JUDGMENT N. N. Mithal, J. 1. Against an order granting succession certificate to the respondent no. 1, the present appeal has been filed . 2. The dispute releates to the estate of Smt. Shakuntala Nigam who was the real sister of the appellant. Respondent no. 1 is the husband of the deceased Shakuntala Nigam while respondent no. 2 is his brother. The deceased was married to respondent no. 1 on 30th April, 1983 and she died on 11th May, 1984 due to burn injuries. She was employed in the Sales Tax Department of the Government of U. P. since 1979 and had a Group Insurance and a Provident Fund Account. A nomination was made by her on 24th November, 1983 in favour of the appellant. On the death of Smt. Shakuntala Nigam, her husband obtained an Estate Duty Certificate and her Death Certificate and applied for grant of succession certificate. Although the appellant was not initially impleaded in the proceedings she was allowed to intervene at her instance and she contested the claim. The court below has granted the certificate to respondent no. 1 being the only heir of the deceased. 3. Sri S. M. Dayal, learned counsel for the appellant, has assailed the findings of the court below on the ground that as a nominee of the deceased, the appellant was entitled to the amounts in question. The submission of the learned counsel was that as a nominee, the appellant was the only person competent to receive the money and the defendants could lay no claim to the same. The submission of the learned counsel, however, does not appear to be sound particularly in view of the Full Bench Decision of this court in Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad, 1971 AWR 785 in which section 39 of the Insurance Act came up for interpretation and after considering the various provisions, the Bench held :- "(1) The Policy holder continues to hold interest in the Policy till the moment of his death. (2) The nominee under Section 39 acquires no interest in the Policy in the life time of the Policy holder. (3) The benefit secured by the policy forms part of the estate of the deceased policy holder. 4. (2) The nominee under Section 39 acquires no interest in the Policy in the life time of the Policy holder. (3) The benefit secured by the policy forms part of the estate of the deceased policy holder. 4. The Bench also held that the nomination does not create a trust in favour of the nominee and they do not have any vested interest in the estate of the deceased. The view expressed by this Court was later on approved by the Supreme Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi v. Smt. Usha Devi, 1984 AWC 133 SC Expressing its opinion on the true purport of Section 39, the Supreme Court held that the policy holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his life time and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the life time of the Policy holder. It was further held that on the death of Policy holder, the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. The Court rejected the submission that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is some times styled as 'statutory testament'. To further enforce its argument, the Court observed that the Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their right in the amount payable under a Life Insurance Policy. Yet the Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment in the Act. In such a situation unless there is a strong and compelling reason to hold that all those decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. That being the position of law as regards the rule of nominee, it is difficult to accept the submission made by Sri Dayal in support of the appeal. The appellant is not claiming any right except as a nominee which right only entitles her to receive the amount initially in order to give effective discharge to the insurer. However, it does not deprive the real heir of his right in the estate left by the deceased. In between the two, therefore, only the respondent no. I has a right to the estate. 5. However, it does not deprive the real heir of his right in the estate left by the deceased. In between the two, therefore, only the respondent no. I has a right to the estate. 5. An effort was made to urge that there is a difference between a nomination under Section 39 and the right that accrues under the Provident Funds Act, 1925. Here again the learned counsel seems to be wrong. In fact prior to the 1946 amendment, Section 5 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925 conferred an absolute right to claim the money on the nominee. However, after the amendment, there has been a material alteration in the position and now the nominee only has a right to receive the money. Therefore, the position has materially changed since 1946. A similar question came up for consideration before the ANdhra Pradesh High Court in Sheikh Dawood v. Mahmooda Begum, AIR 1985 AP 321 , and it was held in that case that in the case of Provident Fund Accounts also the same principles as were laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi's case, 1984 AWC 133 SC would be applicable. In that case, the Division Bench considered a large number of eases on the point and thereafter had concluded as under : (1) The nominee of a provident fund has only the exclusive right to receive the fund. His rights are the same as that of a nominee under section 39 of the Insurance Act. (2) The provident fund remains the property of the deceased subscriber and is available for distribution amongst his heirs in accordance with their personal law. 6. The Supreme Court decision in 1984 AWC 133 SC governs the nominations made in respect of provident fund as well. Sri P. N. Khare appearing for the respondents, however, wanted to rely upon a decision of this Court in support of his submission. The case Dinesh Chandra Saxena v. State of U. P., 1988 AWC 584 , however, is of very little help to the respondents. Although it was a case concerning Group Insurance as in the instant case, but the dispute there was entirely different and related to the effect of nomination made in favour of the mother to the exclusion of the wife without assigning any reason. In the instant case, we are not at all concerned with that aspect. 7. Although it was a case concerning Group Insurance as in the instant case, but the dispute there was entirely different and related to the effect of nomination made in favour of the mother to the exclusion of the wife without assigning any reason. In the instant case, we are not at all concerned with that aspect. 7. Therefore, in view of what has been said above, I find no merit at all in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.