JUDGMENT 1. 1. Petitioner defendant, Ram Dayal, submitted this revision petition before this Court being aggrieved with the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. No. 1. (Alwar) dated 18th November 1989 (sic 1980), by which he allowed the miscellaneous appeal No. 11/80 of the plaintiff non-petitioner No. 1 and dismissed the appeal No. 1 of 1980 of the defendant-petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case are that one Nand Lal entered into an agreement to sell on 13th June 1979 with Murari Lal, non-petitioner No. 1. It is alleged that Murari Lal paid Rs. 7,000/- out of Rs. 8,000/-. It was agreed upon between the parties that the sale-deed will be executed as soon as the complete payment is made. Ram Dayal, defendant has come with the case that the agreement to sell dated, 13th June 1979 is a fictitious document and is and dated. It was also submitted by him that Nand Lal has gifted this property on 11th July 1979 and the possession of the same has been delivered to him. In the document dated, 13th June 1979 also this fact has been mentioned that the possession has been delivered to Murari Lal. Murari Lal instituted a suit on 7.8.89 (sic 79) against Ram Dayal and Nand Lal. He prayed in the suit that the injunction should be issued against the defendant; not to disturb his lawful possession of the property in dispute. Simultaneously or with a difference of some time criminal proceedings were also initiated by the parties. Some of them may be relevant for the purpose of this case, particularly, the proceedings initiated under section 145 Cr. P. C. On 8.8.79 Ram Dayal submitted the first information report and it was stated in the first information report that Murari Lal has forcibly ousted him from the possession of the house. Mutation proceedings were also initiated and the orders were passed in favour of Murari Lal by the Gram Panchayat. However, it was submitted that the order of the Gram Panchayat has been set aside on the ground that the Gram Panchayat had no jurisdiction to pass orders in the matter of mutation proceedings. It was also submitted that the case has been remanded back. It will not be out of place here to mention that the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C continued for a pretty long time. It was also submitted that the case has been remanded back. It will not be out of place here to mention that the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C continued for a pretty long time. However, taking note of the judgment of the appellate court it was considered proper by the Criminal Court that an order which is consistent with the order of the Civil Court should ordinarily be passed and the same was passed. Mr. Agrawal appearing on behalf of the petitioner with all vehemence at his command submitted that the court below has committed an error of jurisdiction in the matter of exercise of powers. It was submitted that the court below has exercised the powers not vested in it by setting aside the order of the trial court as the order of the appellate court is perverse and is based on non-existent facts or the facts which are not correct. 3. As far as the question about the possession of the house is concerned it is a semi admitted position that Ram Dayal was not in possession of the house at the time of filing of the suit. So, it is not necessary to discuss the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as far as the house is concerned. Court below has also divided agricultural land into two parts. One part relates to the agricultural land on which there was no cultivation and other part relates it the agricultural land of which there was cultivation of maize and Tilli. Commissioner was appointed by the trial court and he has submitted the report. In the said report it has been mentioned that field Nos. 582, 498, 495 and 494 are practically un-cultivated. As at the most, there may be a cultivation or irrigation for cultivation about 2 Biswas which cannot be considered as cultivated. It was also submitted that on other fields there was a cultivation ntimely, in field Nos. 267, 266. Commissioner found on inquiry that the real cultivator is Ram Dayal. As far as fields Nos. 582, 498, 495, 490 and 317 are concerned, I am of the view that the judgment of the court below should be maintained as there was no finding even about the specific possession of the property in favour of the present petitioner. It was submitted by Mr. Agrawal that at the relevant time they were under the sub-mergence. 582, 498, 495, 490 and 317 are concerned, I am of the view that the judgment of the court below should be maintained as there was no finding even about the specific possession of the property in favour of the present petitioner. It was submitted by Mr. Agrawal that at the relevant time they were under the sub-mergence. May it be so, I am not inclined to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the court below. 4. Now, there remains third part of the case, namely, field No. 266 and 267. I will consider the case of both the parties in detail about these fields. Trial Court accepted the possession of Ram Dayal and passed the order in his favour. Appellate Court accepted the case of Murari Lal and reversed the order of the trial court and passed the order in his favour considering that Murari Lal is in possession. 5. First of all, I will deal with the submissions made by Mr. Agrawal. He submitted that on the day of filing of the suit, i. e. 7.8.79, the suit was instituted by Murari Lal. In the plaint it has not been mentioned anywhere that he has cultivated field No. 266 and 267. He has only mentioned in the plaint that he is in possession of the agricultural land referred in the suit. No specific averment has been made in the suit about the cultivation. Application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 was also submitted. In that application also there was no averment that he has cultivated field Nos. 266 and 267. The averment that he is in possession may not be sufficient in the circumstances of the case. 6. Mr. Lodha appearing on behalf of the non-petitioner submitted that on 25th August 1979 affidavits of the witnesses have been filed to prove that non- petitioner Murari Lal has cultivated the field. May it be so. On 16th August 1979 the case came before the Court and the present petitioner had also knowledge about the cultivation. It was his duty to state at the time of filing of the application for grant of temporary injunction that he has cultivated the crop and the crop is standing there. At the time of the filing of the suit the crop may be in its beginning and may be at the stage of completion of sowing. It was his duty to state at the time of filing of the application for grant of temporary injunction that he has cultivated the crop and the crop is standing there. At the time of the filing of the suit the crop may be in its beginning and may be at the stage of completion of sowing. As such, the petitioner might not have seen the crop standing and at the time of filing of affidavits of other witnesses, he might have seen the crop and, as such, he has given the additional affidavit subsequently. 7. The second limb of the argument of Mr. Agrawal is that the statement made by Nand Lal co-defendant, should not be admitted in evidence. He has submitted that Nand Lal has parted with the property after executing the gift deed on 11.7.79 After 11.7.79, Nand Lal cannot make an admission which may be used against the present petitioner Ram Dayal. He has referred the provisions of Section 18 of the Evidence Act. 8. The third ground of Mr. Agrawal is that the plaintiff was in hurry of filing of the suit and he was mentioned the wrong measurement of field No. 495 and 498 in the plaint and the application itself. 9. The fourth ground of Mr. Agrawal is that the law provides that if two views are possible then the view taken by the lower court should be accepted. 10. Mr. Lodha appearing on behalf of the present non-petitioner Murari Lal has submitted that this Court should not interfere in discretionary matters particularly when the appellate court has held that Murari Lal was in possession of field Nos. 266 and 267. Mr. Lodha has further submitted that the grant of injunction or refusal of injunction is a discretionary matter and if two views are possible, this Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Court. 11. I have heard the rival contentions of both the parties. 12. As far as the first limb of the argument is concerned, it is not in dispute that the present non-petitioner. Murari Lal has not specifically mentioned in the plaint or in the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 that he has (sic cultivated) field Nos. 266 and 267. The Commissioner found that the crop was standing on the fields. Murari Lal has not specifically mentioned in the plaint or in the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 that he has (sic cultivated) field Nos. 266 and 267. The Commissioner found that the crop was standing on the fields. This fact is a very relevant fact and I am not inclined to accept the submissions of Mr. Lodha that this omission is immaterial as on 25th August 1979 additional affidavits of the witnesses have been filed to prove the possession of Murari Lal and to prove this fact that Murari Lal has cultivated the land. Section 18 of the Evidence Act reads as under : 18. "Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the court regards, under the circumstances the case as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them are admissions. Statements made by parties to suits, suing or sued in a representative character, are not admission unless they were made while the party making them held that character. Statements made by- (1) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, and who make the statement in their character of persons so interested, or (2) persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit, are admissions, if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statements." 13. There are three admissions of Nand Lal in this case. One admission is dated, 13th June 1979 which he has made in the agreement to sell which is said to have been executed by him in favour of the non petitioner. In that agreement there is an admission of Nand Lal that he has delivered the possession to Murari Lal. 14. There is a second admission in the gift deed dated 11.7.79 in which Nand Lal has admitted that he has delivered the position (sic possession) to Ram Dayal. There is a third admission of Nand Lal which he has made before the court during the course of proceedings. In that admission he has admitted in the written reply that he has given the possession to Murari Lal. At present we are concerned with the admission made by Nand Lal in the trial court by filing the reply. There is a third admission of Nand Lal which he has made before the court during the course of proceedings. In that admission he has admitted in the written reply that he has given the possession to Murari Lal. At present we are concerned with the admission made by Nand Lal in the trial court by filing the reply. After the execution of the gift deed it seems that Nand Lal should not be considered as having any title or interest in the property. 15. Mr. Agrawal has cited before me the case of Gangaram Kanhyalal v. Pooran Gulab and others AIR 1954 M.B. 58 . His Lordship was considering the provisions of Section 18 of the Evidence Act and has held as under : "As a matter of probative value, the admission of a person (such as one joint owner) having precisely the same interest at state (as) another (his co-owner). sill in general, be likely to be equally worthy of consideration; there being an identity of legal liability, the two persons may be deemed one so far as affects the propriety of discrediting one by the statements of the others. An admission of one co-defendant is not receivable against another merely by virtue of his position as a co-party in the litigation. It is not by virtue of that person's relation to the litigation that his admission can be used against the other. The vital point for consideration is whether there is such priority of obligation or title between two persons as to justify the use of the admission of one against the other and that must be determined, by reference to the relation between the parties at the time the admission is made. Where the admission was at a time when the patties had no community of interest, it cannot be used." His Lordship further held- "Statements made by persons from whom the parties to a suit have derived their interest in the subject matter of the suit are admissible as admissions only when the admissions are of date prior to date of transfer. A purchaser is not bound by admission made by his vendor subsequent to the purchase made by him." 16. A purchaser is not bound by admission made by his vendor subsequent to the purchase made by him." 16. Madhya Bharat High Court has held that the statement made be a person from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject matter of the suit are admissible as admission only when the admissions are of a date prior to the date of transfer. 17. Mr. Agrawal submits that the transfer has taken place on 11th July 1979 and as such the admission midi by Nand Lal subsequent to the transfer before the Court by filing reply is not admissible in evidence. He has also relied upon the judgment of the case S.V.S Muhammad Yusuf Rowther v. Muhammad Yusuf Rowther and others AIR 1958 Mad. 527 . This case does not deal with the relevancy and admissibility of the document, but it deals with the question of proof. His Lordship hay held that the recital deed of gift by deceased that possession had been delivered (sic). In such circumstances, the onus is on the person claiming that no delivery took place. 18. Mr. Agrawal has also cited before me the case of Radhey Shyam v. Prem Kanta 1982 RLW 31 : 1982 RLR 509 . My brother Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kasliwal has held is under : "The principle contained in sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Evidence Act is based on a solitary rule that admissions must be made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statements. A vendor after selling the property in favour of a vendee is left with no interest in the property and can make any statement to favour third party and, as such, it cannot be made binding against the interest of vendee." 19. It is the settled law that a person cannot make use of an admission made by the vendor in favour of the third party after parting with the property and interest in the property and ordinarily should not be used against the vendee to whom he has sold the property or against the transferee who has received the property under transfer. However, this rule cannot be applied rigidly in all cases. However, this rule cannot be applied rigidly in all cases. Here in the instant case, the suit for specific performance of contract has been filed by Murari Lal against Nand Lal as Ram Dayal claims that the property has been given to him in gift on 11.7.79. He is also a party in this case, prayer has been made that he should be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of Murari Lal. In a suit for specific performance, the admission made by the vendor or a transfer or cannot be used by the person in whose favour thee agreement to sell has been executed. 20. Apart from that one should not forget that there is an admission of Nand Lal in the document dated, 11.7.79 in favour of Ram Dayal and in the document dated, 13.6.79 in favour of Murari Lal. Thus, if the document is considered to be taken as genuine, the first admission may have a force. However, much depends on the genuineness of the document. I will not like to say at this stage while deciding this revision petition that the admission made by Murari Lal is not relevant, but at the same time, I will express that the subsequent admission made by Nand Lal should not be given weightage against Ram Dayal though, it may be relevant. 21. It is true that there is a discrepancy in the measurement referred to in that plaint and the application relating to other khasra numbers, for which I have already passed the order. It will not be out of place here to mention that there were proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. and, in the said proceedings the parties had the opportunity to come to this Court. Initially, the receiver was appointed after the judgment of the appellate court in this case and. Criminal Court accepted the view of the Civil Court and decided the proceedings under sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. accordingly. Mainly, the decision of the Criminal Court in proceeding, under section 145 Cr.P.C. has been guided by the decision under challenge and this Court has also decided the revision petition and held that the criminal courts are hound by the decision of the Civil Court to a great extent while deciding the matter under section 145 Cr.P.C. 22. Mainly, the decision of the Criminal Court in proceeding, under section 145 Cr.P.C. has been guided by the decision under challenge and this Court has also decided the revision petition and held that the criminal courts are hound by the decision of the Civil Court to a great extent while deciding the matter under section 145 Cr.P.C. 22. As far as the mutation proceedings are concerned, the Gram Panchayat passed the order in favour of Murari Lal. However, it has been set aside by the appellate court on the ground that the Gram Panchayat is having no jurisdiction to pass the said order. 23. Now, I will deal with the 4th question. 24. Mr. Agrawal is right when he has submitted that the appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with the order of the trial court in the matter of grant or refusal of discretionary relief. It is true that if two views are possible then the view taken by the trial court should he given due weightage and appellate court should not interfere. The same principle also applies while dealing with the revision petitions. In the case of M/s. D L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and others, ( AIR 1971 SC 2324 ) . Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the errors contemplated under section 115 may relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision and not to errors either of fact or of law." 25. It will not be out of place here to state that section 115 C.P.C. has been amended vide Amending Act of 1976 and a proviso has been added that the High Court shall not under section 115 vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding a issue in the course of suit except where the order (a) if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings (b) order, if allowed to stand would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it has been made. On the applicability of clause (b) both the parties have not argued before me. On the applicability of clause (b) both the parties have not argued before me. However, I will like to observe that after the amendment of 1976 the powers of the High Court which existed prior to the amendment have further been curtailed and it is necessary for the High Court to decide whether the order if allowed, would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. 26. In the case of Managing Director Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway ( AIR 1973 SC 76 ) Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court should not interfere even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with the law or not unless it has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The question of jurisdiction is not involved in this case as it cannot be said that the first appellate court has no jurisdiction to grant injunction. At the same time, if two views are possible it is not desirable that this Court should prefer the view which it thinks proper. This Court should be reluctant in interfering with the order passed by the court below in revisional jurisdiction even if it finds that the order is bad on facts. The evidence has to be weighed and in the process of weighing the evidence the persons are bound to differ. Even if, I accept the view that the trial court has committed an error in the matter of appreciation of evidence relating to field No. 266 and 267, I cannot hold that the trial court has acted beyond jurisdiction or without jurisdiction. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and draw an inference which may be reasonable and it is not necessary that there should be the correct inference. A distinction will have to be drawn between reasonable and correct inference and while dealing with the revision petition it is necessary for this Court to see whether such inference can be drawn in the facts and circumstances of the case or not. If it can be drawn it may not be correct. It may be reasonable inference. A distinction will have to be drawn between reasonable and correct inference and while dealing with the revision petition it is necessary for this Court to see whether such inference can be drawn in the facts and circumstances of the case or not. If it can be drawn it may not be correct. It may be reasonable inference. In the view of the Court then this Court should not substitute its view by drawing any other inference as this Court is having a very limited jurisdiction under section 115 C P.C. However, the mistake of fact or law cannot be corrected by this Court while sitting in revisional jurisdiction. There may be dispute about the possession relating to these fields. However, it is the duty of this Court that none should suffer. If Ram Dayal succeeds and the suit is dismissed then he will be the sufferer if no relief is given by this Court and the order of the trial court is not modified. 27. In the result, the revision petition is partly accepted to this extent that in case the plaintiff non petitioner fails to establish his case then he shall pay at the rate of Rs. 300/- per Bigha per year as damages to Ram Dayal regarding all Khasras. It is further directed that the trial court shall assess the rent of the house and the direction should be issued that in case Murari Lal plaintiff fails to do so then Ram Dayal shall be paid rent at the rate so assessed by the trial court. It is further directed that the plaintiff non-petitioner Murari Lal will give an undertaking before the trial court and furnish solvent security to fulfil the obligations created against him before the trial court. The undertaking and the solvent security should he furnished within six weeks from today. The order of the appellate court is modified only to this extent otherwise, it stands confirmed. 28. Revision petition is disposed of accordingly.No order as to costs.Revision disposed of accordingly. *******