Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner during the year 1981 was working as Sub-Inspector of Police in charge of the Anthikad Police Station, in Trichur District. 2. While controlling the traffic at Kanjani junction, within the jurisdiction of the Anthikad Police Station, on 29-11-1981 at about 7-30 p.m. the revision petitioner, on seeing the respondent riding a scooter in a rash and negligent manner, wanted him to stop the scooter. The respondent disobeyed the signal and this resulted in the petitioner arresting him on the same day. The petitioner later released the respondent on bail. Subsequently he filed a charge sheet (the charges coming under S.279 I.P.C., S.51(A) of the Kerala Police Act, 1960, S.112 of the Motor Vehicles Act and R.386 and 36(1) and (2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules before the Additional Judicial Second Class Magistrate of Trichur. The case was taken on to file by the Magistrate. The Magistrate after trial acquitted the respondent, giving him the benefit of doubt. 3. The respondent thereupon instituted the suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The petitioner in his defence raised a contention that the suit is barred by limitation in view of the provisions contained in S.64 of the Police Act and hence not maintainable. The issue struck in this connection reads:- "Whether the suit is maintainable?" This issue has been disposed of in favour of the respondent by the order under challenge. 4. The controversy centres round the question as to the date from which the period of limitation for the suit begins to run. The counsel for the respondent argues that since the action being one for malicious prosecution, the question as to whether the same is barred by limitation requires to be considered under Art.74 of the Limitation Act. This Article provides that an action or compensation for malicious prosecution shall be initiated within one year from the date on which the plaintiff was acquitted or the prosecution was otherwise terminated. If that be so, the counsel argues, the suit initiated within one year of the order acquitting him by the Magistrate is not barred by limitation. On the other hand, the counsel for the petitioner contends that in order to maintain the suit the same shall be filed within six months of the date on which the offence or the wrong is alleged to have been committed or done. On the other hand, the counsel for the petitioner contends that in order to maintain the suit the same shall be filed within six months of the date on which the offence or the wrong is alleged to have been committed or done. The learned counsel therefore argues that the suit, filed after the expiry of six months of the date on which the alleged wrong was committed, is barred by limitation. 5. The question thus arising for consideration is, "is the suit admittedly filed after six months of the date on which the wrong alleged to have been done, is barred by limitation?". The answer depends upon the construction of S.64 of the Police Act read with S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. 6. Before we go into this aspect, it is relevant to note that the Police Act, the provisions of which have come up for construction, is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the police force in the State of Kerala. The fundamental principle that should be borne in mind while construing the provisions of a consolidating Act is this: The courts must construe the provisions of a consolidating Act as forming a code complete in itself and exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein. That means we should ascertain the true scope of the above section with due regard to the language of that Section and without reference to the common law rule. (See Subha Rao v. I.T. Commissioner, AIR 1956 SC.604 and Bank of England v. Vagliano (1891 (AC) 107 (HL). 7. S.64 of The Police Act would indicate that the legislature by introducing this Section has made an inroad into the common law of England which provides the basis for an action for damages for malicious prosecution initiated against a Magistrate or a police officer, the same can be taken cognisance of by the court only if the plaintiff satisfies the conditions stipulated under S.64 of the Police Act. This section provides that a plaintiff should establish that the damage he suffered, was on account of an act done by the Magistrate or the Police Officer in bad faith. This section provides that a plaintiff should establish that the damage he suffered, was on account of an act done by the Magistrate or the Police Officer in bad faith. To put it differently no Magistrate or Police Officer can be made liable to any penalty or payment of damages on account of any act done in good faith, in pursuance of any duty imposed or of authority conferred on him by any provision of The Police Act or of any other law for the time being in force conferring power on the Magistrate or the police officer or of any rule, order or direction lawfully made or given thereunder. However no suit or complaint against a Magistrate or Police Officer contemplated under sub-section (1) of S.64 can be taken cognisance of by a court unless the suit or complaint is filed within six months of the date on which the offence or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done. Regarding the filing of the suit there is another taboo introduced by sub- section 4 of S.64. It says that no suit contemplated under sub-section 3 shall be instituted until the expiration of two months next after the notice in writing containing a sufficient description of the wrong complained of and the relief claimed has been given to him. Not only that, the plaint aforesaid shall set forth that the notice mentioned above had been served on the defendant and the date of service and the contents of the reply if any, received by the plaintiff. The copy of the said notice shall be annexed to the plaint, endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the plaintiff of the time and manner of service thereof. 8. It is thus clear that unless the suit or complaint (made mention of under subsection (1) of S.64) in respect of any offence or wrong alleged to be committed or done by a Magistrate, Police Officer or other person in discharge of the duties imposed or the authority conferred on him by The Police Act or any other law for the time being in force or any rule, order or direction lawfully made or given thereunder, is filed within six months of the date on which the offence or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done, the court shall not take cognisance of the said suit or complaint. That means any such suit instituted after the aforesaid period is liable to be dismissed. However for the purpose of determining the period of limitation the provisions contained in S.4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act shall apply as these sections are not expressly excluded by the Police Act. 9. From the discussion in Para.7 and 8 it is clear that the period of limitation prescribed by S.64(3) of The Police Act is different from that prescribed under Art.74 of the Limitation Act. That being the position and The Police Act being a special Law (within the meaning of S.29(2) of Limitation Act) a suit contemplated under S.64(3), to say has been validly instituted, must be instituted within six months of the date on which the offence or wrong was alleged to have been committed or done. 10. The above position notwithstanding the learned counsel for the respondent relying on the following decisions, Mohd. Amin v. Jogendra Kumar (AIR 1947 P.C.108), Nagendra Nath v. Basanta Das (AIR 1930 Cal. 392), Chhaganlal v. Thana Municipality (AIR 1932 Bom. 259), Govindji J.Khona v. Damodaran (1969 KLT. 551), Abdul Majid v. Harbansh (AIR 1974 All. 129) and Md.Sharif v. Nasir Ali (AIR 1930 All. 742) argues that six months' period requires to be reckoned from the date on which the respondent was acquitted or in any event the prosecution was terminated. 11. Dilating on this point the learned counsel argued that a plaintiff has no right to sue for damages for malicious prosecution before the prosecution is terminated. Termination may be by an acquittal on the merits and a finding of his innocence, or by a dismissal of the complaint for technical defects or for non-prosecution. In other words only on the prosecution being terminated whether by the order of the trial court or by the order of the appellate/revisional court, the person concerned can sue for damages for malicious prosecution. If that be so the suit for compensation for malicious prosecution needs be filed only within one year from the date of the acquittal or the date on which prosecution is otherwise terminated as provided for under Art.74 of The Limitation Act. To put it briefly the termination of the criminal proceedings is an essential part of the cause of action. To put it briefly the termination of the criminal proceedings is an essential part of the cause of action. This is the position in law notwithstanding the special laws prescribing a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by The Limitation Act, the Counsel submits. 12. The rulings in Md.Sharif (Allahabad High Court) and Chhaganlal (Bombay High Court) apparently support the above argument of the learned counsel. The Allahabad High Court was considering the scope of S.42 of The Police Act 1861 which had prescribed the period of limitation as three months for such suits. S.42 of The Police Act 1861 reads:- "All actions and prosecutions against any person which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act or under the general police powers hereby given shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise." There was no need for the Allahabad High Court however, to construe this provision because this provision, at the relevant time stood repealed by The Limitation Act 9/1871. Their Lordships therefore held thus:- "On the passing of the Limitation Act (9/1871) the part of S.42, Police Act (5/1861) which provides for a period of 3 months for suits contemplated by it was repealed with the result that such suits became subject to the general law of limitation contained in the Limitation Act and the special provision of limitation contained in S.42 of Police Act (5/1861) ceased to be operative". The trend of the discussion in the judgment would however, indicate that had the said provision not been repealed, the same would have prevailed on the principle highlighted in the maxim generalia Specialibus non derogant In Chhaganlal their Lordships explained the position thus:- "I do not find any reference in the judgment to this argument (argument was that the act complained of is the institution of the prosecution on 23rd March, 1923; and the suit should have been brought within six months of that) having been raised in the lower court." The observations regarding the right of a plaintiff to rely on Art.74 of The Limitation Act to sustain the action which was initiated after the expiry of six months stipulated under S.167of The Bombay District Municipal Act, is of no relevance in the context. The other decisions cited at the bar have not dealt with these matters and therefore the principles highlighted in those decisions have no application here. 13. Whatever that be, The Police Act being an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the police force in the State of Kerala, is, as already noted,a code complete in itself and exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein. We have also seen that to sustain the suit for damages for malicious prosecution against a Magistrate or Police Officer within the meaning of The Police Act, the requirements prescribed under S.64 of the said Act, require to be satisfied. That means any suit for damages for malicious prosecution against a Magistrate or police officer, to have the same maintained, the plaintiff shall satisfy the conditions stipulated under S.64 of The Police Act read with S.29(2) of The Limitation Act. The section virtually prohibits courts from taking cognisance of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution unless the said suit is filed within the period prescribed under sub-section (3) thereof. The prohibitive words used in the section are indicative of the intention of the legislature that the legislature wanted "the Section is to be mandatory". It is thus clear that no proceedings for damages for malicious prosecution against a Magistrate or Police Officer within the meaning of The Police Act can be taken cognisance of by courts unless the plaintiff satisfies the conditions stipulated under S.64 thereof. The words used in S.64(3) namely "offence or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done" make it further clear that the suit or complaint contemplated under that section requires to be filed even before the criminal proceedings is terminated or ended in the acquittal of the plaintiff. 14. The above argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, in the light of the discussion above, therefore is rejected. 15. 14. The above argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, in the light of the discussion above, therefore is rejected. 15. Top sum up: A suit for damages for malicious prosecution against a Magistrate or a police officer is not governed by the common law of England which provides the basis for such action ordinarily, but is one regulated by S.64 of The Police Act and the said suit, to say that it has validly been initiated, shall be instituted within six months from the date on which the offence or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done, and not within one year from the date on which the plaintiff is acquitted or criminal proceeding was terminated, as stated under Art.74 of The Limitation Act. For the reasons stated above the order under challenge is set aside. The suit therefore is not maintainable. The C.R.P. is allowed.