small Causes - The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit." Needless to say that the decree so passed in accordance with law on proved facts cannot be interfered by this Court. 8. The plea regarding the suit being barred by the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act has not been pressed before me as before the learned trial Court and does not call for any observations. 9. In the result the civil revision being devoid of merits fails and is dismissed with costs throughout and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court decreeing S.C.C. Suit No. 26 of 1978 are affirmed.