JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of Criminal Revisions nos. 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 all of 1986 preferred respectively by Kaliya, Vestiya, khimchand, Bhursingh and Ditliya. ( 2. ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the revision petitions are these. Complaints were filed against the petitioners in respect of offences under Section 26 (1) (h) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (for short the Act) for having cleared and broken the land of the reserved forest on 30-6-1983. ( 3. ) AT the conclusion of the respective trial, each of the petitioners was convicted of the said offence and sentenced to undergo R. I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 25/ -. ( 4. ) ACCORDING to the prosecution Khasra Nos. 129/124 and 129/136 of village Ponchi Imli, Tahsil Bhabra, District Jhabua have been declared reserved forest vide notification under Section 20 (1) of the Act (vide Ex. P-5 dt. 28-4-1972 ). ( 5. ) THE contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that as there is nothing in the evidence of Shantilal to prove that the lands under cultivation were cleared in June 1983 and that they form part of the Khasra numbers referred to above the offence is not constituted. In support of his contention he places reliance on the decision in Deb Rams case, AIR 1952 All. 33 wherein it has been held that where the clearing or breaking up of the land is prior to the date of notification, no offence under Section 26 (1) (h) of the Act is constituted. He next contends that in the appellate Court the petitioners were not informed about the availability of free legal assistance at State cost and this constitutes infraction of their fundamental right of free legal assistance at State cost guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the case deserves to be remanded to the appellate court. In support of this submission reliance has been placed on the decisions in Suk Dass case, AIR 1986 SC 991 and Hiralals case, 1988 Cr. LJ. 457. ( 6. ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petitions deserve to be allowed. ( 7. ) IT is not in dispute that at the hearing in the appellate Court the petitioners were not represented by any counsel. LJ. 457. ( 6. ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petitions deserve to be allowed. ( 7. ) IT is not in dispute that at the hearing in the appellate Court the petitioners were not represented by any counsel. In the decision in Suk Dass case (supra) it has been observed as under : - "free legal assistance at State cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve jeopardy to his life or personal liberty. This fundamental right is implicit in the requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure prescribed by Article 21. The exercise of this fundamental right is not conditional upon the accused applyin for free legal assistance so that if he does not make an application for free legal assistance the trial may lawfully proceed without adequate legal representation being afforded to him. On the other hand the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge before whom the accused appears is under an obligation to inform the accused that if he is unable to engage the services of a lawyer on account of poverty or indigence, he is entitled to obtain free legal services at the cost of the state. The conviction reached without informing the accused that they were entitled to free legal assistance and inquiring from them whether they wanted a lawyer to be provided to them at State cost which resulted the accused remaining unrepresented by a lawyer in the trial is clearly a violation of the fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 and the trial must be held to be vitiated on account of a fatal constitutional infirmity. " ( 8. ) IT may be pointed out that the expression trial does not merely connote trial as is commonly understood but includes even investigation and appeal. " ( 8. ) IT may be pointed out that the expression trial does not merely connote trial as is commonly understood but includes even investigation and appeal. In this connection the following observations in relation to the fundamental right of speedy public trial implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution, made in paragraph 25 of the Full Bench decision in Madheshwardhari Singhs case, AIR 1986 Patna 324 may profitably be reproduced : - "on principle I am clearly of the opinion that in the majestic sweep of the fundamental right of a speedy public trial in the context of a criminal prosecution, initiated at the States instance, it necessarily connotes all the period from the date of the levelling of the criminal charge to the date of the rendering of the judgment of the Court. Unless it is so held, the cherished fundamental right herein would be whittled down to a teasing mirage, where the investigation of the offences itself may protract on for years (as is well manifested in the present case), and, thus rendering the very concept and purpose of a speedy trial purely illusory. Therefore, a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution herein includes within it both the police investigation of the crime and the later adjudication in Court based thereon. By way of analogy, a reference in this context may again be made to the case of Ramdaras ahir, 1985 Cri. L. J. 584 (Pat.) (supra ). Therein it was held that the word trial in this concept is not technically confined to completion of the proceedings in the original trial court alone, but equally includes the subsequent substantive appeal therefrom. Thus, if the word trial herein includes the later appeal as well, then on a parity of reasoning, it must equally include the preceding police investigation. " ( 9. ) FROM the foregoing discussion it is clear that the fundamental right of free legal assistance at State cost is not limited to original trial but extends even to appeals. ( 10. ) THERE is nothing to indicate that the appellate Court had discharged its obligation of informing the petitioners about their fundamental right of free legal assistance. As the petitioners were admittedly not represented by a counsel at the hearing in the appeals, the appellate decisions in the circumstances are vitiated and cannot be allowed to stand. ( 10. ) THERE is nothing to indicate that the appellate Court had discharged its obligation of informing the petitioners about their fundamental right of free legal assistance. As the petitioners were admittedly not represented by a counsel at the hearing in the appeals, the appellate decisions in the circumstances are vitiated and cannot be allowed to stand. The decision in Ram Nareshs case, 1987 Cri. L. J. 1856 = AIR 1987 SC 1500 may also be usefully perused. It relates to disposal of criminal appeal after arguments. ( 11. ) IN the result, the revision petitions are allowed. The appellate judgment against each of the petitioners is set aside and the appeals are remainded to the Court of Session, Jhabua for fresh disposal with due advertence to the observations made above. Records of the Court below be sent back immediately. Revisions allowed.