JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Sirohi dated 28th March, 1989, dismissing the appeal of the defendant-appellant against the judgment of the learned Munsif, Abu Road, decreeing the suit for ejectment. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus:- 2. On October 1, 1973, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant-appellant on the ground of default and reasonable and bonafide necessity with the allegations, in short, that the premises and the adjoining portion situated at Abu Road (of a building) have been purchased by her through a registered sale-deed from the previous owner Smt. Chandrakala, for the residence of her family. She is presently residing with her father-in-law in a small out-house of the Palace Hotel, Abu Road and it is not possible to continue to live in it. The defendant filed his written statement, seriously contesting the suit. After framing necessary issues and recording evidence of the parties, the trial Court decreed the suit by its judgment dated April 26, 1975. The defendant preferred an appeal. It was allowed and the suit was remanded to incorporate necessary averments regarding comparative hardship and partial eviction as required under Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be called as 'the Act') by the learned Additional District Judge, Sirohi by his judgment dated January 27, 1977. Second appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against this judgment and it was dismissed by this Court on August 21, 1980. The plaintiff amended her plaint. The defendant filed his supplementary written-statement. Additional issues on comparative hardship and partial eviction were framed. The parties pronounced their additional evidence. After hearing them, the suit was again decreed by the learned Munsif by his judgment dated October 3, 1983, holding that the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of her family, she would suffer greater hardship if the suit for ejectment is not decreed and there is no question of partial eviction. The defendant preferred an appeal and it was dismissed by the learned District Judge by his judgment dated March 28, 1989, which has been challenged in thus second appeal. 3. The defendant preferred an appeal and it was dismissed by the learned District Judge by his judgment dated March 28, 1989, which has been challenged in thus second appeal. 3. It may be mentioned here that the house purchased by the plaintiff through registered sale-deed from Smt. Chandrakala consists of two portions. One portion consisting of one room, one kitchen, one verandah, one bath room and latrine is in occupation and possession of the defendant-appellant and similar other portion was in occupation of Ramjan. A suit for ejectment was also filed against Ramjan on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. It was decreed and Ramjan gave its actual and physical possession during the pendency of the present litigation. It is clearly stated in para 2AA of the plaint that the portion vacated by Ramjan is very small, goods have been stored in it and the plaintiff cannot reside in it with her family. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned District Judge has seriously erred to hold beyond the pleadings that the portion of the house purchased by the plaintiff and vacated by Ramjan is in dilapidated condition and it cannot thus be occupied. He urged that no amount of evidence can be looked upon a plea which has not been put forward. He relied upon AIR 1953 Supreme Court 235, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2179 and 1986(3) J.S. 371 (Raj.). It may be mentioned here that in the cross-examination dated March 22, 1983, the plaintiff's husband. Chouga Singh, PW.1 disclosed that this portion of the house is in a dilapidated condition. The amended plaint was filed on October 4, 1980. This portion became dilapidated after this date. It is well settled law that subsequent events may be taken into consideration. 5. Even ignoring the said statement and finding about the dilapidated nature of the portion, the result remains the same. The finding of reasonable and bonafide necessity in respect of the suit house recorded by the first appellate Court is not solely based on this finding of dilapidated nature of the portion vacated by Ramjan. It is admitted by the defendant in his written-statement dated November 14, 1982 that the portion vacated by Ramjan is lying vacant. It is the defendant's case that the plaintiff is still living with her family in an out-house of Palace Hotel (Bikaner House). It is admitted by the defendant in his written-statement dated November 14, 1982 that the portion vacated by Ramjan is lying vacant. It is the defendant's case that the plaintiff is still living with her family in an out-house of Palace Hotel (Bikaner House). If the portion vacated by Ramjan would have been adequate, the plaintiff would not have kept it vacant. She would have shifted in it and would not have continued to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month to Ratan Sindhi for his house in her tenancy and occupation. Her case is that goods and articles have been stored in it. This portion consists of only one room, one verandah, one kitchen, bath room and latrine. The plaintiff's family is a growing family and it consists of six members i.e. plaintiff, her husband and four children including two sons. 6. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants that the lower Courts have seriously erred to hold that the plaintiff is residing in Ratan Sindhi's house despite the fact that neither rent note nor any receipt was filed. The defendant's case is that the plaintiff is still living with her family in out-house of the Palace Hotel (Bikaner House) where her father-in-law was serving. Admittedly, her father-in-law has died long ago. The plaintiff has examined Ratan Sindhi as PW6. He has categorically stated on oath that the plaintiff is living with her family in his house as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. Adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to prove a fact cannot be agitated in second appeal. Reference to AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1933 may be made here. The learned District Judge has rightly observed that it is of no material bearing whether the plaintiff is living in Ratan Sindhi's house or in an out-house (Bikaner House). Undisputedly, she is living in a small rented house. 7. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the first appellate Court has not considered the statements of the defendant-appellant's witnesses. There is no substance in it. Bishan Das DW 1 is a postman and was produced to prove that the rent was sent by Money Order. 7. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the first appellate Court has not considered the statements of the defendant-appellant's witnesses. There is no substance in it. Bishan Das DW 1 is a postman and was produced to prove that the rent was sent by Money Order. Vijay Singh, DW 2 (also DW5) has deposed that one Dan Singh, teacher told him that plaintiff's husband Chouga Singh is living in an out house of Place Hotel (Bikaner House). Vishambhar Lal, DW 4 has deposed that the plaintiff lives in an outhouse of Palace Hotel (BIkaner House). The defendant Mehmood examined himself as DW3. It is not correct that the defendant's evidence was not considered. At the risk of repetition, it may be mentioned here that the learned District Judge has observed that it is of no material bearing whether the plaintiff is residing in Ratan Sindhi's house or in an outhouse of Palace Hotel (Bikaner House). Undisputedly, she is living in a small rented house. 8. There is also no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the judgment of the first appellate Court is not in accordance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC. He relied upon AIR 1951 Patna 502, 1953 RLW 512 and AIR 1985 Bombay 98. It has dealt with all the points which were agitated before it and reasons have been given in support of each finding which were given by the trial Court when it was agreeing with the findings of the trial Court. 9. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the lower Courts have seriously erred in not raising an adverse inference against the plaintiff on account of her not coming in the witness box in support of her case for reasonable and bonafide necessity. This contention is also devoid of force. Chhoga Singh, PW1 has categorically stated on oath that the house has been purchased by him in the name of his wife Laxmi Devi (plaintiff). It is not in dispute that Laxmi Devi and Chhoga Singh are living together along with their children. No suggestion was put in the cross-examination of Chhoga Singh PW1 as to why his wife Laxmi Devi did not come in the witness box. It is not in dispute that Laxmi Devi and Chhoga Singh are living together along with their children. No suggestion was put in the cross-examination of Chhoga Singh PW1 as to why his wife Laxmi Devi did not come in the witness box. It has been held in 1986 RLW 523 that it is not necessary for the landlord to come in the witness box to tell about her reasonable and bonafide necessity. 10. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the defendant has large family and he will be put to greater hardship if he is evicted from the suit premises. There is no great force in this contention. It has been observed in famous case of Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, ( AIR 1979 SC 272 at page 278, para 19) , as follows:- "It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and it was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiff's decree for eviction." 11. It is well proved from the evidence on record that the plaintiff purchased the suit premises and the adjoining portion for the residence of her family. This fact is specifically mentioned in the notice for ejectment Ex. 1 dated July 31, 1973. The suit for rent and ejectment was filed as early as on October 1, 1973 and since then the plaintiff is seriously prosecuting it. During the period of 16 years, her children have grown up considerably, two sons have attained the marriageable age and her need has considerably increased. Admittedly, the defendant was previously residing at Ahmadabad, and now he is residing at Hyderabad for several years. His family is residing in the suit premises. It is not his case that he is not getting a suitable accommodation at Hyderabad for the residence of his family. 12. It has been held in Majhoo Lal v. Radheylal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1991 , that the finding that the premises is reasonably and bonafide required is a finding of fact and it is not open for challenge in second appeal. 12. It has been held in Majhoo Lal v. Radheylal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1991 , that the finding that the premises is reasonably and bonafide required is a finding of fact and it is not open for challenge in second appeal. Reference to AIR 1988 Supreme Court 396 and AIR 1982 Supreme Court 679 may also be made here. It has also been held in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29 and 1979 RLW 226 that the finding on comparative hardship is a finding of fact and it cannot be disturbed in second appeal. Thus, there is no force in the second appeal. 13. The second appeal is summarily dismissed with costs. 14. The defendant is given two months' time to vacate the suit premises and to deliver its actual and physical possession to the plaintiff provided he furnished the usual undertaking that he will not part with the possession and he will pay the entire decretal amount, costs and mesne profits upto date within a month from today.Appeal dismissed. *******