A. P. RAVANI, J. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a holder of license issued under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act 1955 and under the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licence Control and Stock Declaration) Order 1981 (for short Control Order ). The petitioner is dealing in essential commodity namely kerosene at Dabhoi District Baroda. It was alleged that the petitioner had issued a faked bill in the name of one Gitaben Upadhyay of village Ghandod Dabhoi Taluka showing that 3500 liters of kerosene was sold to her that the signature of the customer on the bill issued was also faked. The stock of kerosene was illegally disposed of elsewhere and correct accounts of the receipt and distribution of kerosene were not maintained as required under the relevant provisions of the Control Order. The detaining authority after going through the material placed before it came to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed breach of the provisions of the conditions of licence issued in his favor and had also committed breach of certain provisions of the Control Order. The detaining authority came to the conclusion that the contravention alleged against the petitioner was punishable under the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 However in the opinion of the detaining authority criminal prosecution would be inadequate to prevent the petitioner from indulging in the activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. passed order dated 7/12/1988 directing to preventively detain the petitioner. The order has been passed under the provisions of Sec. 3 (1) of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980 (hereinafter referred to 88 the Act ). The order has been executed on 8/12/1988 The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the order by filing this petition. ( 2 ) AS provided under the Act the maximum period of detention for which a person can be preventively detained in custody is six months. Ordinarily the period of detention would have come to an end by now. Therefore we called upon the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-authorities to show as to whether the petitioner was finally released on expire of the period of detention. Ordinarily the period of detention would have come to an end by now. Therefore we called upon the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-authorities to show as to whether the petitioner was finally released on expire of the period of detention. After referring to the relevant files the learned Counsel for the respondents has stated that the petitioner was frequently released temporarily for a total period of 104 days) under the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act. The details of the application and the period for which he has been released from time to time are as follows: @@@ S. No. Date of Date of Period for which temporary application release release has been ordered. - 1 21 23 10 days 2 28 1 15 days (temp. release extended) 3 10 10 10 days - do - 4 23 25 7 days (temp. release extended) 5 8 10 10 days 6 24 7 7 days 7 10 10 10 days 8 21 21 15 days 9 8 9 20 days -- Total 104 days @@@ ( 3 ) IN view of the aforesaid factual position learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the State Government of Gujarat has exercised the powers of detention. This very authority has within a period of Fifteen days from the date of detention (i. e. on 21/12/1988 as indicated hereinabove) temporarily released the petitioner for a period of 10 days. This period of temporary release has been extended from time to time upto 31/01/1989 Thereafter the petitioner has been temporarily released frequently and the last order of temporary release is dated 8/06/1989 which is for the period ending on 27/06/1989 In view of this factual background it is submitted that the intial satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority as regards the inadequacy of criminal prosecution and the apprehension that the petitioner if released on bail by the Criminal Court will continue the same or similar type of prejudicial activity was not genuine. Therefor it is submitted that the initial satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority being not genuine the petitioner should be ordered to be released forthwith. Alternatively it is submitted that the power of preventive detention exercised by the State Government of Gujarat is not exercised for the purpose for which the same has been conferred upon it. Therefor it is submitted that the initial satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority being not genuine the petitioner should be ordered to be released forthwith. Alternatively it is submitted that the power of preventive detention exercised by the State Government of Gujarat is not exercised for the purpose for which the same has been conferred upon it. The power of preventive detention is exercised for ulterier purpose that is not with a view to preventively detain the petitioner from indulging in the alleged prejudicial activity but the same appears to have been exercised as a punitive measure. Otherwise the State Government itself would not have exercised the power of temporary release frequently which in the facts of the case virtually amounts to granting bail for pretty long time. Thus in view of the subsequent actions of the detaining authority (that i. e. the State Government of Gujarat) it is submitted that the initial order of detention itself is bad and the petitioner should be ordered to be released forthwith. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid submissions may be available to the detenu in a given case. But in all cases simply because subsequent actions of the detaining authority (or that of the appropriate Government in case where the detaining authority is other than the appropriate Government) cannot justify the inference that the initial satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority that it was necessary to preventively detain the detenu was bad or that the power of preventive detention has been exercised with ulterior motives. It may be that the subsequent exercise of power of temporary release may be unlawful or illegal or may be for extraneous purposes. From such subsequent actions it would be hazards to infer in all cases that the initial exercise of power itself vas bad. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case the petitioner has been released temporarily for B period of about 104 days. Atleast on nine occasions the State Government of Gujarat has exercised this power under Sec. 15 of the Act. In his submission this exercise of power under Sec. 15 of the Act is not consistent with the object of preventive detention and hence it has been exercised for extraneous purpose. Therefore the exercise of power is illegal. This contention is required to be examined in details. In his submission this exercise of power under Sec. 15 of the Act is not consistent with the object of preventive detention and hence it has been exercised for extraneous purpose. Therefore the exercise of power is illegal. This contention is required to be examined in details. Thereafter even if we come to the conclusion that the exercise of power is illegal as contended by the learned Colossal for the petitioner the question will arise as to what is its effect on the initial satisfaction regarding necessity to preventively detain the petitioner-detenu. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid submission is required to be considered in the light of the provisions of the Act. The object of the Act is to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of prevention of black-Marketing and maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community and for matters connected therewith. Preventive detention as against punitive detention is in addition to the measures which can be taken under the ordinary criminal law. Measures for preventive detention are not in substitution of punitive measures or to put it differently statutes providing for preventive detention are not to serve as a substitution to the statutes providing for punitive detention in ordinary criminal law. Only when the legislature considers that the ordinary criminal law operating in the field of punitive jurisdiction is inadequate to curb certain anti-social activities and that actions may be necessary to prevent such anti-social activities laws relating to preventive detention may be enacted. This can be for the reasons connected with: (1) security of the State; (2) maintenance of public order; (3) maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community;see Entry No. 3 of List III Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India ). The very enactment of a statute providing for preventive detention postulates that there is a need for immediate action so as to curb the liberty of a person without trial and see that such person does not remain free and indulge in undesirable activities. prejudicial to (1) the security of the State; (2) maintenance of public order; and (3) maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. prejudicial to (1) the security of the State; (2) maintenance of public order; and (3) maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Since preventive detention robes a person of his liberty without trial the statutes relating to preventive detention are required to be interpreted in such a manner that the constitutional and other statutory safeguards provided is this behalf are not infracted in any manner whatsoever. The overall object of the statute is to see that persons whose activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community are preventively detained and they are put in such a position that they are not in a position to carry on their activities for specified period and that their links with such other anti-social elements are snapped. This being one of the main object of the statute relating to preventive detention and particularly that of the Act the provisions contained in Sec. 15 of the Act relating to temporary release are required to be interpreted by Keeping in mind this object of the statute. ( 7 ) IT is not necessary to refer to all the provisions of the Act. Section 13 of the Act provides for maximum period of detention which shall be six months from the date of detention. Section 14 of the Act provides for revocation of the order of detention at any time. Section 15 of the Act provides for temporary release of persons detained relevant part of which is reproduced hereinbelow:sec. 15. Temporary release of persons detained: (1) The appropriate Government may at any time direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in the directions as that person accepts and may at any time cancel his release. (2) In directing the release of any person under sub-sec. (1) the appropriate Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the duo observance of the conditions specified in the direction (3 ). . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . (5 ). . . . . . The power of temporary release has been conferred upon the appropriate Government. (1) the appropriate Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the duo observance of the conditions specified in the direction (3 ). . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . (5 ). . . . . . The power of temporary release has been conferred upon the appropriate Government. Therefore it can be the State Government or the Central Government depending upon the fact as to who has passed the order of detention. Such order of release would be temporary release for a specified period which may be without condition or upon such conditions which may be specified in the direction releasing the person who should accept the same. After temporary release the order of temporary release may be canceled at any time. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 provides that the appropriate Government may require a person to enter into a bond with or without sureties for due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. ( 8 ) THE phrase specified period occurring in Sec. 15 of the Act assumes importance as far as the point raised in this petition in concerned. Section 13 of the Act provides that the maximum period of detention would be six months from the date of detention. The phrase specified period has not been defined in the Act. Hence can it be argued and can it be interpreted to mean that the specified period means any thing and its length may even be beyond the period of six months ? If commonsense and reason are guide to interpretation of any provisions of the statute (and in our opinion these are the surest guides to interpret the provisions of statutes correctly) to assume that the authority concerned has power to release a person frequently from time to time which may run into months together would be absurd. If any authority conferred with power to release temporarily under Sec. 15 of the Act arrogates to itself this power to mean that the phrase specified period can be of any length of time then the very object of the Act and the actions taken thereunder would be frustrated. If any authority conferred with power to release temporarily under Sec. 15 of the Act arrogates to itself this power to mean that the phrase specified period can be of any length of time then the very object of the Act and the actions taken thereunder would be frustrated. ( 9 ) EXERCISE of powers under Sec. 15 of the Act in such fashion i. e. frequent orders of temporary release and the specified period to run for months together or with short interval of few days in between would be in conflict with exercise of powers under Sec. 3 of the Act. This is so because while exercising powers under Sec. 3 of the Act the detaining authority has to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that a person is required to be detained in custody for a specified period which may range upto six months. The detaining authority has to satisfy itself that it is necessary to detain such person preventively. The term necessary implies that it is urgently necessary to do so. If the powers under Sec. 15 of the Act for temporary release are considered to moan that a person detained pursuant to the orders passed under Sec. 3 of the Act can be temporarily released for any number of days or months would mean that the order passed under Sec. 3 of the Act can be nullified by exercising power under Sec. 15 of the Act. Therefore one of the basic rules of interpretation of statutes that the different provisions of the statutes should be interpreted harmoniously suggests that this specified period has got to be short i. e. it can run into number of days only and not into number of weeks apart from the question of running into number of months. This reasonable limit has got to be necessarily implied in the powers conferred by Sec. 15 of the Act. If the specified period is to exceed the limit of seven or ten days or at the most fifteen days in the entire period of detention it would be in conflict with the powers conferred under Sec 3 of the Act. The interpretation which results into conflict between the two provisions of the same statute has got to be avoided. If the specified period is to exceed the limit of seven or ten days or at the most fifteen days in the entire period of detention it would be in conflict with the powers conferred under Sec 3 of the Act. The interpretation which results into conflict between the two provisions of the same statute has got to be avoided. Therefore unless reasonable limitations are read in the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act and unless it is interpreted that specified period in all does not extend beyond seven or ten days or at the most fifteen days both the provision cannot stand together ( 10 ) THE aforesaid conclusion may be examined from the point of view of the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act provides for revocation of detention order. After the order of detention is passed and after the person is detained if the appropriate Government is of the opinion that a person is required to be frequently released temporarily by exercising powers under Sec. 15 of the Act it would not be proper for it to exercise this power (i. e. under Sec. 15 of the Act) so as to nullify the order passed under Sec. 3 of the Act. The proper course for it would be to resort to the powers under Sec. 14 of the Act. Under this provision the order of detention can very well be revoked. The Supreme Court has in the case of Olia Mallick v. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 1816 held that there should be a periodical review of the detention of the person concerned If the appropriate Government feels that the detenu is required to be temporarily released frequently then as held by the Supreme Court it would be proper for the appropriate Government to review such cases. While reviewing such cases it can exercise its power under Sec. 14 of the Act and revoke the order of detention itself. It may be noted that it would be well within the powers of the appropriate Government to revoke the order of detention if the appropriate Government feels that the initial order of detention was unjustified or that the subsequent development and the circumstances are such that the petitioner should no longer be detained in custody and the order of detention may be revoked while making periodical review. In view of the fact that there is power of revocation of the order of detention the frequent release of the dentenu by exercising power under Sec. 15 of the Act is not called for. Such exercise of power can certainly be not called just and reasonable. By necessary implication powers under Sec. 15 of the Act are not meant for frequent exercise of the same. ( 11 ) WE are fortified by a decision of the Supreme Court in the view which we are taking. In the case of State of Bihar v. Rambalak Singh AIR 1966 SC 1441 the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that it is essential to determine the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and its proper exercise. Improper exercise of jurisdiction in such matters must necessarily be avoided by the Court in dealing with applications of this character that is application of bail in cases of preventive detentions. It was a case of releasing the person on bail who was preventively detained under the provisions of Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. It would be proper to reproduce the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in para 11 of the judgment:it is no doubt true that a detenu is detained without a trial; and so the courts would inevitably be anxious to protect the individual liberty of the citizen on grounds which are justiciable and within the limits of their jurisdiction. but in upholding the claim for individual liberty within the limits permitted by law it would be unwise to ignore the object which the orders of detention are intended to serve An unwise decision granting bail to a party may lead to consequences which are prejudicial to the interests of the community at large; and that is a factor which must be duly weighed by the High Court before it deludes to grant bail to a detenu in such proceedings We are flee to confess that we have not come across cases where bail has been granted in habeas corpus precedence directed against orders of detention under Rule 30 of the Rules and we apprehend that the reluctance of the Courts to pass orders of bail In such proceedings is obviously based on the fact that they are fully conscious of the difficulties - legal and Constitutional and of the other risks involved in making such orders. Attempts are always made by the Courts to deal with such applications expeditiously; and in actual practice it would be very difficult to come across a case where without a full inquiry and trial of the grounds on which the order of detention is challenged by the detenu. it would be reasonably possible or permissible to the court to grant bail on prima facie Conclusion reached by it at an earlier stage of the proceedings. If an order of bail is made by the Court without a full trial of the issues involved merely on prima facie opinion formed by the High Court the said order would be open to the challenge that It is the result of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is essential to bear in mind the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and its proper exercise. improper exercise of jurisdiction in such matters must necessarily be avoided by the Courts in dealing with Applications of this character. The aforesaid observations have been approvingly reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Stare of U. P. v. Jairam and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 942 . Therefore the settled legal position is that even though the appropriate Government may have power to temporarily release the detenu this power cannot be exercised so as to nullify the very order of detention and the object of detention itself. The observations made by the Supreme Court as regards the powers of the High Court are applicable with greater force to the executive authorities also. ( 12 ) THUS the purpose of conferring power under Sec. 15 of the Act on the appropriate Government is to see that in grave and emergent situation no untoward incident may happen on account of the detenu being in custody. This provision provides a safety valve so as to avoid untoward incidents. This power does not provide to make it convenient for the detenu to be at large under the excuse that some of his family members are allegedly sick and he is required to look after him. It should not be forgotten that even if the detenu himself may be sick necessary treatment can be provided when he is in custody. This power does not provide to make it convenient for the detenu to be at large under the excuse that some of his family members are allegedly sick and he is required to look after him. It should not be forgotten that even if the detenu himself may be sick necessary treatment can be provided when he is in custody. Sickness of the detenu or the sickness of some of his family members evidenced by a medical certificate which would be available almost for asking should ordinarily not be treated as sufficient ground to elevate the same to the level of grave and emergent situation. This is so because the very purpose of the order of detention is to see that the person under detention is prevented from moving and acting as a free agent during the period of detention. ( 13 ) IN this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M. L. Wadhavan reported in AIR 1987 SC 1748 . In para 31 of the judgment the Supreme Court has inter alia observed as under:the objective underlying preventive detention cannot be achieved or fulfilled if the detenu is granted parsole and brought out of detention. Even if any conditions are imposed with a view to restrict the movements of the detenu while on parole the observance of those conditions can never lead to an equation of the parlor of parole with the period of detonation. One need not look far Ass to see the reason because the observance of the conditions of parole wherever imposed such as reporting daily or periodically before a designated authority residing in a particular town as city traveling within prescribed limits alone and not going beyond etc. will not prevent the detenu from moving and acting as a free agent during the rest of the time or within the circumscribed limits of travel and having full scope and opportunity to meet people of his choice and have dealings with them to correspond with one and all to have easy and effective Communication with whomsoever he likes through telephone telex etc. Due to the spectacles achievements in modern communication system a detenu while on parole can sit in a room in a house or hotel and have contacts with all his relations friends and confederates in any part of the country or even any part of the world and thereby pursue his unlawful activities if so inclined. The aforesaid observations are required to be kept in mind by the authority exercising powers under Sec. 15 of the Act while directing that the detenu be released temporarily. As observed by the Supreme Court such temporary release even with stringent conditions is likely to frustrate the very object of the order of detention. For the aforesaid Reasons we are of the opinion that the power of temporary release under Sec. 15 of the Act cannot be exercised frequently so as to run into conflict with the exercise of powers under Sec. 3 of the Act. If exercised frequently say more than once or twice. it may frustrate the very purpose of the order of detention. Hence such power at the most in grave and emergent situations may be exercised for specified period i. et not beyond fifteen days in all when the total period of detention is of six months. Moreover during the entire period of detention it may be exercised once or Twice at the most twice. These are the inherent limitations on the power conferred on the Authority concerned. ( 14 ) IT needs to be noted that in almost all cases the powers under Sec. 15 of the Act are exercised when petitions for habeas corpus ale pending before the High Court. When a petition challenging the legality and validity of the order of detention is pending before the High Court it would be proper that the powers under Sec. 15 of the Act are not exercised by the appropriate Government. In case the appropriate Government thinks it necessary to exercise these powers it would be proper that either before the exercise of powers or immediately after the exercise of powers this fact is brought to the notice of the High Court. The High Court should be appraised of the fact that during the pendency of the habeas corpus petition challenging the legality and validity of the order of detention the detenu has been temporarily released. The High Court should be appraised of the fact that during the pendency of the habeas corpus petition challenging the legality and validity of the order of detention the detenu has been temporarily released. Reasons for such temporary release should also normally be made available to the High Court. Even for a moment we do not want to suggest that when the petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending the appropriate Government cannot exercise its powers of temporarily releasing the detenu under Sec. 15 of the Act. All that we want to emphases is that to ensure Proper co-ordination between two different authorities - one exercising powers under the Act and another exercising constitutional power and examining the legality and validity of the order of detention - the authority whose action is under challenge before the High Court should keep the High Court informed about its intermittent decisions. This would ensure better co-ordination and proper regulation and implementation of the Act. ( 15 ) IT may also be noted that the Act is a Central Act. When an officer of the State Government or the State Government exercises power under the Act and issues order of detention it is required to make report of the fact of detention to the Central Government under the provisions of Sec. 3 (4) of the Act. We are told that then the State Government exercised powers under Sec. 15 of the Act to temporarily release the detenu no such report was made to the Central Government. In the scheme of the Act it is necessary that at the initial stage the State Government has to make report to the Central Government regarding the detention. In our opinion if the State Government has to resort to frequent exercise of powers under Sec. 15 of the Act it would be in fifteens of things that the Central Government be also kept appraised of this action of the State Government. Therefore to ensure proper co-ordination and proper regulation and implementation of the Act it would also be necessary that atleast when the powers of temporary release are exercised by the State Government for the second time and then onwards the Central Government should be appraised of this fact so that the Central Government also can exercise its supervisory jurisdiction properly. Therefore to ensure proper co-ordination and proper regulation and implementation of the Act it would also be necessary that atleast when the powers of temporary release are exercised by the State Government for the second time and then onwards the Central Government should be appraised of this fact so that the Central Government also can exercise its supervisory jurisdiction properly. The very purpose of the provisions of Sec. 3 (4) of the Act is to see that the Central Government can keep its eyes over the implementation of the Act by the State Government and its officers. Therefore if the power under Sec. 15 of the Act is to be Exercised frequently by the State Government as 8 necessary corollary atleast on the second occasion and on all subsequent occasions of the exercise of powers under Sec. 15 of the Act the Central Government be appraised of the fact about the temporary release of the detenu concerned. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case the power of temporary release has been exercised on flimsy ground that the wife of the petitioner-detenu was sick and was suffering from anxiety. Who does not suffer from anxiety when his or her near relative is detained either preventively or punitively ? This can be said to be no ground whatsoever for releasing 8 person preventively detained on temporary release. WE fail to understand how such a ground could have ever weighed with the authority on whom powers under Sec. 15 of the Act are conferred. This power is conferred with a duty to exercise the same reasonably and for the purpose for which the same is conferred. In the fact of the case we are of the opinion that the power of temporary release has out been exercised reasonably and for the purpose for which the same has been conferred upon the State Government. ( 17 ) IN view of our finding that the power of temporary release has been exercised unreasonably and not for the purpose for which the same is conferred the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the initial order of detention should be held to be illegal and void. We are not prepared to resort to this inverse logic. ( 17 ) IN view of our finding that the power of temporary release has been exercised unreasonably and not for the purpose for which the same is conferred the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the initial order of detention should be held to be illegal and void. We are not prepared to resort to this inverse logic. The legality and validity of the order of detention is required to be judged in the first instance on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority at the initial stage when he passed the order of detention. Subsequent actions lawful or unlawful may or may not justify the inference that the initial satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority regarding the necessity to put the person concerned in detention was not genuine. But in all cases as a proposition of law of universal application such principle cannot be laid down. In the Facts of this particular case we are not prepared to resort to this inverse logic. Hence on the basis of this contention the initial order of detention cannot be held to be illegal and void. ( 18 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case there in only one solitary incident of irregular sale of kerosene. This one solitary incident has been split up into four different activities of the petitioner-detenu. On examining the grounds of detention there is much force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-detenu. One single sale of 3500 liters of kerosene to one individual customer is the sole basis of order of detention. In the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner for such irregular sale criminal prosecution would have been sufficient. In his submission after launching criminal prosecution the authorities could have requested the Court to impose stringent conditions upon the petitioner detenu even if the Court was of the opinion that the petitioner-detenu could be released on bail. In his submission only on the basis of one solitary incident of irregular sale of kerosene the prognosis could not have been made that the petitioner will indulge in such activities in future also. We see much force in this submission. In his submission only on the basis of one solitary incident of irregular sale of kerosene the prognosis could not have been made that the petitioner will indulge in such activities in future also. We see much force in this submission. The contention is reinforced by the fact that even when the petitioner has been temporarily released immediately after his detention within a period of ten days the detaining authority itself has not thought it proper to impose conditions on the detenu to the effect that he shall not attend to his business. In the facts of the case it appears that the respondent authorities have overlooked the fact that preventive detention is not to be used as a substitute to punitive measures. The facts of the case eminently justified criminal prosecution On the basis of this solitary incident prognosis could not have been made that the petitioner detenu would indulge into same or similar type of activities in future and that he was required to be preventively detained with a view to restrain him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. Thus we are of the opinion that the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of one solitary incident of irregular sale of kerosene was not sufficient to warrant the prognosis that it was necessary to detain the petitioner-detenu preventively. Thus the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority in this behalf stands vitiated. ( 19 ) IN the result the order of detention dated 7/12/1988 passed against the petitioner under the provisions of Sec. 3 (1) of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980 produced at Annexure A to the petition is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule made absolute accordingly. (KMV) Rule made absolute. .