JUDGMENT M.P.Singh, J. 1. The petitioner is the owner and landlady of premises no. 15 (old number 9-A), Muir Road, Allahabad. It was let out to the respondent no. 3 in the month of July, 1968. The accommodation comprised of a Drawing-cum-dining room, one bed-room, store, kitchen, a verandah and appurtenant land. 2. The petitioner filed suit no. 8 of 1978 in the Court of Judge Small Cause, Allahabad against the respondent no. 3 for ejectment on the ground : (i) that the respondent no. 3 has constructed one room over the Chabu- tara, enclosed the verandah and courtyard. One more room was constructed on the appurtenant land. This was done without the permission of the landlady. The said construction had 'disfigured' the building. No plan was got sanctioned by the tenant from the Developmeet Authority for the said construction. This act of the tenant made him liable to be evicted under Section 20 (2) (c) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). (ii) that the building was let out to the respondent no. 3 for residential purposes but he started using it for non-residential purposes and opened a Bakery. He also made a big oven for the purposes of his business. For this reason the respondent no. 3 became liable for ejectment under Section 20 (2) (d) of the Act. Relief for arrears of rent for a sum of Rs. 641.20 was also sought for, inter alia other reliefs which are not very much material now. In substance it was a pure and a simple suit of eviction for breach of the provisions of Section 20 (2) (c) causing 'disfiguring' of the building and Section 20 (2) (d) of the Act for using the premises for the purpose other than for which the respondent no. 3 was admitted to the tenancy of the building. 3. The defendant-respondent no. 3 contested the suit stating :- That the premises was let out to him for carrying on the business of bakery and confectionary. Preparation of bread and confectionary was carried on in an oven which was installed at the back of the building. It was the very first step for running the business in July 1968 itself. The oven was provided with a brick covering all around for protection from rain and dust. Preparation of bread and confectionary was carried on in an oven which was installed at the back of the building. It was the very first step for running the business in July 1968 itself. The oven was provided with a brick covering all around for protection from rain and dust. The said construction was also for storing the articles to be backed and after baking. It was done with full knowledge and consent of the landlady and her husband, who were residing in a separate unit, hardly at a distance of 5 yards from the premises let out to him. He has been residing at House no. 121, Seewai Mandi, Nakhas Kona, Allahabad ever since 1960. THEre was no occasion for him to take the building for residential purposes. The premises in dispute is being used for the purposes for which the tenancy was created. The defendant further asserted that he has not made any construction or structrual changes. The wall which is said to have enclosed the courtyard has been in existence from before the commencement of defendant's tenancy. In the verandah a single brick wall was constructed with the consent of the landlady and her husband. But for the said wall, the verandah could not be used for the purpose of bakery, because of immense dust which blew from the adjoining vast vacant plot towards the east which was used for purposes of cattle-grazing. The construction of room over the Chabutra or on the appurtenant land has been denied. 4. The learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit for ejectment by recording the following findings : (i) the defendant did not use the premises for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building. The building was let out for running a bakery. (ii) The defendant did not construct any room as pleaded by the plaintiff, but the suit for recovery of rent from October, 1977 till the date of institution of the suit was decreed. Against the order of the Judge Small Cause dated 26-4-1980, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act before the learned District Judge. Both the findings recorded by the trial court have been upheld by the revisional court. The revision was dismissed on 11-8-1980. The present writ petition is directed against this order. 5. Against the order of the Judge Small Cause dated 26-4-1980, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act before the learned District Judge. Both the findings recorded by the trial court have been upheld by the revisional court. The revision was dismissed on 11-8-1980. The present writ petition is directed against this order. 5. Heard Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G. N. Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 3. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that it will not be possible for him to challenge the findings of the two courts below that the premises was let out to the defendant for running a Bakery. Thus the violation of Section 20 (2) (d) of the Act is no more open for consideration. This gives a protection to the oven and the bricks covering all around it, to protect it from dust and rain. This also protects a single brick wall constructed with the consent of the landlady and her husband. This wall was raised so that the verandah may be used for the purposes connected with the Bakery. It saved the articles from immense dust blowing from the other side. The only contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that on account of the construction raised by the tenant the building has been 'disfigured.' According to him his case was squarely covered under Section 20 (2) (c) of the Act and the suit should have been decreed only on this ground. The argument can be dealt in two parts- (i) whether the defendant-respondent no. 3 has raised the alleged constructions without the permission of the landlord, (ii) whether such a construction has 'disfigured' the building. I immediately come to the first point. 7. In order to consider the worth of the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Paragraph 4 of the plaint has to be referred to strictly. According to the plaintiff the defendant-respondent no. 3 had made- (a) one room over the Chabutra. (b) has enclosed the verandah and courtyard. (c) has constructed one room in the appurtenant land. This is the total construction said to have been raised by the defendant. 8. According to the plaintiff the defendant-respondent no. 3 had made- (a) one room over the Chabutra. (b) has enclosed the verandah and courtyard. (c) has constructed one room in the appurtenant land. This is the total construction said to have been raised by the defendant. 8. IN order to support his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has made a reference to the notice dated 1-8-1977 under section 27 (1) and section 28 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (U. P. Act no. II of 1973) whose copy has been filed as Annexure- 6 to the writ petition. This notice was issued by the Secretary of the Allahabad Development Authority to the petitioner stating that two rooms 15' x 10' and one room 16' x 10' was being constructed. The construction may be stopped. This notice refers to three rooms only. Thereafter another notice is said to have been issued by the Allahabad Development Authority on 19-9-1977 in the name of the petitioner as well as respondent no. 3, the tenant, referring to the same construction of three rooms and directing the respondent no. 3 to remove the construction within 15 days otherwise the demolition would be done by the Development Authority itself. 9. The petitioner's counsel further contended that on 11-7-1977 the defendant had filed an application in response to earlier notice dated 28-6- 1977 before the Allahabad Development Authority that he has already completed the construction and in case it was found to be unauthorised, it may be compounded. The petitioner also filed a copy of the order of Sri Ram Mohan Singh, Secretary of the Allahabad Development Authority by means of which the said construction was ordered to be demolished. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that against this order of the Secretary, an appeal was filed before the Chairman of the Development Authority by the respondent no. 3. The appeal was dismissed on 22-8-1978 holding that since the constructions have already been demolished, the appeal has become infructuous. The respondent no. 3 has denied the service of the said notice under section 27 (1) and section 28 issued by the Allahabad Development Authority. It was also stated that no application for compounding was filed by him. At the relevant time he had gone to Saudi Arab for Haj pilgrimage. The respondent no. 3 has denied the service of the said notice under section 27 (1) and section 28 issued by the Allahabad Development Authority. It was also stated that no application for compounding was filed by him. At the relevant time he had gone to Saudi Arab for Haj pilgrimage. The said proceedings under U. P. Act No. II of 1973 had been manoeuvred by the plaintiff in order to make out a case for eviction against him. This has been done behind his back. 11. Contents of paragraph 4 of the plaint and the notice issued by the Allahabad Development Authority under section 27 (1) and section 28 of the U. P. Act No. II of 1973 are diagonally opposed to each other. The notice mentions of three rooms only whereas the plaint shows two rooms and enclosing the verandah and the courtyard. This divergence could not be satisfactorily explained by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. At the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner the record of the court below was also summoned by this Court. The evidence of both the parties were placed before me. The entire effort on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that this Court may re-appraise the evidence and either record its own finding or remand the case to the revisional court for reconsidering the question of breach of the provisions of section 20 (2) (c) of the Act. The law is well settled that there cannot be variance between pleading and proof. It has been held in the case reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 29, State of West Bengal v. Mir Faquir Mohammad that a party cannot be allowed to adduce evidence for setting up a case inconsistent with one as alleged in the pleadings. 13. In another case reported in AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 291, Allam Gangadhara Rao v. Gollapalli Gangarao while interpreting the scope of Order 6 Rule 2 CPC it has been held that a party can only succeed according to what is alleged and proved. No relief can be granted on facts and documents not discussed in the plaint. Suit based on one cause of action cannot be decreed on another cause of action. 14. The trial court while considering the said constructions has referred to paragraph 4 of the plaint and also the Commissioner's report paper no. No relief can be granted on facts and documents not discussed in the plaint. Suit based on one cause of action cannot be decreed on another cause of action. 14. The trial court while considering the said constructions has referred to paragraph 4 of the plaint and also the Commissioner's report paper no. 19/c/1 read with the site plan attached thereto. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner did not file any objection challenging the Commissioner's report. In the instant case the plaintiff can succeed only in case if he is able to successfully prove that the defendant has constructed a room on the Chabutara, enclosed the verandah and has constructed one room on the appurtenant land without the consent of the landlady and further that this construction has "disfigured" the building. 15. It is reaily very strange that the learned counsel for the petitioner has not confined himself to the case which has been pleaded by him but has argued mainly on the basis of the notice said to have been issued by the Allahabad Development Authority in which only three rooms were mentioned. 16. The petitioner cannot be permitted to travel beyond the pleadings. He has to stick to the case pleaded which is different than the one mentioned in the notice. The Trial Judge disbelieved the case of the plaintiff and recorded a finding that no room was constructed by the defendant-tenant. As regards enclosure of courtyard he accepted the case of the defendant that it was in existence on the date of letting. Regarding raising of 4-1/2 feet high wall enclosing the verandah, it has been found that it has been raised with the permission of the landlady for the purposes of the backery. The revisional court has agreed with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court while dismissing the revision. 17. After looking into the evidence myself I am satisfied that the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below that no construction was ever raised by the respondent no. 3 are correct. Whatsoever constructions were there, they were either existence on the date when the tenancy was created. These findings do not suffer from any illegality. 18. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are only supervisory and not appellate. 3 are correct. Whatsoever constructions were there, they were either existence on the date when the tenancy was created. These findings do not suffer from any illegality. 18. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are only supervisory and not appellate. The law has been settled by the Supreme Court in a series of cases that High Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not sitting as a Court of Appeal. In the case reported in AIR 1978 SC 29 , Muni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, it has been observed :- "We cannot find fault with the High Court but even if the findings were wrong on the evidence before the Court, it was not for the High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority We do not, therefore, see any reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court." 19. In another case reported in AIR 1977 SC 388 , Beant Singh v. Union of INdia, it has been held- "It is true that the High Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the authorities which are empowered to give their own decision in such cases. Apart from the jurisdictional error the High Court may correct error apparent on the face of the record." 20. What is an 'error of law' has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 Satyanarayan Laximinarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirmule, as under : "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Whether an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error can not be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ." In another case reported in Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radha Krishanan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , the Supreme Court while considering this question held- "A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals ; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can, similarly, be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as far instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice." " An error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari must be one which is apparent on the face of the record. Thus where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record." Thus this court has its own limitations and is bound to accept the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below. I do not find that the courts below have either misread the evidence or omitted to consider any material evidence. The prayer for remanding the case to the revisional court is unjustified, hence it is rejected. 21. I do not find that the courts below have either misread the evidence or omitted to consider any material evidence. The prayer for remanding the case to the revisional court is unjustified, hence it is rejected. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a decision reported in Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosang Patel, AIR 1975 SC 2156 , for the proposition that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that on the date of the suit the alleged construction was standing. In that case the Supreme Court took a view that if the tenant has sublet the premises, he ceased to have the protection of the Act. Relying upon this proposition, it was contended that once it is established by means of the notice of the Allahabad Development Authority that the defendant had raised certain construction and even if they were demolished, that will not protect the tenant from the liability of being evicted for that violation of the Act. THEre is no controversy on this point. This is the settled law. But in the instant case both the courts below have recorded categorical findings of facts that no construction as alleged by the plaintiff has been raised by the defendant. Thus this case is of no relevance. 22. Since I am in agreement with the findings recorded by the two courts below that the defendant has not raised any construction as alleged by the plaintiff, the question of 'disfiguring' does not survive for consideration. Any discussion regarding this will be only of academic value. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued this point at great length. Thus it is necessary for me to consider the same also. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this court is competent to record its own finding on the question of 'disfigurement' as this is a pure question of law and not of fact. This court is required to have its own judicial assessment on this question. 23. The word 'disfigure' has not been defined in the Act. In the absence of any legislative definition of the word, it will be useful to refer to the meaning given in the dictionary. This court is required to have its own judicial assessment on this question. 23. The word 'disfigure' has not been defined in the Act. In the absence of any legislative definition of the word, it will be useful to refer to the meaning given in the dictionary. 'Disfigure' has been explained in the Webster's Dictionary to mean- "to make less complete, perfect or beautiful or deface, deform or disguise by changing the figure or appearance." Now we have to look into the scope of words 'deface' and 'deform'- 'deform'- to spoil the form or shape of, to distort, mar the excellence or perfection. 'deface'- to destrory or mar the face or external appearance, injur, spoil or mar by effacing important features or portions. 24. Apart from the dictionary meaning the word 'disfigure' even if give; the popular meaning, it would mean that it spoils the external appearance of the building. This word 'disfigure' has got nothing to do with the diminishing its value or utility. It is an independent phrase having its separate field of operation. It confines only to the limited question that the show of building is spoiled or marred. While considering this aspect of the matter this court is not required to go into the question whether on account of the construction there was diminition of value or utility or not. The scope of word 'disfigurement' has been taken into consideratio by this court in the case reported in Smt. Raj Rani Kapoor v. Bhupinder Singh, 1986 AWC 1214, wherein it has been held- " 'Disfigurement' has not been defined in the Act. However, according to the ordinary dictionary meaning, 'disfigurement' means 'to spoil the figure' to deform, to spoil the beauty; to change to a worse form or to make it ugly. Thus if, the existing shape and the beauty of the building is adversely affected consequent upon raising of the disputed construction either in or upon the building, it may amount to disfigurement. However, it is neither proper nor possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in this respect. Each case must depend upon its own facts. Each case must, therefore be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances for determining whether the offending construction does cause any disfigurement or not. In some cases, even a so called work of improvement may result in disfigurement of the building. Each case must depend upon its own facts. Each case must, therefore be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances for determining whether the offending construction does cause any disfigurement or not. In some cases, even a so called work of improvement may result in disfigurement of the building. Where, for example, a building is of old style having ornamental work on its front elevation but it is partly changed according to modern concept of architecture with plain plastered surface after the old worn out ornamented piaster has peeled off, it may in some cases result in disfigurement. Similarly, if a tenant puts up a cow-shed on the lawns of a bunglow or in the open land in front of the main building or in the area left as setback in the front side some walls are raised to form an enclosure or a part of it is converted into an open air toilet, these may certainly amount to disfigurement of the building. Thus, disfigurement has nothing to do with improvement or otherwise but must be seen in the light of the effect the offending construction has on the mind of an average person on seeing it. "Disfigurement" does not depend upon any single factor but is the cumulative effect of a variety of circumstances such as the place, nature, magnitude and its effect on the look of the existing construction and on the overall appearance of the building." 25. In another case reported in Udai Bhan Gupta v. Hari Shanker Bansal, 1985 (2) ARC 20, it has been held- "Disfigurement of the building does not mean that it had rendered the building ugly due to the offending construction. All that it means is that its earlier figure has been changed. If the look of the building from outside appears to have been changed, then all the constructions which caused such alterations would come within the mischief of section 20 (2) (c)." 26. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision reported in M/s. Vijai Engineering Corporation v. Km. Veena Rani, 1981 ARC 36, in which a limited question of section 20 2) (c) was taken into consideration and the question was whether the structural alterations in the building without the consent of the landlord made by the tenant amounts to diminishing its value or utility or not. Veena Rani, 1981 ARC 36, in which a limited question of section 20 2) (c) was taken into consideration and the question was whether the structural alterations in the building without the consent of the landlord made by the tenant amounts to diminishing its value or utility or not. That is not the point in the instant case. Here the only question is whether the construction of rooms and walls disfigure the building or not. Since both the courts below have recorded a finding that no construction was ever raised by the defendant, the question of disfigurement does not arise Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in Mool Narain Mehrotra v. Smt Gulab Devi, 1987 ) AkC 411. This was a case with regard to material Alterations and the question was whether it diminished its value or utility. The scope of the word 'disfiguring' has not been taken into consideration. 27. The discussions made in the preceding paragraphs reveal that no construction was made by the defendant as alleged by the petitioner. The question of offending the provisions of section 20 (2) (c) does not arise. The suit has rightly been dismissed by the two cour's below. 28. No other point was pressed. The findings recorded by the courts below are pure questions of facts and do not suffer from any error apparent On the face of the record. I see no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.