JUDGMENT A.N. VARMA, J. 1. THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment of the defendant respondent from a portion of a bhumidhari Plot No. 142 as well as for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. Both the courts below have dismissed the suit. Hence this Second Appeal. 2. THE facts relevant for the decision of this appeal lie within a narrow compass. THE appellants were bhumidhars of the aforesaid plots, a portion of which was let out by them to the defendant on a monthly rental of Rs. 30/- under a lease executed on 18-9-1972. THE case of the plaintiff is that defendant fell in arrears whereupon they sent a combined notice demanding the arrears as well as possession of the leased land. On the failure of the defendant to comply with the notice the present suit was brought. THE defence was that by operation of sections 156 and 165 of the UP ZA and LR Act (the Act for short hereafter) he became sirdar of the disputed land and subsequently in consequence of the legislative changes made in these and other related provisions he became its bhumidhar. Both the courts below accepted the plea of the defendant respondent and dismissed the suit. Sri B. B. Paul, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted two points for my consideration in support of this appeal. First, that the view taken by the court below that the rights and interest of the plaintiffs extinguished automatically by operation of law is unsustainable and, second that in any case in view of the finding of the trial court that the suit was not triable by the civil court, the plaint ought to have been returned to the plaintiffs for being presented to the court of competent jurisdiction, namely, the Revenue Courts. 3. I find no merit in either of these two contentions. I shall take up the first point first. In order to appreciate it, it will be necessary to have a look at the scheme of the aforesaid enactment. Section 156 provides that no bhumidhar, sirdar or asami shall let out for any period whatsoever any land comprised in his holding except in the cases provided for in section 157 or to a recognised educational institution for a purpose connected with instruction in agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry. Section 156 provides that no bhumidhar, sirdar or asami shall let out for any period whatsoever any land comprised in his holding except in the cases provided for in section 157 or to a recognised educational institution for a purpose connected with instruction in agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry. It was not disputed that the present case is not covered by the exceptions referred to hereinabove. 4. THE next relevant provision is section 165 of the Act which as it stood on the date of letting lays down:- "165. Effects of lease in contravention of section 157:-When a bhumidhar other than one referred to in section 157 has let out his holding or any part thereof the lessee will, notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract or document of lease, become and be deemed to be- (a) where the total area of the land held by him together with the land held by his family, including the land, if any, let out to him or any member of his family does not exceed twelve and a half acres, sirdar thereof, and (b) where the total area as aforesaid exceeds (twelve and a half acres), a purchaser thereof and the provisions of sections 154 and 163 shall mutatis mutandis apply." This provision was amended by U. P. Act No. 8 of 1977 (w. e. f. 28-1-1977) in substance the change that was brought out by this amendment was that where a bhumidhar lets out his holding or any part thereof in contravention of the provisions of Section 156, the lessee shall become and be deemed to be a bhumidhar. Prior to this amendment the lessee acquired the rights of only a sirdar. A plain reading of the provisions noticed above leaves no manner of doubt that if a bhumidhar lets out his holding in contravention of Section 156, the lessee automatically became a sirdar under section 165 (as it stood until its amendment in 1977). And after the introduction of the amendment made by the U. P. Act No. 8 of 1977 the effect of such letting would be that the lessee shall notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract or document of lease, become and deemed to be bhumidhar with non transferable rights. This consequence flows automatically by the mere act of letting of the holding by a bhumidhar by a simple operation of law. This consequence flows automatically by the mere act of letting of the holding by a bhumidhar by a simple operation of law. On this there seems to be no divergence of opinion. 5. THAT being so it seems axiomatic that the defendant first became sirdar and subsequently w. e. f. 28-1-77 bhumidhar of the disputed land not liable to be evicted therefrom at the instance of the lessor. Upon this ground alone and without more the suit of the plaintiff appellants was liable to be dismissed. 6. THAT brings me to the question whether the extinction of the rights and interest of the bhumidhar upon letting out his holding or a part thereof is automatic. Learned counsel for the appellant cited few decisions, namely, Anant Ram v. Sheikh Mohammad Ishaq, 1981 RD 340, Parmananad v. Board of Revenue, 1966 RD 177 and an unreported decision Abdul Gaffar v. Board of Revenue, W. P. No. 5639 of 1974 decided on 19-1-1978 in support of his contention that there is no automatic extinction of the rights of a bhumidhar upon his letting out land in contravention of section 156. To my mind, having regard to the scope of the instant suit and the relief claimed therein it is unnecessary to enter into this question, though in my opinion, in view of the language of clause (aa) of section 189, which is explicit and unambiguous, it is impossible to accept that the interest of a bhumidaar shall not automatically extinguish upon his letting out his holding or part thereof. The aforesaid provision lays down unambiguously that the interest of a bhumidhar extinguishes if he lets out his holding or part thereof. 7. AT any rate the instant suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the defendant had lawfully acquired sirdari rights in the disputed land, irrespective of whether or not there was an automatic extinction of the rights of the plaintiffs by their letting out a part of their holding to the defendant. There can, in my view, be no scope for controversy that the defendant did in terms of section 165 become sirdar of the disputed land as a direct result of the letting out of the land in his favour. 8. There can, in my view, be no scope for controversy that the defendant did in terms of section 165 become sirdar of the disputed land as a direct result of the letting out of the land in his favour. 8. THAT being so, the suit of the plaintiff appellant was rightly dismissed as under the scheme of the enactment the defendant as a sirdar or bhumidhar could not be legally ejected at the instance of the plaintiff. This brings me to the second question, namely, whether the courts below committed any error in not directing the return of the plaint. The question must unhesitatingly be answered in the negative. It may be remembered that the plea of the bar of jurisdiction was raised by the defendant and not by the plaintiff. Further, neither the defendant nor the plaintiff pressed that plea before the lower, appellate court as is apparent from a reading of the judgment. That being so, in view of the provisions of clause (1-A) of Section 331 of the aforesaid Act, the plea sought to be raised by the appellant in the second appeal cannot be entertained. Section 331 (1-A) incorporates the principles of waiver. Indeed it engrafts an exception to the general rule that consent cannot confer jurisdiction. That is the normal rule. But under section 331 the legislature has provided that where an objection as to the jurisdiction is not raised in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity then unless there has been a consequent failure of justice, the same shall not be entertained in appeal or revision. That being so, the plaintiff having failed to press the issue either before the trial court or even before the lower appellate court and the learned counsel having failed to demonstrate that by the trial of the suit by the civil court there has been any consequent failure of justice, the objection as to the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be entertained. 9. NO other point was urged in support of this appeal. 10. IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.