K. K. CHAUBEY, J. Applicants Said Khan, Malik Khan, and sabboot as first tet and applicants Hashim Khan, Sabbir Khan and Babu Khan separately three different sets have filed these four second bail applications in case crime No. 283 of 1988, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 307, I. P. C. , Police Station Kotwali Dehat, district Mirzapur. 2. All these applicants of four bail applications had earlier filed criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 2727 of 1989 which came up for decision before me on 3-4-1989. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the appli cants, the learned counsel for the complainant and the learned A. G. A. , the bail application was rejected on merit. 3. Co-accused Jafru, thereafter filed bail application No. 4505 of 1989 which came up for decision before Honble Mr. Justice B. L. Loomba. He allowed this application on 11-5-1989. 4. Co-accused Irshad Khan, Rustam Khan, Kallu alias Ayub, Badru alias Josaf, Mitthu, Tstakhar and Najru Khan had filed another bail applica tion No. 4570 of 1989 which came up for decision before me. The order dated 12-5-1989 passed on this bail application goes to show that it was allowed only on the ground of parity because co-accused Jafru had been admitted to bail vide order dated 11-5-1989 of Honble Mr. Justice B. L. Loomba. It does not appear that any other consideration was made. Besides that it also does not appear that this fact, that earlier bail application had been rejected by me on 3-4- 1989, was brought to my notice. 5. Now the four second bail applications have been moved on the ground of parity. It was argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that as the bail applications of the co-accused were allowed on 11-5- 1989 and 1-5-1989 (referred earlier), the applicants having similar case should be admitted to bail in these second bail applications although their first bail application had been rejected on merits. In support of this contention he has cited some rulings ; (1) Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 109. In support of this contention he has cited some rulings ; (1) Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 109. In this case Supreme Court convicted the appellant under Section 326/34, I. P. C. instead of Section 302/34, I. P. C. on the ground of consistency as one of the accused persons had been convicted and sentenced under Section 323/34, I. P. C. although the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it was a clear case of inflicting knife injuries with common intention of the assailants to cause the death. (2) Babu Singh and others v. State of U. P. , AIR 1987 Supreme Court 527. In this case the bail application of the petitioner had been rejected by the Supreme Court and when second bail application was moved in the court, it was observed "an order refusing an application for bail does not necessarily preclude another, on a later occasion, giving more materials, further developments and different considerations. " (3) Gama and another v. State of V. P. , 1987 Cr. LJ 242. In this case it was held by this court that successive bail applications are maintainable if matter has not already been considered in earlier bail application. (4) Rajendra Singn Sethia v. State, 1988 Cr. LJ 749. Relying on the aforesaid judgment of Babu Singh v. State of U. P. , the Delhi High Court held in this case that successive bail applications are main tainable on fresh materials and different considerations. (5) Surath Behera v. State of Oris&a, 1988 Cr LJ 1508. In this case also refence was made of the aforesaid Babu Singhs case by the Orissa High Court and it was held that the successive bail applica tions are not barred. 6. Against the above rulings the learned A. G. A. has placed reliance in Sita Ram and another v. State, 1982 (18) ACC at page 182, in which the principle of consistency and parity has been discussed. I shall come to this ruling lateron. 7. At the very outset I would like to say that there cannot be two opinions regarding the right of an accused to move successive bail applications on fresh grounds. I shall come to this ruling lateron. 7. At the very outset I would like to say that there cannot be two opinions regarding the right of an accused to move successive bail applications on fresh grounds. In Babu Singhs case noted earlier, the Supreme Court has clearly held that an order refusing an application for bail does not necessarily preclude another, on a later occasion, giving more materials, further develop ments and different considerations. Hence, the important question for decision in this case is not the right of the applicants to move second bail application but it has to be considered as to whether in this case the applicants are entitled to be released on the ground of parity. 8. In this connection I would like to quote from the ruling Sita Ram and another v. State, referrea earlier "the claims of the principle of consistency and demand for parity by the accused, however, are not compelling ones and can not override the Judges contrary view in the case before him if even the aware ness of the desirability of consistency fails to move him to modify his view. In other words, this is only a factor to be conisidered and not a governing consi deration. This is clear from the Supreme Court decision in Ashok Kamars case (supra) also where the Court declined to follow the principle in the matter of sentence. " 9. It is correct that after rejection of Bail Application No. 2727 1989 on 3-4-1989. I had also allowed the bail application of some co-accused by order dated 12-5-1989 in bail application No. 4570 of 89, but the order clearly goes to show that it was passed only on the ground of parity of the order dated 11-5-1989 of Hcnblc Mr. Justice B. L. Loomba, by which he allowed the bail application of one co-accused in Crl Misc. Bail Application No. 4505 of 1989. The merit the application was not at all considered by me. It further appears, that the order dated 3-4-1989 rejecting the bail application of some of the co-accused was not brought to the notice of the Honble Mr. Justice B. L. Loomba It was also not brought to me notice on 12-5-1989 which in all fairness should have been done. The merit the application was not at all considered by me. It further appears, that the order dated 3-4-1989 rejecting the bail application of some of the co-accused was not brought to the notice of the Honble Mr. Justice B. L. Loomba It was also not brought to me notice on 12-5-1989 which in all fairness should have been done. As said earlier, the principle of consistency or demand of parity is only a factor to be considered and not a governing consideration. In such circumstances. I feel that the applicants cannot be permitted to raise the plea of parity. Once the order dated 3-4-1989 was passed after hearing the entire case on merit, subsequent order giving bail to some of the accused in the aforesaid circumstances is not a ground to invoke the principle of consistency or parity. 10. I, therefore, do not find any force in these second bail applications and the same are accordingly rejected. Bail application dismissed. .