S. K. MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revisional application, moved on behalf of the defendants in a Suit for eviction, is directed against Order No. 64, dated 8th of June, 1983 passed by the Learned Judge, 6th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, in Ejectment Suit No. 326 of 1977. By the impugned Order the Learned Judge allowed the prayer for amendment of the plaintiff made on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party. ( 2 ) THE Suit was fixed by the husband of the present plaintiff/opposite eviction of the defendants on the grounds of sub-letting and reasonable requirement of the then plaintiff and the members of his family including the present plaintiff, his widow. The original plaintiff died on 25th September, 1979 and an application at the instance of the present plaintiff under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was allowed on 9th of June, 1980. In the said application, it was stated on behalf of the present plaintiff that by a Deed of Gift executed on 17th of September, 1979 by her husband, the original plaintiff, she had become the sole and absolute owner of the Suit premises. On or about 27th January, 1983 on behalf of the substituted plaintiff an application for amendment of the plaint was filed seeking in substance to adopt for herself the ground of reasonable requirement as pleaded originally in the Plaint by her husband and also for bringing certain subsequent developments on record. By the impugned Order the Learned Judge allowed the said amendment and the tenants/defendants have moved the instant Revisional Application. ( 3 ) MR. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, appearing in support of. the Revisional Application, has strongly contended that the plaintiff having become the sole landlord on the strength of a Deed of Gift was not entitled to pray for any decree under Clause (ff) of Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in view of the bar created by Sub-section (3a) of the said Section. According to Mr. the Revisional Application, has strongly contended that the plaintiff having become the sole landlord on the strength of a Deed of Gift was not entitled to pray for any decree under Clause (ff) of Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in view of the bar created by Sub-section (3a) of the said Section. According to Mr. Banerjee, on the basis of the settled principle of Law, the present plaintiff was not entitled to an amendment of the Plaint to obtain a relief for the said purpose as the Suit on the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation would not be maintainable till after the expiry of three years from the date of transfers and an amendment, if allowed, would relate back to the date of institution of the Suit covering the period during which bar under sub-section (3a) operated. This, according to Mr. Banerjee, would result in encouraging circumvention of a statutory bar, condemned by this Hon'ble Court. Mr. Banerjee in support of his aforesaid contention has relied on the decisions reported in 86 CWN 841, AIR 1985 Calcutta 218, 88 CWN 379. Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, appearing on behalf the plaintiff/opposite party, however, has endeavoured to distinguish the aforesaid decisions on facts. According to him, the ground of reasonable requirement under Clause (ff) was already there in the Original Plaint including the requirement of the present plaintiff as the wife of the then landlord/plaintiff and, as such, the proposed amendment, does not introduce any new cause of action or alter or vary any existing cause of action. According to Mr. Roy, the principles laid down in the cases cited by Mr. Banerjee had been so laid taking into consideration the mala fides of the plaintiffs, who tried to circumvent the statutory bar by amendment. According to Mr. Roy, the principles laid down in the cases cited by Mr. Banerjee had been so laid taking into consideration the mala fides of the plaintiffs, who tried to circumvent the statutory bar by amendment. ( 4 ) SUB-SECTION (3a) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Praises Tenancy Act reads as follows:" (3a) Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no Suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in Clause (f) or Clause (5) of sub-section (1) shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest;" ( 5 ) THE language of the said sub-section clearly indicates that the Legislature intended to prevent institution of a Suit on the grounds of Clauses (f) and (ff) at the instance of a transferee landlord before expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest. The main object and primary intention of legislature appear to be to prevent eviction of a tenant on the said grounds by enabling a transfer of landlord, who himself is not able to prove his case for a decree under the aforesaid Clauses, by taking recourse to a device of transfer in favour of another person, who may be in a position to prove the necessary case as required for a decree under the said Clauses, immediately on transfer in favour of the latter. Such intention of the legislature would not require and would not justify that the said sub-section should be extended to cases where in a pending Suit the requirement of the transferee, whose interest intervenes, has already been pleaded and the requisite period of three years has already expired. Any other construction would be inconsistant with the well-known principle of interpretation, namely, that a Court must always avoid multiplicity of litigation and defeat of genuine and bona fide claims of litigants without whittling down the protection afforded to the tenants. In the instant case, the present plaintiff, the wife-donee of the erstwhile plaintiff, has every right to institute an independent Suit immediately as the requisite period of three years has already expired. Her requirement had already been pleaded in the pending Suit as one of the family members of the erstwhile landlord. In the instant case, the present plaintiff, the wife-donee of the erstwhile plaintiff, has every right to institute an independent Suit immediately as the requisite period of three years has already expired. Her requirement had already been pleaded in the pending Suit as one of the family members of the erstwhile landlord. As a successor in interest of the said erstwhile landlord she becomes entitled to proceed with the Suit and proceed with it on grounds, inter alia, of her own reasonable requirement and in my view such a Suit, in the context of the expiry of three years from the date of transfer or acquisition of title, would not be hit by sub-section (3a), I have reached the above conclusion on the lines of the Supreme Court decision in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan reported in AIR 1975 SC 1 ,146. My view is also supported to a great extent by the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of A. K, Mukherjee v. Prodip Ranjan Sarbadhikary and Others reported in 1987 (II) C. L. J. 220 (229 ). ( 6 ) THE cases cited by Mr. Banerjee and noted by me above are distinguishable on facts and also on the points raised and decided therein and they do not touch the instant case or affect the same or apply to it and in that connection to need only state that, in the instant case, the present plaintiff's requirement, pleaded by the original plaintiff in his original Plaint, was of a secondary nature, that is, only in aid of the original plaintiff's claim on that ground, as the present plaintiff had, at that time, no immediate or independent right to institute or maintain the Suit, but this requirement became primary when the present plaintiff, on the death of the original plaintiff, became entitled to maintain and continue the Suit as the transferee pendente lite and it assumed the character of an independent ground for her claim for ejectment necessitating the amendment of the plaint. ( 7 ) IN the above background the amendment would be perfectly bona fide and obviously necessary to do justice between the parties and to put an end to the controversies between them and to prevent multiplicity or purposeless proliferation of proceedings and, the amendment being made, the Suit, on this amended plaint, would be deemed to be instituted on the date of amendment, thus avoiding the three years' bar of sub-section (3a) its earlier institution being, in the aforesaid context, irrelevant and liable to be ignored. ( 8 ) WHAT has been stated above would be sufficient to take the present case out of the mischief of the above two decisions (supra) where there were patent findings of bona fide and deliberate attempt to avoid and circumvent the Statute, the ground in question being available to the plaint' in question, at the date of institution of the Original Suits but kept reserved for timely and convenient use at a later date with the ulterior object of avoiding this statutory bar and to bring it within the 'humane and benevolent dictum (mandate) of the Supreme Court in B. Banerjee's case AIR 1975 SC 1 146 (supra) of doing justice - 'promoting public justice and social gain' - without doing violence to the language of the statute or whittling down its provisions and permitting 'the man in the law to influence the law in the man'. ( 9 ) IN the premises, there is no question of interfering with the Order of the Court below either on merit or in the exercise of my discretion. The Rule, therefore, fails and is discharged though in the circumstances of the case, I will make no Order as to cost. ( 10 ) LET the records of the Court below be sent down forthwith by a Special Messenger at the cost of the opposite party and such cost be put in by Tuesday. Rule discharged.