JUDGMENT 1. - Defendant-petitioner have preferred this revision petition being aggrieved with the order of the Additional District Judge No. 6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, reversing the order passed by the Additional Munsif Magistrate No. 2, dated 21-1-89 and thereby granting mandatory injunction in favour of the non-petitioner plaintiff. 2. Plaintiff -non-petitioner instituted a suit against the defendant-petitioner and submitted that they are tenants for the last number of years and they have been forcibly and without their consent ejected, on 14th January 1989. On 15th January was a holiday and on 16th the suit was instituted. In the suit it was stated that the articles which have been thrown out of their premises are worth lac of rupees and they are lying on the road. It was also submitted that the defendants took the law in their hands. in the suit the prayer was made that the mandatory injunction be issued against the defendants and they be directed to restore the possession of the shop which has been taken away by them forcibly on 14th January 1989. Further prayer was made that the articles which were thrown out of the shop are lying on the road and the plaintiff may be allowed to place them in the premises. They have also prayed that prohibitory injunction be issued against the defendants that in future they should not take the law in hand and should not interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the property. Application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with section 151, C.P.C. was also submitted by the plaintiff. In the said application the similar prayer was made. The application was rejected by the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate vide its order dated 21st January 1989 on the ground that he is having no jurisdiction to restore the position which existed prior to the institution of the suit. Appeal was preferred by the plaintiff and the same has been accepted by the appellate court. The appellate court. vide its order under revision directed that till the disposal of the suit, the plaintiff may be allowed to put his articles in the premises and the possession of the premises may be restored and mandatory injunction was issued to this extent. 3. It will not be out of place to mention the case of the defendants, who are the petitioners before this Court. 3. It will not be out of place to mention the case of the defendants, who are the petitioners before this Court. In the trial court they have submitted the reply to the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2. The case of the defendant-petitioners is that the premises was vacated partly on 13th January 1989 and the goods were packed. The track was to reach there on 14th January 1989 for taking away the articles. In the morning on 14th January 1989, it is said by defendants that, as the truck did not reach, so the plaintiff and his helpers/associates took out the goods out of the premises and placed them on the road. He has further stated that he advised the plaintiff not to put the articles on the road, but the plaintiff said that he has promised to vacate the shop and he will not keep the articles inside the premises. Thus, the defendants case is that the plaintiff voluntarily took out the articles out of the shop inspire of their advice not to do so and placed them on road to honour the promise. It was also stated that the shop was vacated at about 9 a.m. on 14th January and the articles were placed on the road. It was also admitted that till afternoon they could not arrange for the truck and, as such, the plaintiff wanted to put the articles again in the premises and the defendants declined to do so. Defendants submitted that on 14th January 1989, the report was filed against them but it was a false report. Thus, the admitted position is as under:- (i) Upto 14th morning the plaintiff was in possession of the premises as a tenant and his goods and articles were lying in the premises. (ii) On 14th the goods and the articles were taken out of the shop and were placed on the road. (iii) On the very day, i.e. 14th January 1989, plaintiff lodged the complaint at the police station against the defendants. The controversy between the parties is whether the plaintiff voluntarily took out the articles out of the premises in the morning of 14th and handed over the possession of the same to the defendants, or the defendants used the force and without consent of the plaintiff threw the goods and articles on the road and forcibly occupied the premises. 4. The controversy between the parties is whether the plaintiff voluntarily took out the articles out of the premises in the morning of 14th and handed over the possession of the same to the defendants, or the defendants used the force and without consent of the plaintiff threw the goods and articles on the road and forcibly occupied the premises. 4. Learned Additional District Judge No. 6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, accepted the version of the plaintiff and issued temporary injunction directing the defendants to allow the plaintiff to put his articles and goods in the shop and further prohibited them from interfering with the use and occupation of the premises. 5. Mr. Lodha appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the suit can only be instituted under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and the suit cannot be instituted under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. The second contention of Mr. Lodha is that the court has a power only while dealing with the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 to maintain the status quo as it existed on the date of filing of the suit and no injunction be granted to restore the possession which existed prior to the filing of the suit. The third contention of Mr. Lodha is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The fourth contention of Mr. Lodha is that the suit was not maintainable for the reasons stated by him. 6. Mrs. Jain appearing on behalf of the plaintiff submitted that the court is having the jurisdiction to deal with the problem and cannot be a silent spectator. She submits that the order of the learned Additional District Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. 7. I have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the record. 8. The need of the time is to try hard to make our political democracy, a social democracy as well. Social democracy includes the distribution of wealth and economic independence of the citizens. Social democracy means needs of life which recognised liberty, equality and fraternity as the principle of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity cannot be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form an union of trinity in the sense that to diverse one from another is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Social democracy means needs of life which recognised liberty, equality and fraternity as the principle of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity cannot be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form an union of trinity in the sense that to diverse one from another is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Down-trodden classes are tired of being governed with a law, with the administration of law which does not fulfil their requirements and basically gees against the preamble of the Constitution and Chapter-1V of the Constitution. It is the duty of the State including the Judiciary to see that the urge of the down-trodden class for self realisation in the down trodden classes must not be allowed to devolve into a class struggle or class war, otherwise it would lead to the division of the house and that would indeed be a day of disaster for all of us. 9. Court law has to be liberalised and must lend itself to specificity if it has to be justifiable. Board generalisation may not be actualised rights by mere use of vehemence of any or poignance of sentiment. We have to go deep into the problems of the society and we will have to study the rights and duties of the citizens. 10. The late Justice Hugo Black of the U.S. Supreme Court set the functional ideal of the judges in his country thus : "Under our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because, they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. No higher duty, or more solemn responsibility rests upon this Court than that of translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution, of whatever race, creed or persuasion." Page 207--208--209-J.A.G. Griffith-The Politics of the Judiciary reads as under : "Judges are the product of a class and have the characteristics of that class. Typically coming from middle-class professional families, independent schools, Oxford or Cambridge, they spend 20 to 25 years in successful practice at the bar, mostly in London, earning very considerable incomes by the time they reach their forties. Typically coming from middle-class professional families, independent schools, Oxford or Cambridge, they spend 20 to 25 years in successful practice at the bar, mostly in London, earning very considerable incomes by the time they reach their forties. This is not the stuff of which reformers are made, still less radicals ...............Ability by itself is not enough. Unorthodoxy in political opinion is a certain disqualification for appointment." 11. Specific relief may, in brief be explained as relief in specie. It is the remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of the obligation. The term 'obligation' as used in the Specific Relief Act in its wider juristic sense covers duties arising either ex-construction or ex-delicto. Every duty enforceable at law is obligation. The definition clause of the Act of 1963 does not allow narrow interpretation of the word 'obligation' to restrict it to a contractual duties alone. The definition of the word obligation' as used in the Act of 1963 is wide enough and the definition cannot be equated with the definition of the word 'obligation' used in the English Law. 'Obligation' may be said to be a bond or tie, which constrains a person to do or suffer something, it implies a right in another person to which it is co-related, and it restricts the freedom of the obligee with reference to definite acts and forbearance; but in order that it may be enforced by a Court, it must be a legal obligation. The definition of 'obligation' in Section 2 of the Specific Relief Act is so wide that any breach of legal obligation may give a cause to the affected party. The definition of the word 'obligation' in Section 2 of the Act of 1963 should be interpreted in a way which may serve the cause of the society. 12. Mr. Lodha has invited my attention to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and submitted that if any person is dispossessed without his consent from immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, may institute a suit to recover possession thereof notwithstanding any other title which may be set up in such suit. The object of the enactment of Sec. to is to protect the person in possession. One of the object may be to discourage the people from taking the law in their hands. 13. The object of the enactment of Sec. to is to protect the person in possession. One of the object may be to discourage the people from taking the law in their hands. 13. This Court, in the case of Hari Shankar v. Satya Prakash, (AIR 1982 Rajasthan 183 : 1982 RLR 116) has held that 'Civil Court is ceased of jurisdiction of a civil dispute under section 9 and has got ample powers under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2, C.P.C. read with section 37 of the Act to pass appropriate orders'. Thus, while dealing with a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court can exercise powers under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. and can pass any appropriate order. I agree with the view taken by my brother Justice Lodha. While considering the question of prima facie case the question of possession, which is the most important factor or issue in a suit for the restoration of the possession has to be considered by the Court. The Civil Court while considering a case under any of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, articulately sections 5, 6, 9 and 39 of the Act, can pass any appropriate older tinder Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. In the case of Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexandar (AIR 1966 SC 1165) Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act are not mutually exclusive. His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hidayatulla observed that Section 5 of the Act does not limit the kinds of the suit but only lays down the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed. There are terce types of remedies suggested, namely, a party has an option to move the criminal court independently under section 145 Criminal Procedure Code for the restoration of the possession. The patty can file a suit under section 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Party can file suit under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act and under any of the provisions of law and, it is for the Court to decide the suit looking to the prayer and pleadings of the parties. 14. Section 39 of the Act can be invoked in a suit filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Party can file suit under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act and under any of the provisions of law and, it is for the Court to decide the suit looking to the prayer and pleadings of the parties. 14. Section 39 of the Act can be invoked in a suit filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. A suit can be filed tinder any of the sections namely, section 6 and section 39 independent of each other and can also be filed under both the sections.section 6 and Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act of 1939 ate mutually inclusive of each other and do not exclude each other. Under Section 39, a writ of injunction may take a positive form as it may require a party to do a particular thing. In this case the injunction is described as mandatory. It may be impossible in some cases to restore the status quo unless the wrong doer is directed to undo a wrong which he has committed and to prevent the breach, it may some time be necessary to compel the performance of certain acts; and if they are such as the Court is citable of enforcing it, may in its discretion enjoy the performance of these acts by the defendants. A restoration of possession may be ordered under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act as well as under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Both the sections are exclusive of each other and it cannot be said that the suit can only be filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and no suit lies under section 39 of the Act. The suit filed by the plaintiff non-petitioner can be considered as a suit tinder both the sections and it is not necessary to specify a particular law and the section. It is the spirit of the prayer, nature of the prayer and character of the prayer which is to be considered by the Court while granting the relief. 15. Thus, I overrule the objection about the maintainability of the suit which has been raised by Mr. It is the spirit of the prayer, nature of the prayer and character of the prayer which is to be considered by the Court while granting the relief. 15. Thus, I overrule the objection about the maintainability of the suit which has been raised by Mr. Lodha during the course of arguments that the suit which is said to have been filed under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act for the grant of mandatory injunction is not maintainable in the light of the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. I hold that the suit is maintainable and both the sections cannot be applied in the instant case. 16. Mr. Lodha, counsel for the petitioner, submitted that this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Tanwar v. Ram Rakhmal, AIR 1971 Rajasthan 292 held that in granting the injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 the Court cannot do more than restoring the possession on the date of the suit. This Court has followed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (3-A) Nandan Pictures Ltd. v. Art Pictures Ltd ( AIR 1956 Cal. 428 ) . 17. I have perused the judgment of this Court. The case cited by Mr. Lodha does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that cake the plaintiff instituted a suit for the grant of perpetual and mandatory injunction and recovery of damages amounting to Rs. 4,500/-. It was alleged that the plaintiff was a vendor of hot and cold drinks at the railway station and carried on the business in two stalls constructed by the railway administration and six trollies on the payment of fees thereof. The case of the plaintiff was that without notice the contract was terminated and railway administration informed the plaintiff that it would not allow to carry on the work beyond 1st January 1970. The suit was instituted on 17th March 1970. It was pure and simple a contractual obligation. Secondly, it is not a case of throwing away the goods or articles and taking away forcible possession of any rented premises. In the said case the allegations were that the plaintiff was a licensee to carry on trade on railway premises and the licence was cancelled. It was pure and simple a contractual obligation. Secondly, it is not a case of throwing away the goods or articles and taking away forcible possession of any rented premises. In the said case the allegations were that the plaintiff was a licensee to carry on trade on railway premises and the licence was cancelled. In the circumstances of that case and looking to the time gap, this Court decided that when the business of the plaintiff had already been closed on the date of the suit, namely March 1970, there could not be any question of granting injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 to restrict that business. That case has been decided in the peculiar facts and circumstances and the judgment of the appellate court was set aside. 18. Mr. Lodha also cited before me the case of this Court in S.L. Civil Revision Petition No. 664/86 (Bhanwar Lal and another v. Gopi and others, decided on 29th October 1986) . It was submitted that in the said case it was argued that on the date the defendant Gopi moved his application for grant of injunction, he was not in possession of the premises and by way of injunction he cannot be put in possession of the premises as it would amount to giving a direction to maintain status-quo anti. This argument was upheld and the injunction application was rejected. It was a case in which the prayer was made for the demolition of the construction. This case also does not apply in the circumstances of this case, as in the instant case, no prayer has been made for the demolition of any construction. 19. Mr. Lodha has also cited before me the case of Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur (1977 RLW 320 This Court has held that the Appellate court should interfere only when the trial court's order is arbitrary or perverse or is in disregard of the sound legal principles or without considering the relevant records. The proposition laid down by this Court is a sound proposition of law acid. if two views are possible the view which has been accepted by the trial court should ordinarily be accepted and appellate court should not interfere. 20. The proposition laid down by this Court is a sound proposition of law acid. if two views are possible the view which has been accepted by the trial court should ordinarily be accepted and appellate court should not interfere. 20. In the case of Minerva Shiksha Samiti, Bharatpur v. Smt. Mithlesh Kumari (1984 RLR 992) my brother Hon'ble Justice Bhargava held that the court under its power under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. can maintain status quo as it existed on the date of the suit. Hon'ble Justice Bhargava further held that the petitioner was right in invoking power under section 151 C.P.C. to obtain mandatory injunction sought by him in his application. Thus, my brother Justice Bhargava held that in exercise of the powers conferred under section 151 C.P.C. mandatory injunction can be granted if the facts and circumstances require so. This case also does not help Mr. Lodha to this extent, as my brother Justice Bhargava has rightly used the word 'ordinarily' in his judgment. 21. My brother Justice Kochar, while sitting in the Delhi High Court has held in the case of Mrs. Vijay Shrivastava v. M/s Mirahul Enterprises and others, (AIR 1988 Delhi 149) that it cannot be said that no mandatory injunction can be granted by the Court in an interlocutory application in any circumstances. There is no bar to the Court granting interlocutory relief in mandatory form, though, in doing so, the Court should act with greatest circumspection and such powers can be excised only in rare and exceptional cases. I agree with the view taken by Mr Justice Kochar in the aforesaid case. 22. In the case of Indian Cable Company Ltd. v. Smt. Sumitra Chakraborty ( AIR 1985 Cal. 248 ) , the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that, if a Court is called upon to grant any relief on any interlocutory application, which when granted would mean granting substantially the relief claimed in the suit, the court will be very slow and circumspect in the matter of granting any such prayer. It is indeed true that such a relief should be granted only in exceptional cases. I agree with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. 23. Now, in the facts and circumstances of this case, I will have to apply the law discussed earlier. It is indeed true that such a relief should be granted only in exceptional cases. I agree with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. 23. Now, in the facts and circumstances of this case, I will have to apply the law discussed earlier. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that upto 14th January 1989 the petitioner plaintiff was a tenant. It is also an admitted position that on 14th January 1989, the goods and the articles which were lying in the shop were removed from the shop and placed on the road. It is also an admitted position that on 14th January itself the present petitioner filed the complaint before the police. On 15th there was holiday and on 16th January, on the opining of the Court he filed the suit. The only controversy in this question is whether a tenant has vacated the shop and placed the articles and goods on the pavement voluntarily or whither the articles were thrown out by the defendant with force and against the consent of the plaintiff. The Premises and Rent Control Act has been enacted for the protection of the tenants. Every one knows the difficulty in getting the premises on rent and, thereafter, the landlord's behaviour of getting the premises vacated or compelling the defendants to increase the rent. There may be exceptions, but exceptions are very few. In these hard days, plaintiff was a tenant for the last 8 or 9 years. He was running the business. It cannot be ordinarily considered that he will vacate the shop and put his articles and goods on the road without arranging for the alternative premises. It is also in favour of the plaintiff that he filed the complaint at the Police Station on the same day and also instituted a suit as soon as the court opened. The defence version is that they asked the plaintiff not to vacate without arranging for the truck and should not put his articles and goods on the road, cannot be accepted on its face value at this stage. Prima facie it seems that it is not a case in which the plaintiff will vacate the ship and put the articles on the road without arranging for the alternative accommodation. Prima facie it seems that it is not a case in which the plaintiff will vacate the ship and put the articles on the road without arranging for the alternative accommodation. Mafia is working in most of the important cities of the State where some persons are hired and tenant is compelled to vacate the premises forcibly. The Court cannot be and should not be a silent spectator. It is also a well known fact that we have failed to give justice to the down trodden without delay. Even the cases filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act take years together and are not settled. This is a case in which the plaintiff has succeeded in making out a prima facie case in his favour; a very rare and exceptional case. 24. Mr. Lodha appearing on behalf of the petitioner-defendant, submitted that the shop has been vacated before 9 months and the Court should now pass an order in his favour and the balance of convenience is also in favour of his client. The Court should take notice of number of judicial facts which are prevailing in the Society and for which the law has been enacted from time to time. Plaintiff has filed the suit when the courts opened and his articles were lying on the road, can it be accepted that the plaintiff will not remove the articles and goods upto this date. He has lost the business and the premises, which he occupied on 14th January 1989 and prior to that. The balance of convenience is always in favour of the law abiding citizen and it is obligatory on the Court to maintain the rule of law that the down trodden persons who come to the court for relief should be heard and should be given due relief. Every new decision on every new situation is a development of law. Law does not stand, it moves continuously. Once this is recognised then the task of the Judge is to put it on a higher place. He must seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time. A Judge should not be a mere working mason laying brick on brick without thought of over-all design. Judge must be an architect thinking of structure as a whole developing for society a system of law which is strong, durable and just. He must seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time. A Judge should not be a mere working mason laying brick on brick without thought of over-all design. Judge must be an architect thinking of structure as a whole developing for society a system of law which is strong, durable and just. The Judge cannot be a person of status quo Status-quo generally is against the moving wheels of the society. A Judge must be a dynamic Judge, so that he can fulfil the oath which he has taken to preserve the Constitution and be should strive towards the achievement of the goals laid down in the Preamble of the Constitution. He should forget from what class of society he is coming, he should forget his caste and creed and he should only see the Constitution, particularly the Preamble of the Constitution and should strive for achieving that object. If he succeeds in doing so, he will be a real architect, a real Judge and not a machinery or illusory. For this reason also I am of the view that I will have to see the structural position of the Society and should not act as a machinery Judge and I should not consider that the law of status-quo will come in my way and I should act with the spirit of the Preamble of the Constitution and should preserve my oath and see that the down trodden gets the real benefit and the real sufferer does not say that the courts are impediment in giving justice. I think that this is a case in which the balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff whose goods were lying on the road and who had to come to the Court on the opening day for getting a redress. 25. The irreparable loss will be to the person who has suffered. It is a struggle between have and have notes. It is a struggle between the law and muscle power. It is a struggle between law breakers of the society and law abiders. Irreparable loss is always suffered by the law abiding citizen, who does not take the law in his hand and who has a capacity to suffer. I am of the view that the tenant is really the suffer in this case and irreparable loss is also in his favour. Irreparable loss is always suffered by the law abiding citizen, who does not take the law in his hand and who has a capacity to suffer. I am of the view that the tenant is really the suffer in this case and irreparable loss is also in his favour. So, I hold that the plaintiff is having prima facie case, balance of convenience is also in his favour and he is also the sufferer of the irreparable loss. 26. Apart from that it is a case which comes into the category of rare and exceptional one. There is no bar to the Court in granting interlocutory relief in mandatory form, though, in doing so, the Court should act with great care and caution and such power can be exercised only in very rare and exceptional cases. This is a case of very rare and exceptional nature. The very facts that the goods were lying on the road on the date of filing of the suit shows the urgency, the exceptional nature and the rareness. This is a case, in which looking to the facts and circumstances, exceptional nature and rareness of the case, a mandatory form of injunction should be issued in favour of the plaintiff and the appellate Court was justified in issuing the same. 27. Mr. Lodha has argued that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction. He has cited before me some cases on this point and submitted that under Order 39 mandatory injunction cannot be issued. He has further submitted that at the most the Court can issue mandatory injunction under section 151 C.P.C. I have already held that in exceptional cases the Court can issue the mandatory injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2. Mandatory injunction was refused by the trial court and naturally the appeal will lie to the appellate court. Appal was accepted by the appellate court and naturally the revision will lie before this Court. I do not find any force in the submissions of Mr. Lodha on this point. Plaintiff has rightly filed the appeal before the appellate Court and revision before this Court. Even if the arguments of Mr. Lodha are accepted then it is a case of filing of the appeal against the refusal of grant of injunction under O. 39 Rules 1 and 2 and naturally the appeal will lie. 28. Lodha on this point. Plaintiff has rightly filed the appeal before the appellate Court and revision before this Court. Even if the arguments of Mr. Lodha are accepted then it is a case of filing of the appeal against the refusal of grant of injunction under O. 39 Rules 1 and 2 and naturally the appeal will lie. 28. I have already held that the suit is also maintainable. 29. In the result, the revision petition is rejected. Petitioners will pay Rs. 2000/- (Two thousand) as cost to non-petitioner plaintiff.Revision rejected with costs. *******