JUDGMENT : 1. Whether the petitioners have no right to represent for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of service of the port and dock workers and whether the decision of the Union of India, the first respondent herein are justified in refusing to refer the disputes for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal are the questions which have been posed for determination in these petitions. 2. In the first petition, viz. Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988, the first petitioner is the Federation of All India Port and Dock Workers having second and third petitioners, amongst others, as its member Unions. The second petitioner Union was established way back in the year 1920 and was a member of the third respondent, the All India Port & Dock Workers' Federation who used to represent in the matter of negotiating terms and conditions of service of the port and dock workers. In the year 1958, the fourth respondent Indian National Port & Dock Workers' Federation was given representation in the process of classification and categorisation and fixation of wages of the workmen. In 1968, the fifth respondent Port Dock and Waterfront Workers' Federation of India was given representation in a commission appointed to go into the question of ex-gratia payment in lieu of bonus and other demands. In 1977 representation was given to the sixth respondent and it negotiated with the first respondent for settlement of its demands. On the 14th July, 1977 a settlement was signed between the first respondent on the one hand and the third to sixth respondent on the other. On the 16th November, 1978 the third respondent gave a call for strike but the same was called off on the 28th November, 1978. On the 29th November, 1978 a second settlement was signed between the first respondent on the one hand and the fourth to sixth respondents on the other. To this settlement the second petitioner Union was a signatory and a party. 3. On the 15th May, 1980 the first respondent made an order setting up bipartite wage negotiating machinery whereunder the third to sixth respondents were appointed to represent the employees' side and the first petitioner was excluded. The petitioner, therefore, protested by its telegram, dated 3rd June, 1980. 3. On the 15th May, 1980 the first respondent made an order setting up bipartite wage negotiating machinery whereunder the third to sixth respondents were appointed to represent the employees' side and the first petitioner was excluded. The petitioner, therefore, protested by its telegram, dated 3rd June, 1980. It also filed in this Court Writ Petition No. 890 of 1980 challenging the validity of the aforesaid machinery set up by the order dated the 15th May, 1980. Though an interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner, this petition came to be dismissed for want of prosecution on the 1st April, 1984. 4. The first petitioner some time in November, 1980 served a charter of demands on behalf of the port and dock workers and also issued a strike notice. By an order dated the 26th November, 1980 the Assistant Labour Commissioner refused to hold conciliation proceedings on the ground that the notice was not in proper form. 5. On the 4th of January, 1981 the first respondent entered into a third settlement with the third to sixth respondents. On the 28th May, 1981, the first petitioner and its affiliated unions served a notice of strike. By letter dated the 4th November, 1981, the first respondent declined to refer the petitioners' demands covered by the strike notice to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. On the 28th of January, 1982 the first petitioner filed in this Court, Writ Petition No. 189 of 1982 challenging the decision of the respondent dated the 4th November, 1981. Pending this petition, the first petitioner on the 13th December, 1983 served a charter of fresh demands and also served a notice of strike. The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) by his communication dated the 3rd March, 1984 invited the first petitioner and the third to sixth respondents to participate in conciliation proceedings. On 15th March, 1984 the conciliation proceedings held by the Regional Labour Workers (Central Bombay) ended in failure. On the 11th April, 1984 the first respondent entered into the 4th settlement with the third to sixth respondents. On the 27th June, 1988 the first respondent entered into the 5th settlement with regard to one demand with the third to sixth respondents. On the 11th April, 1984 the first respondent entered into the 4th settlement with the third to sixth respondents. On the 27th June, 1988 the first respondent entered into the 5th settlement with regard to one demand with the third to sixth respondents. On the 29th January, 1986, Writ Petition No. 189 of 1982 was decided by my learned brother Bharucha, J. who found that the reason given for refusing to make a reference was not justified. He remitted the matter back to the first respondent to consider the case and decide the matter afresh after observing that it would open to the first respondent to decide upon the issue after giving fresh reasons in support of its findings. He held that "It would be possible to urge in a given case that where the only grounds for refusing a reference have been found to be unsustainable, the Court should direct the appropriate Government to make a reference. I do not propose to follow that course having regard to the circumstances of this case. I shall direct that the first respondent shall reconsider the matter and shall do so in depth and upon relevant and germane considerations. The petition is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The first respondent shall reconsider the petitioner's notice dated 28th May, 1981 on merits and shall, in depth and upon relevant and germane considerations, decide u/s 10(1) of the Act whether or not a reference should be made. Should it decide not to make a reference, it shall record the reasons for so deciding u/s 12(5)." 6. Though the aforesaid order was passed on the 29th January, 1986, no action thereon was taken for a considerable time. On the 29th March, 1988, the first respondent informed the first petitioner that the decision of the Government in the matter will be intimated shortly. On the 7th of April 1988, in a reply given to the Lok Sabha in response to a question raised by one of its members, it was stated that the first respondent had constituted a body composed of specified members of the third to sixth respondents for negotiating and settling the revision of terms and conditions of service of workers employed in the major ports. The petitioners not having been included in the body so constituted filed the first of the present two petitions being Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988. The petitioners not having been included in the body so constituted filed the first of the present two petitions being Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988. They have prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to give adequate representation to the first petitioner on the body constituted, as indicated in the reply given to a question in the Lok Sabha on the 7th April, 1988, for the purpose of negotiating wages and other terms and conditions of service of port and dock workers employed in the major ports of India. They have also prayed for a writ directing the first respondent to refer for adjudication u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the demands covered by the strike notice dated the 25th May, 1981 given by the first petitioner and referred to in the letter dated 4th November, 1981 and the demands covered by strike notice dated the 1st March, 1984 as contained in the charter of demands dated 13th December, 1983 issued by the first petitioner and referred to in Failure Report dated 16th March, 1984. 7. Pending the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988, the first respondent by its order dated the 7th June, 1988 declined to refer the dispute, which was the subject matter of the order dated the 29th January, 1986 passed in Writ Petition No. 189 of 1982, for adjudication. This led to the filing of the second petition being Writ Petition No. 2861 of 1988. 8. Shri Deshmukh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that though the first petitioner Federation was formed in 1978 after it had split from the third respondent, it enjoyed the third highest membership of employees between it and the third to the sixth respondents. It has thus a higher following than the fifth and the sixth respondents. Shri Deshmukh was very sore over the attitude of the first respondent in ignoring the first petitioner in the matter of negotiating settlements. The first petitioner was denied equality and was discriminated via-a-vis the third to sixth respondents for no valid reason. The first respondent as a good Government was expected act fairly and justly. Shri Deshmukh was very sore over the attitude of the first respondent in ignoring the first petitioner in the matter of negotiating settlements. The first petitioner was denied equality and was discriminated via-a-vis the third to sixth respondents for no valid reason. The first respondent as a good Government was expected act fairly and justly. According to him, the version of the first respondent that the petitioner was a split federation of the third respondent and was, therefore, justified in negotiating only with the third to sixth respondents on the ground that they collectively represent the largest number of workers, is nothing short of throwing dust in the eyes only for clouding the issue. The first petitioner is the third largest federation and was entitled to represent on behalf of the workers. He, therefore, prayed that an appropriate writ and/or directions be issued requiring the first respondent to permit the first petitioner to represent for negotiating settlements on behalf of the workers. 9. Shri Deshmukh further submitted that the grounds contained in the order of the first respondent dated 7th June, 1988 refusing to refer the dispute raised by the first petitioner in its notice of strike dated 28th May, 1991 were wholly unjustified. According to him, what the first respondent had done was to enter into the merits of the demand raised by the first petitioner while refusing to refer them for adjudication which was not the function of the first respondent but was the function of the Industrial Tribunal in the matter of adjudicating upon them. In regard to the decision of the first respondent dated the 15th September, 1984 refusing to refer the dispute, it suffered from the same vice as the decision, which was set aside in Writ Petition No. 189 to 1982. He submitted that having regard to the order of rejection dated 7th June, 1988 which was passed consequent upon the order passed in Writ Petition No. 189 of 1982 no useful purpose would be served in remanding the matter of rejection dated 15th September, 1984 to the first respondent. According to him, this is a fit case where appropriate orders should be passed referring the disputes contained in both the aforesaid cases to the Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication. 10. Shri Deshmukh relied upon the case of State of Bombay Vs. According to him, this is a fit case where appropriate orders should be passed referring the disputes contained in both the aforesaid cases to the Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication. 10. Shri Deshmukh relied upon the case of State of Bombay Vs. K.P. Krishnan and Others, wherein it was observed that, the order passed by the Government u/s 12(5) may be an administrative order and the reasons recorded by it may not be justiciable in the sense that their propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character may not be open by judicial scrutiny; in that sense it would be correct to say that the court hearing a petition for mandamus is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Government; nevertheless if the court is satisfied that the reasons given by the Government for refusing to make a reference are extraneous and not germane, then the court can issue, and would be justified in issuing a writ of mandamus even in respect of such an administrative order. 11. A reference was also made to the case of Bombay Union of Journalists and Others Vs. The State of Bombay and Another, wherein it was observed (pp 354-356) : "When the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether a reference should be made under S. 12(5) it has to act under S. 10(1) of the Act. and S. 10(1) confers discretion on the appropriate Government either to refer the dispute, or not to refer it, for industrial adjudication according as it is of the opinion that it is expedient to do so or not. In other words, in dealing with an industrial dispute in respect of which a failure report has been submitted under S. 12(4), the appropriate Government ultimately exercises its power under S. 10(1), subject to this that S. 12(5) imposes an obligation on it to record reasons for not making the reference when the dispute has gone through conciliation and a failure report has been made under S. 12(4)... It is true that if the dispute in question raises questions of law, the appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said questions of law, because that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded 'from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5) or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. Likewise, if the impact of the claim on the general relations between the employer and the employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take that into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not. It must, therefore, be held that a prima facie examination of the merits cannot be said to be foreign to the enquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with a dispute under S. 10(1)... In entertaining an application for a writ of mandamus against an order made by the appropriate Government under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5), the Court is not sitting in appeal over the order and is into entitled to consider the propriety or the satisfactory character of the reasons given by the said Government. It would be idle to suggest that in giving reasons to a party for refusing to make a reference under S. 12(5), the appropriate Government has to writ an elaborate order indicating exhaustively all the reasons that weighed in its mind in refusing to make a reference. It is no doubt desirable that the party concerned should be told clearly and precisely the reasons why no reference is made, because the object of S. 12(5) appears to be to require the appropriate Government to state its reasons for refusing to make a reference, so that the reasons should stand public scrutiny; but that does not mean that a party challenging the validity of the Government's decision not to make reference can require the Court in writ proceedings to examine the propriety or correctness of the said reasons. If it appears that the reasons given show that the appropriate Government took into account a consideration which was irrelevant or foreign, that no doubt, may justify the claim for a writ of mandamus. But the argument that of the pleas raised by the retrenched workman, two have been considered and not the third, would not necessarily entitle the party to claim a writ under Art. 226". 12. Further reliance was placed on the case of M/s Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa reported in 1975 II LLJ 418, wherein it was observed (p. 428) : "The Executive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bonafide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts." 13. Further reliance was placed on the case of M.P. Irrigation Karmachari Sangh v. State of M.P. reported in 1985 I LLJ 519 wherein it was observed (pp 522-523) : "While conceding a very limited jurisdiction to the State Government to examine patent frivolousness of the demands, it is to be understood as a rule, that adjudication of demands made by workmen should be left to the Tribunal to decide. S. 10 permits appropriate Government to determine whether dispute 'exists or is apprehended' and then refer it for adjudication on merits. The demarcated functions are (1) reference; (2) adjudication. S. 10 permits appropriate Government to determine whether dispute 'exists or is apprehended' and then refer it for adjudication on merits. The demarcated functions are (1) reference; (2) adjudication. When a reference is rejected on the specious plea that the Government cannot bear the additional burden, it constitutes adjudication and thereby usurpation of the power of a quasi-judicial Tribunal by an administrative authority namely the Appropriate Government. There may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demands, come to a conclusion that the demands either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to decline reference and Courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts' to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of valid disputes. To allow the Government to do so would be to render S. 10 and S. 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act nugatory". 14. Shri Deshmukh finally relied on the case of V. Veerarajan and others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, wherein on facts similar to the facts arising in the present case, it was held that : "Where in an appeal against rejection by the State Government to make a reference, the Supreme Court after finding that the grounds as given by the State Government were not germane instead of directing to make a reference, sent back the matter to the State Government to give an opportunity to it of giving other valid reasons, in support of its order, and the State Government against supported its order of rejection of reference on grounds which were not germane or relevant for the purpose of such decision, it was held that the Supreme Court could direct the State Government to refer the dispute for adjudication by the Labour Court". Shri Deshmukh thus submitted that this was a fit case where an appropriate writ should be issued referring the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal for their adjudication. 15. Shri Mehta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, the Union of India submitted that the petitioners have no fundamental right to represent in conciliation proceedings. Shri Deshmukh thus submitted that this was a fit case where an appropriate writ should be issued referring the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal for their adjudication. 15. Shri Mehta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, the Union of India submitted that the petitioners have no fundamental right to represent in conciliation proceedings. According to him the fundamental right to form Association or Union conferred by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution does not carry with it a necessary concomitant right to have such Association or Union recognised by the concerned authorities viz. the employers in the case of Labour Unions. He placed reliance on the case of All India Bank Employees' Association. The National Industrial Tribunal reported in 1964 II LLJ 385 wherein their Lordships had an occasion to consider the content and scope of the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. It was held that even a very liberal interpretation of the conclusion that the fundamental right to form unions carries with it a concomitant guarantee that the trade unions so formed shall be enabled to carry out effective collective bargaining or shall achieve the purpose for which they were brought into existence. 16. Shri Mehta further relied upon a decision in the case of M. A. David v. Kerala State Electricity Board decided by the Kerala High Court and reported in 1972 I LLJ. 44 Wherein it was held (p. 48) : "The legal position being thus well-settled that Art. 19(1)(c) does not confer on a trade union a right to claim the grant of recognition by the employer, it is not possible to accept the petitioner's contention that the demad of recognition to it by the Board constitutes a violation of the petitioner's fundamental right under the said Article of the Constitution. There being no other statutory provision in force in this State which confers on every trade union, irrespective of the state of its membership, a right to be recognised by the employer, or imposes a corresponding obligation on the employer to grant such recognition to all trade unions, it must be held that the petitioner union has no legal or enforceable right for the grant of recognition to it". Shri Mehta submitted that the first respondent had recognised the third to the sixth respondents for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of service of the workers. Shri Mehta submitted that the first respondent had recognised the third to the sixth respondents for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of service of the workers. The first petitioner was a split Federation from the third respondent which came to be formed much later i.e. in the year 1978. The negotiations which have been carried on between the petitioners and the third to the sixth respondents have been found to be satisfactory. If representation as claimed by the first petitioner is permitted it would lay down a bad precedent and this would enable various other Federations and Unions to make a similar claim. This would render the negotiating machinery cumbersome and unworkable. In any event, since the first petitioner has no fundamental right to represent, no writ can be claimed in the present petitions. 17. Shri Damania, the learned Counsel appearing for the third to the sixth respondents also resisted the grant of the prayers contained in the petition by contending that the demands which were sought to be referred for adjudication were pre-1981 and 1984 demands. According to him, even if these demands are referred for adjudication, awards would be passed in terms of the settlement arrived at with the third to sixth respondents. Hence, no useful purpose is likely to be served. He placed reliance on the case of Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen reported in (AIR) 1977 S.C. wherein it was held : "When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union, which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour. This would be the normal rule. There may be exceptional cases where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But in the absence of such allegations a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration". He further placed reliance on the case of New Standard Engineering Company Ltd. Vs. N.L. Abhyankar and Others, wherein observations contained in the case of Herbertsons Ltd (supra) were reiterated. He further relied upon the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited Vs. He further placed reliance on the case of New Standard Engineering Company Ltd. Vs. N.L. Abhyankar and Others, wherein observations contained in the case of Herbertsons Ltd (supra) were reiterated. He further relied upon the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited Vs. Their Workmen, wherein it was held (p 431) : "A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scale and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play where an industrial dispute is under adjudication... If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of workmen with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be fair and just and not liable to be ignored while deciding the reference merely because a small number of workers were not parties to it or refused to accept it or because the Tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emoluments than they themselves thought they did". Shri Damania contended that no case has been made out for interference in the present writ jurisdiction. 18. Shri Kapadia, the learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent in Writ Petition No. 2861 of 1988, submitted that the prayers of the petitioners to refer the demands raised on the 13th December 1983 are now stale and no useful purpose would be served by referring the same for adjudication as a settlement has been arrived at the behest of the third to sixth respondents, on the 11th April, 1984. When a strike had been called on the 16th of March 1983 at the instance of the third to sixth respondents, the workers affiliated to the petitioners had also joined the strike. After the settlement dated the 11th April 1984 had been arrived at, all the workers including those affiliated to the petitioners also resumed duties and took benefits of the said settlements. According to him, the present petition suffer from the vice of latches and do not warrant interference in the present writ jurisdiction. 19. After the settlement dated the 11th April 1984 had been arrived at, all the workers including those affiliated to the petitioners also resumed duties and took benefits of the said settlements. According to him, the present petition suffer from the vice of latches and do not warrant interference in the present writ jurisdiction. 19. Having heard the rival contentions of the contending parties, in my view, the first respondent Union of India is not justified in refusing to recognise the first petitioner in the matter of negotiating the terms and conditions of service of the port and dock workers employed in the major ports of India. In my view, the grounds set up by the first respondent that the third to the sixth respondents collectively represent the largest number of workers is nothing but an eye wash. It is conceded on behalf of the first respondent that the first petitioner enjoys the third largest membership from amongst the first petitioner and the third to sixth respondents. It thus commands larger following than the fifth and sixth respondents. Merely because it is a split Federation from the third respondent or merely because it has come into existence at a later stage i.e. in the year 1978 can be no justification to deny the first petitioner a right which on account of large following is due to it. It may be that the right to represent may not be justified as a fundamental right emanating from Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. However, the first respondent is expected to act justly and fairly and if it has to deny the first petitioner a right to represent and if it has to discriminate the first petitioners vis-a-vis the third to sixth respondents, there has to be cogent reasons for doing so. That the third to sixth respondents collectively represent he largest number of workers is nothing but an itsi bitsi of the matter. If the first petitioner were to be permitted to represent along with the third to sixth respondents, they would collectively represent even a larger number of workers. I am thus of the view, that the action of the first respondent in ignoring the first petitioner and refusing to permit it on the negotiating table is against law and justice and the same cannot be sustained. I am thus of the view, that the action of the first respondent in ignoring the first petitioner and refusing to permit it on the negotiating table is against law and justice and the same cannot be sustained. The petitioners would thus be entitled to the reliefs claimed in terms of prayer clauses (a), (b), and (c) of the first petition being Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988. 20. In regard to the further prayers contained in the first petition, viz. to direct a reference to the disputes contained in the demand dated the 13th December, 1983 it is true that the reasons which have commended upon the first respondent while arriving at its decision dated the 15th September 1984 declining to make a reference are the same which were contained in the impugned decision which were set aside in Writ Petition No. 189 of 1982. It has, however, to be observed that in the strike which was held at the instance of the third to the sixth respondents on the 16th March 1984, the members affiliated to the petitioners' Unions also joined. After a settlement had been arrived at between the first respondent on the one side and the third to sixth respondents on the other, the strike was called off by the workers not only of the third to sixth respondents but also by workers having allegiance to the petitioners. All the workers having allegiance to the petitioners duly received the benefits under the settlements arrived at on the 11th April 1984. No steps were taken by the petitioners till the 19th April 1988 when the present Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988 was filed. In my view, the present petition has been motivated on account of the refusal of the respondent No. 1 to permit first petitioner on the negotiating table. When this was made clear in reply to question in the Lok Sabha on the 7th April 1988, the present petition was filed. In my view, the present petition is so far as it seeks to challenge the refusal to refer, which was taken as far back as in 1984 is hopelessly belated and no relief in regard thereto can be granted as the petition for the same suffers from the vice of latches. 21. In my view, the present petition is so far as it seeks to challenge the refusal to refer, which was taken as far back as in 1984 is hopelessly belated and no relief in regard thereto can be granted as the petition for the same suffers from the vice of latches. 21. In regard to the refusal to refer, contained in the decision of the first respondent dated the 7th June, 1988, which is the subject matter of the challenge in the second petition being Writ Petition No. 2861 of 1988, it is true, as contended by Shri Deshmukh, that the Aforesaid order dated 7th June 1988 does enter into the merits of the claim made in respect of the various demands which is not the function of the first respondent exercising jurisdiction u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Shri Deshmukh, to a certain extent, is justified in his criticism that the first respondent has encroached upon the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in the matter of adjudicating upon the demands. However, having regard to the fact that the demands contained in the impugned order relate to a period of the year prior to 1981 and having regard to further fact that over two to three settlements have been arrived at, may be at the behest of the third to the sixth respondents, all the workers having allegiance to the petitioners' Unions have received the benefits under the said settlement, I am inclined not to exercise my writ jurisdiction to direct a reference for the adjudication of he said demands which can now be termed as stale demands. The second writ petition viz. Writ Petition No. 2861 of 1988, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 22. In the result, the first petition viz. The second writ petition viz. Writ Petition No. 2861 of 1988, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 22. In the result, the first petition viz. Writ Petition No. 1194 of 1988 is partly allowed and the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a), (b) and (c) and I pass the order in the following terms :- (a) the first respondent do give adequate representation to the first petitioner on the body constituted as indicated in the reply given to a question in the Lok Sabha on 7th April, 1988 for the purpose of negotiating wages and other terms and conditions of service of port and dock workers employed in the major ports of India : (b) the first and the second respondents and the members of the second respondents do give adequate representation to the first petitioner or any body that may be constituted with representatives of Federations of unions functioning in the major posts of India on it, for the purpose of negotiating, settling or determining any terms and conditions of service of port and dock workers employed in the major ports of India. (c) the first and second respondents and members of the second respondents do hold negotiations for settlement and/or determination of the terms and conditions of service or port and dock workers with first petitioner whenever the same concerns the members of the first petitioner and whenever such negotiations are held with the third to sixth respondents or any of them. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.